Statement for the Record
for the
Joint Economic Committee
Cyber Threat Trends and US Network Security
Lawrence K. Gershwin
National Intelligence Officer
for Science and Technology
June 21,2001
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement
on cyber threat and critical infrastructure issues. Late last year
the NIC published a report called Global Trends 2015 which
presented the results of a close collaboration between US Government
specialists and a wide range of experts outside the government, on
our best judgments of major drivers and trends that will shape the
world of 2015.
In 2015 we anticipate that the world will almost certainly experience
quantum leaps in information technology (IT) and in other areas
of science and technology. IT will be the major building block for
international commerce and for empowering nonstate actors. Most
experts agree that the IT revolution represents the most significant
global transformation since the Industrial Revolution beginning
in the mid-eighteenth century.
- The integration - or fusion - of continuing revolutions in
information technology, biotechnology, materials science, and
nanotechnology will generate dramatic increases in technology
investments, which will further stimulate innovation in the more
advanced countries.
The networked global economy will be driven by rapid and largely unrestricted
flows of information, ideas, cultural values, capital, goods and services,
and people: that is, globalization. This globalized economy will be
a net contributor to increased political stability in the world in
2015, although its reach and benefits will not be universal. In contrast
to the Industrial Revolution, the process of globalization will be
more compressed. Its evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic financial
volatility and a widening economic divide.
Cyber Threat Concerns
As the Director of Central Intelligence testified to the Congress
earlier this year, no country in the world rivals the US in its
reliance, dependence, and dominance of information systems. The
great advantage we derive from this also presents us with unique
vulnerabilities.
- Indeed, computer-based information operations could provide
our adversaries with an asymmetric response to US military superiority
by giving them the potential to degrade or circumvent our advantage
in conventional military power.
- Attacks on our military, economic, or telecommunications infrastructure
can be launched from anywhere in the world, and they can be used
to transport the problems of a distant conflict directly to America's
heartland.
Hostile cyber activity today is ballooning. The number of FBI computer
network intrusion cases has doubled during each of the past two years.
Information derived from the Internet indicates that since last September
the number of hacker defacements on the Web have increased over tenfold.
Meanwhile, several highly publicized intrusions and computer virus
incidents such as the recent intrusion into the California Independent
System Operator -- the non-profit corporation that controls the
distribution of 75 percent of the state's power -- have fed a public
-- and perhaps foreign government -- perception that the networks
upon which US national security and economic well-being depend are
vulnerable to attack by almost anyone with a computer, a modem,
and a modicum of skill. This impression, of course, overstates the
case.
US Networks as Targets
Information from industry security experts suggests that US national
information networks have become more vulnerable -- and therefore
more attractive as targets of foreign cyber attack. An independent
group of security professionals created the "Honeynet Project,"
placing virtual computers on the Internet to evaluate threats and
vulnerabilities that currently exist. The results were stunning:
the average computer placed on the Internet will be hacked in about
8 hours. University networks are even worse, with an unsecured computer
system being hacked in only about 45 minutes.
- The growing connectivity among secure and insecure networks
creates new opportunities for unauthorized intrusions into sensitive
or proprietary computer systems within critical US infrastructures,
such as the nation's telephone system.
- The complexity of computer networks is growing faster than
the ability to understand and protect them by identifying critical
nodes, verifying security, and monitoring activity.
- Firms are dedicating growing, but still insufficient, resources
to the defense of critical US infrastructures against foreign
cyber attack - perceived as a low likelihood threat compared to
routine disruptions such as accidental damage to telecommunications
lines.
Mainstream commercial software -- whose vulnerabilities are widely
known -- is replacing relatively secure propietary network systems
by US telecommunications providers and other operators of critical
infrastructure. Such commercial software includes imported products
that provide opportunities for foreign implantation of exploitation
or attack tools.
- US government and defense networks similarly are increasing
their reliance on commercial software.
Opportunities for foreign placement or recruitment of insiders have
become legion. As part of an unprecedented churning of the global
information technology work force, US firms are drawing on pools of
computer expertise that reside in a number of potential threat countries.
- Access to US proprietary networks by subcontractors of foreign
partners is creating "virtual" insiders whose identity and nationality
often remain unknown to US network operators.
- Foreign or US insiders were responsible for 71 percent of the
unauthorized entries into US corporate computer networks reported
to an FBI-sponsored survey last year.
- Despite growing interconnectivity, control networks -- whose
compromise could disrupt critical US infrastructures such as power
or transportation -- are designed to be less access from outside
networks, according to industry experts. In addition, many control
networks use unique, proprietary, or archaic programming languages
thought to be -- and clearly intended to be -- poorly understood
by hackers. Nonetheless, we remain concerned that increasing use
of the Internet by critical infrastructures and the US military
combined with increasing convergence to just a few software systems
could leave the US open to more damaging attacks.
Growing Foreign Capabilities
Advanced technologies and tools for computer network operations
are becoming more widely available, resulting in a basic, but operationally
significant, technical cyber capability for US adversaries.
