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Air &
Space Power Chronicles
Cyber Attack Response:
The Military in a Support Role
by
Col(S) Nonie C. Cabana
| "The enemies of peace realize they cannot
defeat us with traditional means. So they are working on new forms
of assault: cyber attacks on our computer systems"1 |
President Clinton |
Introduction
This article will examine the military support role regarding cyber
attack to the U.S., the consequences and implications, and offer possible
alternatives to strengthen our homeland defense against cyber attack.
It contends that the DOD should not lead the counter cyber attack efforts
based on three likely scenarios: 1) transportation infrastructure; 2)
financial institutions; and 3) public services.
There is general agreement today that technology is changing the way
future warfare would be conducted--especially on the use and vulnerabilities
of computer information systems.
Before World War II, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans served as defense
firewalls to protect the United States from enemy attack. The Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, however, suddenly challenged our invincibility
and made us question our ability to withstand further attack. Unfortunately,
winning the war on both fronts caused our fears to fade. John Gilligan,
Director of Information Technology/Systems, Department of Energy, summed
it up well when he stated: "The state of the art is such that, while
we are putting up protective barriers and firewalls and such, there is
a general agreement that there are no 100% guarantees."2
Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism further stated: "an attack on Americans
cyberspace is an attack on the United States that should trigger a military
response."3
Assuming a foe launched a cyber attack on the U.S., what role should
the military take in response? Should the military take the lead because
others view cyber attack as both an act of warfare and a national defense
issue? Both cyber and biological agent attacks cross this difficult line.
What makes these attacks different from a nuclear warhead delivered by
a missile? The distinction seems to hinge on whether the issue is 1) to
defend against a cyber attack, or 2) to deal with the domestic consequences
of the attack.
If the military takes the lead role in the cyber attack defense, it should
be prepared to deal with possible resistance from other federal agencies
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department
of Justice. Some say the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Health and
Human Services, Energy, Transportation, State, and the Environmental Protection
Agency, could also play key roles, depending on the cyber attack target.
The military should embrace the supporting role during a cyber attack
to the homeland until the cyber attack is clearly defined as a threat
to our vital interest and the responsibility among federal agencies is
delineated.
Moreover, a litmus test is needed to assess whether the cyber attack
even constitutes a direct attack to our vital interests national security,
homeland defense, and economic prosperity. When does a cyber attack become
a weapon of mass destruction or mass disruption? Shall a distinction be
made between destruction and disruption to craft an appropriate military
response? No doubt, this issue requires further discussion and exploration
to produce a realistic and workable strategy.
Another challenge is finding the perpetrator because it could simply
be curious children/teenagers or disgruntled citizens. On the other hand,
if hostile nations or known terrorists initiated the attack, the U.S.
military should likely retaliate.
Conversely, the military lead role outside the homeland is well defined.
For instance, the military played an active cyber war role in Kosovo.
Bob Brewin, Federal Computer Week, reported that a London-based
spokesman for U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, confirmed that "it was the
first time a Joint Task Force staff was organized with an information
operations (IO) cell, which was composed of military personnel with expertise
in various facets of IO.4 The IO cell objective was to disrupt
Serbias computer systems to give the U.S. and her allies the winning
edge in the information warfare.
Background
The age of cyber attack presents a new challenge to the military.
A 1999 Reuters, Washington Post article for example stated: "organized
attacks such as solar sunrise on DOD computers in February
1998, and computer viruses such as Melissa early this year,
highlight the governments susceptibility."5 Further,
Executive Order 13010, July 15, 1996, "defines certain national infrastructures
as so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
impact on the defense or economic security of the United States."6
Although we may eventually know the spot of origin of a cyber attack,
finding its perpetrator may be an even greater challenge. Complicating
this dilemma is "the threat is going to be death by a thousand cuts,
rather than a giant attack."7 Russian "cyberspooks"
may have recently infiltrated U.S. computer security. The operation coined
"Moonlight Maze,"targeted information on classified naval codes
and missile guidance systems.8 The attack may have been committed
by a person or persons not connected to the government, who were upset
at the U.S. over the Kosovo affair;9 however, no one knows
for sure. Does this event then warrant a military retaliation? The answer
should be a resounding "no", since there was no immediate threat
to our interest and the chief instigator was unknown. For the U.S. to
retaliate, there has to be a direct attack by a rogue nation or known
terrorist to our critical information infrastructure such as electrical
grids and transportation nodes, which falls under our economic and security
interests.
