Current
and Projected National Security Threats
to
the United States
Vice
Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy
Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency
Statement
For the Record
Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
24
February 2004
INTRODUCTION
Last
year I testified that Defense Intelligence was at war on a global
scale. That war has intensified. Defense Intelligence
is providing intelligence essential to defeat our nation's enemies
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Iraq and Afghanistan. In
addition, we are intent on identifying emerging challenges to
our homeland, allies and interests. Providing the highest
quality defense-related intelligence to our war fighters, defense
planners and national security policy makers is essential for
the successful accomplishment of their tasks.
The
events of the last several years and our successes are transforming
the strategic environment. Defense Intelligence must identify
those new opportunities and challenges to support our nation's
security strategy. In addition to these daunting tasks,
we are called upon to "know something about everything all the
time." The potential for surprise is an enduring reality,
especially when we are simultaneously engaged on several fronts. We
must mitigate the impact of surprise by devoting resources to
broad situational awareness and quickly generate needed intelligence
on any security issue as disturbing trends or opportunities are
identified.
ENABLE
SWIFT DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY
Global
Terrorism. During the last year, notable progress
has been achieved in the GWOT. We have shrunk the
favorable operating environments for al-Qaida and other terrorist
groups and captured several al-Qaida senior operational coordinators
and a significant number of terrorists. We have disrupted
several terrorist operations. Nevertheless, Al-Qaida
remains the greatest terrorist threat to our homeland. Al-Qaida
expressed its intent to stage another wave of attacks in
the US. Aircraft hijackings remain a concern.
Despite
25 months of sustained pressure, al-Qaida continues to demonstrate
it is an adaptable and capable threat. Their network has
directed numerous attacks since 9/11, most recently in Istanbul
and Riyadh. Al-Qaida continues to enjoy considerable support
and is able to recruit terrorists. Capable but less experienced
individuals are replacing those captured.
Al-Qaida's
planning has become more decentralized and has shifted to softer
targets. The network increasingly generates attacks in
alliance with like-minded groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in
Southeast Asia. The arrest of senior al-Qaida and JI leader
Hambali last summer eliminated a significant link between the
two groups. However, the al-Qaida/JI nexus will endure
because the two groups have a shared ideology and experience
during the period of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. While
al-Qaida does not control the daily operations of JI or affiliated
groups, congruence of broad goals promise continued attacks against
US interests and our partners in the GWOT.
Al-Qaida
and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We
remain concerned about rogue scientists and the potential that
state actors are providing, or will provide, technological assistance
to terrorist organizations.
Terrorist
use of man-portable air defense system (MANPAD) missiles against
civilian and military aircraft was underscored following the
attack last fall against a commercial cargo aircraft in Baghdad
and the failed attack in Mombassa in 2002. A MANPAD attack
against civilian aircraft would produce large number of casualties,
international publicity and a significant economic impact on
civil aviation. These systems are highly portable, easy
to conceal, inexpensive, available in the global weapons market
and instruction manuals are on the internet. Commercial
aircraft are not equipped with countermeasures and commercial
pilots are not trained in evasive measures. An attack
could occur with little or no warning. Terrorists may
attempt to capitalize on these vulnerabilities.
Iraq
is the latest jihad for Sunni extremists. Iraq has the
potential to serve as a training ground for the next generation
of terrorists where novice recruits develop their skills, junior
operatives hone their organizational and planning capabilities,
and relations mature between individuals and groups as was the
case during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and extremist
operations in the Balkans.
Although
not presently linked to attacks on the GWOT Coalition, Lebanese
Hizballah remains capable of terrorist operations on a global
scale. Hizballah has extensive and well-honed capabilities
and may have contingency plans in place for attacks in Iraq. The
group's global presence makes it a potential threat to our interests
worldwide.
The
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) remains the most
potent terrorist threat to US interests in Colombia. During
the past year, the FARC conducted multiple attacks in Colombia
and since early 2003 has held three US citizens hostage. Its
attack against a Bogota bar, last fall, injured three Americans
and 70 Colombians, killing one. The continued emphasis
on urban terrorism, especially in Bogota, increases the risk
to US citizens. At the same time, the FARC's perception that
US support is the direct cause of the Colombian government's
recent successes, increases the likelihood the group will target
US interests in 2004.
We
are also increasingly concerned over "Ungoverned Spaces," defined
as geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective
control. Terrorist groups and narco-traffickers use these
areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, relatively
free from interference. There are numerous "Ungoverned
Spaces" around the world such as the western provinces in Pakistan,
portions of the southern Philippines, Indonesian islands, Chechnya,
rural areas in Burma, several areas in Africa and areas in South
America. Ungoverned spaces include densely populated cities
where terrorists can congregate and prepare for operations with
relative impunity. I believe these areas will play an
increasingly important role in the War on Terrorism as al-Qaida,
its associated groups and other terrorist organizations use these
areas as bases for operations.
