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Chapter Three

Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

Operations Security - (OPSEC)

Security Training

Task Force Eagle initiated Security Awareness Training for the Security Managers on the enlarged Division Staff. This training was intended to ensure that basic security practices were being followed in the staff, which supports OPSEC by ensuring that classified information is not compromised. Although OPSEC is an Operations function and not a Security function,1 consistent application of proper security measures ensures that classified information is not compromised, which is the essential pre-requisite for effective OPSEC. Security managers are responsible for the proper handling, transmittal, storage, management, and destruction of classified documents and information. "Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence that is associated with operations and activities. OPSEC and security programs must be closely coordinated to ensure that all aspects of sensitive operations are protected."2

OPSEC, information security (INFOSEC), and physical security in a multinational peace operations force are more complicated than in U.S.-only, or allied operation (e.g., NATO-only). In multinational operations outside of an alliance framework, such as the NATO-led multinational peace operations in Bosnia, INFOSEC and OPSEC challenges multiply. One of the additional INFOSEC challenges in such a multinational setting were the new, unique, and unfamiliar classifications created for SFOR. These included SECRET REL SFOR, Confidential REL SFOR, SFOR SECRET, SFOR Confidential, and SFOR-Restricted,3 which co-existed side by side with NATO classifications for the NATO elements of SFOR, and U.S.-only classifications, with which the security managers were already familiar. Given that new staff members were rotating into the staff all the time as individual replacement augmentees, such training was critical to ensuring that the procedures associated with these new classifications were thoroughly understood.

"Education provides the concepts and knowledge to develop appropriate policies, procedures, and operations to protect joint force information systems. Training develops the skills and abilities required to operate while mitigating joint force vulnerabilities."4

--Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

The Task Force Eagle Security Awareness classes were presented on a weekly basis for the security managers of the division staff sections and cells. The primary instructor was the Special Security Officer (SSO) Non-Commissioned Officer In-Charge (NCOIC), who organized the classes into blocks of one hour or less. The classes were announced at the Division Chief of Staff update meetings, and over e-mail to identified Staff Section and Cell Security Managers. Attendance was tracked and reported to the Chief of Staff. Topics covered the gamut of INFOSEC concerns from security containers to emergency evacuation and destruction to classification guidance. The classes also provided the SSO an opportunity to review the division's policies with the Security Managers.

In November 1998, the LIWA deployed a Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) to Task Force Eagle (TFE) to conduct an OPSEC survey and vulnerability assessment of TFE operations. The VAT not only performed that task, but trained over 200 personnel in OPSEC, contributing to an improved OPSEC program within TFE. The LIWA VATs analyze, investigate, and survey unit operations to assess the vulnerability of the deployed force to adversary IO or C2W sabotage, deception and attack and to assess their ability to maintain personnel and security programs and protect such facilities.5 Although deployed to conduct an OPSEC Survey or Vulnerability Assessment of TFE, the LIWA VAT also conducted training sessions for OPSEC officers, commanders, and staff officers or NCOs on OPSEC. The background and experience of the VAT members made them more than qualified to conduct this kind of training. Their employment in this manner demonstrates a legitimate additional mission for LIWA VATs, especially as IO doctrine and TTPs are still developing.

Lessons Learned: The application of the LIWA VAT to the task of training OPSEC to a deployed force is an excellent example of the tenet of agility in MOOTW. "In operations other than war, as commanders perceive changes to their environment, they devise imaginative methods of applying their resources to those changes and act quickly to gain or maintain control of the environment."6 The LIWA VAT is a unique resource to the commander in MOOTW that can improve his OPSEC programs in a variety of ways.

Task Force Eagle's Security Awareness Training provides an example of how U.S. forces participating in multinational peace operations can enhance their INFOSEC and OPSEC on a routine basis. "Peacetime operations are usually long-term commitments."7 They also follow a more predictable operations temp or OPTEMPO, and thus better provide the necessary conditions for planning and executing routine training than would be the case in short-term, high-OPTEMPO combat operations. The high degree of visibility this training achieved through reporting to the Division Chief of Staff ensured it had appropriate command emphasis to be taken seriously. This approach should be considered for any division engaged in peace operations and should start early in the operation to make it standing operating procedure.

