



# Countering International Terrorism:

# The United Kingdom's Strategy

July 2006

*Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the  
Secretary of State for the Home Department  
by Command of Her Majesty*

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# OVERVIEW

1. The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from extremists who believe they can advance their aims by committing acts of terrorism here in the UK and against our citizens and interests abroad. To combat this threat the Government has developed a counter-terrorism strategy and set up programmes and plans to give effect to it. This document describes that strategy and explains what organisations and individuals can do to help in its implementation.

2. Since our counter-terrorist strategy comprises both open elements (which can be freely publicised and discussed) and classified elements (which are kept secret), this paper gives only a partial account of the strategy and omits those secret aspects.

## THE THREAT

3. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon: for example, the UK experienced repeated domestic terrorist attacks as a result of the long-running troubles in Northern Ireland. The principal current terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify violence. Such people are referred to in this paper as Islamist terrorists. They are, however, a tiny minority within the Muslim communities here and abroad. Muslim communities themselves do not threaten our security; indeed they make a great contribution to our country. The Government is therefore working in partnership with Muslim communities to help them prevent extremists gaining influence there.

4. The current threat from Islamist terrorism is serious and sustained. It is genuinely international in scope, involving a variety of groups, networks and individuals who are driven by particular violent and extremist beliefs. It is indiscriminate – aiming to cause mass casualties, regardless of the age, nationality, or religion of their victims; and the terrorists are often prepared to commit suicide to kill others. Overall, we judge that the scale of the threat is potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish significantly for some years.

## THE RESPONSE

5. Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term strategy for countering international terrorism (known within Government as CONTEST). Its aim is to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence. The strategy is divided into four principal strands: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE.

### *Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals*

6. The PREVENT strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals. We seek to do this by:

- Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform – addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination;
- Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists – changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate; and

- Engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.

### ***Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them***

7. The PURSUE strand is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations. It has a number of aspects:

- Gathering intelligence – improving our ability to identify and understand the terrorist threat;
- Disrupting terrorist activity – taking action to frustrate terrorist attacks and to bring terrorists to justice through prosecution and other means, including strengthening the legal framework against terrorism, e.g. by introducing legislation to deport those who are judged to be not conducive to the public good; and
- International co-operation – working with partners and allies overseas to strengthen our intelligence effort and achieve disruption of terrorists outside the UK.

### ***Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas***

8. The PROTECT strand is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK and UK interests overseas. This covers a range of issues including;

- Strengthening border security – so that terrorists and those who inspire them can be prevented from travelling here and we can get better intelligence about suspects who travel, including improving our identity management, for example by use of biometrics;
- Protecting key utilities – working with the private sector;
- Transport – reducing the risk and impact of attacks through security and technological advances; and
- Crowded places – protecting people going about their daily lives.

### ***Preparing for the consequences***

9. The PREPARE strand is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack. The key elements are:

- Identifying the potential risks the UK faces from terrorism and assessing their impact;
- Building the necessary capabilities to respond to any attacks; and
- Continually evaluating and testing our preparedness – e.g. by frequently exercising to improve our response to incidents and learning lessons from incidents that do take place.

## **RESPONDING TO A DEVELOPING THREAT**

10. Within this framework, as this paper describes, a great deal of work has been done since 2003 to develop and implement plans and programmes to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities at all levels of Government, the emergency services, business and the wider community. Parliament has legislated to support this effort. Terrorist activity has been disrupted, including through a number of successful prosecutions in the courts.

11. While good progress has been made, at the same time the threat has grown and it has changed in character. It has both domestic and international dimensions. The terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 brought home the risk of suicide attacks by British citizens. Following those attacks, the Government has worked with others to step up and deepen the counter-terrorism effort.

12. The Prime Minister set out a twelve point action plan on 5 August 2005 principally focused on strengthening powers to tackle those committed to facilitating and promoting terrorism and on strengthening community integration. A widespread consultation exercise was launched with the Muslim community. Other steps have been taken to accelerate the development of counter-terrorism capability.

13. This paper identifies the range of issues which need to be addressed in implementing an effective counter-terrorism policy against the type of threat we now face. It shows the breadth of the challenge under each of the principal strands. Each needs a consistent and effective implementation effort involving a number of partners, which the Government is working actively to achieve. In addressing the challenge, the Government is clear that particular focus and effort is needed in the PREVENT strand. The Government has an important role to play here. Ultimately, however, this is a battle of ideas in which success will depend upon all parts of the community challenging the ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence.

### ***Providing the necessary resources***

14. Additional resources have been made available both to respond to terrorist events - for example, £775m was made available following the 9/11 attacks – and in support of the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy, including increasing the funding and capacity of our security and intelligence services and the police. By 2008, annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is double what it was prior to 9/11.

### ***Working together***

15. Developing and delivering this counter-terrorism strategy involves all parts of Government acting together and taking a joined-up approach to dealing with this complex and wide-ranging threat. Delivery also depends upon partnerships with the police and emergency services, local authorities, and devolved administrations, as well as with the private sector and the voluntary and charitable sector.

16. Perhaps the most important of all these partnerships is between these bodies, led by the Government, and our citizens and communities. Public awareness of the threat, understanding of the measures needed to combat it, and active support and cooperation with the police are critical to the success of the strategy.

17. We also share a common interest with many other countries in combating terrorism, so work with other governments and through international organisations is an important part of protecting the UK and its interests.

18. The threat is real: this paper explains how we can all work together to understand and tackle it successfully.

# **COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S STRATEGY**

19. The United Kingdom faces a continuing threat from extremists who believe they can advance their aims by committing acts of terrorism here in the UK and against our citizens and interests abroad. This paper summarises the Government's strategy for countering that threat.

## **INTRODUCTION**

20. Terrorism is a difficult and complex problem and our response to it is wide-ranging and comprehensive. To help the public understand this issue better, we are setting out in this paper an explanation both of the threat that we face and what we are doing to deal with it.

21. In doing so, we will look at the action being taken to prevent the radicalisation which can lead to terrorism, action to pursue terrorists and those who sponsor them, as well as what is being done to protect the public and deal with terrorist incidents. At intervals there are boxes of text giving more information about specific issues or examples of specific actions that have been taken in order to deliver our counter-terrorism strategy. (These actions are a selection from the full range of current counter-terrorist activities, not all of which could be included here.) The paper also looks at the issues of risk, the likelihood that a terrorist incident will happen and the potential severity of its impact, and of vulnerability, the susceptibility to a particular type of attack.

22. Our strategy for dealing with terrorism has evolved over many years in the light of experience. For example, it incorporates the lessons from dealing with Irish terrorism over some 30 years. It was renewed following the 9/11 attacks in the USA, when the aim and framework described below were developed and increased resources for countering terrorism were agreed, and it was looked at again following the 7 July 2005 attacks. The range of policies, plans, and programmes described below will continue to be developed as necessary in future.

23. Terrorism is an international phenomenon which takes many forms. The Government's strategy is informed by, and has informed, the counter-terrorism strategies of a number of other countries, with whom the UK has close links and a wide range of co-operation.

24. Our strategy comprises both open elements, which can be freely publicised and discussed, and classified elements, which are kept secret. There have to be such secret elements, in order to avoid alerting the terrorists themselves either to capabilities we possess for countering their purposes or to vulnerabilities which they could exploit. Consequently, although we have tried to explain as much to the public as we safely can, this paper gives only a partial account of our counter-terrorist strategy and omits those aspects which have to be kept secret.

## THE THREAT

25. The Government keeps under review the range of potential terrorist threats that may arise in the United Kingdom and to our citizens and interests overseas. The principal terrorist threat is currently from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and unrepresentative interpretation of the Islamic faith to justify violence. Such people are referred to here as Islamist terrorists<sup>1</sup>. This paper focuses on that threat and on the responses to it.

26. In any response to this threat, it is important to recognise that terrorists using these distorted readings of Islam are a tiny minority within Muslim communities. Muslim communities themselves do not threaten our security – in fact, we rely on the huge contribution they make to the economic, cultural, and social life of the UK. Muslims are as much at risk from terrorism as anyone else, as was shown by those who were killed or injured in the attacks on 7 July 2005. But Muslims themselves are aware of the risk of radicalisation within certain offshoots of their communities and we must work in partnership with communities to identify and respond to the risks that extremism poses.

### *Recent terrorist activity*

27. During the 1990s Islamist terrorist groups carried out numerous attacks in a variety of countries. A bomb attack against the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and the Paris Metro attacks in 1995 were amongst the earliest of these, but later in the decade many more attacks were made in other countries, including in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tanzania and Kenya, and Yemen.

28. In the event, the most serious of these attacks came in September 2001, when four simultaneous actions in the eastern USA killed nearly 3,000 people, including 67 British citizens, making it the worst terrorist incident of modern times.