Most US adversaries have access to the technology needed to pursue
computer network operations. Computers are almost globally available,
and Internet connectivity is both widespread and increasing. Both
the technology and access to the Internet are inexpensive, relative
to traditional weapons, and require no large industrial infrastructure.
- The tradecraft needed to employ technology and tools effectively
however - particularly against more difficult targets such as
classified networks or critical infrastructures - remains an important
limiting factor for many of our adversaries.
Hackers since the mid-1990s have shared increasingly sophisticated
and easy-to-use software on the Internet, providing tools that any
computer-literate adversary could obtain and use for computer network
reconnaissance, probing, penetration, exploitation, or attack. Moreover,
programming aids are making it possible to develop sophisticated tools
with only basic programming skills.
- Globally available tools are particularly effective against
the mechanisms of the Internet, but specialized tools would be
needed against more difficult targets, such as many of the networks
that control critical infrastructures.
Even with technology and tools, considerable tradecraft also is required
to penetrate network security perimeters and defeat intrusion detection
systems - particularly against defensive reactions by network security
administrators. Tradecraft also will determine how well an adversary
can achieve a targeted and reliable outcome, and how likely the perpetrator
is to remain anonymous. Attackers must tailor strategies to specific
target networks -- requiring advanced and continued reconnaissance
to characterize targets and ensure that exploitation tools remain
effective in the face of subtle changes to computer systems and networks.
- Cyber attacks against less well-defended networks still would
require prior identification of critical nodes and a preplanned
campaign, if the attacks were to achieve a strategic impact.
Potential Actors and Threats
Let me talk about some of the groups that will challenge us on
the cyber front.
Hackers
Although the most numerous and publicized cyber intrusions and
other incidents are ascribed to lone computer-hacking hobbyists,
such hackers pose a negligible threat of widespread, long-duration
damage to national-level infrastructures. The large majority of
hackers do not have the requisite tradecraft to threaten difficult
targets such as critical US networks -- and even fewer would have
a motive to do so.
Nevertheless, the large worldwide population of hackers poses
a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing
serious damage, including extensive property damage or loss of life.
As the hacker population grows, so does the likelihood of an exceptionally
skilled and malicious hacker attempting and succeeding in such an
attack.
- In addition, the huge worldwide volume of relatively less skilled
hacking activity raises the possibility of inadvertent disruption
of a critical infrastructure.
Hacktivists
A smaller foreign population of politically active hackers --
which includes individuals and groups with anti-US motives -- poses
a medium-level threat of carrying out an isolated but damaging attack.
Most international hacktivist groups appear bent on propaganda rather
than damage to critical infrastructures.
Pro-Beijing Chinese hackers over the past two years have conducted
mass cyber protests in response to events such as the 1999 NATO
bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade. Pro-Serbian hacktivists
attacked a NATO Website during Operation Allied Force. Similar hacktivism
accompanied the rise in Israeli-Palestinian clashes last year and
several thousand web page defacements and some successful denial-of-service
attacks were associated with the recent EP-3 incident.
Industrial Spies and Organized Crime Groups
International corporate spies and organized crime organizations
pose a medium-level threat to the United States through their ability
to conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft,
respectively, and through their ability to hire or develop hacker
talent.
- Japanese syndicates used Russian hackers to gain access to
law enforcement databases, evidently to monitor police investigations
of their operations and members, according to a press report last
year.
- According to press reports, a Mafia-led syndicate this year
used banking and telecommunications insiders to break into an
Italian bank's computer network. The syndicate diverted the equivalent
of $115 million in European Union aid, to Mafia-controlled bank
accounts overseas before Italian authorities detected the activity.
Foreign corporations also could use computer intrusions to tamper
with competitors' business proposals, in order to defeat competing
bids or unfairly position products in the marketplace.
- Computer network espionage or sabotage can affect US economic
competitiveness and result in technology transfer-directly through
product sales, or indirectly -- to US adversaries.
Because cyber criminals' central objectives are to steal, and to do
so with as little attention from law enforcement as possible, they
are not apt to undertake operations leading to high-profile network
disruptions, such as damage to US critical infrastructures.
- Major drug trafficking groups, however, could turn to computer
network attacks in an attempt to disrupt US law enforcement or
local government counternarcotics efforts.
- Organized crime groups with cyber capabilities conceivably
could threaten attacks against critical infrastructure for purposes
of extortion.
Moreover, rampant criminal access to critical financial databases
and networks could undermine the public trust essential to the commercial
health of US banking institutions and to the operation of the financial
infrastructure itself.
- In addition, criminal computer network exploitation could inadvertently
disrupt other infrastructures.
Terrorists
Traditional terrorist adversaries of the United States, despite
their intentions to damage US interests, are less developed in their
computer network capabilities and propensity to pursue cyber means
than are other types of adversaries. They are likely, therefore,
to pose only a limited cyber threat. In the near term, terrorists
are likely to stay focused on traditional attack methods -- bombs
still work better than bytes -- but we anticipate more substantial
cyber threats are possible in the future as a more technically competent
generation enters the ranks.