OPSEC Threats in Peace Operations.

In the Nordic-Polish (Nord-Pol) Brigade, the senior IO officer was the Brigade Press Information Officer (PIO). On one occasion, the Nord-Pol PIO suspected that insistent repeated requests for interviews from a Serbian News Service SRNA, were a thin cover for a surreptitious use of the media to conduct intelligence collection operations against SFOR on behalf of the radical elements of the Bosnian Serb political leadership.

In peace operations, adversary IO may include the surreptitious use of the media under false pretenses to conduct intelligence collection on the peace operations force. Such intelligence could support, among other things, adversary IO in the form of well-crafted propaganda and disinformation in the form of either false press stories or rumors. Joint Doctrine for MOOTW recognizes the OPSEC threat posed by "the possibility of media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information."8 In discussing OPSEC, FM 100-6 mentions that "the inevitable presence of the news media during military operations complicates OPSEC.(and) could be a lucrative source of information to an adversary."9 Doctrine cautions commanders, staff officers and soldiers to "balance OPSEC and other operational requirements when working with the media."10

In the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the press was merely an organ of control for the government during the communist era. The emancipation of the media from political control has not yet been entirely achieved in the former Yugoslavia. In some of the former Yugoslav republics, and in the Bosnian entities, the press may either be suppressed, or used as a tool to spread propaganda or collect information. Displaying trademark former communist tendencies, the FWFs have had few qualms about "using deception, trickery, or civilian-run enterprises.such as the media."11

Prohibitions on Photography.

Photography of sites by soldiers of the peace operations force represents a serious OPSEC risk. Photography of sites occupied or used by the peace operations force should be prohibited. Army Peace Operations doctrine explains that prohibition of photography of sites occupied or used by the peace operations force is a standard OPSEC measure.12 At Task Force Eagle Base Camps, signs are posted at all entries prohibiting photography, which apply to SFOR forces and local nationals alike. However, inside the compounds, soldiers and U.S. civilian contracted personnel are permitted to take photographs. Many of these photographs are taken on conventional film which had been processed through the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Post Exchange (PX) out to contracted local-national (host-nation, or HN) film processing facilities for developing.

A more serious OPSEC challenge is represented in the capabilities of digital photography. Digital photography is more rapidly disseminated over e-mail and the Internet via homepages. As the NATO-led peace operations matured, more and more information has been posted on the Internet on the SFOR, the U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM), Task Force Eagle, and unit Family Support Group home pages. As digital cameras, already sold through the AAFES PX, become less and less expensive, more soldiers will be equipped with this new photographic technology. OPSEC experts advise that the only way to effectively combat the problem is to establish a clear policy on the use of photographic equipment on base camps and operational sites.

Two important sources of imagery products in support of operations are the Combat Camera and the Mobile Public Affairs Detachments. Any policy on photography would have to accommodate these important sources of imagery products. The photographs taken by these two groups would be either be "cleared on site," or reviewed by the OPSEC before publication. "Cleared on site" means that the OPSEC officer provides guidance before taking pictures on what areas are off-limits. For those situations not cleared in advance, the OPSEC officer would review the photos before publication over command information products and the Internet. Doctrine states that public affairs units should achieve OPSEC "through security at the source and operational security awareness."13 "Security at the source" is the same as "cleared on site."

An effective command policy on photography of sites would recognize that soldiers are proud of what they do, and will want to take photographs, but would provide clear guidance on which situations and locations were authorized for personal photography. Under this policy, no aerial photography would be allowed, except by the Combat Camera and MPADs. Under such a policy, designated areas would be marked for authorized outside group shots, for example, in front of a unit sign or marker, or in front of a crew vehicle. Usually, what appears in the background of such photographs is a greater risk to OPSEC than is the subject of the photo itself. A simple policy allowing personal photography inside living areas, but not in operational areas or security would be a significant step in the right direction. Such a policy would achieve OPSEC while still allowing soldiers to take photographs of their comrades and while allowing Public Affairs to accomplish its missions of providing command and public information on operations to American forces and the American public.