29. Since then, there have been further significant attacks: in predominantly Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia – including the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in October 2002, in which over 190 people were killed, including 28 British citizens – and Turkey; in India; as well as more attacks in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. There have also been significant attacks in Europe: multiple attacks on the Madrid train network in March 2004 and attacks in the United Kingdom in July 2005, when nearly simultaneous explosions on the Underground network and a bus in London killed 52 innocent people and injured over 700 others.

30. Many intended terrorist actions in this period, however, were disrupted or unsuccessful. These are discussed further below.

### *Characteristics*

31. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. For example, the UK experienced repeated domestic terrorist attacks as a result of the long-running troubles in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the threat that we currently face does have certain distinctive characteristics.

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<sup>1</sup> The majority of groups usually referred to as Islamists are not terrorists. Islamism is a term with no universally agreed definition, but which is usually used to suggest that a particular group or movement is seeking to build political structures it deems Islamic.



32. First, the threat is genuinely international. Compared with earlier terrorist threats, attacks have been carried out, or attempted, against a very wide range of targets in many countries. Sometimes these attacks are carried out by individuals from the country concerned and sometimes by outsiders, so the domestic and international dimensions of this threat are closely interlinked. The terrorists also make maximum use of the freedoms and possibilities of modern life – especially the ease of travel and the ease with which information and money flows across the world.

33. Second, the threat comes from a variety of groups, networks and individuals. These range from larger groups organised around clear hierarchic and bureaucratic structures, to much looser and smaller groups of like-minded individuals. These different elements often cooperate and assist each other, but often also pursue separate goals.

34. In the past, terrorists have sometimes sought protection or sponsorship from states, as was provided in the 1990s in Sudan and under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. They continue to seek out places where governments and security forces are weak as ‘havens’ for training and other activities. These terrorists are, however, essentially non-state actors – they do not need state support to operate.

35. Third, these terrorists intend to cause mass casualties. They are indiscriminate: aiming to cause the most death and destruction that they can, regardless of the age, nationality, or religion of their victims. Whilst they do aim at governmental targets, such as embassies and units of the armed forces, or those with symbolic value, such as the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one distinctive feature of their attacks is that these often deliberately strike at ordinary people going about their lives. Other terrorist groups have done this in the past, but not on such a scale.

36. And these terrorists are often prepared to kill themselves as a means of killing many others. This is not unique to these groups, but it has not been a feature of previous threats that the UK has faced.

37. Fourth, the people involved in these terrorist attacks are driven by particular violent and extremist beliefs. A common thread connecting many of the planned or successful terrorist attacks in the UK, the rest of Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and North America over the past decade has been that those involved have claimed to be acting in defence of Islam. However, the great majority of Muslims in the UK and abroad reject both extremism and violence. What the terrorists in fact draw on is a particular and distorted form of Islam, sometimes referred to as Islamist extremism, which they say encourages or obliges its adherents to carry out acts of violence against those that they identify as their enemies.

*What do the terrorists say?*

The individuals who have carried out terrorist attacks which they claim are in defence of Islam do not in fact adhere to a single set of beliefs: they may appear to outsiders to hold similar views, but can nevertheless have quite distinct opinions and approaches on particular issues. Overall, however, it is possible to identify certain common themes.

First, the terrorists adopt a particular and malignant misinterpretation of Islamic teaching which they believe places an obligation on believers to fight and explicitly to kill to achieve their aims. This interpretation, which they believe legitimises their terrorist acts, is sometimes referred to as Jihadism<sup>2</sup>. It is not accepted by most Muslims.

<sup>2</sup> The term “jihad” refers primarily to non-violent struggle, for example the spiritual struggle to lead a good life. It may also be used to mean military struggle, but the vast majority of Muslims do not consider today’s terrorism to be legitimate, military jihad.

Second, the terrorists brand the current governments of many Muslim states as ‘apostate’ – that is as having turned away from true Islam – on the basis that those states do not conform to the terrorists’ idea of how a Muslim state should be run. By labelling existing Muslim states in this way, the terrorists believe they can justify taking violent action against the governments and citizens of those states, even though they are co-religionists.

Third, the terrorists seek to remove what they believe are un-Islamic and alien ‘Western’ influences from the Muslim world. This approach includes resistance to secular institutions, to certain human rights, and to Muslim religious practices of which they disapprove.

Fourth, the terrorists argue that Islam itself is facing an active, sustained, and long-term attack from what they characterise as the Christian and Jewish inspired, but secular, West. This illusion is sustained by characterising relations between Muslims and Westerners as a long history of injustices and grievances, whilst downplaying any evidence to the contrary<sup>3</sup>. These claims are used to justify indiscriminate attacks against ordinary innocent people.

Taken together, these four elements amount to an intolerant pursuit of narrowly framed beliefs, coupled with an implacable hostility to the West and its peoples – and to Muslims whose religious practices diverge from their own – and a rejection of basic human rights and values, backed up by a willingness to commit extreme violence in pursuit of their aims.

Al Qa’ida, led by Usama Bin Ladin and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri, is a radical Islamist terrorist network that particularly espouses these views.

### ***The threat to the United Kingdom***

38. The threat to the UK comes from different quarters. As we saw in the tragic events of 7 July 2005, terrorists inspired by Islamist extremism may come from within British communities – the bombers were British citizens brought up in this country. However, those charged in connection with the incidents on 21 July 2005 are of African origin. In recent years, terrorist suspects investigated in the UK have come originally from countries as diverse as Libya, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere - as well as those who have lived most or all of their lives in the UK.

39. The Government assesses that the current threat in the UK from Islamist terrorism is serious and sustained. British citizens also face the threat of terrorist attacks when abroad. Overall, we judge that the scale of the threat is potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish significantly for some years.

40. The UK has achieved some significant successes in dealing with potential attacks by Islamist terrorists, since before 2001. A number of credible plans to cause loss of life have been disrupted; in many cases the individuals involved have either been successfully prosecuted and imprisoned or are awaiting trial. However, as the tragic attacks of 7 July 2005 have shown, it is not possible to eliminate completely the threat of terrorist attacks in this country. The rest of this paper describes what is being done to minimise that risk.

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<sup>3</sup> This is sometimes referred to as ‘the single narrative’.

## THE RESPONSE

41. Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has been implementing a long-term strategy for countering international terrorism and the extremism that lies behind it. The aim is:

**to reduce the risk from international terrorism,  
so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence.**

42. To achieve this, the Government has put in place a comprehensive programme of action, against both short and long term objectives and involving activity both at national and local level here in the UK and overseas. The strategy and the programme to implement it (known within Government as CONTEST) are divided into four principal areas:

- preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
- pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them;
- protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas; and
- preparing for the consequences.

43. Taken together these are known as the ‘Four Ps’: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE.

### *Principles*

44. The Government believes that respect for international law and human rights standards must be an integral part of its efforts to counter terrorism. The promotion of good governance and human rights internationally is also a key element of wider efforts to combat terrorism and extremism.

45. Similarly, the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active citizenship in Britain strengthens society and its resistance to terrorism here in the UK.

46. Successful delivery of this counter-terrorism strategy depends upon partnerships between all parts of Government; the public, private, and voluntary sectors; and all of us as individuals and as members of communities.

## PREVENTING TERRORISM BY TACKLING THE RADICALISATION OF INDIVIDUALS

47. The PREVENT strand of CONTEST is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the UK and elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist threat.

48. The processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are critical to understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support for their activities. This section of the paper deals with the measures being taken to counter radicalisation.

### *How does radicalisation occur?*

Identifying the factors which may lead to radicalisation, and some of the arguments used to justify it, are important so that we can focus our responses in order to reduce the risk of terrorism. Of course, setting out these factors does not in any way imply that we accept their validity or that resorting to terrorist violence could ever be justified.

It is also important to see this as a two stage process. An alienated individual who has become highly radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority of radicalised individuals actually cross over to become terrorists: by financing, lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating in terrorist attacks.

There are a range of potential factors in radicalisation and no single factor predominates. It is likely the catalyst for any given individual becoming a terrorist will be a combination of different factors particular to that person.

Potentially radicalising factors include the development of a sense of grievance and injustice. As has already been noted, the terrorists' version of history and recent events is highly negative and partial in its interpretation of past interactions between Islam and the West.