As we wrestle with this new form of asymmetrical warfare, we need to
produce a litmus test and assess the militarys possible role before
we face the inevitability. Failure to do so invites unnecessary risks
that further increase military operational tempo.
Transportation Infrastructure:
Disabling the transportation computer systems operating our highways,
railroads, waterports and airports could degrade our vital interest--economic
prosperity and military readiness. For example, a cyber attack on Savannah
Water Ports, Georgia, Bell Souths switching systems "would
make it impossible to deploy military forces at the pace specified in
operations plans."10 Protecting a commercial waterport
like Savannah involves several government agencies including the Departments
of Transportation, Commerce, Justice, Defense, and other agencies. A report
prepared by a top-level Defense Department advisory panel summarized the
DOD position: "We should not forget information warfare as a form
of warfare, not a crime or act of terror." The report further made
this point: "The response could entail civil or criminal prosecution,
use of military force diplomatic initiatives or economic mandates."11
Thus, the Departments of Defense, Justice, States, and Commerce all have
legitimate roles to play in dealing with this war on information systems.
A 1999 Defense News article stated: "Tomorrows threats
will require a responsive apparatus to support U.S. decision-makers. Todays
sprawling, tangled network of agencies and staffs simply cannot do the
job."12 Clearly, this issue deserves a closer look and
increased attention from our Administration; for if we fail to address
it, we may find that we have indeed "met the enemy," and he
may be us. The ultimate losers would be the American people.
Our transportation vitality thrives because of its robust and cutting-edge
computer systems. A massive attack on these systems could spell instability
and chaos at the highest order. Computer reliance "has created a
tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict
and could have a catastrophic effect on the ability of DOD to fulfill
its mission."13
Another way cyber attack can impair our defense posture would be through
manipulation of data in the Global Transportation Network (GTN). The U.S.
Armed Forces uses this system for "intransit visibility, command
and control (C2) applications, and business decision support tools."14
Assuming that hackers successfully broke into the GTN, what would happen
when GTN data showed that critical combat troops and equipment were in
place in the computer data, but in reality, were not. This predicament
would not only cause unnecessary requisition requests for additional resources
but would also throw-off the warfighters decision making process.
However, does this potential impact compel DOD to take the leading role?
Although this situation affects national security, it would not reach
a crescendo to warrant the military taking the lead. That is, experiencing
temporary transportation setbacks may occur, but Americas robust
technology, coupled with her "societal agility," would find
a way to overcome this problem. If on the other hand, gathered intelligence
showed the nation states or known terrorists launched this specific attack
to impair U.S. vital interest, then the military should exercise the option
to respond.
A computer failure in the transportation infrastructure goes beyond its
immediate platform. This was illustrated by Slabodkins August 31,
1999 article, which depicted the U.S. Navys Aegis cruiser Yorktown,
a test bed for its Smart Ship Program, was "dead in the water"
for several hours due to "a basic programming problem."15
This incident represented what an adversary could do to our combat ships
without firing a missile or conventional weapon. What action should the
military take? Clearly, no conventional weapon was used. What level of
retaliation would be appropriate, and when should it be directed? Since
this scenario did not identify the enemy and did not impact the vital
interest, the military should take a role in support of the federal lead
agencies and not lead the effort itself. Such an attack would present
a complex dilemma for the Interagency Working Group in the National Security
Council determining exactly who should lead.
Clearly, there are many stakeholders in the decision making process whom
have equally important roles in the process. Each agency could legitimately
take the lead. A decision matrix might institute a process to optimize
leadership responsibility.