A
number of factors combine to present a terrorist threat to the
United States for years to come. Despite recent reforms,
Arab populations on the whole live in societies that lack political
and economic freedoms, effective government and good educational
systems. Literacy and education levels were lower than
in many other developing regions. Especially in madrasas,
teaching methods and religious curriculum emphasizing rote learning
produce students without skills needed to compete for jobs and
anti-Western in beliefs. At the national level, their
poorly educated workforces limit ability to compete in the global
economy. Not surprisingly, many Arab states suffer
high unemployment. "Demographic bubbles" which burden
government services and economies promise continued problems. These
factors in combination will feed Arab public sentiment which
is increasingly opposed to US policies. Radical Islam
has the potential to be a force in many areas of the world for
decades to come.
Iraq. The
security situation in Iraq varies by region. The north,
where Kurds maintained control after the fall of the regime and
have a largely intact infrastructure is quiet. The south
also remains comparatively quiet. Moderate Shia clerics
and the Shia population support Coalition efforts and oppose
Former Regime Elements (FREs). However, the situation
could become volatile. Shia backing for the Coalition
is based largely on expectations that a political structure based
on an elected representative government serves their interests.
Insurgent
attacks in central Iraq account for the vast majority of all
incidents. Anti-Coalition activity centers in Sunni-dominated
areas, especially west of Baghdad, around Mosul and along the
Baghdad-Tikrit corridor -- areas home to former regime military
and security members. Saddam's capture likely reduced
the morale and effectiveness of some resistance members. However,
many FREs and party loyalists are motivated by Arab and Iraqi
nationalism and self-interest and will continue the resistance,
opposing the foreign presence and emerging new order. That
said, it appears much of the Sunni population has not decided
whether to back the Coalition or support the opposition. The
key factor is whether stability can be established and whether
viable alternatives to the Ba'athists or Islamists emerge.
We
believe FREs led by remnants of the Baath Party are responsible
for the majority of anti-Coalition attacks. Their strategy appears
to be multi-faceted: attempting to undermine the Coalition, creating
insecurity, attacking cooperating Iraqis and assassinating leading
figures, and driving out international organizations. The FREs
have adjusted to Coalition tactics, and now employ more "stand-off" weapons,
such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) and mortars.
The
number of anti-Coalition attacks has declined over the past months
from a high in November during Ramadan. Additionally, the Coalition
has captured or killed 46 of the 55 most-wanted former regime
members. Efforts to capture the remaining senior former regime
figures, in particular, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, are supported
almost daily by new intelligence.
Foreign
fighters, while fewer in numbers than the FREs, are a threat. Fighters
from numerous countries are reported to have entered Iraq. They
are motivated by Arab nationalism, extremist religious ideology
and/or resentment of U.S. policies and beliefs. Most are assessed
to be linked to groups that hope to gain notoriety and increased
support by conducting attacks in Iraq.
In
addition to our other efforts in Iraq, supporting the search
for CAPT Michael Scott Speicher remains a high priority. We continue
focused efforts to determine his status. These efforts will continue
until we have a full accounting.
Afghanistan. Attacks
by Taliban and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) since early spring
of last year, reached their highest levels since the collapse
of the Taliban government. The majority of the attacks
are ineffective rocket or bomb attacks. However, recent
attacks show increasing accuracy and sophistication. Violence
against humanitarian assistance and reconstruction personnel
has led some organizations to suspend operations. Continued
reductions of United Nations activity may negatively impact the
Bonn Process. Upcoming political events such as the June
2004 presidential elections may prompt increases in violence.
Afghanistan's
new constitution was approved in early January. This paves
the way for a presidential election this summer and legislative
elections later this year. The show of support among Loya
Jirga delegates for President Hamid Karzai bodes well for his
political strength and chances in the presidential election.
Karzai's
ability to use his growing political strength to encourage compliance
with his reform agenda may provide long term stability, but could
result in near term tensions. President Hamid Karzai remains
critical to stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he
remains the only individual capable of maintaining the trust
of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group (Pashtuns) and support
of other ethnic minorities. A Taliban insurgency
that continues to target humanitarian assistance and reconstruction
efforts is a serious threat, potentially eroding commitments
to stability and progress in Afghanistan.
Pakistani
assistance remains a key to a successful outcome. Cultural,
religious and political considerations have limited the central
government's commitment to disrupting Taliban operations, support
and sanctuaries. However, Pakistan has been more active
against al-Qaida infrastructure. Pakistani military operations
have contributed to the disruption of al-Qaida sanctuaries, particularly
in South Waziristan.
