Statement by
Michael A. Vatis
Deputy Assistant Director
and
Chief, National Infrastructure Protection Center
Federal Bureau of Investigation
before the
Joint Economic Committee
United States Congress
March 24, 1998
"CYBERCRIME, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT"
Chairman Saxton, Vice Chairman Mack,
and Members of the Joint Economic Committee:Thank you for this opportunity
to discuss cybercrime, the vulnerabilities of our Nation's critical
infrastructures to increasing cyber threats, and what the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) is doing to combat these problems.
As we continue to rush into the Information
Age, our society is moving increasingly on-line.We use computers, the
Internet, and other new "information technologies" to conduct business,
perform scientific research, engage in personal communications, and
do just about anything else that inventive minds can think of.But as
society as a whole is moving on-line, so are criminals.Criminals use
computers to facilitate crimes committed in the physical world.For example,
they can use computers and the Internet to communicate with co-conspirators
or to keep accounts of their illicit gains.Criminals also use these
tools to engage in criminal activity on-line.For example, they use the
Internet to defraud unsuspecting senior citizens, disseminate child
pornography, steal credit card numbers, and rob banks by electronically
shifting funds to their own off-shore accounts.
But the Internet and other advances
in information technology do not merely give criminals new means to
commit traditional crimes like theft or fraud.They also allow criminals
and other malicious actors to cause new types of harm that go well beyond
the potential loss to the individual victim and can affect our national
economy and, indeed, our national security.
What type of harm am I talking about?The
everyday functioning of our economy depends on the delivery of certain
critical services.While we once got along fine without electrical power,
think of the consequences if the power went out for a week -- not just
in one town or city, but across the whole Eastern Seaboard.And while
plenty of people made their fortunes before the telephone, imagine what
would happen to the Fortune 500 if they were deprived of telephone service
for a few days.
There are several services whose availability
we may take for granted, but which are truly critical to the smooth
functioning of our society.We call these vital services our "critical
infrastructures."Executive Order 13010, signed in 1996, lists the following
eight infrastructures as "critical" to our economic health and our national
security:telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation (including
roads, railroads, airplanes and airports, mass transit, ports and harbors),
electrical energy, gas and oil supply, water supply, emergency services
(fire, health, police), and government operations.These infrastructures
are defined as "critical" because their debilitation or destruction
would have a significant adverse impact on our national economy or national
security.
In the United States, we are able to
expect things to work because our infrastructures are highly developed
and efficient.Individuals and families can wake up in the morning confident
that the lights will work, water will flow from the tap,and the trains
will run.Businesses, too, can plan their activities and investments
around the certainty that they will have ready access to telecommunications,
that gas or oil will supply power to their factories, that their goods
will be transported by truck, rail or airplane, and that funds can be
safely deposited or withdrawn from their bank accounts.It is a given,
in both our personal and professional lives, that essential goods and
services will be available when needed.
Not so long ago, our dependence on
these infrastructures did not pose a significant problem because there
was little risk that these vital services would be knocked out.Only
a rare and isolated occurrence, such as an earthquake or tornado or
an accidental power outage could knock out a critical service over a
broad area.The physical breadth of the infrastructures made it difficult
for a potential malefactor to cause anything other than an isolated
disturbance.And physical security measures adopted to prevent theft
or vandalism generally also kept out those who would seek to destroy
an infrastructure's ability to continue operating.A strong fence and
a good security staff fended off not only thieves and vandals, but also
terrorists.Moreover, our geographic isolation from other countries made
it difficult for foreign adversaries to launch an attack on our infrastructures.
The Information Age, however, has changed
things dramatically.For while information technologies create dramatic
increases in efficiency and productivity, our dependence on them creates
new vulnerabilities.
All critical infrastructures now rely
on computers, advanced telecommunications, and, to an ever increasing
degree, the Internet, for the control and management of their own systems,
for their interaction with other infrastructures, and for communications
with their suppliers and their customer base.For example, electric power
grids and natural gas pipelines are controlled by computer systems,
and those computers may be linked to each other and to the company headquarters
by publicly-accessible telecommunications systems and commercially available
information technologies to allow efficient management of power generation
and smooth delivery to consumers.Billions of shares are traded each
day over the telephone or Internet, and the stock exchanges could not
function today without their vast networks of computers.Banks no longer
rely on ledger books and safe deposit boxes to account for and secure
their holdings, but depend on computerized accounting systems to manage
depositors' accounts.The telecommunications system itself no longer
uses operators to manually plug in calls to a switchboard but depends
on computerized switching stations to handle the billions of calls placed
each day.The government also relies on computers and publicly available
communications systems to conduct the nation's business.Public and private
networks and databases use the same technology, and vulnerabilities
that affect one also affect the other.
