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Information
Bulletin: Guidance for Response to Ricin Delivered by Mail
Information Bulletin
Title: Guidance for Response to Ricin Delivered by Mail
Date: February 9, 2004
The widest dissemination of this material is encouraged and
authorized.
DHS intends to update this Bulletin should it receive
additional relevant information, including information provided
to it by the recipients. Based on this notification,
no change to the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level
is anticipated; the current HSAS level is YELLOW.
OVERVIEW
This is a joint DHS and FBI Information Bulletin. DHS Information
Bulletins communicate issues that pertain to the critical national
infrastructure and are for informational purposes only.
While DHS possesses no information indicating specific terrorist
targeting of U.S. critical infrastructures through the delivery
by mail of the toxin ricin, such targeting would be consistent
with certain terrorists' stated objectives to disrupt and undermine
vital economic interests in this country.
DETAILS
On the afternoon of February 2, 2004, Senate staff observed
gray granular powder on an automated mail opening system. Preliminary
field tests indicated the possible presence of a biological toxin.
Samples of the material were tested overnight at a government laboratory
and results indicated the presence of ricin. The three Senate Office
Buildings were closed and secured on February 3rd. The samples
were forwarded to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in Atlanta, Georgia and on February 4th three out of the four samples
tested positive. At this time no threat letter has been
identified and no threat has been received.
Past incidents involving the presence of ricin have occurred
in the United Sates and the United Kingdom. On October 15, 2003,
a
postal worker discovered a business-size envelope containing
the toxin ricin in a mail distribution facility in Greenville,
South
Carolina. The letter, which was addressed to the U.S. Department
of Transportation, did not pass through the postal system. In
January 2003, law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom searched
several locations in London as part of an ongoing counterterrorism
investigation and found small amounts of ricin, as well as equipment
that could be used in its production. In April 1991, several
members of a domestic extremist group in Minnesota extracted ricin
from castor beans and discussed using it against federal law enforcement
officers. The amount of ricin produced could have killed
more than 100 people if effectively delivered.
Background on Ricin
Ricin is a poison that can be made from the waste (mash) left
over from processing castor beans. Ricin can be made in the form
of an off-white powder, a mist, or a pellet or it can be dissolved
in water or weak acid. It would take a deliberate act to make
Ricin and use it to poison people. Ricin is one of several toxins
that
exert toxicity by inhibiting protein synthesis. Ricin can enter
the body through inhalation, ingestion, abraded (non-intact)
skin, mucosal membranes (e.g., eyes and nose), and injection.
Ricin poisoning
is not contagious, and person-to-person transmission does not
occur.
Toxicity
Exposure to ricin may occur through:
- Inhalation, skin, or eye contact: as an aerosol, powder, or
dust
- Ingestion: through contamination of food, water, or consumer
products
- Injection: directly through the skin
Ricin toxicity and lethality
can vary by dose and route of exposure. In
animal studies, inhalation and intravenous injection have been
shown as the most lethal routes. The lethal dose for humans,
by inhalation or injection, is estimated to be 5 - 10 mg/kg. Because
the ricin protein is large, it is not well absorbed orally or through
the skin. To date ricin poisonings have only occurred in
humans after ingestion or injection. Ricin is considered
to be a much more potent toxin when inhaled or injected compared
with other routes of exposure, however ricin would need to be dispersed
in particles smaller than 5 microns to be used as an effective
weapon via inhalation. It is technologically difficult to
produce ricin particles of this size and purity.
For more information about ricin go to: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/ricin/
SUGGESTED PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Suggested Actions for Mail Room, Postal and Shipping
Facility Operators
Two categories of actions are necessary : 1) Identifying and assessing
biological (including ricin) threats; 2) Managing biological threats
that appear credible.
1. Identifying and Assessing Biological Threats
Several commercial handheld
or test-strip ricin detection devices are available; however
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) have stated that the performance of these assays is unknown. While
many of these tests indicate a high false positive, they may be
more useful in ruling out the presence of ricin. These test
kits should only be used by trained and certified hazardous materials
professionals. If such testing is deemed necessary, personnel
should preserve original evidence for forensic analysis. Automated,
continuously monitoring bio-detection systems are available commercially;
however they may be cost-prohibitive for many companies.
Measures that can be taken without installing special detection
equipment are the same for most biological threats and are organized
according to whether the mail is opened or unopened and whether
it contains a written threat or an unidentified container:
Opened mail that is leaking a suspicious liquid or powder,
or mail that has a suspicious odor: If you open
a letter or package and see an unknown material, or if an unknown
material is leaking from the mail as a liquid, powder, or odor,
do not try to clean it up or otherwise disturb it. Set
the mail down on a stable surface and call the first responder
designated to respond to this type of threat, e.g., the HAZMAT
team at the local fire and rescue department.