RELIABLE
STRATEGIC WARNING ACROSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL THREATS
Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Missile Proliferation The
trend with respect to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
missiles remains troublesome. There is continuing
terrorist interest in acquiring and using WMD, especially
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. North
Korea's reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and
Iran's admission to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) about years of covert nuclear activity reinforce concerns. The
recent Libyan disclosure and pledge to divest itself of WMD
and long range missiles programs and admit international
inspectors is a positive sign. Other
states continue to develop biological and chemical weapon
capabilities. Numerous states continue to improve
their ballistic and cruise missiles, focusing on longer range,
better accuracy, deployment of new units and use of underground
facilities. Proliferation of WMD- and missile-related
technologies continues and new supply networks challenge
US counter-proliferation efforts.
Nuclear
Weapons Russia's nuclear weapons
stockpile continues to decline. DIA believes the number of
weapons in China, India, Pakistan and North Korea will grow. We
are also concerned about Syrian interest in nuclear technologies
that could support a weapons program.
We
believe North Korea has nuclear warheads from plutonium produced
prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework. After expelling IAEA
personnel in late 2002, North Korea reactivated facilities at
Yongbyon and claims it reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods
from the Yongbyon reactor, adding plutonium for additional weapons. Pyongyang
is expected to increase its weapons inventory by the end of the
decade through plutonium production and a possible un-located
uranium enrichment capability. North Korea's current proliferation
activities are troubling. The potential for the
North to market nuclear weapons and technology is also troubling.
In
2003, Iran admitted to the IAEA that it had a covert uranium
enrichment program for many years, removing any doubt about the
military intent of their program. Tehran now claims it
will halt uranium enrichment activity, in exchange for nuclear
technologies. Faced with international pressure, Iran
signed, but has not yet ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty's Additional Protocol, allowing for more intrusive IAEA
inspections. However, we remain concerned about Iran's
ultimate nuclear intentions.
In
South Asia, India and Pakistan have well-developed nuclear infrastructures
and small stockpiles of weapons. Pakistan recently developed
the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons use. Weapon
stockpiles in India and Pakistan are expected to grow.
Chemical
and Biological Weapons Numerous states
have chemical and biological warfare programs. Some
have produced and weaponized agents, while others are in
research and development stages. Contributing to the
threat is potential development of new agents with toxicities
exceeding those of traditional agents, or with properties
that could challenge existing countermeasures. While
we have no intelligence suggesting states are planning to
give terrorist groups these weapons, we remain concerned
about, and alert to, the possibility.
These
weapons are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear
munitions. Supporting technologies are relatively inexpensive
and readily available because they have legitimate roles in medical,
pharmaceutical and agricultural industries.
Ballistic
Missiles In addition to Russia and China,
the United States will likely face intercontinental ballistic
missile threats from North Korea. Iran may have the
capability to field an intercontinental ballistic missile
by 2015. Russia's force will continue to be the most
robust and lethal.
China
is modernizing its ballistic missile forces and is fielding increasingly
accurate solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles that will enhance survivability
and provide Beijing flexibility. China is improving its
silo-based, liquid-propellant ICBMs and is testing a new mobile,
solid-propellant ICBM, the 8,000-km-range DF-31. It also
is developing programs for an extended-range version of the DF-31. The
number, reliability, survivability and accuracy of Chinese strategic
missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase during
the next decade.
Based
on a space launch vehicle program, we judge Iran will have the
technical capability to develop an intercontinental ballistic
missile. However, we do not know whether Iran has decided
to field such a missile. Tehran declared its 1,300-km Shahab-3
medium-range ballistic missile operational last summer.
North
Korea continues to develop its Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental
ballistic missile. This missile could deliver a nuclear
warhead to parts of the United States in a two stage variant
and target all of North America if a third stage is added. Press
reports indicate North Korea is preparing to field a new IRBM,
about the size and dimensions of the Russian SS-N-6 SLBM. If
this is true, such a missile could reach US facilities in Okinawa,
Guam and possibly Alaska. North Korea is the world's leading
supplier of missiles and related production technologies, selling
to countries in the Middle East and North Africa and to Pakistan.
Cruise
Missiles The numbers and capabilities
of cruise missiles will increase, fueled by maturation of
land-attack and anti-ship cruise missile programs in Europe,
Russia and China; sales of complete systems; and the spread
of advanced dual-use technologies and materials. The
threat from today's anti-ship cruise missiles is challenging
and will increase with the introduction of more advanced
guidance and propulsion technologies. Proliferation
of land attack cruise missiles will also increase the threat
to our forward based military forces and provide area denial
weapons against potential contingency operations.
