coordination requirement suggests that if Director/TTIC
disagrees with a DHS/IA analytic conclusion on the significance
of terrorist-related information, DHS/IA could not disseminate
its conclusion. Correct?
that choke-point coordination by TTIC consistent with
ensuring that the Department’s Information Analysis
sub-directorate serves the independent analytic role
the Homeland Security
Topic – Zero
sum? Can both DHS and TTIC reach end-state analytic
is the Department getting its analysts? If from other USG
agencies, how is it attracting them away?
DHS have to compete with TTIC for terrorism threat analysts?
personnel resources are you contributing to the TTIC? Will
you assign any DHS analysts to TTIC? How many?
can you spare them, consistent with meeting DHS/IA’s
existing statutory responsibility for conducting all-source-based
analysis of terrorist threat-related information?
the Department won’t send TTIC its top analysts,
given that sec. 201 of the HS Act requires DHS to create
that same analytic capability?
TTIC – with its DHS analysts – eventually
be folded into DHS?
-- DHS and TTIC analytic capabilities and tools:
many other things, section 201(d)(14) of the Homeland Security
Act requires that the Under Secretary of HS for IAIP:
and utilize … a secure communications and information
technology infrastructure, including
data-mining and other advanced analytical tools, in order
to access, receive, and analyze data and information in
furtherance of the responsibilities under [section
201], and to disseminate information acquired and analyzed
by the Department, as appropriate.”
is the status of the Department’s efforts – in
conjunction with the intelligence and law enforcement communities – to
enable DHS analysts to achieve their full, statutorily
mandated, analytic capability?
2/03 Joint Statement of the TTIC Senior Steering Group
asserts that “TTIC analysts will … have available … the
Intelligence Community’s most powerful analytic tools
for searching, analyzing, linking, and visualizing the
Intelligence Community’s data holdings to best
understand the terrorist threat picture.”
about the Department’s own analysts?
June, the DCI pledged, “on behalf of the entire U.S.
Intelligence Community to give our fullest support to the
Department of Homeland Security. … We will help
the Department develop the analytical
methodologies, tradecraft and techniques…,
based on our own vast experience ….”
analysis of terrorist threat-related information is
concerned, isn’t that support really going to go
to TTIC, rather than to the Department?
-- Disseminating warnings and advice to state/local/privates
DHS/IAIP has statutory responsibility “[t]o administer
the Homeland Security Advisory System, including--
responsibility for public
advisories related to threats to
homeland security; and
in coordination with other agencies of the Federal
Government, providing specific
warning information, and
advice about appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures, to State and local government
agencies and authorities, the private
sector, other entities, and the public.” HS
Act, sec. 201(d)(7).
HS Act gives the DHS Under Secretary for IAIP “primary
responsibility for public
advisories related to threats to
homeland security” and “in coordination with
other agencies,” requires that he provide “specific
warning information and advice … to State and local government
agencies and authorities, the private
sector, other entities, and the public” (sec.
you understand these DHS warning responsibilities to be
exclusive or shared? Does the FBI have a role? Does any
other federal agency/entity?
TTIC? Could it issue a threat warning directly to state
HS Act requires the Under Secretary for IAIP to “disseminate,
as appropriate, information
analyzed by the Department … to agencies
of State and local governments
and private sector entities … in
order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption
of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United
States” (sec. 201(d)(9)).
TTIC now exercise that function for DHS/IAIP?
TTIC itself disseminate any of
its analytic products directly to state, local, or private
sector officials? Which? To whom? How?
o Will DHS disseminate
TTIC products to state/local officials? As TTIC products
and without annotation or other changes?
-- Is TTIC a re-tread – the DCI’s CTC
with a new bumper sticker?
a “Counterterrorist Center” (CTC) at CIA headquarters,
really not a CIA center, is it? It has representatives
from the FBI, Secret Service, Customs, and various DoD
entities like NIMA and NSA and is run by the DCI in his
capacity as head of the Intelligence Community, isn’t
the DCI’s CTC analyzes terrorist related information
from all sources available to the US Government, doesn’t
was the problem with the DCI’s CTC?
will TTIC have or do that CTC hasn’t had?
in the Congress designed DHS’s Information Analysis
sub-directorate to be the solution to CTC’s analytic
and information sharing shortcomings. The President agreed;
he approved the Homeland Security bill and it’s
TTIC’s creation represent any diminution in the Department’s
commitment fully to meet its statutory responsibility
for conducting comprehensive analysis of all the terrorist
threat-related information the USG has available to it?
the Department itself meet that binding legal mandate?
there any reason to think that TTIC can do a better
job of meeting the Department’s responsibilities
than the Department itself can?
there any way we can enhance DHS’s legal authority
to assist its Information Analysis sub-directorate
in doing its prescribed job?
is one of TTIC’s four “equal partners.” The
missions of three of TTIC’s four partners are
independent of the HS Act. Accepting your assurance
that the Department
remains fully committed to meeting its statutory mandate
should we expect TTIC to
share that interest and commitment?