But this reliance on new technologies
comes with a price, and that price is a new vulnerability to those who
would cause harm.For just as the new technologies make it easier for
companies to communicate and control their businesses, they also make
it easier for malicious actors to cause harm.The new vulnerability stems
in part from the fact that the Internet and modern telecommunications
systems are inherently open and accessible.That means that, with a certain
amount of technical skill, one can use these communications media to
get inside a company's or a government agency's computer system without
ever physically penetrating its four walls.Moreover, the increased centralization
of command and control systems afforded by the new technologies also
means that, once inside that system, a potential malefactor can use
those same technologies to cause harm over a much broader area than
he ever could have hoped using physical weapons such as a bomb.
This vulnerability is exacerbated by
several factors.First, most of our infrastructures rely on commercially
available, off-the-shelf technology.This means that a vulnerability
in hardware or software is not limited to one company, but is likely
to be widespread, affecting every entity that uses the same equipment.A
malefactor with knowledge of this one vulnerability can therefore attack
multiple victims across the country, with just a few strokes on a keyboard.
Second, our infrastructures are increasingly
interdependent and interconnected with one another.For example, the
banking system depends on the availability and reliability of the telecommunications
system and the Internet, which in turn rely on electrical power.Our
transportation system depends on the availability of gas and oil supplies,which
in turn are controlled through the use of new information technologies.The
infrastructures are thus increasingly interdependent, so much so that
it is difficult to predict the cascading effects that the disruption
of one infrastructure would have on others.
Third, our telecommunications infrastructure
is now truly global.Satellite communications, the Internet, and foreign
ownership of telecommunications carriers in the U.S.have all combined
to undermine the notion of a "National" Information Infrastructure.This
means that our geographic isolation no longer acts as a moat to fend
off foreign adversaries.Instead, it is now as easy to break into an
infrastructure's network from St. Petersburg, Russia, as St. Petersburg,
Florida.A personal computer and a telephone connection to an Internet
Service Provider anywhere in the world are enough to conduct an attack.
Software is one weapon of cyber attacks.Such
software includes, among others, computer viruses, Trojan Horses, worms,
logic bombs, and eavesdropping "sniffers" that can be used to obtain
passwords that allow hackers "root access" control of a computer system.Advanced
electronic hardware also canbe used in cyber attacks, including such
items as high-energy radio frequency (RF) weapons, electromagnetic pulse
weapons, RF jamming equipment, or RF interception equipment.These weapons
can be used to destroy property and data; intercept communications or
modify traffic; degrade the integrity of data, communications, or navigation
systems; and deny crucial services to users of information and telecommunications
systems.
So that's the vulnerability picture
in the cyber world.But what about the corresponding threat?In the physical
world, the range of people or groups that would have the means and motive
to cause widespread destruction of an infrastructure are relatively
limited -- terrorist groups and hostile nations are the most likely
actors.But the accessibility of the information infrastructure, global
connectivity, and the rapid growth of a computer-literate population
combine to ensure that millions of people around the world possess the
means to engage in a cyber attack.The spectrum of threats in this new
cyber world is staggeringly broad and varied, including:the disgruntled
insider seeking revenge against his employer; the recreational hacker
out to test his "cracking" skills; organized crime groups seeking illicit
financial gain; domestic or international terrorist groups bent on causing
harm to send a political message; foreign intelligence services seeking
companies' proprietary data or sensitive government information; and
hostile nation states utilizing information warfare as part, or instead,
of a strategic military attack.Let me discuss each of these threats
in a little more detail.
Perhaps the most imminent threat today
comes from insiders.Insiders have the advantage of not needing to break
into computer systems from the outside, but only to use, or abuse, their
legitimate access.Many of the computer intrusion reports the FBI and
other law enforcement organizations receive have at their core an employee,
former employee, consultant, or temporary employee who has exceeded
his or her access, often in revenge for some perceived wrong.These individuals
often have intimate knowledge of where the most sensitive information
is stored, how to access the information, and how to steal or damage
the data.
Recreational hackers are also increasingly
dangerous, in part because of the widespread availability of "cracking"
tools on hacker websites.One no longer needs to have a sophisticated
understanding of computers and the Internet to successfully crack into
a company's systems.Rather, one needs only to download an automated
hacking tool from a website, compile the source code using a program
readily available on the Internet, and click on a button to launch an
attack on any number of target sites.