Paralysis of Financial Institutions
The advent of computer capability to electronically transfer funds
and make payments has enhanced the global economy and forever changed
the way we do business. Hence, a cyber attack to this institution is an
attack to our vital economic interest. Statistics indicate that over the
last five years at least 25 percent of economic growth are attributed
to information technologies.16 John Hamre, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, illustrated the impact of monetary transactions: "Every
month we write about 10 million paychecks. We write about 800,000 travel
vouchers. One of our finance centers disburses $45 million an hour."17
The Tampa-based Armed Forces Financial Network (AFFN) employs "more
than 30,000 ATMs in more than 30 countries and on two Navy ships,"
which equates to a total of "more than 60-million cardholders."18
The military is also working with AFFN to develop a smart card "that
can serve as a combination ID card, meal ticket and cashless charge card."19
It would be a powerful attraction for terrorists to make a cyber attack
on those electronic cardholders. Without firing a single shot, they could
achieve the significant accomplishment of upsetting morale and creating
economic chaos within the military-civilian establishment and financial
community.
Equally important, panic and hysteria created by a successful cyber attack
on financial institutions such as the World Trade Center or the Wall Street
could cause the public to lose confidence and trust in our government
because it would have failed to protect the American interest. In the
words of Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, "the
most important single demand that any political community must meet is
the demand for protection."20 The military must be cognizant
of the fact that federal agencies such as FEMA, DOJ, and others may be
placed in charge of protection and possible reaction on issues clearly
domestic in nature. These agencies are better adept in this field.
Our interagency coordination machine is lacking a tool to put all these
agencies under a single command and control umbrella that would perform
like a military theater unified Commander-in-Chief or joint task force.
Although, this issue is being addressed, it has not yet produced a viable
alternative to the present policy. In spite of damaging, degrading and
paralyzing financial institution and risking the domino effect of this
paralysis to our national economy and security, the military should apply
restraint and prudence. It should not be tempted to take charge of matters
clearly under the lead charter of other federal agencies. Rather, prudent
judgment by civilian and military senior leaders must prevail in providing
military assistance to the designated lead federal agency without creating
the perception that the military "has taken over." Exception
to this rule, nevertheless, applies when the nation states or known terrorist
initiated the attack to destabilize our vital interest. At this juncture,
the military response becomes reasonably appropriate.
On the other hand, when the situation calls for a leader, the military
organization should respond. Recall the militarys proactive stance
to establish an Information Operations cell within the Joint Task Force
in the war in Kosovo.21 Granted, the military believed it had
identified the perpetrators, and the American public distanced itself
from this attack, for it did not directly affect the vital interest. On
the homeland, however, determining the enemy is tougher. Here, the enemy
may just be a curious child or student anxious to see how far he/she can
go. Hence, reliance on lead federal agency is the best option to deal
with this domestic issue.
Public Services
Continuous improvement of information technology makes our 911 emergency
service support system an integral and reliable part of community service.
Nevertheless, because the 911 service affects us all, it has become a
potential cyber attack target. A Los Angeles Times article reported "the
Red Team hackers hit the jackpot they broke into networks that direct
the 911 emergency response systems."22 Does this act,
then, represent a direct attack to our vital interests? Arguably so. After
all, this attack violates our individual safety and promotes fear among
the populace, both of which are inseparable to our vital interest. Consequently,
if the evidence shows the attack originates from rogue states or known
terrorists, a military response should remain an option to punish the
perpetrators.
Equally important, is the absence of telecommunications capabilities,
which could severely disrupt fire department and ambulance services. Delay
of legitimate emergency response could mean life or death to hundreds
of victims. Like the 911 issue, this dilemma undoubtedly smacks our core
values to protect and save lives. Hence, this situation can also be viewed
as a direct attack to our vital interest, which warrants an appropriate
military action. Absent this evidence, the military should take the supporting
role.
Several federal agencies could take the lead in response. Some say the
Department of Justice could lead because criminal acts may have occurred.
Others view FEMA fit the bill because government services have essentially
stopped.
The Dilemma for the Military
The military is not trained to enforce civil laws. Further, the
Posse Comitatus Act prohibits military employment for direct law enforcement.23
An attempt to change this act should be avoided for the U.S. clearly has
adequate law enforcement agencies to effectively deal with civil laws.
