|
Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and the Internet
November 6, 2003
09:30 AM
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
Dr. Bill Hancock
Chief Executive Officer
Internet Security Alliance
2500 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, VA, 22201
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Dr. William Hancock. I am Vice
President
of Security and Chief Security Officer of Cable & Wireless, a large multinational
telecommunications and hosting company. I am Chairman of the National Reliability
and Interoperability Council (NRIC) Focus Group 1B, Cybersecurity, a federally
authorized council of advisors to the FCC. I am also the Chairman of the Board
of the Internet Security Alliance. I appear here today on behalf of the nearly
60 member companies of the Internet Security Alliance.
The Internet Security Alliance was created in April of 2001,
six months prior to 9/11 as a collaboration of the Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon
University and the Electronic Industries Alliance as well as founding
membership of well known international companies with high interest
in security issues related to Internet commerce.
I am pleased to note that four of the five witnesses before you
this morning are members of the IS Alliance. This doesn't surprise
me since members of the Alliance engage in a broad range of activities
designed to enhance information security not just for themselves
but for all of us who make up the world-wide
Internet community.
We are an international, inter-industry group of companies dedicated
to expanding cyber security through information sharing, best practices,
standards development, education and training, public policy development,
international outreach to trusted partners and the creation of
market-based incentive programs
to improve information security.
Among the core beliefs of the IS Alliance are the following:
- The Internet is primarily owned and operated by private organizations
and therefore it is the private sector's responsibility to aggressively
secure the
Internet.
- Information security on the Internet is grossly inadequate.
- A great deal of security enhancements can occur through application
of basic technologies and through enhanced education and security
awareness.
- Technology, while critical to security, will not be enough
to provide a safe
and secure Internet environment.
- To improve overall cyber security, creative structures, thought
and incentives may need to evolve to provide continued security
assurance from the
home PC to the large corporate network environments.
- Government is a critical partner, but, ultimately, the industry
must shoulder a substantial responsibility and demonstrate leadership
in this field if we are
to eventually succeed.
As what we in the security business call a "grey beard," I
have been a
technical expert, "insider" and leader in the development and deployment
of networking and security technologies for over 30 years. While such a span
of time might tend to make one wax philosophical about viruses and worms, I tend
to have a reality-based perspective as an active practitioner of security on
one of the largest network infrastructures in the world. When worms and viruses
hit infrastructures, to me it's not a statistic where some other company was
taken to the pavement: it's often one of my customers where I and my security
teams are expected to leap into action and solve the crisis at hand.
As a security practitioner, I saw the technical games that were
the genesis of modern computer viral infections. A computer virus
is a man-made code component that attacks computer software and
causes a variety of debilitating conditions. Most folks in the
security community attribute initial virus development as part
of a technical game at Bell Labs in the late 1960's called "CPU
Wars," where developers of operating systems would deliberately
create infestation code and place it on each other's machines.
This action typically resulted in machine disruptions, funny messages
on screens and other types of computing interruptions. There were
strict rules, however - infestations had to be non-propagative,
they could not cause destruction, stop applications from executing
and they could not execute during normal hours of operations. Infestations
had to be removable on demand. The initial purpose of such games
and pranks were to learn, creatively, about how operating systems
and computers worked and to share discoveries and ideas in a creative
way.
Such is not the case today.
Viruses are a main staple of the hacking community as a method
of disrupting programs and systems for a variety of purposes. Some
virus-writing efforts are for personal motivations to hurt a specific
company, product or service. Some are written by skilled programmers
with serious social development or emotional problems as a means
of self-expression. Other viruses are written by "gangs" of
programmers who have a specific political agenda or by those who
have a need to express social will. Still other viruses are written
by nation-states as part of their cyberwarfare development efforts
to debilitate infrastructure in today's modern technology-dependent
warfare environments. There are entities that write viruses under
contract to attack competitors and their infrastructure. There
are disgruntled employees who seek revenge on their former corporate
masters. Viruses are written for a wide variety of reasons but
are broadly categorized as being written for social dysfunctional
reasons or for
the purposes of economic disruption.
Viruses do not self-propagate. They attack whatever system upon
which they are activated and perform their damage on that system.
Some virus writers have gotten creative with the explosive use
of email and have devised ways for viruses to be propagated by
email programs and systems. While it appears that a
virus "moves," the technical reality is that the virus does not self-propagate
- it needs assistance from an external program such as e-mail or from a file
transfer action to move from system to system. With the worldwide proliferation
of email in the last five years, this makes movement of viruses from one system
to another painfully trivial.
