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Subcommittee
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
November 19, 2003
10:00 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Mr. David B. Morrow
Managing Principal,Global Security and Privacy Services
EDS
1400 Crescent Green
Cary, NC, 27511
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on Cybersecurity and Consumer
Data: What's at Risk for the Consumer. My name is David Morrow,
and I am the deputy director for global security and privacy services
at EDS. I have over 25 years of experience in the information technology
("IT") field as a computer programmer and analyst, operations
chief, security officer, investigator, and consultant. Prior to
joining EDS, I was a security consultant with Ernst and Young,
LLP and Fiderus Strategic Security and Privacy Services, a small,
start-up consulting firm. I also spent 13 years of a 22-year Air
Force career as an investigator of computer crime for the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). When I retired in 1998,
I was the Chief of the Computer Crime Investigations and Information
Warfare Division for AFOSI. I am honored to join you today to present
EDS' views on the state of information technology security, two
years
after my last appearance before the Subcommittee.
In my testimony two years ago, I focused on the changes in our
way of life after the tragedy of September 11, and the need to
make investments to protect our information networks. I called
upon government and industry to increase their collaboration, to
focus not only on physical security but also information security,
and to view cyber security as an essential capital investment rather
than as an expense. I also noted a few ways that government can
help industry bear the burden to protect our information economy
and, therefore, our economic security. At the risk of repeating
myself, I do want to emphasize that all those comments still hold
true. Today, I will focus my comments on what has changed in the
last two years, what needs improvement, and once again where I
think both
industry and government can make greater efforts.
What has changed?
Thankfully, we have not seen another September 11. However, we
are still in a heightened threat environment. More recent attacks
on our information networks, such as the DNS root server attacks
in October 2002 and several high profile virus and worm attacks,
have not stopped us from relying on them to conduct business and
live our lives. In fact, we continue to look to information technology
to drive innovation, efficiency, and productivity in our business
operations. In addition, consumer use of the Internet for recreation
and to conduct business continues to expand. And, our networks
and the data on them are
still vulnerable.
At EDS, we are seeing an increase in the tempo and severity of
new viruses and other attacks on our information infrastructure.
As I believe many of us predicted here two years ago, the complexity
and sophistication of such attacks has continued to increase, making
the task of defending and repairing our networks and systems all
the more difficult. Installing software "patches" to
deflect intrusions has become the favored way of addressing impending
attacks. But, our clients are concerned about the need to install
patch after patch after patch in rapid succession, on thousands
of servers and tens of thousands of desktops. As you can imagine,
it is a daunting task to do three major patch updates in one week
in a large company or government agency. As these attacks become
more frequent, severe, and sophisticated in often incompatible
environments, what we call patch management has become a larger
issue.
Unfortunately, another change we have seen is the increased incidence
of identity theft and criminal misuse of personal information that
affects millions of Americans at any given moment. While there
are a variety of both high and low technology ways to obtain personal
identity and credit information, the biggest "bang" for
the criminal "buck" is still to locate and steal such
information from an insecure network. I am disturbed by the increasing
number of identity theft victims, and I believe more effective
practices in network security and protection of personal data would
benefit us all, both individually and as a society. I am glad to
see that the Administration and Congress took the opportunity of
reauthorizing the Fair Credit Reporting Act to address this challenge
in a positive way and look forward to the passage of that legislation
very soon.
Another change is the regulatory environment for us and for our
clients. The
Federal Trade Commission's new "Do-Not-Call-List", the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and the pending FCRA reauthorization are the latest iterations. They follow
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act. None of these regulatory frameworks give specific requirements for information
security - and shouldn't, in my opinion. But in one way or another, either through
greater corporate accountability, stronger privacy requirements, or new reporting
obligations, each has direct or indirect implications for improving the integrity
of data. As such, I would argue that each raises the level of awareness of information
security in enterprises across
the country.