- The process of globalisation, in particular over the past two decades, has had ramifications right across the world and in many countries the effect has been not just economic, but also political, social and cultural change on a significant scale. Given the impact on local ways of life, those already predisposed to be suspicious of the West can seek to portray these changes as a deliberate attempt to replace traditional structures with Western models, rather than as the consequence, for good and ill, of modernisation.
- Alongside this is often a simplistic, but virulent anti-Westernism. The presence of Western interests, and sometimes military forces, in Muslim countries – even though this is at the request and with the permission of a country's government – is seen by some as an affront and a source of shame.
- Also some argue that the West does not apply consistent standards in its international behaviour. Conflicts such as Bosnia and Chechnya are cited, where Muslims have been the victims of violence, and it is argued that the Western nations have failed to act quickly or effectively enough to protect them, ignoring many positive interventions (*'the UK support for Muslims across the world'* boxes below). In particular, this applies to perceptions of relations with Israel and the approach to the Middle-East Peace Process, where the UK is actively committed to a two-state solution, with a viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel.
- Specific events – for example, the Coalition action to restore sovereignty in Kuwait, the UN authorised actions in Afghanistan to remove the Al Qa'ida terrorist organisation and the Taliban government sponsoring it and then restore stability there, and US and UK action in Iraq to remove a serious threat to international security and subsequently to promote a democratic and pluralist government – are sometimes portrayed as attacks on Islam itself, regardless of the actual rationale for the action. Media coverage of isolated and unacceptable incidents involving Western forces in Muslim countries, where individuals fail to live up to the standards we have set ourselves in the treatment of prisoners and civilians, may also be used to convince susceptible individuals that the West is antipathetic to Islam.

Another potential factor is a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage, arising from socio-economic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity. While an individual may not be relatively disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as less privileged; also different generations within the same family may have significantly different views about these issues.

An important factor is exposure to radical ideas. This may come from reading radical literature on Islamic and other subjects or surfing the Internet (where many types of radical views are strongly promoted), but more often radicalisation seems to arise from local contacts and from peers. Exposure to a forceful and inspiring figure, already committed to extremism, can be important here. This person may be associated with a particular place (e.g. a mosque) or can be a national or international figure, seen on video or heard on tapes. Inspiration from a distance is important and there is evidence that the rise of the Internet, with its ability to connect people, to pass ideas between them, and then pass those ideas on to others has had a significant impact on the accessibility and flow of radical ideas.

None of these factors is conclusive and they are probably best viewed as considerations which may influence radicalisation.

## *Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform*

49. The first area of action to counter radicalisation lies in addressing structural problems in the UK and elsewhere that may contribute to radicalisation. In the UK, this forms part of the Government's broader equality agenda and we are working with communities and the public and private sectors to address these wider issues. Many Government programmes that are not specifically directed at tackling radicalism nevertheless help to build cohesion in communities across the country - for example, Sure Start.

### *Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society*

Many Muslims suffer high levels of disadvantage, and work has been underway for some time on addressing the inequalities they experience. The Government's broader race and community cohesion strategy 'Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society' (IOSS) was published in January 2005 and outlined a cross-government response to reducing inequalities, particularly those associated with race and faith, and to increasing community cohesion.

In particular, the strategy includes actions being taken to help Muslims improve their educational performance, employment opportunities, and housing conditions.

There is now a cross-government steering group that considers the progress made against these initial indicators, and an annual report on progress against its actions is due to be published in Summer 2006.

The Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund was announced through this initiative in January 2005. Its purpose is to help faith-based organisations to engage more effectively with the Government, with civil society, and with other faiths. To date total funding of £7.7 million has been shared between 588 organisations, £1.5million of which went to Muslim organisations.

### *Commission on Integration and Cohesion*

A Commission on Integration and Cohesion was announced in June 2006. It will consider how local areas themselves can play a role in forging cohesive and resilient communities, by:

- examining the issues that raise tensions between different groups in different areas, and that lead to segregation and conflict;
- suggesting how local community and political leadership can push further against perceived barriers to cohesion and integration;
- looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies; and
- developing approaches that build local areas' own capacity to prevent problems, and ensure they have the structures in place to recover from periods of tension.

The Commission will report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and will publish its findings in June 2007.

### *Supporting reform and modernisation*

We have increased UK and international support for regionally-led reform in the Muslim world. This is important for many reasons, but will help address the political and socio-economic environment which extremists exploit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Global Opportunities Fund has supported over 150 projects in the Middle East and North Africa and 25 programmes in Afghanistan and other key countries in South and South East Asia and Africa to support the development of effective, accountable governments, democratic institutions and the promotion of human rights. For example:

- support for civil society anti-corruption initiatives;
- media reform projects across the Middle East;
- prison reform;
- education initiatives and partnerships with madrassas (traditional Islamic educational institutions that specialise in the transmission of religious education) on reform;
- legal reform (including training of lawyers on international human rights law); and
- exchanges between Christian and Muslim religious teaching institutions.

The FCO redirected the focus of its scholarship programme to reflect this work. In 2005/6, 119 candidates from Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) countries secured scholarships. The FCO also introduced a new fellowship scheme to offer mid-career professionals the opportunity of an intensive three-month course in the UK. In 2005, it welcomed 87 fellows from 43 countries on seven specially tailored Chevening Fellowship courses under the overall themes of 'Engaging with the Islamic World' and 'International Security and Governance' at UK universities – including: 'Islam and Governance' at the University of Birmingham, 'Participation of Women' at University College London and 'Government Relations with NGOs and civil society' at the University of Glasgow. So far in 2006, 88 fellows have come on the same seven courses.

More than 30 countries receiving UK development assistance have sizeable Muslim populations. Some of our largest bilateral development programmes are focussed on predominantly Islamic countries, for example in 2004/5 we provided £122 million in Bangladesh; £72 million in Afghanistan; and £56 million in Pakistan. The Department for International Development (DfID) contributes to modernisation through working on improving governance, including anti-corruption, reform of security services and justice systems, reform of education systems, and laws on private sector development in order to help create educational and employment opportunities for disaffected youths.

### ***Deterring those who facilitate terrorism***

50. The second area of action to counter radicalisation is by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate; deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists.

#### *Legislation*

The Terrorism Act 2006 made it a criminal offence directly or indirectly to encourage the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to disseminate terrorist publications. This offence includes statements or publications that glorify terrorism.

The Terrorism Act 2000 made it illegal for certain terrorist groups to operate in the UK and extended proscription to include international terrorist groups, like Al Qaida. The Terrorism Act 2006 broadened the basis for proscribing organisations to include those that promote or encourage terrorism.

#### *Unacceptable behaviours*

The list of Unacceptable Behaviours published on 24 August 2005 sets out the behaviours likely to lead to an individual being excluded or deported from the UK. It covers any non-UK citizen who uses any medium, including:

- writing, producing, publishing or distributing material;
- public speaking including preaching;
- running a website; or
- using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth leader;

to express views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;
- seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
- foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or
- foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.

#### *Acting on unacceptable behaviours*

Thirty six foreign nationals have been excluded since August last year on all grounds of unacceptable behaviour. There has been one decision in principle to deport and four other deportation cases on grounds of unacceptable behaviour are under consideration.

51. Sometimes particular places can also be sources of radicalising influences. The influence of particular mosques has already been mentioned (see *How does radicalisation occur* page 10), but there is also evidence that individuals can become radicalised whilst in prison.

#### *Prisons and radicalisation*

In February 2006, the first national training event for HM Prison Service (HMPS) Imams was delivered as a result of direct intervention and support from the HMPS Police Advisors Section. They identified a need for specialist training for Imams, in order to support their daily work with all Muslim prisoners, including those imprisoned for terrorist-related charges. This national training event also led to the establishment of a partnership between the Police Advisors Section and the HMPS Muslim Adviser.

The Police Advisors Section has encouraged HMPS to develop strategies to identify and combat radicalisation within the prison population. The officers have been working with HMPS and other Police and community specialists to establish a unique mentoring programme, which seeks to identify those Muslim prisoners potentially susceptible to radicalisation or extremist views and which supports them upon their release from prison to integrate back into their local community.

52. The Government will be working with local communities to identify other areas where radicalisation may be taking place and to help communities protect themselves and counter the efforts of extremist radicalisers.

### ***The battle of ideas***

53. Speaking on 21 March 2006, the Prime Minister said: “This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core”. The third area of action to counter radicalisation is therefore a battle of ideas, challenging the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify the use of violence. In particular, we are working with communities to help them discourage susceptible individuals from turning towards extremist activity.

#### *Recent engagement with Ministers*

- Following the London bombings, the Prime Minister met 25 Muslim community leaders on 19 July 2005. The meeting was to make a united reinforcement of the need to work together to prevent extremism in our communities.
- The Home Secretary subsequently chaired a meeting on 20 July 2005 with Muslim community leaders at which it was agreed to establish seven community-led working groups to develop recommendations for tackling extremism amongst our young people (see below).
- The Ministers for Women held their biannual meeting with representatives of the Muslim Women’s Network in October 2005 and discussed the role women can play in tackling extremism in Muslim communities. Membership of the network includes representatives from academia, non-governmental organisations and grass-roots community groups.
- In November 2005, the Prime Minister attended a discussion group in Leeds of 50 people aged between 16 and 25 to find out about the challenges facing young British Muslims. As part of more general discussions about longer-term partnership between government and local communities, they looked at the way the media report on terrorism and Islam and about ways of finding a community-led response to extremism.
- In February 2006, Dr Kim Howells met a group of successful and influential young Muslim men and women in Whitechapel, London and discussed the issues they chose to raise, from education to foreign policy. He then visited Ebrahim College to meet teachers and pupils of this innovative institution.
- In May 2006, the Prime Minister and Ruth Kelly hosted an event for 40 Muslim women at Downing Street, aimed at boosting understanding of the community through meeting a wider range of people from within it.