Viruses have a variety of effects on businesses. Some are just
annoying, such as
one of the early viruses called "giggle," which caused a PC to play
a giggling voice continually through the PC's speakers for hours upon end. Other
viruses destroy software at great corporate cost. One disgruntled employee case
I worked on some years ago with the FBI involved an individual who was fired
for hacking into the human resources system and changing his salary. After being
fired, he went home, downloaded a piece of malicious code from an Internet underground
hacking site and created a small program that would delete all contents of a
user's hard drive. He then created a fake email account on a popular public email
site and emailed the virus to all the staff at the company with a notation that
the file contained a speech from the company's president and that it was being
sent so that employees could hear it. Upon "playing" the file, the
virus wiped out the hard drive. 1279 employees were sent the virus - 710 ran
the program and their entire systems had to be rebuilt. The overall cost to correct
the damage caused by this one virus at this company was almost one million dollars.
You can imagine the horrific cost to repair such damage at a large defense contractor,
financial institution or
manufacturing concern.
Many more malicious and wide-spread viruses are seen "in
the wild" on the Internet on a daily basis. Many are written
with Russian, Chinese and other languages in comments in their
code. Some have direct ties to organized crime, especially outside
the US. Many are propagated from commonly known havens for virus
writers where there is no fear of legal prosecution or where the
technical skills of the government to prosecute are minimal or
non-existent. Some estimates are as many as 100 or more computer
viruses or their variants are released world-wide on a monthly
basis. The costs to protect against viruses and contain them when
they hit can easily be quantified world-wide in the billions of
dollars.
In 1988, at the genesis of commercial use of the Internet, I
was working at NASA's Langley facility as a consultant when the
now-famous Morris worm hit the Internet. We all scratched our heads
and initially thought there was a network infrastructure problem.
What we did not know was that a young student at Cornell University
had created a self-replicating program which would move, very rapidly,
from computer to computer, attempting to replicate itself as fast
as possible throughout all connected computers. Back then, the
Internet was small enough that all the major network control area
personnel knew each other personally. We could all get on a conference
call and discuss what was going on and coordinate a response. It
caused such a serious outage of the Internet that many organizations,
to include CERT/CC (represented here today), were founded to serve
as an early-warning and solutions service for what was recognized
as a new security threat with explosive growth potential. Needless
to say, with the estimated 655 million worldwide users of Internet,
getting together on a worm attack conference call has become rather
problematic.
A worm is typically an autonomous self-propagating program which
travels from machine to machine, executing its payload. They do
not need the assistance of other standard programs, such as email
servers, and can move from system to system using an exploit in
a program or protocol. A worm typically consists of a "movement" component,
a propagation component and a payload, which may contain nothing
at all, self-executing code or a malicious viral infection. Payloads
seen in the last couple of years have consisted of a system subversion
methodology called a "root kit," where a hacker may later
take total
control of a system, using standard "known" viruses or defacement tools
for automatically defacing websites. For instance, in May 2001, a hacking group
that called themselves the Honkers Union of China defaced several hundred thousand
websites using a worm that defaced the victim's website with a banner containing
the hacker's name. The worm would then rapidly attempt to propagate itself to
other sites.
Most worms in today's environment propagate from system to system
using known vulnerabilities and attempting to exploit a system
based upon those vulnerabilities. In many cases, proper patching
against known vulnerabilities or disabling technical components
that are not needed for operations would prevent the attack and
subsequent propagation of many worms. For instance, on January
25th of this year, a worm called "Slammer" attacked Internet
systems via a known vulnerability in a popular database program
- one for which the corrective patch had existed for over 7 months.
Sites that were patched simply were not affected. Sites that blocked
all network entry points for all programs, except those that were
open for production programs, with technologies such as firewalls
were similarly not affected. Unfortunately, much of the Internet
community using the database had not properly applied those patches
and they were severely debilitated for almost three days as a result
of such negligence.
Some worms have been written to attempt to hurt specific Internet
addresses such as whitehouse.gov and software manufacturing companies.
Studies of the various types of worms seen in the last two years
suggest that some are being used to probe, experiment and test
methods in which to infiltrate infrastructures throughout the world.
Having reviewed many of them and examined the code personally,
it is readily apparent to me that some were written by very professional,
highly trained programmers who could have easily done substantially
more damage than they did - if they wanted to. When professionally
written worms appear, they gain extra attention from within the
security community as it usually is an indication that someone
very serious about their efforts is setting something up for later
use in a more destructive way.
The use of worm-based techniques of propagation, combined with
virus development techniques, is causing new problems for companies
and consumers alike. A good example is the recent and continuing
propagation of the SoBig worm/virus technology that was and is
still used by SPAMmers. SoBig and its variants are commonly used
by SPAMmers to distribute a compact email server system to computers
which previously did not have such capability. The unwitting victims,
such as a broadband cable-connected home PC, are favorite targets
of SPAMmers. By doing this, the numbers of email servers capable
of sending SPAM to users on any given day has jumped from a couple
of hundred thousand or so to several million. This type of technological
approach to SPAMming has resulted in an exponential jump in SPAM
emails, bandwidth consumption, and overhead (congestion) throughout
the Internet.