This increasing awareness is a key component in the changes that
I have seen in the last two years. More and more companies are
coming to us with questions about how to address their information
and network security. The problem is, they are still often asking
the wrong questions. There is not a silver bullet that can address
everything that achieves a stronger security posture. You can't
point and click and say "done." There are no magic technologies
or software. Information security is a continual process that elevates
security planning out of the traditional information technology
silo and involves the whole enterprise: IT, legal, regulatory,
sales, marketing, and security, as well as each individual employee
and business partner. It's hard work, but it's
essential.
Another concern is the lack of details or guidance on standards
of acceptable security practices. There are many organizations
that are putting forth standards that purport to drive best practices
or interoperability, for example. But the proliferation of differing
standards has caused some confusion among some of our clients that
has prevented them from making important changes as they wait for
further direction. We often use the ISO Standards because they
are widely accepted, but there is room for improvement in developing
standards for the future that are flexible enough to reflect changes
in technology and
business operations.
As modern global businesses become increasingly intertwined through
partnerships, consortia, and merger and acquisition activity, traditional
network and security boundaries are, in many cases, no longer intact.
The security problems of one member of a partnership arrangement
or newly acquired company now quickly become the problems of the
entire group as the insecure network or system becomes the weak
link in the entire chain. In addition, information security entails
many things that may not appear to be security issues at first
glance, such as enterprise training, for example. Addressing these
issues requires strategic thinking about:
· the way a company or agency uses information, both on the network
and off; · what information is critical to the enterprise; · what
risk mitigation measures need to be put in place for what functions,
how your information security fits into an overall business continuity
plan; and · how privacy and security policies and processes complement
- or contradict - each other in the
business.
Companies need to look at information security in a holistic way
to create
and integrate what has been dubbed a "culture of security" in to their
enterprise. This may be a daunting task for those enterprises that are behind,
but it is crucial to ensuring our economic security.
Despite its demonstrated critical importance, we have not seen
a universally overwhelming increase in the amount of investment
that companies or the government are making in information security.
Some of the early adopters are often driven by regulation or in
response to an attack, but there are many more who have taken a
wait-and-see approach and hope that the next incident does not
affect them.at least not too much. Part of that is a response to
the current economic situation, and part is still a lack of understanding
of the loss
implications from an attack or even a natural disaster.
There is cause for hope, however. In a survey of corporate Chief
Information Officers released earlier this month by Forrester Research,
increased funding for security and privacy efforts were at the
top of the list of priorities for 2004. I am hopeful that as the
economy continues to recover, these plans will materialize into
concrete actions and investment in the security and privacy of
our national data resources.
What companies have been doing since September 11, is committing
some resources and expertise to the greater dialogue on information
security. Trade associations and other industry groups are including
information security in their work program, or beefing up existing
programs. New information sharing mechanisms are developing, existing
ones are working to improve their impact, and industry groups are
putting forth best practices and other guidance for their industry.
EDS was a founding member of the Information Technology Information
Sharing Analysis Center, or ISAC, one of 13 that were set up as
part of Presidential Decision Directive 63 for the designated critical
infrastructures. We have also taken on a role in the National Infrastructure
Advisory Council (NIAC) that was established after September 11.
Importantly, efforts are also extending beyond the so-called high
technology sector. EDS led an effort in the Business Roundtable,
an association of Fortune 200 Chief Executive Officers, to develop
a roadmap for large corporations in any sector to seriously consider
their cyber security. The publication is called Building Security
in the Digital Economy: An Executive Resource and is submitted
as part of my written testimony.
What still needs improvement?
While I appreciate the increased level of awareness, I still think
we need to do more to increase the level of real investment and
improvement in information security. I believe it requires a recognition
that security is not merely good for its own sake. We need to incorporate
the notion of security as a business enabler into our business
models. Enterprises that are looking at security as an enabler
to their business are investing in more strategic ways, and are,
therefore, better able to serve their clients, consumers, citizens,
and business partners. As I said earlier, it's not just a business
expense.it's an essential element in today's strategic - and networked
- business model.
I believe the jury is still out on the role of the Department
of Homeland Security in information security. We do applaud the
creation of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) as well
as its initial efforts on establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency
Response Team (US-CERT) and collaborating with industry. EDS will
be participating in the Cyber Security Summit scheduled for early
December and the ongoing work of the summit's designated task forces.