In addition to the OPSEC risk posed by digital still cameras, hand-held video cameras pose an OPSEC risk as well. Many soldiers in TFE have taken their personally owned light, portable, hand-held video cameras around the basecamp and on patrol to make video tapes which are subsequently sent home in the mail. Video cameras are an important peace operations tool, but when used for personal purposes, represent an additional OPSEC risk.14 Guidance on the use of video cameras should be included in the command photography of sites policy.

Without any guidance on what may be photographed, soldiers may quite easily, and unknowingly, take photographs of classified aspects of either operations or infrastructure inside the peace operations force compounds. If these photographs are then developed by HN film processors, the information is leaked and an OPSEC failure results. Digital photographs, that is, photographs taken with digital cameras, represent a serious OPSEC challenge as the dissemination of such pictures worldwide is possible with a few key strokes.

Lesson Learned: Prohibitions on photography must be sufficiently restrictive and stated in a command policy to reduce OPSEC risks to the peace operations force. Outside of authorized areas, only official photography should be allowed, and OPSEC officers must either clear photography on site, or review all official photographs selected for publication in open sources. OPSEC experts advise that only any policy will require OPSEC training and awareness programs for the soldier if it is to be truly effective in containing the OPSEC risk posed by both conventional film and new digital technology photographic systems.

OPSEC and Communications Security (COMSEC) in MOOTW.

Use of non-secure radio communications in support of day-to-day operations and convoys poses a COMSEC risk to the peace operations force. In Task Force Eagle the use of non-tactical, unsecure hand-held transceivers of military and civilian origin had proliferated to the point that their use represented a COMSEC risk to the force. Motorola "brick" radios, AN/PRC 127s, and even commercially obtained two-way radios of civilian manufacture are in wide use throughout TFE in support of daily operations and convoys. The uncontrolled use of such radios may potentially result in the compromise of critical information.

Army peace operations doctrine emphasizes that "communications security (COMSEC) is as important in peace operations as it is conventional military operations. Belligerent parties can monitor telephone lines and radios."15 Adversaries employing simple "Radio-Shack" police scanner-type technology to intercept friendly force radio traffic would easily obtain convoy and patrol departure times, computer passwords, VIP locations and movements. Unsupervised use of these systems to transmit such information unencoded with even the simplest means available, such as brevity codes or codewords, represent a significant OPSEC threat.

Because of the multinational character of most peace operations, interchangeable secure communications systems are typically unavailable, resulting in most transmissions being in the clear. Published TTPs to achieve proper COMSEC in multinational peace operations direct that "when transmitting (sensitive information) in the clear, the peacekeeping force's communications can be monitored by the belligerents, the media, or other interested parties.use brevity codes or secure means of transmission."16 Sensitive information, such as locations, size, or identity of the Entity Armed Forces, equipment deployments, matters relating to the deployment of the reserve force or Quick-Reaction Force (QRF), and movements, "must always be encoded to preclude a compromise."17

Lesson Learned: The use of non-tactical, unsecure hand-held transceivers in peace operations must be controlled with a view toward the OPSEC and COMSEC implications associated with their use. At a minimum, users should be cautioned about the nature of information transmitted over such systems, and the use of codewords and brevity matrixes should be the standard.

Psychological Operations - (PSYOP)

PSYOP product approval process versus the commander's message approval process.

Both PA and PSYOP are part of the IO Staff during both peace and war, and similiar processes are employed to approve their messages. Doctrinally, the PSYOP peacetime product approval process' requirements remain in effect in all peacetime operations, including peace operations. The approval chain is a direct line from the psychological operations task force (POTF)18 to the Task Force Commander to the CINC to the National Command Authority (NCA). For most missions, the NCA delegates this authority to the CINC, who then may pass it to the Task Force Commander.19 The PSYOP product approval process to get a product on the street may take only a few hours, or may be measured in weeks.20

The process for approving commander's themes and messages for Information Operations other than PSYOP was a combined staff approach that produced a set of targeted commander's themes and messages oriented toward specific audiences. The Draft themes and messages, crafted by the IO Staff, were presented to the commander for approval. In developing these themes and messages, the IO Cell had the subject matter expertise in the IOWG to ensure the messages were consistent with the mission. The SJA representative to the IOWG ensured these messages are consistent with the terms of reference (TOR) authorizing the peace operation, U.S. laws, and the peace agreement. The PA representative to the IOWG and the senior PA official ensured they are written to have appropriate media appeal. The JMC representative to the IOWG ensures that messages oriented to the military forces of the FWFs were phrased to achieve their intended effect. The PMO representative provided his analysis on messages targeted at the local police forces. And the entire IOWG provided input on the messages to the general population and business leaders.