While most of the uses of viruses and worms are typically malicious
or at least inconvenient in today's environment, this will change
over time. Worm technologies are currently being viewed as a potential
method to distribute critical security patches to systems on networks.
Viruses can be used to distribute applications on some modern operating
systems. Some countries have introduced legislation to outlaw all
use of viruses and worms in all forms. This is a short-sighted
and a simplex application of laws to a complex issue as the same
technologies are being looked at, very seriously, for use in good
- not
evil.
With the conditions for development of viruses and worms remaining
as-is, I expect the following situations to develop in the near
future:
- Infestations of "invisible" infrastructures. Most
of us don't think about the software inside a cell phone, automotive
electronic system, DVD player, radio frequency ID tag systems,
parking lot gate attendant systems, toll booths, wireless luggage
bag-to-passenger matching systems, point of sale terminals, automatic
door openers, letter sorters, printing presses and many others.
As these technologies become more sophisticated, so do their
connectivity methods and operating environments. Companies that
produce such products migrate towards general-use commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, which allow greater opportunities
for attack.
- Worm, virus and hybrid attacks against communications infrastructures
due to lack of security controls in base networking protocols
and "building
block" protocols such as Abstract Syntax Notation.1 (ASN.1). Much of the
communications infrastructure of the world is built on protocol security concepts
developed in the 1970's which do not translate well into today's technical security
needs.
- Use of viruses and worms by terrorist organizations as a way
to deteriorate, disrupt and disable economic and social support
systems in use by countries dedicated to anti-terrorist efforts.
As horrible and malicious as the various physical attacks have
been by terrorists against the United States, those effects are
minimal compared to a debilitating attack by a worm against our
financial, transport or utility infrastructures.
- Accelerated sponsorship by hostile nation-states where the
use of cyber attack is a rapid method of furthering a country's
political and economic goals (cyber warfare and information operations
methodologies).
- Worms/viruses that "jump" between operating environments
and applications. Some have shown this capability already and
it's a rapidly growing
trend.
While there are many disturbing trends in virus and worm development,
there are certain issues which IS Alliance is particularly concerned
about:
- Companies that provide critical services, such as utilities,
transport and petrochemical entities are interconnecting historically
isolated networks with Internet facilities. This results in such
networks being attacked and infested with viruses and worms that
cause the networks to become disabled and this can critically
affect infrastructure.
- Home consumer PCs are being increasingly targeted by viruses,
worms and
hybrids harnessed for use as part of world-wide malicious "chains" of
attack systems (known as Zombies) to effect Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
and worm attacks against Internet connected entities
- Research and development into new security encodings and methods
in base network protocols needs to be accelerated to help offset
the continued
development of malicious code used to attack infrastructure
- Lack of law enforcement actions, globally, in the prosecution
and arrest of virus and worm developers. An extremely low number
of persons involved in the development and distribution of malicious
code are ever identified or prosecuted due to a lack of technical
tools, skills and personnel in most law enforcement
organizations.
- Inclusion of basic system and application protection methodologies
by developers of same. Basic technologies such as polymorphic
checksums and cryptographic signature methods are well known
and available. Such technologies could be used by all manner
of developers to stop infestations and propagation of these malicious
code segments.
- Lack of senior corporate management to act properly, responsibly,
rationally and quickly in the deployment of security technologies
to prevent infestations and propagation of malicious code. Too
many companies still do not invest in the
basics.
- Acknowledgement that viruses and worms are truly a multinational
problem. While leadership by technologically advanced countries
is crucial, introduction of viruses and worms into network infrastructure
is easily done by the "weakest link" in connectivity
- a small country with no laws on cybercrime, no assets to protect,
and no national will or means to prosecute perpetrators becomes
the entry point for the world to be attacked. Remember that access
to a small country's infrastructure does not require a physical
presence - even a dial-up connection from anywhere on the planet
will do just fine.
The "cure" for infestations is a long way off and will
require partnership with industry and government to solve. Base
research in network security improvements, deployment of security
technologies, legislative efforts to prevent criminal use of worms
and viruses, improvement in operating systems to stop infestations,
application-level security technologies, law enforcement prosecution
of cyber criminals involved in the creation and distribution of
virus and worm technologies, improvement in base critical infrastructure
and education and training through all levels of corporations,
government and society will need to be combined to come up with
effective eradication
solutions.
Perhaps the most ironic aspect of viruses and worms is not just
the cost to repair or prevent infestation - it's not like biological,
chemical or nuclear terrorism where thousands or millions of dollars
are required to make such an attack happen. It's just the entry
cost necessary to create and distribute worms
and viruses:
A PC with an Internet connection.
With this, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I conclude my
opening remarks. Thank you for your efforts and your leadership
in this important topic. |