However, we hope that its placement in the new agency does not
illustrate a lack of concern, authority, or funding for information
security efforts in the US government. We all need to be diligent
to make sure the NCSD's efforts are
maintained and relevant.
Virtually every one on this panel two years ago called for a public-private
partnership and increased collaboration on cyber security. Arguably,
we have made important strides in that direction as more companies,
people, and agencies are talking about these issues in our associations
and in government groups. These efforts are encouraging, but I
argue we can do more, particularly by coordinating and learning
from them, rather than duplicating them. In addition, once again
we cannot look at individual aspects of security in isolation.
As we consider our infrastructure protection, we have to look at
the convergence of physical and cyber security because they can
no longer be looked at
independently.
In sum, I would characterize our state of information security
readiness as marginally better than it was two years ago, with
hope for greater improvement. While more are concerned, many are
not doing as little as possible to remedy the problems they have.
While more are aware of the threat, they are not mitigating the
corresponding risks with appropriate measures. And, while there
is more activity and public-private collaboration on information
security, it is not well coordinated across the spectrum of industries
and issues that are impacted
by security measures.
What can be done?
First, we can continue our efforts for a more coordinated program
of industry-government cooperation. The release of the Administration's
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace earlier this year provides
a framework for continued work, and I urge both industry and government
to take advantage of the upcoming Summit to solidify some of that
work going forward. The Department of Homeland Security's National
Cyber Security Division provides a focal point for monitoring industry
efforts and participating as appropriate. As DHS solidifies its
operations, we should ensure that the division has the appropriate
mandate,
funding, and industry coordination to support its activities.
Second, we can strive to improve information sharing mechanisms
that are an important component of the public-private partnership
on cyber security. For example, the Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs) are still active and are looking for ways to be
more effective for their industries. I would argue the ISACs should
also look for ways to communicate and even collaborate with each
other when appropriate. Just as we cannot put information security
into one silo, we cannot look at each industry sector in isolation.
We are all interconnected now and rely on not only the security
of our own network, but that of our suppliers, customers, partners,
and competitors. Industry was collectively pleased when Congress
provided for Freedom of Information Act exemptions for information
shared on cyber security in the Homeland Security Act. We urge
Congress to preserve the integrity of that provision in any future
reviews of the Act in order to allow continued information sharing
about vulnerabilities, breaches, attacks, and other actual or anticipated
cyber incidents. Our experience has repeatedly shown that effective
and timely information sharing is one of the most effective ways
to prevent widespread incidents and to combat them when they do
occur.
Third, we still believe there are areas where incentives are necessary
for companies to allocate the necessary funds to upgrade their
information security. This is particularly true for functions that
the US Government deems to be of critical importance to our economic
- and, therefore, our national security.
Fourth, we must continue to emphasize research and development
for innovations in information security and encourage Congress
to keep these avenues
open for resolution in the budget process.
Fifth, I remain a strong proponent of ways in which we can continue
to develop and professionalize the cadre of information security
professionals practicing today. In the past two years we have seen
a notable increase in the number of educational institutions offering
courses and even advanced degrees in information security topics.
While this is an encouraging sign, I still believe that there is
great room for improvement in expanding the discussions beyond
the purely technical disciplines and into the more general business
curriculum.
Finally, as stated earlier, our intertwined information networks
are global in nature and transcend traditional borders. That directly
impacts global companies such as ours as well as consumers. It
is imperative that we engage in the global dialogue on information
security as well. I commend the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation for their
efforts to bring this issue to the international arena.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would just like to emphasize the fact that the
improvements we have made over that last two years in information
security have much to do with an increasing awareness of cyber
security concerns for all of us. Increased awareness here at home
and abroad will continue to be crucial for our security going forward,
and I support efforts such as this hearing toward that objective.
We are better off and heading in the right direction, but we can
and need to do more - now. I have outlined some suggestions for
future focus that I hope are
helpful to the Committee.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to share my views
and EDS' experience once again. I will be happy to answer any questions
you and the
Members of the Subcommittee may have. |