
Posthearing Questions from the September 10, 2003, Hearing on
Worm and Virus Defense: How Can We Protect Our Nation's Computers
from These Serious Threats? GAO-04-173R, October 17, 2003
Worm
and Virus Defense: How Can We Protect Our Nation's Computers
From
These Serious
Threats?"
Committee
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information
Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census
Wednesday, September 10, 2003
10:00 AM
Washington - STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PUTNAM
Good morning. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee
on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations
and the Census will come to order.
Today we continue our in-depth review of cyber security issues
affecting our nation. There are several things unique to cyber
attacks that make the task of preventing them particularly difficult.
Cyber attacks can occur from anywhere around the globe: from the
caves of Afghanistan to the war fields of Iraq, from the most remote
regions of the world or simply right here in our own back yard.
The technology used
for cyber attacks is readily available and changes continually.
And, maybe most dangerous of all, is the failure
of many people – including many of those who are critical
to securing these networks and information from attack -- to take
the threat seriously, to receive adequate training, and to take
proactive steps needed to secure their networks. A severe cyber
attack could have serious repercussions throughout the nation both
in a physical sense and in very real economic dollars.
The initial plan for
this hearing was to focus primarily on strategies and methodologies
within the agencies of the federal government
for identification and mitigation of computer vulnerabilities through
a system of “patch management”. However, recent events
caused us to expand the boundaries of this hearing to include computer
systems throughout our nation. This summer everyone -- once again
-- realized just how vulnerable our computer networks are to cyber
attack. The Blaster worm and SoBigF virus brought home the reality
that unsecured computer systems are all too prevalent and that – as
a nation – across all levels, government, business and home
users, we absolutely must take computer security more seriously.
The Blaster worm infected
over 400,000 computers in less than five days. In fact, about
one in three Internet users are infected
with some type of virus or worm every year. The speed at which
worms and viruses can spread is astonishing. What’s equally
astonishing is the lethargic pace at which people deploy the patches
that can prevent infection in the first place. Microsoft announced
the vulnerability, and had the patch available… weeks before
the exploit appeared.
The recent viruses and worms have been blamed for bringing down
train signaling systems throughout the East, affecting the entire
CSX system, which covers 23 states. Additionally, new information
coming to light shows that the Blaster worm is being linked to
the severity of the power blackout of last month. The North American
Electric Reliability Council blames another worm, Slammer, for
impairing bulk electric system control by bringing down networks.
We learned last week that The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
issued a formal Information Notice to nuclear power plant operators
warning them about an incident in January in which the Slammer
computer worm penetrated networks at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear
plant and disabled two important monitoring systems for hours.
A recent Gartner study
predicts that by the year 2005, 90 percent of cyber attacks will
attempt to exploit vulnerabilities for which
a patch is available or a solution known. So, why aren’t
systems patched and anti-virus programs kept up to date? This hearing
will examine the issues surrounding these incidents, including
how vulnerabilities are discovered, how the public is notified
about potential vulnerabilities, the mechanisms that exist for
protecting systems, the real and potential problems presented by
patching systems, and the scope of the problem confronting the
federal government, the business community and the general public.
System administrators are often times overwhelmed with simply
maintaining all the systems they have responsibility for overseeing.
Challenges that organizations face in maintaining their systems
are significant: with an estimated 4,000 vulnerabilities being
discovered each year, it is an enormous challenge for any but the
best-resourced organizations to install all of the software patches
that are released by the manufacturer. Not only is the sheer quantity
of patches overwhelming for administrators to keep up with, but
patches can be difficult to apply and also have potentially unexpected
side effects on other system components that administrators must
then evaluate and address. As a result, after a security patch
is released, system administrators often take a long time to fix
all their vulnerable computer systems. Obviously, small organizations
and home users, who lack the skills of system administrators, are
even less likely to be able to keep up with the flow of patches.
The Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) Federal Computer
Incident Response Center recently awarded a $10.8 million, five-year
contract for a government-wide patch management service to notify
agencies about security holes in commercial software for systems
on their networks, and the availability of patches to fix them.
The service is known as the Patch Authentication and Dissemination
Capability (PAD C).
The goal is to simplify patch management by providing administrators
only with information relevant to their IT systems and ensuring
that patches are genuine and effective. PAD C went on-line in January
of this year.
According to officials, once agency system administrators have
provided a profile of their systems and software, PAD C will alert
them to potential vulnerabilities, provide interim security advice
until a patch is made available, disseminate available patches,
and keep management informed of available patches and which ones
their systems administrators have downloaded.
Large organizations,
such as business and educational institutions, often rely on
commercial firms to notify them of vulnerabilities.
For example, there are several firms that offer vulnerability notification,
combined with analysis of the customer’s computer systems
for vulnerabilities. These firms also provide information on where
to get the patches and prioritize them for the system administrators.
In addition, the commercial critical infrastructure sectors depend
on information from their Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs) to help them respond to potential cyber threats. These
ISACs are designed to allow members of a sector to share information
about incidents to help increase preparedness and vigilance. The
progress of Blaster demonstrates the importance of the early warning
systems that ISACs are tasked with developing.
Independent researchers discover most vulnerabilities. These researchers
may be academics, consultants or black hats. The Organization for
Internet Security is working with software vendors, consultants
and other interested parties to formalize procedures for dealing
with vulnerabilities, including vendor notification and controlled
disclosures. There is a very important role for government to play
in the disclosure procedures. It is simply not acceptable for vendors
to determine on their own schedule who gets notified and when.
Given the potential national security risk that could emanate from
the exploitation of a vulnerability, it is imperative that the
appropriate government entities be involved in this process from
the very beginning.
Vulnerabilities in software,
and the worms and viruses that exploit them, have become a fact
of life for the Internet. The government,
law enforcement and private industry must develop…and continue
to update… a plan to deal with these emerging threats. How
can we educate home and small business users to minimize the risk
posed by zombie computers? How can researchers, the government
and the software industry work together to identify and remedy
vulnerabilities in the most constructive manner? How will the federal
government evolve an effective patch management program? What can
be done to expedite the discovery and prosecution of cyber criminals
who release worms and viruses? And, most important of all, how
can the federal government, law enforcement and industry work together
to protect the vital infrastructure of the Internet?
We have an excellent
line-up of witnesses this morning who will share with use their
expertise as we explore Worms and Viruses,
how can be better protect the Nation’s computers?
|