TTIC’s non-legislated structure and its preponderance
of non-DHS partner-participants, wouldn’t it be logical
to expect, in TTIC, a 75% dilution of DHS’s institutional
commitment to terrorist threat analysis?
-- Access to information – Foundation of DHS’s
Section 202 of the HS Act is concerned with ensuring
that the Department will have access to all the information
it needs. Section 202(d) provides that the Secretary
Homeland Security, “in consultation with the Director
of Central Intelligence, shall work to ensure that intelligence
or other information relating to terrorism to which the
Department has access is appropriately shared with the
elements of the Federal Government” responsible
for analyzing terrorist threat information, “as
well as with State and local governments,
June, the DCI testified that he was “committed
to assuring that the new Department receives all of
terrorist-related intelligence available.”
you assure us that you are satisfied that the Department
is now getting all of the relevant terrorist-related intelligence
the HS Act, DHS is entitled to receive threat and vulnerability-related
information, regardless of whether the Secretary of HS
has requested it and “whether
or not such information has been analyzed” (sec.
you assure us that DHS is, in fact, receiving the “raw,”
unevaluated information to which it is, by law, entitled?
· DHS – particularly,
its Information Analysis sub-directorate – was designed
to fuse not only information, but “bureaucracies,
missions, and cultures.” The HS Act broke through
restrictive boundaries to bring our best resources
together to solve an otherwise intractable problem.
TTIC (whatever its virtues) doesn’t do that – it
just brings representatives of those bureaucracies
together around a table.
you give us a DHS perspective on that?
-- DHS access through the Secretary or access only to
202 of the HS Act, which is the “access to information
section,” repeatedly refers to providing “the
Secretary” with threat and vulnerability information,
generally without his having to request it.
you understand that to mean that [you/the Secretary] are
getting that information for the use of the elements of
the DHS that need it?
just for the Secretary’s personal use?
you satisfied with the relevance, volume, usability, and
timeliness of the threat information DHS is getting from,
e.g., CIA, FBI, and DoD?
timeliness: Does this information routinely come to DHS
in a readily usable form, free of handling restrictions
confining access and use to a few, highly cleared individuals?
unclassified, “tear-line,” versions of
classified reports come to DHS near real-time, so that
DHS can quickly
make the substance of those reports available to state,
local, and private sector customers who need it to
safeguard American people and interests?
not, have you been told when you can expect that?
any intelligence or law enforcement agency ever denied
a request for information the Secretary has [you have]
made, not for your personal use, but to assist elements
of the Department in meeting their responsibilities?
-- Moving information from where it’s collected
to where it’s needed:
October, in an open hearing on the 9/11 tragedy, DCI George
move information in ways and to places it has never before
had to move. … Now, more than ever before,
we need to make
sure our customers get from us exactly what they need – which generally means exactly
what they want – fast
and free of unnecessary restrictions. … We
don’t have the luxury of an alternative.”
represents a vast array of new customers for intelligence
information. Only a few DHS elements are elements of the
you describe for us any innovations in information
sharing that the Intelligence Community has made to serve
HS Act is about moving information to those who need it.
In some ways, DHS is a clearinghouse. But is DHS the one-stop
way to get homeland security-related information to all
federal entities that need it?
Answer is NO! “[T]he responsibility to share information
relevant to the mission … of any covered entity
in addition to DHS remains the responsibility of the
or initial federal recipient of the information and does
not shift to DHS by virtue of DHS’ receipt
of the information” (March 4, MOU, sec. 3(m)).]
-- Implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on information
On March 4, 2002, the Secretary of HS, the Attorney General,
and the DCI (as head of the Intelligence Community) signed
a comprehensive MOU on information sharing under the Homeland
Security Act. Section 3 of the MOU sets out agreed policies
and procedures for sharing homeland security-related information.
Like the Act itself, the MOU present cultural and practical
challenges for intelligence, L/E, and HS agencies.
October, the DCI testified: “It is … clear
that, when errors occur – when
we miss information or opportunities – it
is often because
our sharing and fusion are not as strong as they need to
be. Communication across bureaucracies, missions,
and cultures is among our most persistent challenges ….”
information sharing MOU provides that “the Secretary
shall be provided access to all information necessary for
him to carry out the mission of the Department” (sec.