*(a) Working with communities*

54. The Government has been working with communities for many years to help shape policy and determine its objectives.

55. The Home Office has supported Muslim and other faith communities and encouraged their contribution to social cohesion and interfaith activities (work now being taken forward by the Department of Communities and Local Government). This has included establishing a Ministerial and Officials visits programme in January 2003 to listen to the concerns of Muslim communities; working with media organisations to improve perceptions of Muslim communities; working with the Police on protecting the Muslim community; and consulting with all faith communities on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

56. Similarly, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been working with Muslim communities on a range of generic and country specific issues. Typical examples include setting up the British Hajj Delegation (providing consular support to British Hajj pilgrims) seven years ago, and regular Ministerial involvement in community events, such as Mike O'Brien's speech at the inaugural meeting of the Association of London Mosques in 2005.

57. Following the attacks in London last July, Home Office ministers visited nine towns and cities with large Muslim populations to consult them about how government could work with communities to prevent extremism. 1,000 British Muslims took part in these consultations and seven community-led working groups were set up under the banner of 'Preventing Extremism Together' (PET). The working groups produced 64 recommendations: 27 of these were for the Government to lead on, while the remainder were for communities themselves to work on, supported by Government where necessary.

58. Progress on the three principal recommendations, where the Government is supporting communities – a national grassroots-led campaign targeted at Muslim youth (the Scholars' Roadshow); Muslim Forums on Extremism and Islamophobia, and a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board – is outlined below.

*PET – Scholars' Roadshows*

A series of national roadshows are taking place, led by British Muslim organisations and supported by Government. To date 20 influential mainstream Muslim scholars and thinkers have spoken to audiences of young British Muslims to propagate effective arguments against extremist justification for terrorism and denounce it as un-Islamic. Up to 30,000 people have attended the first seven of 12 roadshows and we expect more than 100,000 to attend in total.

*PET – Muslim Forums against Extremism and Islamophobia*

The creation of six regional forums led by key individuals to bring together members of local Muslim communities, law enforcement and public service agencies to discuss how to tackle extremism and Islamophobia in their area. The forums provide a safe space for sharing views and developing new thinking and action plans for dealing with extremism. The first three forums were held in late June and early July 2006.

*PET – Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board*

The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board is an initiative led by Muslim communities, which aims to provide guidance and support to mosques and imams. A steering group of Muslim leaders has undertaken an extensive national consultation on matters such as the accreditation of imams, better governance of mosques, and interfaith activity. The steering group represents all sections of the Muslim community and published a good practice guide for mosques when the Advisory Board was formally launched on 27 June 2006.



59. Action has been agreed on all 27 of the recommendations for the Government. At the time of writing, action on three of the recommendations had already been completed – consultation on the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) ‘Youth Matters’ Green Paper; extending Equal Opportunities legislation to cover discrimination on the grounds of faith; and expanding the Muslim Ethnic Achievement project to improve the achievement levels of Muslim students. In a further 17 cases the Government has accepted the recommendation and work is in progress to implement it. For three recommendations the Government is still considering its response; for two more an alternative outcome has been put in place; and the remaining two recommendations are not being taken forward. Further information about progress on all the PET recommendations will be made available on the Department for Communities and Local Government’s website ([www.dclg.gov.uk](http://www.dclg.gov.uk)).

60. A key outcome of the PET initiative has been that representatives of many differing views within the British Muslim communities have worked with Government towards a single goal. This approach is continuing. Within the PET framework, a cross-government forum has been established to consider how to tackle extremism on campuses; outside PET, the Government is working with Muslim communities to improve their approach to tackling extremism – for example, funding the charity Forward Thinking to run a series of workshops across England with young Muslims on the role of Islam in a pluralistic society.

### *(b) Working internationally*

61. The Foreign Office is doing more to explain that our foreign policy is based upon striving for UK interests in a safe, just and prosperous world and to counter extremists’ allegations that it has an anti-Islamic agenda. This means explaining better the reasons why, for example, we supported and continue to support action in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many disagreed with the decisions to take military action in those countries. We respect those views. However, the UK Government intervened because of wider issues and not because these are Muslim countries. In fact, in the wider context of British foreign policy, we have done much to help and assist Muslims all over the world (see below).

#### *UK support for Muslims across the world – general*

Over the last five years, bilaterally and through other organisations, the UK Government has provided over £5.5 billion in international development assistance to much of the Muslim world.

#### *UK support for Muslims across the world – specific*

- Kosovo: The UK, as a part of NATO, played a leading role in the intervention in Kosovo, in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe not seen in Europe since the Second World War, and has played a significant role in the subsequent reconstruction programme.
- Pakistan earthquake: The UK has been among the largest bilateral donors to earthquake relief and reconstruction efforts.
- Turkey: The UK is one of the strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU membership.
- Kashmir: We are fully involved in supporting dialogue between India and Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, emphasising that any durable solution must take into account the wishes of the peoples of Kashmir.
- Palestine: The UK Government is fully committed to a Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel. On top of our significant financial assistance to the Palestinians, we are focusing international efforts on helping to develop the institutions necessary for a viable Palestinian state.
- Bosnia: The UK supports the War Crimes Chamber, bringing to justice those who committed crimes during the wars of the 1990s. The UK has also played a major role in the reconstruction of Bosnia, with over £20 million in bilateral assistance in the last two years.

- Darfur, Sudan: The UK is one of the largest bilateral donors in helping the victims of the crisis in Darfur. We are also fully engaged in support of the peace process.
- Afghanistan: The UK, as part of an international coalition, helped to remove the Taliban regime that both shielded the Al Qa'ida terrorist organisation and abused the human rights of Afghanistan's (Muslim) citizens.
- Iraq: The UK as part of an international coalition helped remove a regime that was a standing threat to neighbouring countries, and had viciously abused the human rights of its own – mostly Muslim – citizens.

62. We are also working to counter extremists' false characterisation of the UK as being a place where Muslims are oppressed. The Foreign Office and Home Office have, for example, facilitated a series of visits by delegations of British Muslims to 13 countries and additional visits are planned. A dedicated team of key language specialists works to explain British policies and the role of Muslims in British society, in print, visual and electronic media. The FCO's network of missions abroad is fully involved in this work.

63. The PREVENT programme is by its nature a long-term commitment, which will take time to show concrete results.

## **PURSuing TERRORISTS AND THOSE THAT SPONSOR THEM**

64. The PURSUE strand of CONTEST is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations.

### ***Intelligence***

65. By their nature, terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is therefore vital to defeating terrorism. All disruption operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, intentions, and means of operation. The Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – known collectively as the security and intelligence agencies – are therefore critical to the work on PURSUE, as is the work of the police, both special branches and neighbourhood policing alike, for UK-based terrorist networks.

66. Our understanding of the new terrorist networks continues to improve. Since September 2001 there has been a significant shift of Government resources into the business of gathering and analysing information on the threat and configuring departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it. While we are taking action to build an ever better picture of extremist activity within the UK, our understanding of the threat still remains inevitably imperfect.

### ***Taking a joint approach***

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which was created in June 2003, has continued to analyse and assess all intelligence relating to international terrorism. It continues to attract interest from overseas as an example of joined-up working in the intelligence field and this approach is being emulated in a number of other countries.

67. Public safety is the top priority for the Government, the police, and the intelligence agencies. The Government fully support the police and Security Service in the difficult decisions they must make when faced with the current terrorist threat. Operational decisions on whether and how to conduct counter terrorist operations are a matter for the police. There may be situations where the police believe they have no choice but to take action on the basis of the specific intelligence they have received. The difficulties in assessing intelligence about terrorist activity were highlighted in the Government's response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005:

“... many pieces of intelligence are received by the [Security and Intelligence] Agencies on a weekly basis on potential terrorist threats and intentions. Terrorists make great efforts to ensure that intelligence about their intentions is difficult to obtain and analyse. Intelligence is generally fragmentary, of varying reliability and difficult to interpret. Complex and challenging investigative judgements have to be made on the basis of often incomplete data. There is always a difficult balance to strike between investigating those known to be a current threat and working to discover other possible threats.”

### ***Disruption***

68. Covert operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police. The police are responsible for taking executive action, such as arrests, and conducting the investigation against those suspected of involvement in terrorism. The SIS and GCHQ, in collaboration with intelligence and security partners overseas, operate covertly in support of the Security Service to disrupt terrorist threats.

#### *Successful disruptions*

The police and the security and intelligence agencies have disrupted many attacks against the UK since November 2000, including four since last July alone.

69. The Government continues to strengthen its co-ordinated, multi-agency, and international approach to the disruption of terrorist activity. Prosecution remains the preferred way of responding to persons involved in terrorist activity, but other options for taking disruptive action include deportation on grounds of national security or unacceptable behaviour, control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, freezing and seizing financial assets, and proscription of organisations.