National Governments
National cyber warfare programs are unique in posing a threat
along the entire spectrum of objectives that might harm US interests.
These threats range from propaganda and low-level nuisance web page
defacements to espionage and serious disruption with loss of life,
to extensive infrastructure disruption. Among the array of cyber
threats, as we see them today, only government-sponsored programs
are developing capabilities with the future prospect of causing
widespread, long-duration damage to US critical infrastructures.
- The tradecraft needed to employ technology and tools effectively
remains an important limiting factor -- particularly against more
difficult targets such as classified networks or critical infrastructures.
For the next 5 to 10 years or so, only nation states appear to
have the discipline, commitment and resources to fully develop
capabilities to attack critical infrastructures.
Future Tools and Technology
New cyber tools and technologies are on the way for both the offense
and defense. For example, because networks -- and their vulnerabilities
-- are evolving so rapidly, new tools for network mapping, scanning,
and probing will become increasingly critical to both attackers
and defenders. Either side could apply research in autonomous software
"agents" -- intelligent, mobile, and self-replicating software intended
to roam a network gathering data or to reconnoiter other computer
network operations.
Incremental deployment of new or improved security tools will
help protect against both remote and to some extent inside threats.
Technologies include better intrusion detection systems, better
methods for correlating data from multiple defensive tools, automated
deployment of security patches, biometric user authentication, wider
use of encryption, and public key infrastructures to assure the
authenticity and integrity of e-mail, electronic documents, and
downloaded software. However, the defense will be at some disadvantage
until more fundamental changes are made to computer and network
architectures--changes for which improved security has equal billing
with increased functionality.
For attackers, viruses and worms are likely to become more controllable,
precise, and predictable -- making them more suitable for weaponization.
Advanced modeling and simulation technologies are likely to assist
in identifying critical nodes for an attack and conducting battle
damage assessments afterward.
- In addition, tools for distributed hacking or denial of service
-- the coordinated use of multiple, compromised computers or of
independent and mobile software agents -- will mature as network
connectivity and bandwidth increase.
The rapid pace of change in information technology suggests that the
appearance of new and unforeseen computer and network technologies
and tools could provide advantages in cyber warfare to either the
defender or the attacker. Wildcards for the years beyond 2005 include
the possibility of fundamental shifts in the nature of computers and
networking, driven, for example, by emerging optical technologies.
These changes could improve processing power, information storage,
and bandwidth enough to make possible application of advanced software
technologies -- such as artificial intelligence -- to cyber warfare.
- Such technologies could provide the defender with improved
capabilities for detecting and attributing subtle malicious activity,
or could enable computer networks to respond to attacks automatically.
- They could provide the attacker with planning aids to develop
an optimal strategy against a potential target and to more accurately
predict effects.
Implications
Despite the fundamental and global impact of the information revolution,
the reliance of critical US activities on computer networks, and
the attention being devoted to information operations, uncertainty
remains whether computer network operations will evolve into a decisive
military weapon for US adversaries.
- To a degree that we cannot estimate, emergency measures to
compensate for computer network disruptions will be available
to maintain some basic level of services -- as demonstrated during
the Y2K rollover. Adversaries, therefore, may never overcome the
planning uncertainties that derive from a US potential to work
around even severe degradations in network performance.
Nonetheless, a recent CIA report "Preserving National Security in
an Increasingly Borderless World" suggests that the information age
and advanced technology will embolden our adversaries to target what
they perceive as our vulnerabilities rather than to engage US forces
directly:
- Weapons of "mass effect," such as denial-of-service attacks,
are likely to proliferate in the coming decade.
- As the technology revolution accelerates, civilian technology
will increasingly drive military technology, and the civilian
sector will increasingly become the point of attack for enemies
of the United States.
Whether or not foreign computer network operations mature into a major
combat arm, however, they will offer an increasing number of adversaries
new options for exerting leverage over the United States -- including
selection of either nonlethal or lethal damage and the prospect of
anonymity.
- Adversaries will be able to use cyber attacks to attempt to
deny the United States its traditional continental sanctuary with
attacks on critical infrastructures. They could exploit US legal
and conceptual controversies relating to defending privately operated
networks with US Government resources and the separation of the
US domestic and foreign security establishments.
Adversaries also could use cyber attacks to attempt to slow or disrupt
the mobilization, deployment, combat operations, or resupply of US
military forces. Attacks on logistic and other defense networks would
be likely to exploit heightened network vulnerabilities during US
deployment operations--complicating US power projection in an era
of decreasing permanent US military presence abroad.
Whatever direction the cyberthreat takes, the United States will
be confronting an increasingly interconnected world in the years
ahead. As the CIA report points out, a major drawback of the global
diffusion of information technology is our heightened vulnerability.
Our "wired" society puts all of us -- US business, in particular,
because they must maintain an open exchange with customers -- at
higher risk from enemies. In general, IT'S spread and the growth
of worldwide digital networks mean that we are challenged to think
more broadly about national security. We should think in terms of
global security, to include the dawning reality that freedom and
prosperity in other parts of the world are inextricably bound to
US domestic interests.
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