3(g)). Can you assure us that the Intelligence Community
is giving you everything you think you need?
March 4 information sharing MOU (sec. 3(f)) provides
fully operational,” TTIC “shall be the preferred,
though not the exclusive, method
for sharing [terrorist threat-related] information at the
national level” and that “TTIC information-sharing
mechanisms and procedures shall be consistent with the
DHS Legislation” (i.e., the HS Act).
TTIC the Department’s preferred method for sharing
terrorist threat-related information with other federal
you aware of any type of information that is shared solely via
TTIC? If so, is there a written agreement to that effect?
[MOU at sec. 3(f).]
sharing information with TTIC meet, e.g., CIA’s
HS Act obligations to share that same information with
DHS entities that need it?
Answer is NO! MOU, sec. 3(m) cautions: “A covered
entity’s voluntary or obligatory provision of
covered information to another covered entity does not in
itself discharge or diminish any other obligation the
providing entity may have to provide that information,
or any part
of it, to any other department, agency or other public
or private organization or individual under any statute,
Presidential Directive, or other agreement.”]
any federal agency told you that if you want certain
terrorist threat-related information from them, you’ll
need to go ask TTIC?
-- Making HS-related information useable – Revising
the ORCON rules:
Since the September 11 attacks, it has become obvious
how absolutely critical it is that ALL information that
shed light on a potential terrorist threat gets precisely
where it’s needed in time to be useful. The DCI testified
last October, that it must move “fast and free of
unnecessary restrictions.” The information sharing
MOU recognizes that reality. It provides: “In general,
parties shall disclose … information free of any
originator controls or information use restrictions” (sec.
MOU also refines the old “ORCON” and “third
agency” rules to permit covered entities to share
information without asking the originating agency’s
permission. The old rule gave the originator complete control
over whether and how information it had obtained would
be used. The new rule permits HS-related information to
be shared without permission, but “to the greatest
extent possible, in a manner that permits the originating
agency to know to whom the information has been provided” (sec.
MOU requires the parties to recommend changes to existing
formulations of the “ORCON” and “third
agency” rules, including EO 12958, “in order
to comply with the DHS Legislation and to carry out the
President’s announced policies for protecting against
terrorist threats to the homeland ...” (sec. 3(l)).
the AG, Secretary of HS, and DCI agreed on recommended
changes to the ORCON and “third agency” rules,
as the MOU requires?
those discussions now underway? When do you expect that
they will be completed? Please keep this committee informed
of your progress.
Topic – Making
sure DHS employees get access to all pertinent information:
President has granted DHS the authority to clear its employees
for access to classified information (EO 13284, sec. 19(c)
you assure us that all US Government entities, including
TTIC, are honoring DHS clearance and access decisions?
the same Executive order, the President ordered DHS to
recognize and give effect to the clearances of those who
became DHS employees when their agencies were merged into
you assure us that TTIC is recognizing and giving full
effect to the clearances of DHS analysts and others who
may be assigned by DHS to support the TTIC?
is not imposing additional requirements?
of an our-way-or-no-way deal? Meet our requirements
or your people aren’t welcome here?
requirements are those? How is that consistent with the
model of a joint venture of equal partners?
there a single document that states the requirements applicable
to TTIC analysts? [FYI:
Answer is Yes.]
document governs DHS participation in the TTIC, right?
Who issued that document?
you provided a copy to this committee?
you see that we receive a copy without delay?
DHS analysts are less trustworthy than TTIC’s?
again, I’m wondering why it wouldn’t be more
efficient to fulfill its architects’ ambitions
by bringing TTIC into DHS.
-- Getting state/local officials the information they
need, when they need it:
If the Department is going to fulfill its mandate to
get HS-related information to the people who really need
out where the rubber’s hitting the road, some
state, local, and private sector officials will need
to classified information.
the Department providing homeland security related information
to state/local officials?
if it – e.g., an indication of a possible attack – is
decides if state/local officials really need access to
the mayor of, e.g., a mid-sized city gets an unclassified
warning of a possible terrorist threat and then says he
needs access to additional threat-related
information, which is classified,
in order to assess the city’s vulnerabilities,
will DHS grant the mayor the access he is seeking?
what conditions? How soon? Who decides?
the Department ever denied any state or local official’s
request for access?
the Department itself conduct the clearance process for
state/local HS officials, or does the FBI or some other
entity do that?
how long does it take to clear state and local officials?
Are some state/local officials considered priorities for
clearance? How is that determined?
that determination based on an assessment of the risk
of terrorist attack on that official’s jurisdiction?