70. There are limits to what we can say about disruption activity. We cannot be publicly explicit about the detail of many of these operations because of the need to preserve operational security and our capability to conduct similar operations in the future. In addition, where individuals are being prosecuted for terrorist offences, the Government obviously cannot discuss specific cases until the legal processes are complete. Many disruptions of terrorist networks lead to prosecutions for other, non-terrorist offences – sometimes major offences such as crimes of violence, and sometimes lesser offences such as fraud – or to actions for deportation, or to impose control orders. In many cases, these actions must by law remain anonymous, so again they cannot be discussed in any detail, though regular information is provided to Parliament on the scale of such actions. For example, the Home Secretary provides a regular quarterly report to Parliament on the exercise of the control order powers. And there is an independent reviewer (currently Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) who makes an annual report to Parliament on the operation of the control order powers.

### (a) Prosecution

71. Successful prosecution in the courts, based on gathering the necessary evidence and apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they can carry out their intentions, is of course our preferred way of disrupting terrorist activity.

#### *Terrorism Act 2006*

The Terrorism Act 2006 extended the maximum period for which a suspected terrorist could be detained before being charged with an offence from 14 days to 28 days.

#### *Successful disruptions – prosecution*

- Mohammed Ajmal Khan was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment on 17 March 2006, including for conspiracy to provide money or property for use in a terrorist act.
- Abu Hamza was convicted of 11 offences on 7 February 2006, including six counts of solicitation to murder, and sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.
- Andrew Rowe was convicted on 23 September 2005 of two counts of possession of an article for a terrorist purpose, which included notes on how to use a mortar. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.
- Saajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment on 22 April 2005 for conspiring to destroy an aircraft using a method similar to that used by Richard Reid (the "shoebomber").
- Kamel Bourgass was convicted on 13 April 2005 of plotting to manufacture homemade poisons and explosives with the intention of causing harm. He has been sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment to run concurrently with the life sentence already being served for the murder of Detective Constable Stephen Oake.
- Overall, 62 people were subsequently charged with criminal offences following arrests in 2005 under the Terrorism Act 2000. In the first three months of 2006, a further seven people have been charged with criminal offences following arrests under the Act.<sup>4</sup>

72. Where prosecution is not possible, we make effective use of a number of security measures designed to make the UK a more hostile environment for terrorists to operate in. The Home Office and the Police lead on these activities in the UK; HM Treasury lead on asset freezing.

### (b) Deportation

73. Where the person concerned is a foreign national, and is a threat to the UK, deportation will usually be an appropriate means of disrupting terrorist activity. This is important in terms of ensuring public safety, as well as sending a strong signal that foreign nationals who threaten our national security cannot expect to be allowed to remain in the UK. Those who are outside the UK will normally be excluded (see *Acting on unacceptable behaviours* page 12).

#### *Successful disruptions – deportation*

- Since 7 July 2005, 38 foreign nationals have been detained under immigration powers pending deportation on grounds of national security. One further person who was detained under immigration powers before 7 July remains in custody awaiting deportation.
- Of these 38, two have been deported to Algeria, four face criminal prosecution, and a further six have been placed on Control Orders after it was decided there was no realistic prospect of deportation. The remaining 26 face deportation on grounds of national security, along with the person who had been detained prior to 7 July (i.e. 27 in total).
- A number of appeals against deportation have recently started to be heard – no determinations have yet been given.

<sup>4</sup> These statistics were provided by the Metropolitan Police Service and are based on the most up-to-date police records. The figures are subject to adjustment as cases are processed through the criminal justice system.

74. We have enacted legislation to provide us with additional legal tools to deport and exclude persons who have participated in terrorism.

*Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006*

The Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006 introduced a range of additional measures which are relevant in the counter-terrorism context:

- where an individual is being deported on grounds of national security any appeal before removal is limited to human rights grounds;
- a good character test for registration as a British citizen;
- a lower threshold for deprivation of British citizenship, enabling deportation action to follow;
- a power to deprive a person of their right of abode (a provision allowing certain Commonwealth citizens to enter the UK as if they were British citizens); and
- an interpretation of the Refugee Convention to make it clear that people who commit, prepare, or instigate terrorism, or encourage others to do so, are not entitled to protection as refugees.

*Other mechanisms*

It is the Government's policy not to permit individuals from abroad who are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities to remain in the UK. Deporting a terrorist significantly disrupts the activity of that network, which is beneficial internationally, as well as removing that immediate source of potential attacks from the UK. But the Government will not deport someone to a country where he faces a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Therefore we are negotiating agreements with some countries to ensure that, where someone is deported, we can obtain specific assurances, backed up by independent monitoring, to enable us to satisfy ourselves that removal is consistent with our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The UK has concluded Memoranda of Understanding with three countries (Jordan, Libya and Lebanon) to facilitate deportation of terrorist suspects in a manner consistent with our obligations under the ECHR. Monitoring bodies have been appointed in Jordan and Libya; agreement in principle has been reached with a monitoring body in Lebanon. Negotiations are ongoing with a number of other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Separate arrangements are in place for deportations to Algeria.

*(c) Control orders*

75. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 enables the Secretary of State to make a “non-derogating” control order against an individual who he has reasonable grounds for suspecting is involved in terrorism-related activity and where he considers it necessary for the protection of the public. These measures can be applied to any individual, irrespective of nationality, and whatever the nature of the terrorist activity. A control order is a last resort measure, to address the threat from an individual where prosecution is not possible and, in the case of a foreign national, where it is not possible to deport him or her due to our international human rights obligations (in particular, where there is a real risk of torture).

76. Control orders are preventative. They place one or more obligations upon an individual in order to prevent, restrict or disrupt involvement in terrorism-related activity. A range of obligations can be imposed to address the risk posed by the individual concerned, including a curfew, restrictions on the use of communication equipment, restrictions on the people that the individual can associate with, and travel restrictions. The legislation requires that control orders made by the Secretary of State must be compatible with the individual's right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although there is a procedure in the legislation for Parliament to agree to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR, so the Secretary of State can apply to a court to make a “derogating” control order, this has currently not been exercised.

77. The 2005 Act contains strong safeguards to protect the rights of the individual, including requirements for judicial oversight and review of control orders. The legislation and its operation have recently been challenged in the courts. The High Court ruled on 12 April 2006 that the legislation is incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair hearing), and ruled again on 28 June 2006 that the obligations imposed in six specific cases amounted to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. The Government is appealing both judgements in the Court of Appeal. All existing control orders remain in force (including the six cases in the second High Court ruling which remain in force pending the outcome of the appeal), and the Secretary of State will continue to make new control orders where he considers it necessary to do so.

*Successful disruptions – control orders*

There are currently 15 control orders made by the Secretary of State in operation. Nine of these are in respect of foreign nationals; the other six are in respect of British citizens.

*(d) Financial controls*

78. Whenever terrorists come into contact with the financial system, they can generate vital clues that can lead to their disruption and apprehension. To maximise the impact of this financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, the UK's money laundering and terrorist finance measures require financial institutions to 'know their customer', keep proper records, and report suspicious activity. Irrespective of any final charges, every terrorist suspect is subject to financial investigation. Enquiries following the attacks of 7 July and attempted attacks of 21 July demonstrated the critical role of terrorist finance investigation in progressing specific enquiries and establishing an enhanced intelligence picture.

*(e) Seizing and freezing assets*

79. A major challenge for law enforcement is to disrupt terrorists' ability to raise, move and use funds. Experience has shown the costs of carrying out bombing incidents to be relatively low but terrorist networks also need more significant funding to support the rest of their activities, including recruitment, training and welfare payments to the families of those killed. This is often achieved through ordinary criminal activity such as identity fraud, cheque fraud and misuse of charities.

80. Various powers now exist to challenge terrorist fundraising. For example, the UK's terrorist asset freezing powers publicly identify suspected individuals and groups linked to terrorism. These also freeze any existing assets and disable terrorists' ability to raise or move further funds.

81. An effective and collaborative partnership between specialist law enforcement officers, government and the private financial sector in the UK has raised awareness of the vulnerabilities and has helped develop solutions.

### *Successful disruptions - financial*

Since 2001, in relation to terrorist cases there have been:

- £400,000 of cash seizures under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2000;
- £110,000 of forfeited funds;
- £475,000 of funds seized under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and
- £477,000 subject to Treasury asset freezes.

(This does not include the £78 million that was frozen until 2002 as part of UK action against the Taliban.)

82. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions, countries are required to freeze the assets of individuals who are involved with terrorism and stop them receiving payments directly or indirectly. To ensure that these sanctions do not contravene basic human rights, the Government is required to make payments under licence to meet basic expenses. The Government has announced to Parliament that state benefits paid to individuals sharing the same household with a listed person will only be paid under strict licence conditions, providing safeguards to ensure funds are not diverted to terrorism.