Today,
very few countries, to include Russia, possess land-attack cruise
missiles. China is expected to field its first dedicated
LACM soon. China is developing and procuring anti-ship
cruise missiles capable of being launched from aircraft, surface
ships, submarines and land that will be more capable of penetrating
defenses.
In
the next ten years, we
expect other countries to join Russia, China and France as major
exporters in cruise missiles. India,
in partnership with Russia, will begin production of the PJ-10,
an anti-ship and land attack cruise missile, this year and may
export the system.
Proliferation Russia,
China, and North Korea support various WMD and missile programs,
especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Russian
entities support missile and civil nuclear programs in China,
Iran and India, and to a lesser degree in Syria. Some
of these nuclear technologies could have weapons applications. Chinese
companies remain involved with nuclear and missile programs in
Pakistan and Iran. In some cases, entities from Russia
and China are involved without the knowledge of their governments. North
Korea is the world's leading supplier of missiles and related
technologies. We also see evidence of what is termed "secondary
proliferation," when countries who previously imported weapons
or weapons technology begin indigenous production and export
of those systems. The most disturbing example of this
trend is the linkage of North Korean, Libyan and Iranian enrichment
programs to Pakistani technology.
Information
Operations (IO). The information operations
threat consists of capabilities such as electronic warfare,
propaganda, denial and deception, and computer network attack
to affect human or automated decisionmaking processes. Some
of these target infrastructures such as US logistics, command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance and domestic economic infrastructure. Several
adversaries are pursuing information operations focused on
select capabilities such as propaganda and denial and deception. Russia
and China have adopted more comprehensive approaches with
multiple capabilities. Chinese military theorists
are developing information operations doctrines, targeting
both Western and regional nations that will pose a long-term
strategic threat to US interests.
Many
adversaries have demonstrated skill in misinformation and disinformation
campaigns that target the United States and third parties to
undermine US interests. The threat to computer networks
is extremely dynamic, with growing capabilities that are easily
proliferated. Numerous distributed denial of service techniques,
to include viruses and worms, could be used to shut down or disrupt
computers in the lead up to or during a conflict. Most
disturbing is that the basic tools are readily available on the
Internet and can be customized by adversaries to fit their needs. We
expect the IO threat to grow.
General
Technology Proliferation. The situation remains
unchanged from my testimony last year. Advances in information
technology, biotechnology, communications, materials, micro-manufacturing,
and weapon development are having a significant impact on
the way militaries and terrorist groups organize, plan, train
and fight. Globalization of "R&D intensive" capabilities,
such as computer hardware and software, biotechnology and
nanotechnology, is allowing smaller militaries, groups, and
even individuals' access to capabilities previously limited
to those of the major powers. Integration, advancements
and unanticipated applications of emerging technologies make
the future and, correspondingly, our military strengths and
vulnerabilities, extremely difficult to predict. While
DIA cannot identify with specificity, some aspects of our
military advantage will erode. Technological surprise is
of great concern and we are watching this area intensely.
Global
Defense Spending. Non-US global defense
spending which we reported last year dropped 50% over the
past decade, will likely increase during the next five years. The
improving global economy is allowing increased funding at
moderate rates. Defense spending will enable countries
to pursue selective force modernization.
Globalization. Globalization
remains an overwhelming force that presents security challenges. Terrorists,
proliferators of illicit weapons and military technology, narco-traffickers
and alien smugglers are making increasing use of the world's
financial, communication and transportation systems. Rapid
change from transforming industries and infusion of foreign products,
media and ideas is outstripping the ability of many governments
and societies to adjust politically, economically and culturally. Portions
of the population in many of these countries are instigating
a backlash against the West and the United States, in particular. This
backlash is one factor in extremist movements such as al-Qaida
in the Islamic world and political instability in a broad range
of countries. Our challenge is to develop collection and
analytical skills to track and intercept the threatening things
and people traveling around the world, and understand and predict
instability and the social backlash that threaten our citizens
and interests.
International
Crime. Criminal groups in Western Europe,
China, Colombia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia
are involved in illicit transfers of arms and military technologies,
narcotics trafficking and alien smuggling. We continue
to identify links between terrorism and organized crime. For
example, the Afghan drug trade is a source of revenue and
logistic support for Taliban and other opposition groups. Elements
of al-Qaida traffic in opium and heroin. In addition,
we are concerned that criminal groups will use their established
networks to traffic in Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorist
movement.