These approved messages could be disseminated through the other IO means available to the division, such as 1) Press Statements from the MND-N CPIC; 2) talking points provided to the commanders for their commander's radio shows; 3) commanders' meetings with local authorities; 4) JMC bi-lateral commissions with the EAFs, and; 5) Civil Affairs meetings with local authorities. However, PSYOP product approval procedures remain separate from the Division's process for approving the commander's public information messages. By law and Joint/Army doctrine, PA operators will not focus on directing or manipulating foreign or domestic public actions or opinions. The PA's mission is to report newsworthy events without bias. The PAO must ensure that press conferences and statements follow these constraints.

To produce a PSYOP product in support of an IO effort, the Division PSYOP Development Detachment (DPDD)21 required approval from the CJICTF, which operated as the POTF. This separate approval process meant that PSYOP was not operating at the same speed as the division in preparing messages for dissemination. Having two parallel approval processes operating at different speeds sometimes meant that PSYOP was not ready to produce a product as fast as the division would have liked. However, the PSYOP product approval process as practiced in OJF was doctrinally and legally correct and is likely to be the same in future operations.

However, the fact that the division commander had approved messages that were already being disseminated by other means made it easier for the DPDD to make its case for product approval and obtain such approval faster. If the division commander was already disseminating the message, they could argue, then PSYOP should support with a product with the same message. The message was going out on the street with or without PSYOP, but it would be more effective if supported by PSYOP. The product approval worksheet explained the approved commander's public information messages and how the PSYOP product would support them.

The preceding arguments must be taken with a note of caution, which is that the IO Cell should not propose messages for the commander which are inconsistent with alliance, coalition, or U.S. Government policy. Tactical-level IO must be "nested" with themes and messages approved at higher levels of command.

Nothing in current Army IO doctrine (FM 100-6, 27 August 1996) addresses the process by which IO themes and messages are approved. PSYOP doctrine (FM 33-1, 18 February 1993) does explain the PSYOP product approval process, but does not explain how PSYOP products will be created alongside other IO "products" in the form of commander's messages disseminated through other than PSYOP means. Future revisions of both doctrines should note the relationship between these two processes.

Lesson Learned: Events will occur that are not specifically addressed in current PSYOP themes and messages expressed in readily available products. In these instances, the IO Cell and the greater IO Staff may develop more precisely focused messages that apply general themes to particular problem sets for the Commander's approval. These messages can then be disseminated via FRAGOs to the force for dissemination through other than PSYOP channels. This allows the entire force to "speak with one voice" and to exercise the commander's public information program to the local population. In this manner, the commander maintains the flexibility and agility to rapidly disseminate messages to targeted audiences. This process also serves to accelerate the approval process for PSYOP products developed in support of such events.

Division-Level PSYOP Products.

The Division PSYOP element developed its own printed PSYOP product in the form of a magazine entitled Exclusive, providing the division a product focused exclusively on the target audience within the division's AOR. One of the significant criticisms from U.S. PSYOP personnel of the printed PSYOP products produced by the CJICTF and disseminated by the divisions during Operation JOINT GUARD was their lack of relevance to the issues specific to each MND area of responsibility (AOR). While PSYOP planners complained of "overly generalized products that covered general themes and which were applicable to a broader target audience, but which did not specifically support the division commander's needs...," they did provide a start point for further action.22 The PSYOP products produced by the CJICTF were, by necessity, generalized so as to apply to the entire theater. Written in general form, these products provided forces a starting point and great latitude to "build on" to the message to apply them more precisely to their area of operations. The Exclusive is an example of building on and focusing the higher product to a target audience.

Responding to the PSYOP imperative of Adaptability,23 the MND-N DPDD (formerly the Division PSYOP Support Element or DPSE) developed its own printed product that would more precisely target the populace in the division AOR and respond to the needs of the commander. The DPDD developed the format of the new Exclusive to meet the needs of the commander in addressing issues of importance to the local populace, and provide a means to communicate a more precise message within his AOR. The first issue was built on articles submitted by TF Commanders and focused on areas of cooperation between SFOR and the community in construction projects, humanitarian assistance projects, items of general interest in the AOR, and light entertainment in the form of a horoscope and "top ten" music lists.