Moreover, the problem is exacerbated
by our continued romanticization of hackers as technical whizzes who
are not really doing anything wrong but are actually providing a service
by pointing out the vulnerabilities in an individual's or a company's
or government agency's system.But do we praise the burglar for demonstrating
the vulnerability of our home security by breaking in and stealing our
cash or jewelry?Even if he does not steal or break anything, the simple
invasion of our private property causes a feeling ofviolation and vulnerability
that would send chills down all our spines.Or do we thank the vandal
who breaks into the corner store and defaces or destroys someone else's
property?Of course not.But, similarly, we should not tolerate or condone
analogous acts committed with computers.These are not acts that occur
in some ethereal "cyberspace" that is somehow divorced from the real
world.These are acts that are very real, and can cause serious harm.It
is no joke when an individual's private E-mail communications are intercepted,
or when a company's proprietary data is stolen or destroyed, or when
a government agency's sensitive data is compromised.And these acts can
have serious physical consequences.No one would laugh if a hacker caused
air traffic control to go down at an airport, as happened in a case
in Massachusetts that recently resulted in a plea bargain.Or if a hacker
tied up 911 emergency phone services, potentially denying critical aid
to people with true emergencies, as happened in a recent case in Florida.Our
society has to do a better job of educating our children and young adults
that breaking into someone else's computer system has serious real-world
consequences, and is a serious crime.
Where hackers formerly may have been
motivated by the technical challenge of breaking into a computer system,
the motivation may now be shifting more toward hacking for profit.As
more and more money is transferred through computer systems, as more
fee-based computer services are introduced, and as more sensitive proprietary
economic and commercial information is stored and exchanged electronically,we
will see criminal hackers use their computer skills for illicit gain.
Terrorists and transnational criminals
also rapidly are becoming aware of and exploiting the power of cyber
tools.This has been true in the past as new means of communication and
secrecy have been introduced to the public.For example, narcotics traffickers
began using communications advances such as pagers, cellular phones,
and unbreakable encryption soon after their introduction to the public.The
fantastic growth of the Internet and other global information networks
grants increasing numbers of users with hostile intentions access to
global networks -- and to those United States networks upon which critical
infrastructures depend.
Finally, as our nation's defense and
intelligence agencies increasingly rely on commercially available information
technologies and publicly accessible communications systems for their
everyday work, foreign intelligence services and hostile nation states
will increasingly seek to acquire and use cyber tools to conduct espionage
or engage in "information warfare" against us.Several different commissions,
including the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
and the National Defense Panel, have recognized that no nation or group
hostile to the United States can match us in traditional military firepower.Because
of this, they would not be expected to take us on in a frontal or "symmetrical"
attack.Rather, they would utilize irregular, "asymmetrical" attacks
that hit us where we are most vulnerable.And one of those vulnerabilities
is our reliance on information technologies for command and control
of our national security activities as well as for the daily functioning
of our privately-owned critical infrastructures.This vulnerability is
particularly attractive to foreign enemies in that it is just as easy
to crash a system from a computer terminal overseas as it is from one
in the United States.
Some would say that this vulnerability
is overstated, that there are sufficient technological security tools
to protect against malicious hackers and crackers, and that infrastructures
have built in redundancies to their systems to prevent catastrophic
system failures in the event of a successful intrusion.I'm afraid that
the facts prove otherwise.Although we have not experienced the electronic
equivalent of a Pearl Harbor or Oklahoma Cityas some have foretold,
the statistics and our cases demonstrate our dangerous vulnerabilities
to cyber attacks.
A 1998 study by the Computer Security
Institute shows that 64% of companies polled reported information system
security breaches -- an increase of 16% over last year.The total financial
losses from the 241 organizations that could put a dollar figure on
them adds up to $136,822,000.This figure represents a 36% increase in
reported losses over the 1997 figure of $100,115,555 in losses.
While the Carnegie Melon CERT/Coordination
Center reported a small reduction in security incidents (2,134 in 1997,
down from 2,573 in 1996), the type and scope of attacks indicates a
disturbing increase in the use of automated scripts, enabling malevolent
network users to attack very large numbers of systems with much greater
efficiency.
A study of 300 Australian companies
by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu found that over 37 percent of the companies
experienced some form of security compromise in 1997, with the highest
percentage of intrusions (57%) occurring in the banking and finance
industry.
A 1996 survey by the American Bar Association
of 1,000 companies showed that 48 percent had experienced computer fraud
in the last five years.Company losses were reported to have ranged from
$2-10 million.
In 1996 the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) estimated that as many as 250,000 attacks on DOD systems
may have occurred in 1995.DISA indicates that the number of attacks
has been increasing each year for the past few years, and that trend
is expected to continue.