Uneven
Economic and Demographic Growth. Uneven economic
and demographic growth will remain a source of instability. The
poorest countries are almost universally those with the fastest
population growth. High birth rates create demographic
momentum as large groups of young people reach child-bearing
age. As a result, much of the world population will
remain below internationally recognized poverty standards.
This is a problem not only for the very poor countries, but
middle income ones as well. Middle Eastern, South
East Asian and African states are experiencing a "demographic
bubble" (34% of Egyptians, 43% of Saudi Arabians, 42% of
Afghans, 36% of Filipinos, 43% of Liberians and 48% of Congolese
(DROC) are less than 15 years of age). Their economies
and government services are not meeting the demands of growing
populations. Education systems, as I spoke to earlier in
my testimony, are a critical factor for development. Inadequate
education systems can mean countries and even regions are
not capable of taking advantage of the opportunities of the
global economy. The gap between the rich and the poor
grows larger. Meanwhile, the communications revolution
gives the poor a clearer view of the world's wealth, fueling
resentment against their own governments and the developed
world.
North
Korea. Pyongyang's open pursuit of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems remains a serious challenge. Pyongyang
considers its nuclear weapons program critical to regime
survival. North Korean media reports suggest Kim Chong-il
believes the speed and success of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) underscores the ineffectiveness of the North's conventional
forces and the value of nuclear weapons.
North
Korea's approach with respect to nuclear weapons is assessed
to be designed to achieve the maximum concessions from the US
and other regional powers to ensure its own political and economic
survival. While Kim Chong il may be willing to abandon
his nuclear weapons program, turn over the existing plutonium
stockpiles and accept a vigorous inspection regime, we do not
know the specific conditions which the North would require to
reach an agreement.
North
Korea People's Army remains capable of inflicting hundreds of
thousands of casualties and severe damage on the South. North
Korean missile forces can also attack Japan. Internally,
the regime in Pyongyang appears stable, but there are many unknowns. Kim
Chong-il's security services maintain tight control over the
domestic population.
North
and South Korea cooperate in economic, transportation, and social
sectors, but the South has made little headway on security issues. Without
Seoul's assistance North Korea might be much less stable.
China. Chinese
leadership transition since 2002 has progressed smoothly. The
new leaders are unified in their focus on domestic stability
and economic growth, maintaining the same security priorities
and calculus as their predecessors. Former President Jiang
Zemin retains control of the armed forces as Central Military
Commission Chairman, providing continuity to Chinese military
modernization and strategic direction.
China's
leaders continue support for the global war on terrorism, in
part because they see opportunities for international cooperation
against domestic separatist problems--predominantly the ethnic-Uighur
communities in western China. Beijing's criticism of the
US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and what they consider
US unilateralism has been muted. However, Beijing likely
fears a long-term US presence on its borders. The Chinese
government has also limited its criticism of Coalition military
operations in Iraq.
China
is keenly interested in Coalition military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq and is using lessons from those operations to guide
People's Liberation Army modernization and strategy. Beijing
was impressed with US ground forces' performance during the Iraq
war. While several years will be needed to fully incorporate
lessons, China's military leaders are reevaluating some of their
military assumptions.
China
continues to develop or import modern weapons aimed at enabling
it to fight and win wars on or near its periphery. Acquisition
priorities include surface combatants and submarines, air defense,
fourth-generation fighters, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles,
space and counter-space systems, and modern ground equipment. The
PLA is also cutting approximately 200,000 personnel to streamline
the force, reduce costs, and support modernization. While
making progress, the PLA continues to face significant technical
and operational challenges.
Domestic
political events on Taiwan are the principal determinant of short
term stability in the Taiwan Straits. Beijing is
carefully monitoring developments in advance of Taipei's March
2004 presidential elections and referendum. We see no
indications of preparations for large-scale military exercises
to influence Taiwan voters. Most of China's efforts
appear to be diplomatic, oriented toward convincing the United
States to constrain Taiwan. China's leaders see last year's
enactment of Taiwan's referendum-enabling legislation as a legal
basis for prospective independence. China's leaders also
are concerned that Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian would interpret
re-election in 2004 as a popular endorsement for Taiwan independence. Beijing
will not tolerate Taiwanese independence and will use military
force regardless of the costs or risks.
Russia. After
nearly a decade of declining activity, the Russian military is
beginning to exercise its forces in mission areas it believes
are essential for deterrence, global reach and rapid reaction. Open
source reporting confirms that ground force exercise activity
in 2003 doubled that of 2002; training for use of non-strategic
nuclear forces continues; and Russia desires to have the ability
for its Navy and Air Force to operate globally, as evidenced
in their joint exercises in the Indian and Pacific Oceans in
2003. Russian military spending has increased in real terms
in the past four years, in line with its improving economy. Additionally,
we expect modest increases in the procurement of new weapons. Improvements
will continue unless Russia suffers an economic setback – especially
a significant decrease in the price of oil.