In short, the military should shy away from law enforcement issues clearly
internal and domestic in nature. To stay on track, federal, state, and
local enforcement agencies must work hand in hand with the military to
preclude violation of the Constitution when dealing with cyber attack
cases in the U.S. For instance, the military should not "cross the
line" when it supports the federal agencies to counter drug operations
and control the flow of illegal immigrants crossing our borders. The same
principle of restraint should apply to a cyber attack. There has to be
an agile command and control instrument that puts the best lead agency
to deal with situational cyber attacks.
Another dilemma facing the military is the containment of cyber attack.
For no matter how much preparation is done to counter cyber attack, it
can happen anytime and anywhere. Cyber attack circumvents boundaries.
In the words of Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.): "Borders are no defense
for the penetration of information even in a highly controlled or authoritarian
societies."24 Countering this dilemma may require some
investments on Research and Development to enhance the penetration detection
system.
Consequences and Implications of Military Role
Twentieth century America is not accustomed to seeing its military
involved in domestic affairs, except during national disasters, emergency,
and riot situations. Nevertheless, examples of the military providing
disaster relief to the community is not unprecedented. Recall military
assistance in the "Oklahoma City bombing" during this decade.25
Our Constitution clearly defines the role of the military to be subordinate
to civilian authority. The Honorable John J. Hemre, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, made it clear that "DODs mandate is to provide assistance
to appropriate federal civilian authority--either the Department of Justice
or the Federal Emergency Management Agency Hamre further states: "there
are no plans to create a Homelands Defense Command or any
other military institution to oversee civilian-led response efforts."26
He is right. The American people nurture this special relationship.
Moreover, the militarys allegiance to the President as Commander-in-Chief
makes it the "force of choice" to deliver results without political
squabbling. Nonetheless, traditions, ethics and the military ethos compel
the military to be sensitive in taking the lead for fear of public rebuke
impeding citizens civil rights. For example, Mr. Weiners August
16, 1999 article in New York Times illustrated this fear when "Congress
has blocked money for a planned system to safeguard government computers,
a prominent Republican has denounced the system as "Orwellian,"
and some civil libertarians are calling this system a potential threat."27
One way of avoiding this criticism while at the same time engaging
the populace, however, is show the general public that the military would
take appropriate action to punish the nation states or known terrorists
responsible for attacking our homelands vital interest based on
intelligence and military resolve.
Regarding the year 2000 computer problem potential havoc to our way of
life, DODs position is to remain noncommittal. Some may argue that
DOD should assist the citizens because of its oath to "support and
defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic."
However, DOD position on this issue is "year 2000 problem becomes
an enemy only if nation states or terrorists use it as an opportunity
to attack U.S. interest."28 At what point then does an
attack inflicting damages to our vital interest, but uses non-traditional
mechanisms become a proper role for the military? How does this scenario
differ from a missile attack to our homeland? One answer is that we are
now working on a national missile defense technology to shoot it down
in the mid-air before it lands on large populated areas. On the other
hand, we have not developed a similar defense technology to thwart a cyber
attack making it more difficult for us to identify the enemy or perpetrator.
Another challenge facing the military is the complexity of defining weather
a cyber attack constitutes a weapon of mass destruction or a weapon of
mass disruption. Knowing the difference between these two issues may help
the military craft its appropriate response.
The recent designation of U.S. Atlantic Command to U.S. Joint Forces
Command continues the tradition of providing military assistance to civil
authorities in the event of a nuclear or biological attack within the
U.S.29 A cyber attack could also fall under this military
assistance program.
Moreover, The Armed Forces Journal, October 1999 issue, captured a Marine
Corps officers sentiment participating in Exercise Urban Warrior
in the CONUS when he said: "I would put down my arms and walk away
if the armed forces were to do anything against the American people."30
This unique distinction of respecting the civil rights of the American
people is a powerful reminder to the military for not assuming lead roles
in matters clearly under the auspices of other federal agencies. USA Today,
recently reported "the military continues to enjoy the respect from
the American public because it does not threaten the interest of any American
and it has remained above politics."31 The message is
clear for the military to assume a supporting role in this arena.