Finally, we at the FBI have seen significant
increase in the number of pending computer intrusion investigations
and in the number of successful prosecutions.Pending cases have increased
133% from the beginning of FY 1997, from 206 to 480.In FY 1997, there
was a 110% increase in informations and indictments (from 10 to 21),
a 950% increase in arrests (from 4 to 42), and an 88% increase in convictions
(from 16 to 30).
As a caveat, let me state that it is
not clear what accounts for these increases in our own case statistics
or in the numbers reported by the private studies.It may be that systems
administrators have simply gotten better at detecting intrusions, or
that companies have become more willing to share information about their
own exploited vulnerabilities.Or, it may be that the number of intrusions
has risen significantly.Most likely, in my view, all three things are
occurring.Regardless of the cause, however, these numbers clearly indicate
significant vulnerabilities to cyber attacks.
Let me now give you a few examples
of the types of computer crimes we have seen in recent years to further
illustrate the problem:
You are undoubtedly aware of the recent
series of intrusions into Department of Defense and other government
agency computers across the country.This case involved widespread illegal
intrusions into government systems using holes in the systems' software.I
cannot go into detail on this matter because it is a pending case, but
the FBI recently identified two juveniles in California who appear to
have been responsible for many of the intrusions.And the Israeli National
Police, working with FBI, Air Force, and NASA investigators, this week
placed under house arrest one individual who also appears responsible
for many of the intrusions.While we are still determining the extent
of harm caused by these intrusions, the potential harm was obviously
enormous.Even the unclassified systems used by DoD and other government
agencies contain an enormous amount of important and sensitive data,
the loss or alteration of which would have serious adverse consequences
for our national security.
Many of you have also probably read
about the plea bargain in Massachusetts this week of a teenage hacker
who was able to break into the former NYNEX (now Bell Atlantic) system
and, through it, disable telecommunications at a regional airport, cut
off services to the airport's control tower, and prevent incoming planes
from turning on the runway lights.This case is a wake-up call for those
who would argue that hacking is simply harmless fun.
In 1994, foreign crime groups operating
in several different countries were able to hack into the Citibank Cash
Management System, which is used for banking functions such as wire
transfers.The criminals compromised passwords to impersonate account
holders worldwide, and attempted 40 transfers totaling $10 million.As
a result of early detection by Citibank officials, and close cooperation
between Citibank investigators, payee banks, foreign police, and the
FBI, the perpetrators were tracked down and arrested, and actual losses
were limited to $400,000.But imagine if the hackers had been intent
not simply on stealing funds, but on destroying Citibank's account records
or denying service to Citibank customers.The effects in such a scenario
would have had much more serious and widespread consequences.
In another case, hackers from Germany
recently captured the customer credit card files of a Miami company.The
hackers threatened to distribute all the credit card numbers unless
they were paid ransom.When one of the hackers tried to pick up the money,
he was arrested by German authorities.If the hackers had chosen to use
the numbers instead of trying extortion, law enforcement may not have
been able to stop them before they had caused significant financial
loss.
An international computer hacker organization
headquartered in Dallas, Texas successfully penetrated the networks
of several telecommunications providers and acquired unlisted telephone
numbers, personal addresses, credit information, and National Crime
Information Center data, causing losses in excess of $500,000.The hackers
installed a sniffer which compromised at least 15 telephone company
systems including records, maintenance, and operational control system,
and also illegally wiretapped the phone lines.The advanced level of
expertise of the hackers was comparable to telephone company experts,
and suggests that they could have disrupted telecommunications on a
national basis if they had wanted to.
In July, 1997, the owner of a computer
communications company sent, or caused to be sent, malicious computer
code which resulted in the redirection of computer communications away
from the computers of one of his competitors.This redirection of computer
communications resulted in a direct loss to the victim company of at
least $1,500,000.Additionally, millions of Internet users were denied
access to various affected Internet sites.
These are just a few examples of the
computer crime problem that we are seeing.But they illustrate the growing
problem of cybercrime, the international dimension of the problem, and
the increasing threat to our critical infrastructures.And, as I stated
earlier, they demonstrate that this is not simply a problem of enforcing
the law against imaginative criminals, but of protecting our economic
health and national security.
Now let me tell you what the FBI is
doing about it.On February 26 of this year, the FBI created the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC).The NIPC's mission is to detect,
deter, prevent, assess, warn, respond to, and investigate unlawful acts
involving computer and information technologies and unlawful acts, both
physical and cyber, that threaten or target our critical infrastructures.This
means we do not simply investigate and respond to attacks after they
occur, but we try to learn about them and prevent them beforehand.This
requires the collection and analysis of information gathered from all
available sources, and the dissemination of our analyses and of warnings
of possible attacks to potential victims, whether in the government
or private sector.