The Exclusive was targeted at a broader audience than either the Herald of Progress, which was oriented exclusively to adults, or the Mirko, which was oriented primarily to teen-age children. The market audience for the Exclusive included both segments, and also devoted a page to the younger audience with the inclusion of a "children's page."

The Exclusive began as a monthly publication produced by the DPDD and was intended for dissemination throughout all of MND-N. The first issue of the publication was compiled from the input of division staff elements, The American Brigade and each Task Force Commander. The objective of the Exclusive was to inform the citizenry in the MND-N AOR of the positive aspects of SFOR's presence and to provide commanders the opportunity to communicate messages targeted at their AOR.

Five thousand copies of the first issue were produced and disseminated in the troubled city of Brcko. The DPDD used its organic printing capabilities (Risograph) to produce the inaugural issue. The significant challenge to this method was having to manually fold the magazines - a project which required over 80 manhours. An effort similar to the MND-N DPDD's Exclusive was also occurring at the same time in MND-SW, where that MND produced a weekly eight-page, full-color newsletter called the Mostavi. Each division sought to provide a PSYOP product more sharply focused on the needs of their commander and the citizenry in their AOR. The CJICTF agreed to pay for the production of a combined newsletter that would be identified by different names in each MND AOR, but containing stories from all the MNDs to make it a standard product. The newsletter would contain the same set of stories in each MND, but be presented in a different order, according to the preferences of the MND PSYOP or Public Information Officer. Additionally, the title banner and announcements on the cover would be unique in each MND. Initial plans for the new combined newsletter were for it to start as a bi-weekly and then move to a weekly publication when procedures were refined.

The new combined product was to be printed at separate facilities in each MND AOR, with the various inputs from the MNDs being transmitted electronically to each of the three production sites for layout in accordance with the format to be established in each MND. Until that procedure was in place, initial issues of the combined product were to be printed in MND-SW through a contracted printing service. The combined product was expected to cost about 40,000 DM per week.

"The peacekeeping force commander may determine there is a need to inform and educate HN civilians and belligerents about the peacekeeping force...The peacekeeping force commander has the prerogative in requesting support for information and education programs."24

--FM 33-1, Psychological Operations

The initial strategy for MND-N was to rotate responsibility for articles to the Brigades to reduce the frequency that each unit would have to produce an article. A planned feature for the new MND-N portion of the combined product was to publish sections of the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP, a.k.a. the Dayton Peace Accord or DPA), so that local citizens would have their own copy of the peace agreement after collecting several issues of the publication. Also planned for MND-N was the publication of the schedule for the unit Commander's Radio Shows in the MND.

Lesson Learned: Joint PSYOP doctrine includes publicizing beneficial reforms and programs associated with the peace settlement among the PSYOP objectives for MOOTW.25 Army PSYOP doctrine puts the commander at the heart of this process. By developing a division AOR-specific PSYOP product in the form of the Exclusive, the MND-N DPDD responded to the commander's need for more precisely focused products to accomplish that mission in his AOR. The publication of the peace settlement, in this case the GFAP, allowed the commander to provide critical information to the local populace to understand the mandate for the peace operations force and what the parties to the agreement had committed their peoples to abide.

The Exclusive also expanded the set of IO tools by which to communicate IO messages, providing increased flexibility in options when planning IO campaigns. The efforts of the MND-N DPDD in conceiving of and ultimately publishing a division-level magazine-style PSYOP product represent a new direction for PSYOP products in peace operations. The combined aspect of the product allows for optimal efficiency in production costs and results in a more complete product. The combined product still follows the centralized product approval process, but reflects the needs of the division commanders. By sharing the basic building blocks of the product, i.e., stories and articles, but applying their own layout and design concepts, each division achieved a stylized product that met its unique requirements.

Using the Peace Accord as a PSYOP Message.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, in the third year of the NATO-led peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, the Task Force Eagle Division PSYOP Development Detachment published the Peace Agreement in its printed products to achieve both C2-Protect and C2-Attack effects.