Opened mail that contains a written threat: If
anyone in the organization opens a letter or package with or without
powder and discovers a written threat, such as a note that says "You
have been contaminated with ricin," put the package or letter down
on a stable surface and call the first responder designated to
deal with this type of threat. The mail center supervisor
or the first responder must ensure that local law enforcement authorities
and the FBI local field office are notified in either of these
events.
Unopened mail: Whenever a mail center
worker identifies an unopened package or letter as "suspicious",
a mail center supervisor or specially trained employee should examine
the mail piece to confirm that it meets the "suspicious" criteria
established for the location (e.g., it is covered with powder or
appears saturated from the inside). If confirmed, do not
open it. A supervisor or designated mail center worker who
is trained to confirm the identification must be available during
all working hours.
Next, determine if the
mail piece is addressed to a person who actually works in the
facility. If so, and if the addressee
can be located in a reasonable period of time, contact the addressee
and ask him or her to identify the package. If the addressee
recognizes the package and is certain it is not threatening, deliver
it. If the addressee does not recognize the package, or if
you cannot locate the addressee, attempt to contact the individual
listed on the return address to verify the contents of the package. If
you successfully contact the sender of the package, ask them to
provide a description of the contents, intended addressee, and
the reason it was mailed to your location. Provide this information
to the addressee for further verification.
If the addressee does
not recognize the package, or if you cannot locate the addressee,
do not open it. The supervisor or designated
mail center worker should call the previously designated first
responder. This first responder will be responsible for opening
the package in a controlled environment and following the appropriate
protocol for evaluation of the threat. A "controlled environment" may
be a glove box, hood with negative airflow and HEPA filters on
the exhaust airflow, or a similar device. When identifying
the first responder who will open suspicious letters or packages,
make sure they have a controlled environment available.
Mail that contains an unidentified secondary container: If
x-ray inspection shows a secondary container that may contain an
unknown material, or if you open a letter or package and discover
such a container, do not open or otherwise disturb the secondary
container. Treat the secondary container as suspicious, unopened
mail. As above, first call the addressee and see if they
can identify the container. If he or she cannot be located,
then call in the first responder designated to open suspicious
mail.
2. Managing
Biological Threats That Appear Credible
In the event that a trained first responder, after reviewing the
situation, determines that a possible biological hazard may actually
be present (i.e., a biological agent may have been released into
the workplace, or a biological agent may be present in a package
or envelope that has been opened), the first responder should take
the following steps or ensure that these activities are performed
where appropriate:
- Turn off the ventilation system, fans or window air conditioners
for the area of potential release.
- Turn off any high-speed mail processing equipment that may
have handled the suspicious mail piece.
- Make sure that the suspicious substance is not disturbed by
covering it
- Keep everyone out of any room(s) that may have been contaminated.
In addition, the first
responder should immediately call local law enforcement authorities
and the FBI Field Office and ask to
speak to the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) coordinator. The
FBI website is http://www.fbi.gov.
The FBI WMD coordinator will respond to the scene and will, in
conjunction with other federal, state, local, and internal experts,
conduct a threat assessment and, in conjunction with public health
officials, direct other actions to protect employees and the general
public.
Suggested Actions for First Responders
Ricin should only be
handled by trained and certified hazardous materials professionals.
Hazardous Materials Teams should be aware
that ricin mostly presents a particulate inhalation or splash hazard
depending on the preparation of the material. Personal protective
equipment (PPE) for first responders, including those who are decontaminating
victims at the scene, is generally determined by the Incident Commander
based on the mechanism of dispersal and whether dispersal is continuing. Preventing
droplets from contacting broken skin or mucosal membranes (e.g.,
the mouth or eyes) is important when decontaminating someone, but
airborne dispersal of ricin during decontamination is an unlikely
hazard. PPE can consist of a chemical-resistant suit with
gloves, air purifying respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus
and eye/face protection. Sampling, seizure, or transportation of
ricin should be completed only under the authority of or in coordination
with law enforcement.
Personnel who may have been exposed to ricin should wash the effected
area vigorously with soap and water. Equipment and supplies can
be decontaminated with a weak (0.5 percent) hypochlorite solution
(bleach) and/or soap and water.
Healthcare providers should report suspected or known cases of
ricin poisoning immediately to the regional poison control center
(telephone, 1-800-222-1222) and to local or state public health
agencies, which will report cases to the CDC, and other federal
agencies including the DHS.
DHS encourages
recipients of this Information Bulletin to report information
concerning suspicious or criminal activity
to local law enforcement, local FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force
or the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The
HSOC may be contacted at: Phone: (202) 282-8101 or by email at HSCenter@dhs.gov.
This information is available for print as a PDF
file (5 pages - 148KB)
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