This broader mission also means that
we in the FBI, and indeed law enforcement as a whole, cannot do this
alone.Rather, this mission requires the combined efforts of many different
agencies.The Defense Department has a critical role to play because
its reliance on information technologies makes it a prime target for
our adversaries and because it holds much of the government's expertise
in defending against cyber attacks.Our intelligence agencies have an
important role because of their responsibility for gathering information
about threats from abroad.And other civilian agencies with jurisdiction
over critical infrastructures, such as the Departments of Treasury,
Energy,and Transportation, have similarly significant roles.
But this is also not just a role for
the federal government.State governments must be involved because they
own and operate some of the critical infrastructures and because their
agencies are often the first responders in the event of a crisis.
And, perhaps most importantly, this
mission requires the intensive involvement of the private sector.Private
industry owns and operates most of the infrastructures, so it must be
involved in helping us defend them.And it also has the greatest expertise
in the technical problems and solutions.
In recognition of the vital roles all
of these entities must play, the NIPC is founded on the notion of a
partnership.It creates a partnership by including representatives from
the other critical federal agencies, from state and local law enforcement,
and from private industry.This will foster the sharing of information
and expertise, and improve coordination among all the relevant actors
in the event of a crisis.And it will augment the physical presence of
these representatives by establishing electronic connectivity to the
many different entities in government and industry who might have, and
need, information about threats to our infrastructures.
Let me say at this point something
about what we are not.We are not the Nation's super-systems administrator,
responsible for physically securing everyone's systems against intruders
or advising on the latest security software or patches to fix vulnerabilities.That
role clearly must be filled by systems administrators in each company,
by chief information officers in government agencies, and by industry
groups and other entities with expertise in reducing vulnerabilities
and restoring service.Rather, our role is to help prevent intrusions
and attacks by gathering information about threats from sources that
are uniquely available to the government (such as from law enforcement
and intelligence sources), combining it with information voluntarily
provided by the private sector or obtained from open sources, conducting
analysis, and disseminating our analyses and warnings to all relevant
consumers.And if an attack does occur, our role is to serve as the federal
government's focal point for crisis response and investigation.That
job is big and difficult enough, so I don't want to create any unwarranted
expectations about what else we might do.
The NIPC incorporates and expands the
mission and personnel of the FBI's former Computer Investigations and
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) which was created in
1996 to coordinate the FBI's investigations and response to the increasing
problem of computer crime.The NIPC, located at FBI Headquarters in Washington,
D.C., consists of three sections. The Computer Investigations and Operations
Section (CIOS) is responsible for managing support to computer intrusion
investigations conducted by our Field Offices,providing and coordinating
technological support to all FBI investigations involving computers
and information technologies, and for developing and managing an interagency
Cyber Emergency Support Team (CEST) analogous to the Domestic Emergency
Support Team and Foreign Emergency Support Teams that are responsible
for responding to terrorist acts in the U.S. or abroad.In addition,
CIOS provides and coordinates subject matter experts, equipment, and
technological support to cyber investigators from our Field Offices
and other federal, state or local government agencies.
The Analysis and Warning Section (AWS)
provides analytical support for computer investigations, and serves
as the information clearing-house for research and analysis about physical
and cyber threats and unlawful acts that target the critical infrastructures
of the United States.It is charged with obtaining relevant information
from all sources -- law enforcement investigations, intelligence sources,
open sources, and voluntarily provided industry data -- analyzing it,
and disseminating its analyses and tactical warnings to relevant consumers.
The Training, Administration, and Outreach
Section (TAOS) has at its core the responsibility for coordinating the
training and continuing education of cyber investigators in the FBI
Field Offices, in other federal agencies, and in state and local law
enforcement; and of personnel in the public and private sector involved
in infrastructure protection.It also will direct our extensive outreach
efforts to FBI Field Offices, other government agencies, industry, and
academia, which are necessary to encourage the sharing of information
about threats, vulnerabilities, and technological developments.In addition,
the TAOS provides the administrative support that underlies and is necessary
to all of the other activities of the Center.
Let me note, finally, that we have
been in existence less than a month, so we are still very much in the
early stages of building the Center.We have a lot of work to do in order
to establish the necessary liaison with other agencies and the private
sector, and to put in place our personnel and equipment.This will take
time.But the Department of Justice and the FBI have taken an important
first step in establishing this Center, in recognizing the need for
an interagency and public-private partnership, and in realizing that
the new challenges of the next century require new ways of thinking
and creative solutions.
Thank you.
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