Paraphrasing Mr. Sullivans and Mr. Harpers statement, ultimately,
the military support to the community is based on providing basic needs,
ensuring public health, providing open communications, and assisting in
the rapid return of civil society with its duly constituted government.32
This is one facet the military can touch the hearts and minds of the American
people, and, in turn, win their trust and confidence.
Facing the Future
The militarys ability to organize and coherently respond to
crises is a national asset. Therefore, its assistance to public and private
sectors is crucial in protecting the well being of our nation. Other lead
agencies would be well served to emulate the militarys command and
control structures to achieve unity of effort. Several recommendations
are worthy of further exploration:
A. Consolidate interagency guidance. According to the GAO, "Federal
Agencies have not completed interagency guidance and resolved command
and control issues."33 The Federal Response Plan is a
good starting template. It is working well for FEMA and other agencies
during consequence management. It should include annex(es) that deal with
cyber attack.
B. Elevate the title of National Coordinator to Director for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter Terrorism. Put teeth into implementation
of Presidential Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection
that covers cyber attack.34 Elevating his title would put him
in equal status with FEMA Director, Attorney General, and the "Drug
Czar." This elevation, naturally, would not eliminate the challenges
of working with peers and solidifying relationships with the private sector
representing multiple interests. However, this elevated title would give
him an equal footing among the lead federal agency directors to espouse
his agenda. On the flip side, an extreme caution and sensitivity should
prevail to avoid a negative perception of abuse of power affecting citizens
civil rights as a result of this title elevation. Recall J. Edgar Hoovers
legacy as the FBI director.
C. Keep the private sector engaged. A dialogue has been initiated
via the Information and Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC) to keep the industry
engaged. Moreover, under the Presidential Decision Directive 63, ISAC
was allowed to "gather, analyze, sanitize and disseminate private
information from the National Information Protection Center for further
distribution to the private sector."35 The idea was designed
so "the ISAC may emulate particular aspects of such institutions
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that have proved
highly effective, particularly its extensive interchanges with the private
and non-federal sectors."36
Despite this dialogue, the private sector is still driven by profit.
There must be a "carrot" to get the private sector engaged.
Otherwise, their full cooperation in cementing a responsive public-private
partnership remains hallow. J. Douglas Beason, author of "DOD Science
and Technology," was correct when he said: "Industry will not
step up to fill a void unless there is a sufficient profit."37
Possible incentives for the private sector might be tax breaks or other
governmental relief.
D. Integrate cyber attack impact to U.S. Joint Forces Commands
Joint Task Force for Civil Support's training program to address strengths
and weaknesses of state and local computer defense mechanisms. This initiative
may require extra efforts since the task force appears to be more focused
on dealing with disasters caused by the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
E. Integrate the lead agency (Sector Liaison Official) with the private
sector (Sector Coordinator) to assess and develop a workable course
of action.38 State and local government agencies should maximize
benefits offered by the public and private sector at the national level.
Fostering a dialogue is essential for the existence of public service
support to the community. Ultimately, the objective is to make the public
and private sectors more aware of the military support role in their community.
In sum, the military role should be supporting, not supported for cyber
attack defense. Exception to this rule applies if the attack is initiated
by rogue nations or known terrorists against our vital interest or conditions
where the military is best suited for the mission. For domestic consequence
of a cyber attack, the military role should also be supporting.
In conclusion, the military can perpetually maintain the highest respect
and admiration from the American people by defending the homeland against
a cyber attack from rogue nation states and known terrorists. Taking the
supporting position on the defense of cyber attack and domestic consequence
platform would allow the military to distance itself from getting entangled
with civil matters affecting domestic law enforcement. At the same time,
the military should simultaneously assist agencies to better prepare them
against cyber attack and improve their homeland cyber attack defense.
This arrangement is a win-win situation for our nation.
Notes
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the
President On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century," January
22, 1999, www.whitehouse.gove/WH/new/htm1/19990122-7214.html,
August 31, 1999.
- Bob Drogin, "In Theory, Reality, U.S. Open to Cyber-Attack,"
Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1999, p.16.
- Tim Weiner, "Author of Computer Surveillance Plan Tries to Ease
Fears," New York Times, August 16, 1999, p.1.