Moscow
is attempting to reclaim great power status. Russian leaders
believe an improving military supports its foreign policies and
conveys the image of an active global power capable of asserting
it national interests. It also supports the leaders'
domestic political position. Additionally, Russia is improving
its relations with some countries, most notably France, China,
and India, in pursuit of a "multi-polar" world and to enhance
its arms sales.
Russian
military leaders were surprised by OIF's speed, effectiveness
and low casualties, but not by the operation's ultimate success.
Proponents of Western-style military reforms believe the results
demonstrate the need for change in the Russian armed forces. However,
they face resistance from an entrenched bureaucracy and senior
leaders with vested interests in the status quo. OIF reinforced
previous Russian assessments of the need for precision strike
capabilities and improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
systems. Russian military leaders recognize the need for
more resources, but economic realities will prevent dramatic
increases in military expenditures.
Russian
leaders see OIF as an embodiment of US unilateralism and believe
US actions have weakened the GWOT alliance. Despite these
views, Russia voted in favor of several US-backed UN Security
Council Resolutions. Moscow believes the United Nations
should have the lead in establishing an Iraqi government. They
will also work to ensure Russian commercial access to post OIF
Iraq and repayment of some of their loans to the previous Iraqi
regime .
President
Putin and other Russian leaders reacted calmly to the latest
round of NATO enlargement and are working to improve relations
within NATO. However, many maintain the traditional Russian
fear of military encirclement, citing potential of US military
rebasing and suspicions that Washington is not interested in
ratifying the adopted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
or extending it to the Baltic States. They will oppose
Ukraine's, Georgia's and Azerbaijan's efforts to join NATO.
The
Chechen war continues after more than four years and is a drain
on the Russian military. Moscow rejects negotiations to
end the war, but has not been able to defeat the guerrillas. Approximately
65,000-75,000 Russian troops remain in Chechnya. Official
casualties approach Soviet losses in Afghanistan. However,
Chechnya remains a minor issue for most Russians and has not
threatened President Putin politically. Nevertheless, Chechen
extremists remain capable of headline-grabbing attacks in many
areas of Russia.
Iran. Iran
remains wary of the large US force presence in Iraq. However,
fears of war between the US and Iran have eased and most Iranians
are indifferent to the US presence. Nonetheless, a substantial
minority strongly distrusts US motives in the region. Iranian
attitudes will be shaped by Washington's ability to improve the
political and economic situation of ordinary Iraqis, especially
the Shia.
With
the exception of naval forces, Iran's military modernization
has been stagnant. In reaction to OIF, Iran publicly announced
implementation of an asymmetric strategy emphasizing lightly
armed but numerous guerrilla forces. The only addition
to Iran's air and air defense inventory is a new IRGC Air Force
squadron of Su-25 close air support aircraft. Iran's Navy,
the region's most capable, can temporarily disrupt maritime traffic
through the Strait of Hormuz using a layered force of KILO Class
diesel submarines, ship- and shore-based antiship cruise missiles
and naval mines.
On
the domestic scene, the hope among Iranians that President Khatami
could institute change has faded. Conservatives retain
control, and reformists are not mounting a challenge to their
authority. Although Iran is stable for now, the regime
must address social and economic problems if it is to ease public
frustration and the potential for future unrest.
Israeli-Palestinian
Violence. The Israeli Palestinian conflict
remains basically unchanged from last year. It furthers
anti-American sentiment, increasing the likelihood of terrorism
and increasing pressure on moderate Middle East regimes. While
Israeli-Palestinian violence continues, the intensity and
fatality levels decreased this past fall. Nevertheless,
violence could flare suddenly.
Periodic
attacks along Israel's northern border could escalate, drawing
in Syria and Lebanon. In October, Israel retaliated for
a terrorist attack by striking a terrorist training camp in Syria. Israeli
leaders warned they would hold Syria responsible for future terror
attacks by groups it harbors or sponsors.
A
US diplomatic convoy entering the Gaza Strip in October 2003
was deliberately targeted with an improvised mine. DIA
believes this attack to be an isolated incident. We have
no credible intelligence that a major Palestinian terrorist group
is currently targeting US facilities and persons.