In any peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, there will be some formal agreement between the warring factions, which details the nature of the peace to be kept or enforced. The agreement frames the mandate authorizing the peace operation and the specific Terms of Reference which define the powers, missions, roles, and responsibilities of the peace operations force.26 The agreement which ended open hostilities among the three FWFs in Bosnia Herzegovina was the General Framework on the Agreement for Peace (GFAP, a.k.a. the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA), or Dayton Accord (DA)).

The GFAP framed the context of all military and diplomatic intercourse among the FWFs, binding the political and military leadership to its points. However, throughout the general population, the average person did not know its details even three years after its signing. This information vacuum was an invitation to misinformation, deliberate disinformation, and propaganda.

Demonstrating the degree to which the accord had become less familiar over time, the President of the Republika Srpska, one of the two entities created by the accord, stated in a December 1998 interview that "the DA is a magic or a religious document and its spirit needs to be explained."27 To that end, the DPDD planned to publish the GFAP in a handbook form and installments in the Division's PSYOP magazine product Exclusive in 1999.

By publishing the text of the peace agreement in the local language and alphabet, the DPDD contributed to "maintain(ing) the consent of the local populace and belligerents concerning the presence of a peacekeeping force."28 This effort also served a C2-Protect function of countering adversary propaganda by filling the information vacuum before adversaries could. Indirectly, this tactic served as a C2-Attack option by "attacking the legitimacy and credibility" of those opposed to the peace settlement.29 Those who violated the agreement would now have to risk judgment by the people, now educated on the agreement, on their conduct vis-à-vis the points in the peace accord itself. By discrediting those opposed to the peace process, PSYOP is "driving a wedge between the adversary leadership and its populace to undermine the adversary leadership's confidence and effectiveness."30

Lesson Learned: Publishing the peace agreement through PSYOP products achieved both C2-Protect and C2-Attack goals. As regards C2-Protect, this tactic provided the local populace the means to judge for themselves whether or not the entity political and military leadership was following the provisions of the treaty, and to cut through propaganda and misinformation and make their own assessments. Publishing the facts prevented misinformation, rumor, and propaganda about what was written in the agreement. As regards C2-Attack, it put those elements opposed to the peace agreement on the defensive as their credibility and influence were threatened by dissemination of the truth.

TTP: Future peace operations will likely have a published treaty or accord to which the FWFs commit to support. By publishing the agreement in installments over several issues of PSYOP printed products, the local populace was encouraged to collect the products to have their own reference. This also meant that each issue of the printed products maintained its balance with attention to other subjects.

Unit-Level Information Operations.

In MND-N, U.S. Forces used existing radio stations as an INFOSYS through which they were able to communicate directly to the local populace in the Area of Responsibility. The practice of broadcasting civil-military information over civilian radio stations in a "talk-show" format began during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and continued to grow in Operation JOINT GUARD.31 At first, the PSYOP staff officer arranged radio interviews with local radio stations for BN TF Commander, XO, and other officials. These interviews were both live and recorded for airing at a later time. Before the interview would take place, the PSYOP staff officer would obtain the questions the interviewer would ask, and would suggest issues important to the success of the SFOR mission that the commander would like to talk about. The PSYOP cell would prepare answers to the questions provided and get the SJA and PAO staff officers to review the questions and answers to ensure synchronization. The commander could then review the question and answer report and use it as preparatory tool before the interview, or as a crutch during the interview.

Unit-level Information Operations Broadcast
over Radio Kamalon, 102.7 FM, in the Tuzla Valley during OJF.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, American forces in TFE expanded the practice of using local radio stations as a platform from which to conduct information operations by securing the cooperation of more local radio station managers to broadcast military radio shows. During Operation JOINT FORGE, the American Task Force operating out of Camp Bedrock expanded its effort to include a total of five radio stations in the Tuzla Valley.32 The shows were "live" and included answering listener call-in questions about the peace accord, as well as questions about the peace operations force and its mission.

The Battalion Task Force operating out of Camp Dobol also expanded the radio operations begun during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT FORGE, broadcasting from the nearby city of Kladanj and Zvornik.33 In both of these unit-level efforts, the Division Public Affairs Office assisted the unit commanders in preparing for and executing the on-air broadcasts by providing the weekly "Media Guidance to Commanders." Additionally, the Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) assisted the commander in preparing for the specific interview by providing tips on what to expect and how to handle loaded or unexpected lines of questioning and stay to the desired message.