### *(f) Proscription*

83. The proscription of terrorist organisations also contributes towards making the UK a hostile environment for terrorists and sends a strong message that the UK totally rejects such organisations and any claims to legitimacy. Proscription is a tough power as it has the effect of outlawing previously lawful activity. Once an organisation is proscribed it is a criminal offence to belong to, support, or display support for a proscribed organisation. The Terrorism Act also allows the police to seize all property of a proscribed organisation.

### *Successful disruptions – proscription*

- A total of 40 international and 14 domestic terrorist organisations are currently proscribed in the UK.
- The list of proscribed organisations is contained in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and is available on the Home Office website (<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk>).
- This list was extended by Order in 2005.

### *Working with communities*

84. As recent events have demonstrated, counter terrorist operations can have an impact on relations between the police and local communities. It is in the interest of everyone – in particular the police and the affected local community – that these operations are conducted in the most appropriate and effective manner, and take due account of community relations issues.

85. It is also important that local communities are provided with as much information as possible in a transparent and open manner. However, this needs to be balanced against maintaining the integrity of an ongoing counter-terrorist operation (including protecting the source of any intelligence) as well as legal constraints. Considerable effort is made by the police at all levels to engage with local communities in such circumstances: through local partnerships, through regular contact with community representatives informally, and through mechanisms such as the Muslim Safety Forum (see below).

86. Lessons are continually being learned on all these issues in order to improve the way in which counter terrorist operations are conducted.

### *Muslim Safety Forum*

There are monthly Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) meetings, held at New Scotland Yard, to address matters of concern to the Muslim communities in the UK, mainly, although not exclusively, related to terrorism and extremism. This is a national meeting, albeit mainly London-based.

It grew out of existing contacts and work with the Muslim Council of Britain, initiated by the police as far back as 2000, and was eventually formalised as the MSF on 13 September 2001. It is run by the Muslim members and community representatives themselves, with police attendance from the Metropolitan Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers; police forces other than the Metropolitan Police attend by request or invitation.

## ***International dimension***

87. Both intelligence gathering and action to disrupt and apprehend terrorists are often carried out in co-operation with our international partners. To facilitate this, the UK provides training and other assistance to certain foreign governments, in order to help them build up their ability to counter terrorism.

### *Assisting other countries*

- In FY05/06, the UK spent over £7.3M helping other nations to build their counter-terrorist capabilities.
- Over the past year the Ministry of Defence has assisted with counter-terrorist training in more than a dozen countries.
- Other agencies, such as the Police, have provided counter-terrorism training assistance to officials from other nations, both in the UK and by deploying trainers overseas.
- The police Counter-Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officer (CTELO) Scheme has also been expanded. In addition to close co-operation with our partners in the European Union, CTELOs are now being posted to Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa.

### *Working with and through international institutions*

- A new EU Counter-terrorism Strategy was endorsed by the European Council in December 2005 during the UK's Presidency.
- The swift extradition from Italy to the United Kingdom of a suspect in the attempted bombings on 21 July demonstrated the effectiveness of the new European Arrest Warrant.
- In the United Nations we are working to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 which creates legal obligations on all states to crack down on terrorists, their supporters and their sources of finance, as part of an effective UN global counter-terrorism strategy.

## **PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, KEY NATIONAL SERVICES, AND UK INTERESTS OVERSEAS**

88. The PROTECT strand of CONTEST is concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the UK and UK interests overseas to a terrorist attack.

89. This covers a range of issues such as borders, the critical national infrastructure, and crowded places. For security reasons, this paper does not provide any information about the extent to which there are currently concerns in relation to specific risks or vulnerabilities relating to any particular sector or area.

90. Following the terrorist attacks in London of 7 July 2005, we have reviewed the UK's Threat Level system and how Government and security professionals respond at each level. We are clear that, in future, the Government should say more publicly about its general analysis of the terrorist threat and broad approach to protective security. The review has simplified the system



for security practitioners and works to clarify the process for the general public without causing alarm. The 'Threat Levels: The System to Assess the Threat from International Terrorism' paper published in July 2006 provides more information on these changes.

## ***Borders***

91. One strand of this work aims to strengthen the UK's border security and tracking systems. The Border Management Programme (BMP) is a cross-government initiative aimed at developing and implementing closer and more effective joint working in order to strengthen border security whilst minimising the impact on legitimate traffic.

92. The Strategic Objectives of the Programme are to:

- improve intelligence sharing in support of border operations;
- jointly identify and manage risks;
- provide a more effective border control; and
- minimise the impact on legitimate traffic and business partners.

### *e-borders*

The e-Borders programme will revolutionise our capability to process passengers entering and leaving the UK by air, rail and sea. The programme will use systems and technology to ensure that we know much sooner who is entering and leaving and will afford better opportunities to manage the passenger volumes.

Project Semaphore is a pilot scheme that is being used to test elements of e-Borders systems and processes. Project Semaphore was launched in November 2004 and will be superseded by the full e-Borders system, which is being rolled out over the period from 2008 to 2014.

Project Semaphore currently captures inbound and some outbound passenger information from 18 air carriers on selected routes originating from 37 non-UK airports. To date 9 million passenger movements at an annual rate of 12 million passenger movements have been captured. The passenger information received is passed through an operations centre staffed by operators from the UK Immigration Service, the Police Service, UKVisas and HM Revenue and Customs, and checked against various agency watchlists. This increasing data capture has already provided benefits to the British intelligence community with over 100 'alerts' having been issued to them.

Project Semaphore is therefore assisting the intelligence community by:

- increasing the effectiveness of monitoring of travellers moving into, out of or transiting the UK;
- reducing the number of routes available to those not wishing to come to the notice of UK authorities;
- increasing the number of effective interventions against individuals of national security interest;
- increasing intelligence on individuals of national security, immigration or criminal interest; and
- capturing increased quantities of data for post incident or historical analysis.

### *Biometrics*

A programme to implement biometric visas is currently at the stage of contractual negotiations, with the aim of implementation starting in August 2006.

### *Radiological threats*

Fixed radiation detection equipment is now operational at a number of UK ports and airports screening traffic entering the United Kingdom for the illicit movement of radioactive materials. Rollout of the strategic fixed and mobile capabilities across the UK is continuing to take place during 2006-07.

## *Critical National Infrastructure*

93. Other strands of work aim to reduce the vulnerability to attack of the UK's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) including its transport systems, and of crowded places. Further measures include protecting UK interests overseas.

94. Risks are assessed and identified through a national process which considers the probability of the event and especially its impact on the UK. This helps to identify the priorities for protection, the aim of which is to reduce the vulnerability to and likelihood of a terrorist attack through proportionate security measures and technological advances.

## *Working with the Private Sector*

95. The contribution of the private sector is crucial in protecting the UK and UK interests overseas against terrorism. This involves the public sector working closely with key utilities, such as energy and water, and with key services, such as transport and finance, within a framework of advice and regulation that aims to help these businesses operate safely.

### *Working with the energy sector*

Electricity, oil, and gas installations and networks are critical to the running of the country, providing the energy we need to function, including supporting the operation of many other vital services and utilities. There is a long-standing programme of work designed to ensure the protection of these and other types of critical infrastructure from terrorist attack. This is carried out in partnership with industry and government, makes use of new technologies, and covers physical, personnel, and electronic security. This programme is continually adapted to take account of the changing shape of sector and this work continues, keeping in step with terrorist methodologies.

### *Working with the transport sector*

We are working with the transport industries to improve further and develop the wide range of measures available to counter the terrorist threat. For example, screening of people and baggage has traditionally been a key part of the UK's air transport security regime. It is essential that we continually update this approach, taking advantage of new technologies, exploring applicability in new areas, and developing methods that can be rolled out in response to enhanced threat. To this end, trials of various methods of screening people and baggage are being conducted on the rail and London Underground networks. The first trial, carried out on the Heathrow Express platforms at Paddington Station in January to February 2006, was successful, with the equipment performing well and the process being received positively by the majority of those members of the public who were requested to take part. New barriers to vehicles are being tested at some mainline stations.

### *Advice and assistance*

A booklet entitled "Protecting Against Terrorism" has been published, aimed at those responsible for the safety of others in businesses and other organisations. It contains protective security advice based on the best practice derived from Government's experience in advising a variety of organisations on protective security, including the Critical National Infrastructure. It is a joint effort by the Security Service, Home Office, Cabinet Office, and Association of Chief Police Officers, supported by London First and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).

The National Security Advice Centre (NSAC) provides advice to Government and the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors on the protection of physical assets and on personnel security. It makes information available via the MI5 website. The National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) provides advice on the protection of critical information networks from electronic attack. NISCC has its own website ([www.niscc.gov.uk](http://www.niscc.gov.uk)).

### *Travel advice*

The FCO issues travel advice notices for 217 countries and overseas territories. Each travel advice notice includes a section on the threat of terrorism. This allows British travellers and expatriates to have up to date information on which to base their decisions about travel. Travel advice needs to strike a balance between danger and disruption: making public safety its prime concern whilst seeking to minimise the disruption that terrorists seek to cause. In cases where the terrorist threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale or endemic to affect British nationals severely, the FCO will advise against travel.