On population? On other criteria?
a state or local official ever be denied access only because
DHS did not consider his/her locale populous enough to
warrant a clearance?
there an effort to make the clearance process for state
and local officials more efficient? Would a new Executive
order specifically on clearing state/locals help?
recent Executive orders (1/23 & 2/28/03) give several
senior DHS officials, including the Secretary, the
authority to make clearance and access determinations
for DHS applicants
those DHS officials also be the most appropriate officials
to make clearance and access determinations for state
and local officials?
will you prevent state and local officials from getting
bogged down in current federal clearance processes that
delay, e.g., nominations to senior Administration positions?
you see any objections to applying existing executive branch
clearance processes on elected state/local officials who
need classified information to do their jobs effectively?
There’s an arcane, metaphysical argument that
forcing existing federal clearance standards (EO 12968)
state/local officials who have HS-related duties would
be unconstitutional, as it would amount to imposing
an additional qualification for their offices by executive
branch fiat. Qualifications of state/local officials
are a matter of state law under the 10th Amendment
of the Constitution (reservation of powers to states).]
-- Funding the TTIC consistent with its non-legislated
DHS participation in and expenditures on TTIC have
to be enabled by the Department’s annual authorization
and appropriation legislation?
it your understanding that [each/none] of TTIC’s
four agency venturers will seek an annual appropriation
to fund its participation in TTIC?
just “some,” which and why?
and costs: Correct that salaries/benefits of those
assigned to TTIC will be paid by their home agencies?
Will that change in the out-years?
you asked that CIA and FBI assign analysts to DHS?
DHS be able to assign analysts who have been detailed
to DHS on to TTIC as a DHS contribution to TTIC’s
analytic cadre? (If so, who will pay their salaries?
How will DHS
replace them in IAIP?)
and costs: What entity or entities is/are
paying the build-out costs for TTIC’s temporary
is the Department’s approximate
cost, if any, attributable to preparing TTIC’s
temporary accommodations and its permanent facility?
expenses: Will TTIC’s operating expenses
be shared among its four equal partners?
If so, how will each agency participant be taxed
to pay its share? (N.b., operating expenses must
to an agency – cannot be shared.)
-- Scope and level of DoD support to DHS and TTIC:
The President’s SOTU address and the White House “Fact
Sheets” issued in connection with the TTIC announcement
make clear that the Department of Defense, like DHS
itself, is to be a full and equal partner in the TTIC.
DoD now has Under Secretaries for Intelligence and
the type and level of support DoD entities are providing
this routinely include DoD intelligence and logistical
any DoD entity providing terrorism threat analysts to assist
the DHS Information Analysis sub-directorate in getting
up and running?
you asked DoD for support? (Are you aware of any instance
in which DoD has denied a request for assistance, including
intelligence support, to DHS?)
you been informed that DoD is providing such support to
precisely, do you understand to be DoD’s current
participation in TTIC?
DoD providing equivalent support to the DHS IA sub-directorate?
NORTHCOM, the new homeland defense command, supporting
your knowledge, has DoD assigned specific units to work
in the TTIC?
-- Could TTIC usefully be brought under the DHS umbrella?
concede for these purposes that TTIC is a good idea,
that it will generate efficiencies, if not savings, and
it does not, per se, violate the HS Act.
it have been more appropriate to build TTIC within the
there any role assigned to the TTIC that DHS could not
itself perform, whether through IAIP or some other entity
or combination of entities?
June, the DCI testified: “We are committed to
bringing the Intelligence Community into genuine partnership
the Department of Homeland Security.”
you share that commitment and that it’s more
than an appealing turn of phrase. But partnership implies
more than a customer-supplier relationship.
I’d like to know precisely where and how -- other
than through TTIC -- that partnership is reflected?
there a similar commitment to partnership with the law
such a partnership be useful in order to eliminate the
potential for duplicative and conflicting efforts in providing
threat warnings to states, localities, and private sector
bringing TTIC into the DHS – presumably into
the DHS Information Analysis sub-directorate -- assist
ensuring TTIC is adequately funded?
Topic – Redundancy
follow-up: Won’t TTIC duplicate DHS’s
TTIC a temporary, early-days, expedient to maximize
so, when will TTIC “sunset” in favor of
an indigenous DHS capability?
that TTIC isn’t a per se violation of the HS
Act, provided that the Department meets its threat
obligations under the Act --
DHS/IAIP reaches its statutorily mandated capability,
TTIC be redundant?
will TTIC do that the Department will not?
the Department meets its statutory mandate to “identify
and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to
the homeland,” what’s the point of TTIC?
Mandate is at sec. 201(d)(1)(A) of HS Act.]
the Department cannot yet meet that statutory mandate,
isn’t TTIC transitional?