- Bob Brewin, "Kosovo Ushered in Cyber War," Federal Computer
Week, September 27, 1999, p.1.
- Reuters, "GAO Cites Computer Security Risks," Washington
Post, October 4, 1999, p.7.
- The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order
13010, July 15, 1996.
- John Markoff, "Cyberwarfare Breaks the Rules of Military Engagement,"
New York Times, October 17, 1999, p.1.
- Gregory Vistica, "Were in the Middle of a Cyberwar,"
Newsweek, September 20, 1999, p.52.
- Daniel Verton, "Russia Hacking Stories Refuted," Federal
Computer Week, September 27, 1999.
- Bob Brewin and Heather Harreld,
"U.S. Sitting Duck, DOD Panel Predicts," Information Warfare,
November 11, 1996, www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw111/duck.htm, August 31, 1999.
- Ibid.
- "Panel Lacks Inspiration," Defense News, October
4, 1999, p. 26.
- Bob Brewin and Heather Harreld, "U.S.
Sitting Duck, DOD Panel Predicts," Information Warfare, November
11, 1996, www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw111/duck.htm, August 31, 1999.
- Global Transportation Network: "A USCINCTRANS Update," Defense
Transportation Journal, August 1999, p.8.
- Gregory Slabodkin, GCN staff, "Navy CIO
Orders an Investigation of Yorktown Systems Failure," www.cs.virginia
edu/~survive/NEWS/news003.txt, August 31, 1999.
- The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by
Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,
and Counter-Terrorism, and Jeffrey Hunker, Director of the Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, May 22, 1998.
- The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing, September
16, 1998, Appendix F.
- Jeff Harrington, "Arming the Armed Forces With Access ton Cash,"
St. Petersburg Times, September 19, 1999, p. 1H.
- Ibid.
- Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, The Free Press,
1991, pp.197-198.
- Bob Brewin, "Kosovo Ushered in Cyber War," Federal Computer
Week, September 27, 1999, p.1.
- Bob Drogin, "In Theory, Reality, U.S. Open to Cyber-Attack,"
Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1999, p. 16.
- Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, Federal Laws, Posse Comitatus
Act, Section 1385 of Title 18, U.S. Code.
- Admiral Bud Edney, USN (Ret.), "Thought on Rapid Dominance,"
Shock & Awe, National Defense University Institute for
National Strategic Studies, November 1999, p. 145.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency, Oklahoma City Bombing, Briefing
Book, 1-3 (1995).
- John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Military wants no
Domestic Law-Enforcement Role, USA Today, October 5, 1999,
p. 16.
- Tim Weiner, "Author of Computer
Surveillance Plan Tries to Ease Fears," New York Times, August
16, 1999, p.1. http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug1999/s19990817author.htm, August
26, 1999.
- "DOD Is Right to Sit Out Y2K," Federal Computer Week,
August 30, 1999, p.1.
- Jack Dorsey, "Cohen Warns of Perilous Global Times," The
Virginia Pilot, October 8, 1999, p. B4
- Jason Sherman, "Invading Virginia," Armed Forces Journal,
October 1999, p.16.
- Terrorist Attack in U.S? Dont Put Military In Charge,"
USA Today, September 30, 1999, p.19.
- Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Seeing the Elephant,
Hope Is Not A Method, Times Books, Chap 5, p. 85
- Reuters, "GAO Cites Computer Security Risks,"
Washington Post, October 4, 1999, p.7.
- White Paper: The Clinton Administrations
Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision
Directive 63, May 1998, Section IV, A Public-Private Partnership to
Reduced Vulnerability, www.gsa.gove/ciao/, August 31,
1999.
- Ibid., Appendix F-12.
- Ibid., Appendix F-12.
- J. Douglas Beason, "There Aint No Such Thing As A Free
Lunch," DOD Science and Technology, p. 98.
- White Paper: The Clinton Administrations
Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision
Directive 63, May 1998, Section IV, A Public-Private Partnership to
Reduced Vulnerability, www.gsa.gove/ciao/, August
31, 1999.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are
those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position
of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force
or the Air University.
This article has undergone security and policy content review and has
been approved for public release IAW AFI 35-101.
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