## PREPARING FOR THE CONSEQUENCES

96. The PREPARE strand of CONTEST is concerned with ensuring that the UK is as ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack.

97. Achieving this involves developing the resilience of the UK to withstand such attacks. This means improving the ability of the UK to respond effectively to the direct harm caused by a terrorist attack, and in particular to those individuals affected by it; to recover quickly those essential services which are disrupted by an attack; and to absorb and minimise wider indirect disruption. We will measure our success by whether we reduce the impact of terrorist attacks on British citizens and our way of life.

98. A very large number of stakeholders deliver resilience, across the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is important that all organisations pull in the same direction if contingency planning is not to be disjointed and inefficient, and if the response to an emergency is to be as effective as possible. The provision of leadership and direction to the resilience community, and processes which join-up work at the local, regional and national levels of government, and between the public, private and voluntary sectors, is thus of fundamental importance to the PREPARE strand.

99. The key elements of PREPARE are: identifying the potential risks the UK faces from terrorism and assessing their impact; building the capabilities to respond to them; and regularly and honestly evaluating and testing our preparedness, including through identifying lessons from exercises and real-life events.

### *Identifying and Assessing risks*

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office was created in July 2001 to work with a range of organisations to assess the consequences for the UK of potential emergencies, whether caused by terrorism or other factors. This risk assessment process, which looks over a five year period, forms the basis for decisions about emergency preparedness, including investment decisions.

The aim is for organisations at every level to follow this process. A wide range of organisations are involved and this work, for the first time, forms a systematic and all-inclusive approach to risk analysis which is reflected across the UK, at national, regional and local levels. In particular at the local level, the conduct and publication of local risk assessments are now formal duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (see box on page 26).

100. Given the vast range of potential terrorist attack scenarios, with a wide range of potential consequences, it is neither practicable nor prudent to plan for every scenario. Instead, planning seeks to build generic capabilities and plans, able to be drawn on flexibly in the response to a wide range of terrorist (and other) events.

### *Building capabilities*

The cross-government Capabilities Programme, managed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, is the core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the United Kingdom.

The Programme consists of 17 capability ‘workstreams’ which fall into three groups:

- Three workstreams which are essentially structural, dealing respectively with national, regional and local response capabilities;
- Five which are concerned with the maintenance of essential services (i.e. food and water, health, utilities, transport, and financial services); and

- Nine functional workstreams, dealing respectively with the resilience of the response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks; management of human infectious diseases; management of animal and plant infectious diseases; handling mass casualties; management of mass fatalities; evacuation and shelter capabilities; site clearance capability; warning and informing the public; and responding to flood emergencies.

Substantial investment has been made to ensure that the emergency services, local authorities and government departments and agencies are prepared to respond effectively to any emergency. For example:

- Over 7,000 police officers are already CBRN trained, and more are being trained. Over £200 million is being provided under the New Dimensions Programme for mass decontamination, urban search and rescue and high-volume pumping capability. 80 new Fire and Rescue Service Incident Response Units are now operationally available each containing equipment capable of decontaminating up to 400 people an hour.
- Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Department of Health established a national stockpile of medical countermeasures. Antibiotics, antidotes, respiratory support and specialist equipment are stored in 'Pods' strategically placed around the UK. These pods are accessible by the NHS on a 24-hour basis for rapid deployment in the event of a mass casualty incident.
- Resources are held at national level to fill gaps and enhance the capability of local responders to manage mass fatality incidents including temporary demountable structures for body storage and stockpiles of general mortuary equipment. A National Disaster Victim Identification Team has been created to provide police and forensic personnel who have been trained in emergency management.
- Regional resilience teams are in place in each Regional Government Office. Multi-agency Regional Resilience Forums have been convened in each English region to co-ordinate wide-area planning and to act as a bridge between central Government and the local response.

#### *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has established a modern framework for civil protection capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The Act and supporting regulations and guidance have:

- created a common framework of duties for all organisations that are at the core of emergency planning and response work;
- given local responders a clear set of roles, responsibilities and standards to guide their work;
- mandated structures and processes for partnership working at the local and regional level, and advocated much greater multi-agency integration and collaboration;
- required emergency planning arrangements to be underpinned by systematic assessments of risk and exercised regularly;
- mandated business continuity planning to ensure that local responders can sustain the effectiveness of their functions even in the face of an emergency, and continue to deliver core functions with a minimum of disruption; and
- conferred a duty to raise awareness of emergency management issues in the communities they serve.

The bulk of the duties in the Act came fully into force in November 2005. The Act and significant new investment at a local level in the last spending review (including a doubling of local authority funding) are already giving new direction and impetus to emergency preparedness work at the local level.

#### *Business Continuity Management*

We aim to ensure that organisations at every level of the UK and in every sector who have a role in the response to or recovery from a major emergency, or whose actions will be important in absorbing and minimising its indirect impact, have effective business continuity arrangements.

The recently expanded Preparing for Emergencies website ([www.pfe.gov.uk](http://www.pfe.gov.uk)) provides a 'single portal' for advice to business and the voluntary sector on emergencies, business continuity and other issues.

*“Preparing for Emergencies – What you need to know”*

In 2004 the Government published a booklet providing general advice for a range of emergencies. “Preparing for Emergencies – What you need to know” was delivered to over 25 million households throughout the UK. The booklet aimed to ensure that people across the UK had practical, common sense information about how to prepare for and what to do in the event of an emergency. The booklet is also available on [www.pfe.gov.uk](http://www.pfe.gov.uk).

101. Finally, we need rigorously and honestly to assess our preparedness to ensure we keep pace with the developing risks and enhance where necessary our capabilities to match them.

*Evaluating & testing resilience*

The UK’s ability to respond to a terrorist incident is practised regularly (as are our arrangements for responding to a wide range of other emergencies).

As part of this framework the Home Office has, for a number of years, sponsored a National Programme of Counter-Terrorist exercises in conjunction with UK police forces, which are designed to look specifically at the response to terrorist incidents at local, regional, and national levels, up to and including the Government central crisis management (“COBR”) mechanisms. The CT exercise programme involves both live operational and table-top exercises.

Almost all elements of the response to the events of 7 July 2005 had been the subject of exercise activity in the previous two years in either live or table top format. Such activity included exercise OSIRIS II, which was held at Bank Underground Station in September 2003, the CAPITAL series of tabletop and command post exercises which focused on the co-ordination of the emergency response across London, and the international counter-terrorist exercise ATLANTIC BLUE held jointly with the USA and Canada, which took place in April 2005, with the UK elements focusing on London.

The importance of this programme of regular exercises, which test capability and drive improvements, was shown on 7 July 2005, when relevant components of emergency plans developed and tested in recent exercises were put into effect and worked well.

***Reassuring communities***

102. One of the terrorist’s aims is to create suspicion and division between communities. We have therefore put in place measures to monitor the reaction of communities to incidents and assess the risks to vulnerable sections. This involves the police, other public agencies and community leaders working together. Interfaith networks, as well as wider civic society, demonstrated after the events of 7 July 2005 that they would not allow extremists to divide them.

**BROADER ISSUES**

***Resources***

103. The Government considers investment in counter-terrorism and resilience to be a priority and this has been reflected in the resources which have been made available both to respond to terrorist events – for example, £775m was made available following the 9/11 attacks – and in support of the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy.

104. As our knowledge of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism capabilities has increased, and as new threats and opportunities have emerged, the Government has allocated further resources to this area to enable increased capacity. For example, the 2005 Pre Budget Report announced an additional £85m to enable new capabilities to be developed and accelerate delivery of existing plans. Final decisions on how this money is allocated lies with departments. By 2008, annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is double what it was prior to 9/11.

105. As part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, the Government will review its counter-terrorism and security plans and expenditure.

*Additional resources for counter-terrorism*

The Security Service (MI5) is in the process of doubling the size of its counter-terrorism capability. This includes strengthening its partnership with the police by opening offices in key regions outside London.

Police forces across the UK are being given additional funding to increase CT capabilities including special branch coverage of terrorist suspects, and specialist investigation capabilities.

*Additional resources for resilience*

The Government has more than doubled its contribution to local authorities' resilience activities, to £40.7m p.a. for each of the years covered by the Spending Review 2004. This 113% increase was strongly welcomed by the Local Government Association.

### ***Who is involved***

106. Developing and delivering the Government's counter-terrorism strategy involves all parts of Government acting together and taking a joined-up approach to dealing with this complex and wide-ranging threat. Delivery depends upon partnerships with many others.

107. Counter-terrorism strategy and planning is overseen by a Cabinet committee, DOP(IT), chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Home Secretary as Deputy Chair. Within this framework, the Home Secretary chairs the Cabinet committee, DOP(IT)(PSR), that looks particularly at issues around the PROTECT and PREPARE strands of the strategy.

