Espionage by the Numbers:
Family or Friends
This table also shows the relationship between the age at which the subjects first became involved with espionage as well as whether the offenders were volunteers or recruited. The largest group of volunteers and of those recruited by friends or family were between age 20 and 24. The largest number of those who were recruited by foreign intelligence were between 25 and 29 years old. Those recruited on the initiative of a foreign intelligence service tended to be older (median age 35) than both volunteers (30) and those recruited by family or friends (25.5).
The most significant conclusions from this table are that most Americans spies are volunteers, not recruits, and that the most vulnerable age group is employees in their 20s. The volunteer spies are overwhelmingly in the young adult category.
The following table shows that half of the American spies have been military personnel, half civilian. It also the age at which spies began their espionage. Among espionage offenders who were in the military, about two-thirds began their involvement before the age of 30, while among civilians, initial offenders tended to be older. This difference probably results from the simple fact that the military population has a lower average age.
Age Espionage Began by Military and Civilian Employment
|Age||%||Number of Cases||%||Number of Cases|
The following table offers a positive note -- that 26% of all offenders were caught before they could do any damage, and 47% were caught during their first year of betrayal. Many of the young military offenders have been stopped in their tracks. Military offenders are more likely than civilian offenders to be apprehended in the early stages of their crime.
Length of Espionage by Military and Civilian
|Length of Espionage||%||Number of Cases||%||Number of Cases|
|Intercepted First Time
|Less than 1 year||19.2||14||21.3||16|
|1 4.9 years||24.7||18||37.3||28|
|5 years or more||19.2||14||25.3||19|
The following table compares three categories of offenders with respect to their reported motivations. Motivation as coded in the database is based only on publicly available information. Actual motivation is difficult to assess, as it is often different from what appears on the surface. Many offenders had mixed motivations, in which case all significant motivations are recorded in the data base.
Motivation of Volunteer and Recruited Spies
|* One offender may have several different motivations|
According to this evidence, financial gain played the major role among volunteers but was important for many recruits as well. Disgruntlement and revenge were far more prevalent among volunteers than recruits. Not surprisingly, those recruited by family or friends were more often motivated by ingratiation (the desire to please or satisfy) than by anything else. Recruitment by coercion was rare. Although not shown in the table, the full data base shows that ideology as a motivation diminished sharply after the 1940s.
Although money appears to top the list of motivations attributed to these offenders, it is interesting to see how few received any significant amount of payment before being arrested. Almost half received nothing because of early detection or because they acted from non-mercenary motives. Only ten received $100,000 or more usually paid over long periods of time. In most cases, the financial pay-off to the espionage offender is nil or next to nothing when compared to the high risk of getting caught or the monumental cost to the nation from compromised weapon systems, lost technology lead-time, or neutralized intelligence collection systems.
Estimate of Money Received
|Amount||Number of Cases|
|$1,000,000 or more||4|
Security officers have assumed for years that foreign personal contacts, especially family ties and other ties of emotion or obligation, add an element of vulnerability to recruitment for espionage. This is why foreign connections are an area of focus in background investigations. The numbers lend credence to this assumption.
Thirty-nine percent of Americans arrested for espionage had foreign relatives. This is substantially higher than the percentage of cleared personnel in general who have foreign relatives. The actual percentage may be higher than 39%, as the available unclassified information was insufficient in many cases to determine whether or not an offender had foreign relatives.
Although not shown in the table, it is noteworthy that the foreign relative played no role in the recruitment in most cases. Also, in a majority of the cases, the foreign relative was located in or was from a friendly country rather than a hostile country.
Foreign Relatives by Volunteer and Recruited Spies
Family or Friends
|%||Number of Cases||%||Number of Cases||%||Number of Cases|
Here are a few additional highlights from this database that give us additional understanding about motivations and situational factors leading to espionage:
1. Information about this database and data on additional variables are available in the report by Suzanne Wood and Martin F. Wiskoff, "Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II." Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, May 1992. That report is being updated.