Configuring Technical Safeguards
| 1.0 |
Identification Data |
| 1.1 |
BSP Number |
|
00003 |
| 1.2 |
BSP Title/Name |
|
Reviewing the Configuration
of Technical Safeguards at USAID Mission |
| 1.3 |
Version Number |
|
1.1 |
| 1.4 |
Adoption Date |
|
January 23, 2001 |
| 1.5 |
Approving Authority |
|
CIO Council Security Practices Subcommittee (SPS) |
| 1.6 |
Responsible Organization |
|
United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Management,
Information Resources Management (M/IRM), Information Systems Security Team |
| 1.7 |
Level of BSP |
|
Candidate |
| 1.8 |
Security Processes or other
Framework(s) Supported |
|
In the Security Process Framework:
Technical Security/Operate/Administer Technical Security Safeguards/Monitor Security
Safeguards. In the SSE CMM Framework: Monitor Security
Posture /Monitor Security Safeguards. |
| 1.9 |
Reserved |
|
Not to be completed by the
drafter |
| 1.10 |
Points of Contact |
|
Government BSP Owner:
- James P. Craft, CISSP
USAID Information Systems Security Officer
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., Suite 2.12-032
Washington, DC 20523-2120
Telephone: 202-712-5460
Fax: 202-216-3053
E-mail: jcraft@usaid.gov
Vendor Partner:
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| 2.0 |
What This BSP Does |
| 2.1 |
BSP's Purpose |
|
This BSP discusses how to review the technical
configuration of the security mechanisms of selected operating systems, network operating
systems, and firewalls, and, if the configuration is not secure, to reconfigure the
mechanisms at USAID missions worldwide. The procedures efficiently blend remote monitoring
with onsite validation.UNIX
This section provides a checklist designed to assess the UNIX
operational security posture of an organization. Individual line items in the UNIX
checklist that are checked "No" should be documented in the Justifications
section of the checklist.
Windows NT
This section provides a checklist for configuring the security of an NT
4.0 system.
The checklist contains items relative to physical security, user account
security, auditing and supervisor account security. Security configuration compliance with
the checklist is considered as a minimum requirement and is mandatory for host systems
connected to the organization's backbone and/or to the Internet. The security
configurations included herein will also be used for any initial and follow-on system
accreditation, security plans, and similar activities. This checklist is subject to change
if any new system anomalies or vulnerabilities are identified.
Individual line items in the Windows NT checklist that are checked
"No" should be documented in the Justifications section of the checklist.
Banyan
This section provides a checklist for configuring the security of a
BANYAN VINES-based system.
The checklist contains items relative to the physical security, user
account security, auditing and supervisor account security. Security configuration
compliance with the checklist is considered as a minimum requirement and is mandatory for
host systems connected to the organization's backbone and/or to the Internet. The security
configurations included herein will also be used for any initial and follow-on system
accreditation, security plans, and similar activities. This checklist is subject to change
if any new system anomalies or vulnerabilities are identified. Personnel using this
checklist are cautioned that, because there are several variants of the basic BANYAN VINES
operating, additional configuration requirements may be necessary.
Individual line items in the Banyan checklist that are checked
"No" should be documented in the justifications section of the checklist.
Microsoft Proxy Server
This section provides a checklist to assess the Microsoft Proxy Server
operational security posture of an organization. Individual line items in the Microsoft
Proxy Server checklist that are checked "No" should be documented in the
Justifications section of the checklist.
Network Review (General Security Checklist)
This section provides a checklist to assess the physical, operational,
and administrative security posture of an organization. Individual line items that are
checked "No" should be documented in the Comments section. |
| 2.2 |
Requirements for this BSP |
|
OMB A-130 Appendix III:
- Section A.3.a.3 states: "Review of Security Controls. Review the
security controls in each system when significant modifications are made to the system,
but at least every three years. The scope and frequency of the review should be
commensurate with the acceptable level of risk for the system. Depending on the potential
risk and magnitude of harm that could occur, consider identifying a deficiency pursuant to
OMB Circular No. A-123, "Management Accountability and Control" and the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), if there is no assignment
of security responsibility, no security plan, or no authorization to process for a
system."
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| 2.3 |
Success Stories |
|
Below is correspondence from an organization
expressing their appreciation for raising their security posture through the use of this
Risk Assessment Process. Subject: COMPUTER SECURITY TEAM VISIT
Source: David Bayer, USAID Peru Executive Office
If you have the opportunity to have the Information Systems Security
Officer (ISSO) Jim Craft and his Risk Assessment Program Area
Manager, Rodney Murphy, visit your Mission with their team of computer security experts,
then take advantage of it. They did one hell of a job during their
February visit with us at USAID/Peru in getting us up to speed and
raising our level of consciousness about security issues. This is not to say that our
dedicated IRM staff, led by Systems Manager, Lucho Figueroa, have not been
working their hearts out to get us into shape, but it is a real
injection of energy to have professional people like Jim, Rodney, John Zoble, Mike Reiter
and Steve Bui come in and sit down to review your Computer Security
Program and Computer Contingency Plan with you.