KNOW
SOMETHING ABOUT EVERYTHING
Pressures
in the Islamic World. The process
of sorting through competing visions of what it means to
be a Muslim state in the modern era continues. As
stated earlier in my testimony, we are particularly concerned
over the stability of many of our Arab partners because of
their poor economic conditions, ineffective government institutions
and "youth bulge." Arab public sentiment is increasingly
opposed to US policies according to recent polls, increasing
pressures on governments who support the US. Support
for the war on terrorism is low, ranging from 56 percent
in Kuwait to 2 percent among Jordanians and Palestinians. Support
for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable
ratings in Morocco declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27
percent in spring of last year and in Jordan from 25 percent
in 2002 to only 1 percent in May 2003. The percentage
of Saudi's expressing confidence in the United States dropped
from 63% in May of 2000 to 11% in October 2003. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington's perceived
pro-Israeli bias, was cited in some polls as a leading reason
for anti-US sentiment. These conditions and increasing
anti-US sentiment provide sustenance for radical political
Islam at the expense of moderate elements.
Many
of our partners weathered stresses within their countries during
OIF because of the short duration of the conflict, acquiescence
to expression of moderate levels of anti-US sentiments and protests,
and reliance on their strong military and security forces. Challenges
to stability and continued support for the war on terrorism remain. Additionally,
the assassination of a few key leaders could quickly change support
for pro-US policies.
Pakistan President
Musharraf faces significant political and economic challenges. He
was recently the target of two sophisticated, well-planned assassination
attempts. His support for the global war on terrorism, crackdown
on indigenous Islamic extremists, Afghan policy, restrictions on
Kashmiri militants and attempts to improve relations with India
have all increased his vulnerability. Popular hostility
to the US is growing, driven in particular by Islamabad's support
for US counter-terrorism efforts. Opposition constrains
his range of options.
Musharraf's
viability depends on continued support from his military. He
appears to retain the support of this core constituency. However,
the two recent attempts on Musharraf suggest insider knowledge. He
remains at high risk of assassination. If Musharraf were
assassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's new leader would
erode pro-US policies. The extent and pace of this erosion
will depend on how Musharraf departs and who replaces him.
Tension
Between India and Pakistan Since Prime
Minister Vajpayee's "hand of friendship" speech last spring
and successful South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) conference in Islamabad this January, India and Pakistan
have taken a series of steps to defuse tensions from the
2001/02 crisis. These include restoring high commissioners,
resuming transportation links, building people-to-people
contacts, observing a cease-fire along the Line of Control
and pledging to engage in dialogue on all bilateral issues
including Kashmir. With the underlying causes of the
Kashmir dispute unresolved and continued but reduced cross
border infiltration, relations could rapidly deteriorate
in the wake of another spectacular terrorist attack or political
assassination. Both sides retain large forces close
to the Line of Control in Kashmir and continue to develop
their WMD and missile programs. Pakistan views its
WMD programs as its only viable alternative to India's improving
conventional capabilities.
Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia The
Egyptian government remains in control of the country. Egypt's
multiple, overlapping security agencies effectively manage
protests and political dissent. Cairo seeks closer
official cooperation and consultation with Washington in
promoting stability and security in Iraq but is limited by
public discontent over US regional policies. Cairo
also is actively pushing the various Palestinian factions
to agree to a cease-fire and return to the negotiation table
with Israel.
The
Jordanian government remains stable, largely owing to the loyalty
of the military and security forces to a very popular King. The
government is accelerating political and economic reform in the
face of chronic economic and social pressures. King
Abdallah has acknowledged that terrorism remains a threat?citing
the bombings of the UN headquarters and the Jordanian embassy
in Iraq last year. Jordan's position has been steadfast
in denouncing terrorism, and Jordanian Foreign Minister Muasher
has reiterated Jordan's commitment to cooperate with all countries
and multilateral efforts in the fight against terrorism.
Despite
recent terrorist attacks, the Saudi regime's control of national
resources, the security infrastructure and international support
will enable the regime to survive. The backlash from last
year's bombings actually strengthened public support for the
global war on terrorism and prompted the government to seek increased
international counterterrorism cooperation with the United States
and other allies. At the same time, the Saudi public opposes
US policies in the region.
Indonesia President
Megawati, who faces election this summer, has increased political
stability in Indonesia. Still, social and economic problems
persist and Islamic extremists continue to foster terrorism and
sectarian unrest. National unity remains a core preoccupation,
with major security operations containing, but not defeating
secessionists.
Terrorist
bombings in Bali in 2002 and last year in Jakarta mobilized government
efforts, leading to arrests and convictions of many Jemaah Islamiyah
figures. Indonesia's largely moderate Islamic population
rejects terrorism but often is wary of US policies in the Middle-East. Jakarta's
cooperation on counter-terrorism will, to varying degrees, continue. However,
the government will avoid close identification with the US and
treat Islamic militant figures with caution through the elections. If
President Megawati is re-elected, the Indonesian government will
likely strengthen its counter-terrorism cooperation.