Task Force Eagle's use of existing civilian radio facilities is an example of co-opting the INFOSYS of the FWFs during peace operations. The radio shows enhance force protection for TFE soldiers by allowing the peace operations force to communicate directly with the local populace, thereby sidestepping the FWF leadership altogether and removing unnecessary filters from the communications process. Some FWF leaders remained opposed to the implementation of the peace accord. Sidestepping these leaders allowed the peace operations force to appeal to the citizenry to put pressure on these leaders to support the objectives of the peace operations force. By communicating directly to the local populace, the peace operations force is able to defeat hostile propaganda directed against the friendly force by those opposed to the peace accord.

Lesson Learned: Units as small as battalion task forces can contribute to the execution of the peace operations information campaign by co-opting civilian INFOSYS to broadcast messages that support information campaign themes. Co-opting existing civilian radio infrastructure to broadcast IO messages in a radio talk show format allows the peace operations force commander to communicate directly to the local populace and enhances force protection by removing barriers to cooperation and understanding.

TTPs for the Preparation and Execution of the Commander's Radio Shows in OJF.

Battalion Task Force and Company Commanders conducted radio shows in support of IO aimed at the local populace. These shows co-opted existing civilian radio networks to provide new platforms from which to disseminate IO messages, refute misinformation, and defeat adversary propaganda. Joint and Army Peace Operations doctrines already recognize that "such local information programs as radio.newscasts.can help ensure that the peacekeeping objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the parties in the conflict and their civilian populations.such efforts can help counter rumors and disinformation."34 However, the details of just how to implement such a program are unstated in peace operations and psychological operations doctrine and TTP manuals. The TTPs provided here should be documented in the next iteration of these manuals.

During Operation JOINT FORGE, American forces in TFE expanded the use of using local radio stations as a platform from which to conduct IO by securing the cooperation of more local radio station managers to broadcast military radio shows.35 Battalion Task Force and Company Commanders conducted radio shows over local FM and AM radio stations to deliver IO messages and to refute adversary propaganda and misinformation in the press and local rumor. As the use of civilian radio stations expanded, Company Commanders increasingly found themselves supporting the Division's IO as they conducted radio shows in a "talk-show" format over local stations.

The procedure for conducting the radio shows starts with the tactical PSYOP team (TPT) identifying which radio stations are willing to cooperate in airing a "talk show" in the question and answer format featuring an American officer discussing the peace operation. The shows were both "live" and pre-recorded for broadcast at a later time. The TPT negotiated the rate per minute to pay for the show, and set the date and time for the show. Usually, the radio station manager provided a list of questions to the TPT a few days in advance of the show. Once the show had aired a few times, local listeners called in questions to the station throughout the week in anticipation of the next show. At first, these questions came from the journalists who worked for or with the radio station. The initial set of questions were then provided to the interpreters for translation into English while still at the station if any further clarification is required. Occasionally, these questions were provided via e-mail directly to the TPT.

Once the questions were delivered to the TF Command Post, they were reviewed by the Mobile Public Affairs Detachment and compared to the Weekly Media Guidance for Commanders, published by the Senior PA Officer of the Division (the Coalition Press Information Center Director). The Weekly Media Guidance (WMG) to Commanders included a special section devoted to radio shows entitled "Tips for Commander's Radio Shows." Additionally, the WMG provided IO messages targeted to civil authorities, civic leaders, and public officials.

Before the show aired, the TF or Company Commander arrived at the station to review the questions once again to confirm them. The commander informed the station manager whether or not he wanted to take "call-in" questions from the listening audience. The shows usually interspersed music in between periods of questions and answers. Typically, about 10 or so questions were provided up front by the station manager. When call-in questions were included in the radio show, they were written down by the radio station's telephone receptionist and handed to the interpreter for explanation. The commander could then accept or reject any question called in without having to interact with anyone other than the host. This allowed the commander to review the questions for suitability and prevented him from having to deal directly with zealots on the phone while "on the air."