108. The Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office is responsible for overseeing the strategic direction and delivery of pan-government counter-terrorism capability, working to the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary as appropriate. The Cabinet Office works closely with the Home Office, which is the lead policy department and responsible for the delivery of a number of the strands of the Government's counter-terrorism planning and programme, and with the other key contributors described below.

109. Other Government departments – such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for Transport (DfT), the Treasury, and the Ministry of Defence – take the lead in aspects of policy and its implementation.

110. Operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police. Intelligence in relation to possible terrorist threats at home and overseas is developed by the Security Service, SIS, and GCHQ. Operations against potential terrorists are a police matter. In the event of a terrorist incident the response is led by the Emergency Services and local authorities. Work with communities is led by the Department for Communities and Local Government, supported by the Home Office.

*Military force*

The British Armed Forces contribute to UK's counter-terrorism strategy, predominantly in PREVENT and PURSUE activities overseas and in specialised elements of PROTECT at home, in particular hostage recovery, maritime counter-terrorism, bomb disposal and the interception of renegade aircraft. Overseas, any military operations which reduce regional instability or prevent the failure of states can assist in the prevention of terrorism, and on a small scale even modest military training can assist other nations to protect themselves and pursue terrorists in their territory, to their benefit and ours.

The Government has declared itself willing to use military force in accordance with international law for counter-terrorism purposes when non-military tools cannot achieve its goals. There will always be considerable challenges in doing so because before we could consider the use of force in a particular case we would have to pinpoint the terrorists precisely, which is usually extremely difficult. It would also be necessary to establish that the use of military force against a particular target is lawful, both in international and domestic law.

111. Much of the work involves partnerships across the public sector – involving the police and emergency services, local authorities, devolved administrations, and central government departments – as well as partnerships with businesses in the private sector, and with the voluntary and charitable sector, which has a key supporting role in any major emergency.

112. Work in and with other countries is and has to be an important part of protecting the UK and its interests. The UK also shares a common interest with many other governments in combating terrorism. International work features prominently throughout the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Again, many parts of the public sector are involved. The FCO has a leading role, working closely with DfID, the Ministry of Defence, SIS and GCHQ, the police, DfT and others. Through its global network of Posts, the FCO co-ordinates our work with other governments. This includes understanding and combating radicalization, supporting reform, sharing intelligence, assisting governments in improving their counter-terrorism capability, organising joint counter-terrorism exercises, and promoting joint action against known terrorists.

113. The FCO also leads work with and through international organisations such as the EU and the UN to deliver more effective international action against terrorism. This includes action through the sanctions the UN and EU have in place against terrorists and those who support them, the technical assistance that both the UN and EU can provide to countries seeking to enhance their counter-terrorist capacity, and the promotion of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and development of effective criminal justice systems which are essential for successful international action against terrorism.

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***Other useful websites:***

No.10	<a href="http://www.number-10.gov.uk">www.number-10.gov.uk</a>
Cabinet Office	<a href="http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk">www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk</a>
Foreign Office	<a href="http://www.fco.gov.uk">www.fco.gov.uk</a>
Security Service	<a href="http://www.mi5.gov.uk">www.mi5.gov.uk</a>
Secret Intelligence Service	<a href="http://www.sis.gov.uk">www.sis.gov.uk</a> or <a href="http://www.mi6.gov.uk">www.mi6.gov.uk</a>

## Summary of progress on the Prime Minister’s twelve point action plan

30	1 Introduce new grounds for deportation and exclusion.	Actioned	Thirty six foreign nationals have been excluded since August last year on all grounds of unacceptable behaviour. There has been one decision in principle to deport and four other deportation cases on grounds of unacceptable behaviour are under consideration. (See <i>Acting on unacceptable behaviours</i> , page 12) Two foreign nationals who were detained under immigration powers pending deportation on grounds of national security have since been deported to Algeria. A further 27 foreign nationals face deportation on grounds of national security. (See <i>Successful disruptions – deportation</i> , page 18)
2	Create an offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism.	Actioned	Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to encourage terrorism. This offence includes statements or publications that glorify terrorism and came into force on 13 April 2006. (See box, page 12)
3	Automatically refuse asylum in this country to anyone who has participated in terrorism.	Actioned	Section 54 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 allows the Home Secretary to deny asylum to terrorists while respecting our obligations under the Refugee Convention. Section 55 in the Act allows the Secretary of State to certify that an appellant is not entitled to the protection of the Refugee Convention. Sections 54 and 55 are due to come into force imminently. (See box, page 19)
4	Consult on extending the powers to strip citizenship, applying them to British citizens engaged in extremism and making the procedures more effective.	Actioned	Section 56 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 lowers the threshold for removal of British citizenship by replacing one of the existing criteria with a new power to deprive where such action is held by the Home Secretary to be “conducive to the public good”. The power came into force on 16 June 2006. Several cases are currently being considered against this new criterion. (See box, page 19)



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|----|---|------------------------|---|
| 5  | Consult on setting a maximum time limit for all future extradition cases involving terrorism.   | Consultation completed | Following the consultation it has been decided not to set a maximum time limit. A working group chaired by the Home Office, with membership from the Crown Prosecution Service and other stakeholders, has met monthly to monitor developments in cases and remove obstacles to progress.   |
| 6  | Examine a new court procedure to allow a pre-trial process; and examine whether pre-charge detention can be significantly extended.                                   | Actioned               | The Government is currently examining ways of allowing more sensitive material to be used in court.<br>The maximum period of pre-charge detention was extended from 14 to 28 days in the Terrorism Act 2006. This provision will come into force before the end of July 2006.   |
| 7  | Extend the use of control orders for those who are British nationals and cannot be deported.  | Actioned               | There are currently 15 control orders made by the Secretary of State in operation; nine of these are in respect of foreign nationals and the other six are in respect of British citizens. (See <i>Successful disruptions – control orders</i> , page 20)   |
| 8  | Expand court capacity to deal with control orders.  | Actioned               | The Courts are ensuring that the capacity required is available for terrorism cases. The appropriate judicial resources are allocated accordingly and the matter is being kept under review.  |
| 9  | Proscribe Hizb ut Tahrir and the successor organisation of Al Mujahiroun.   | Under review           | Section 21 of the Terrorism Act 2006 widened the criteria for proscription. The list of proscribed organisations is currently being reviewed on the basis of these new criteria. Forty international and 14 domestic terrorist organisations are currently proscribed in the UK. (See <i>Successful disruptions – proscription</i> , page 21)         |
| 10 | Review the acquisition of British Citizenship to make sure that it is adequate; and establish with the Muslim community a commission to advise on better integration. | Actioned               | Section 58 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 extended the requirement to be of good character to virtually all applicants for British citizenship. This provision is expected to be implemented in July/August 2006. (See box, page 19). A Commission on Integration and Cohesion was announced on 28 June 2006. (See box, page 11) |

32	<p>11 Consult on a new power to order closure of a place of worship which is used as a centre for fermenting extremism; and consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics who are not British Citizens to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach and who will be excluded from our country in the future.</p>	<p>Consultation completed</p>	<p>The public consultation on taking powers to close a place of worship resulted in a decision not to legislate at this stage.</p> <p>The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board was formally launched on 27 June 2006. A steering group of Muslim leaders published a good practice guide for mosques alongside the launch of the Advisory Board. Once established we will work with the Advisory Board to identify individuals who are not suitable to preach in this country and who should be considered for deportation or exclusion. (See box, page 14)</p>
12	<p>Bring forward the proposed measures on the security of our borders with a series of countries specifically designated for biometric visas over the next year.</p>	<p>Actioned</p>	<p>A programme to implement biometric visas is currently at the stage of contractual negotiations, with the aim of implementation starting in August 2006. (See box, page 23)</p>

## **Annex B**

### **WHAT CAN THE PUBLIC DO TO HELP?**

The Government's strategy for countering terrorism depends upon everyone making a contribution to its success.

Members of the public can help by:

- working in their own community, particularly with young people, to encourage community engagement and to counter those who seek to promote radicalisation and terrorist violence.
- being alert to their surroundings and identifying and reporting unusual or suspicious activities. Any suspicious activity should be reported to the Anti-Terrorist Hotline 0800-789321.
- consulting FCO travel advice ([www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk)) before travelling abroad.
- reading the "Protecting Against Terrorism" booklet. It is not just for Government and big businesses. It contains clear, general security advice about how to help make a community safer. It is available on the internet at [www.mi5.gov.uk](http://www.mi5.gov.uk).
- consulting the Preparing for Emergencies website ([www.pfe.gov.uk](http://www.pfe.gov.uk)), which provides detailed information for the public to help them prepare. The website also provides information for businesses about business continuity— ensuring that they can handle an emergency, continue to function, and can recover effectively afterwards.

Security guidance for employers can be obtained from the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC), which is part of the Security Service, ([www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page5.html](http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page5.html)) and from the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) ([www.niscc.gov.uk](http://www.niscc.gov.uk)).







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