Philippines. Like
President Megawati in Indonesia, President Arroyo has increased
political stability in the Philippines and support for the GWOT.
She is also standing for re-election in 2004. The country
suffers from an active communist insurgency and Muslim separatist
groups, some linked to al-Qaida. None, individually
or combined, can overthrow the government. At the same time,
government security forces are overextended and cannot deal effectively
with the problems. Arroyo survived a failed coup by junior
officers protesting corruption and pay inequity in the military
in summer 2003. We do not expect a repeat of this incident
prior to the May 2004 elections, despite the fact that coup rumors
persist.
Philippine
support for the war on terrorism will continue. US military
operations in the Philippines are limited by their constitution
and political opposition. Law enforcement efforts have
actually been more successful than the military in capturing
terrorists. Manila has contributed a 100 member contingent
to Iraq and is willing to contribute more if funding issues are
resolved. They are looking to benefit from reconstruction
contracts.
Liberia. Liberia
is representative of many countries in Africa suffering from
widespread government corruption, illicit arms flow and mercenaries. Liberia
is on a path to recovery after 14 years of civil war, owing to
the ouster of regional troublemaker and former President Charles
Taylor, the signing of a comprehensive peace accord, the intervention
of UN peacekeepers and the installation of a National Transition
Government (NTGL). Even so, power struggles within the
NTGL and factional fighting in the interior will persist until
the UN deploys forces in other parts of Liberia to ensure demobilization
and disarmament of targeted groups.
OTHER
EVOLVING TRENDS
There
are threats, both passive and active, to Defense Intelligence's
collection capabilities. Information is the life blood
of analysis and analysis is the foundation for knowledge. To
ensure information superiority we must understand and counter
those threats.
The
Counterintelligence Threat. Threats
from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state
actors, represent a growing challenge as they become more
complex and elusive. These actors target a widening
range of US interests, from military and intelligence plans,
operations and capabilities, to the growing threats to US
economic, technological, scientific and industrial competencies. Adversaries
and traditional allies alike target US capabilities.
Cover,
Concealment, Camouflage, Denial and Deception. Key
target countries have increased cover, concealment, camouflage,
denial and deception efforts to thwart US technical intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance and clandestine human intelligence
collection. Virtually every state that perceives itself
threatened by US military power and intelligence is assessing
the performance of US tactics, weapons and reconnaissance
capabilities in OIF to develop more effective countermeasures
against US high-technology warfare.
Underground
Facilities. Use of underground facilities
(UGFs) to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic missiles, leadership,
and other activities is expanding. Growing numbers
of UGFs are especially notable among nations with WMD programs. In
2003, we have observed more than a dozen new military or
regime-related UGFs under construction.
Space
and Space-Denial Capabilities. Adversaries
recognize the importance of space and are improving their
access to space platforms. Worldwide, the availability
of space products and services is accelerating, fueled by
proliferation of advanced satellite technologies, including
small satellite systems, and increased cooperation among
states and increased activity by consortia. These
developments provide unprecedented communications, reconnaissance
and targeting capabilities to our adversaries because most
space systems have military as well as civil applications.
CLOSING
THOUGHTS
The
US faces an assortment of existing and developing challenges,
ranging from growing arsenals of nuclear armed intercontinental
ballistic missiles, to terrorists potentially armed with WMD
or IO weapons, to insurgents and extremists attempting to destabilize
our most important partners in GWOT. At the same time,
advances in technology and increasing globalization have made
our job of collection and analysis more difficult. Further
complicating our task is the fact that some of our most productive
and sensitive intelligence collection systems or their capabilities
have been compromised, allowing adversaries to develop passive
and active counter-measures.
My
predecessors and I have testified that the defense intelligence
threat paradigm, which focused primarily on the military capabilities
of a small set of potential adversarial states no longer addresses
the challenges we face. Traditional concepts of security,
threat, deterrence, intelligence, warning, and superiority are
outdated. We must transform our people, organizations
and capabilities if we are to meet these new conditions, just
as our adversaries pursue new ways to diminish our strengths.
As
I testified last year, the intelligence transformation initiatives – intended
to improve our capability to provide warning, increase the quality
and relevance of our all-source analysis, better facilitate effects-based
campaigns, supply greater insights into adversaries' intentions,
enhance preparation of the intelligence and operational battle-space
and more effectively support homeland defense – continue
to be the centerpiece of my tenure as Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency. I am particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities
of achieving Persistent Surveillance and Horizontal Integration,
and the fielding of "state of the practice" information management
tools and capabilities within Defense Intelligence to improve
our ability to discover information and create knowledge, areas
which I will highlight in my budget testimony later in the year.
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