And last but not least, they have given us some key advice and
methods for closing out some computer security audit issues which are not only USAID/Peru
exposures but endemic to all Missions worldwide.
Computer security is becoming an important issue in for USAID and all
organizations. In this environment, new security standards and having a formal security
program in each overseas Mission is very important. |
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| 3.0 |
What This BSP Is |
| 3.1 |
Description of BSP |
| 3.1.1 |
Inputs
- Scanning tools and results (see Section
4.4)
- Safeguards Configuration Checklists
- Safeguards Configuration Handbooks
|
| 3.1.2 |
Process
Step 1. Determine the operating system on each target system host(s).
Step 2. Determine the IP addresses associated with each operating system
on the target system host(s).
Step 3. Run the tool appropriate for the system(s) being reviewed to
determine where configuration problems exist. (see Tools
Section 4.4)
Step 4. Document problems, evaluate and obtain patches/fixes.
Step 5. Conduct an on-site visit to the organizations whose system(s) is
being verified.
- Use the appropriate Checklist to determine what configuration
items should be verified.
- Use the appropriate Handbook to determine how to verify the
configuration items and how to correct those which may create a vulnerability.
Step 6. Complete the Checklist as each item is verified/corrected. Items
not found on the checklist should be analyzed and appropriate action taken. Items
implemented as a result of the analysis should be submitted for addition to the OS
checklist.
Step 7. Coordinate and document all changes with Application owners as
well as the system administrators.
Step 8. Run the tool appropriate for the system being reviewed to
determine that the configuration problems have been resolved. Document any remaining
vulnerability.
Step 9. Prepare the Final Report and forward to the organization's ISSO,
the reviewed system's owner, and other appropriate parties. |
| 3.1.3 |
Outputs |
|
The results of the Technical Safeguard
Configuration review are contained in the overall final report of the mission's
cyber-security assistance visit report. A template of that report's table of contents is attached. |
| 3.2 |
Relationship to Other BSPs |
|
This BSP comprises a sub-set of the total
integrated process for conducting a cyber-security assistance visit at USAID missions
worldwide. |
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| 4.0
|
How To Use This BSP |
| 4.1 |
Implementation Guidance
|
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Having the Administrator of the system being
reviewed work closely with the individual conducting the review can enhance the efficiency
of this process. |
| 4.2 |
Implementation Resource
Estimates |
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Personnel: Operating System Administrator
or knowledge equivalent. Time per System/Device:
- Preparation Time up-front: 2 - 4 hours identifying the current condition
of the configuration and downloading the appropriate patches in preparation for the
on-site activities.
- On-Site Time: 4 - 8 hours depending on the status of the device. Four
hours to verify a previously configured device, and up to 8 hours to configure a newly
installed device.
- Final Report Preparation Time: 4 hours; this includes the documentation
of activities by the reviewer and also the transfer of the documentation by the report
writer into the final report.
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| 4.3 |
Performance Goals and
Indicators (Metrics) |
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General Goal: To
eliminate those security vulnerabilities associated with the configuration of the subject
systems. Performance Goal: To
identify existing vulnerabilities, define and implement countermeasures, and verify
solution effectiveness.
Outcome Goal: Known vulnerabilities will
be resolved. Unresolved vulnerabilities will be documented for further analysis and
resolution development.
Output goal: To achieve compliance with
OMB A130 guidelines.
General Objective: To protect automated
information systems against potential threats.
Performance Indicator: The results
obtained from each system scan/evaluation will provide metrics for determining
requirements for repetition interval. |
| 4.4 |
Tools |
|
The tools used to perform the Technical Safeguards
Configuration Review are the configuring mechanisms provided with the subject systems and
selections from the available configuration scanning tools. The tools shown here are
configuration scanners in general use that have been found effective in past network
surveys. Because new vulnerabilities can be discovered at any time, other tools should be
evaluated and may be used if they augment the functions included in this list. The latest
versions of all tools should be used:
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| 4.5 |
Training Materials |
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User guides and materials
for the above listed tools |
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| Appendices |
| A |
Executive Overview and
Briefing |
|
Appendix A |
| B |
Reference List |
|
Not available |
| C |
Procurement Information |
|
The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has contracted for general
IRM support with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) under the Agency's
Principle Resource for Information Management Enterprisewide (PRIME) contract
(GS00K96AJD0012) with FEDSIM. USAID obtains its information system security
support from CSC under the PRIME contract using the Performance Work Statement
(PWS) at Appendix C |
| D |
Evaluation Information
|
|
Not yet evaluated. |
| E |
Recommended Changes |
|
Version 1.0 of the BSP was
reviewed after conducting cyber-assistance visits to Phnom Penh, Cambodia and Manila,
Philippines during November and December, 2000. The review has determined the original BSP
remains valid and has incorporated minor editorial revisions. |
| F |
Glossary |
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Not available. |
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