Upon completion of a "live" show, or faithful broadcasting of a pre-recorded show, the TPT payed the station the agreed-upon rate using Field Ordering Officer and Class A Agent procedures for field-ordering of services. For shows pre-recorded for later broadcast, the TPT would withhold payment for non-compliance with the contractual agreement in the event the show was not aired faithfully.

TF commander at Radio Sekovici refuting rumors
and defeating hostile propaganda following the arrest
of a high-profile PIFWC.

The commander's radio show proved to be a very responsive IO tool that allowed the commander to bypass elements opposed to the implementation of the peace settlement to reach the people directly and discuss the goals of the peace operations force. Additionally, it is one of the fastest means by which IO messages can be delivered in response to crisis events. The sensational arrest of a very high-profile Person Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC), General Krstic of the Bosnian Serb Army, on 02 December 1998, provides an example of where the Commander's Radio Show provided a quick and flexible IO tool to apply to the rising tensions that followed the arrest. The TF Commander was able to refute rumors and defeat adversary propaganda concerning the alleged torture of the PIFWC and his driver on the air directly to the people within the range of the station in the towns of Sekovici and Vlasenica. Army PSYOP doctrine notes that "crises can be averted when using truth to counter rumors, disinformation, and misrepresentation of facts," which can be accomplished through public information programs.36

Lesson Learned: The TTPs established by Task Force Eagle may be emulated in future peace operations. The basic steps involved are:

  • PSYOP teams identify, locate, and visit local radio stations to negotiate the radio show.
  • The local station manager provides the TPT the questions to be asked during the show, which follows a question-and-answer "talk-show" format.
  • These questions are translated on the spot, and then sent to the PA element supporting that unit for review. The JAG may also need to review the questions in some cases.
  • The commander arrives early at the station to confirm the questions with the show host.
  • Call-in questions, if accepted, are written down throughout the show and handed to the commander during the "music breaks" during the show. The commander reviews the questions for suitability and accepts or rejects them.
  • Following the broadcast of the show, the TPT pays for the services using Field Ordering Officer and Class A Agent procedures for ordering field services.

Endnotes, Chapter Three:

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, Joint Publication 3-54, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 January 1997), p. vi.
2. Ibid., p. I-1.
3. REL meaning "releasable to."
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 09 October 1998), p. III-3.
5. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Information Operations, Field Manual 100-6 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 August 1996, hereafter cited as Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations), p. B-3.
6. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 14 June 1993), p. 2-7.
7. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual 100-7 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 31 May 1995), p. 8-5.
8. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 16 June 1995, hereafter cited as Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War), p. IV-6.
9. Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, p. 3-3.
10. Ibid., p. 2-6.
11. MAJ Erin Gallogly-Staver, USA, and MAJ Raymond S. Hilliard, USA, "Information Warfare: Opposing Force (OPFOR) Doctrine -- An Integrated Approach," News From the Front!, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth KS, September-October 1997, p. 13.
12. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994, hereafter cited as Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations), p. 36.
13. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, p. IV-6.
14. See CALLCOMS Observation 10007-17500, "Video Cameras as Information Operations Tools During Peace Enforcement Operations," published in B/H Combined Arms Assessment Team 9 Initial Impressions Report, Operation JOINT GUARD: Task Force Eagle Operations (Fort Leavenworth KS: CALL, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, March 1998, hereafter cited as B/H CAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations), p. A-55.
15. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 36.
16. Fort Riley, "Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Combined Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises," Draft (Fort Riley, KS, November 1995), p. 16.
17. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: USGPO), 29 April 1994, p. VII-5.
18. During the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, the POTF was known as the Coalition Joint Information Campaign Task Force, or CJICTF.
19. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Psychological Operations, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington, DC: USGPO, Unclassified, Distribution Limited, hereafter cited as Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations), 18 February 1993, p. C-1.
20. B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations, p. A-91.
21. PSYOP forces do not have DPDDs. Recently, the PSYOP force structure was changed to authorize tactical DPDDs. At the earliest, these detachments will be available for use in 2002. For TFE, PSYOP assets were organized under the DPDD concepts prior to deployment.
22. B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations, p. 52.
23. See Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, p. 3-25. The manual states that "PSYOP personnel adapt to methods and structures and help develop new ones suited for each mission."
24. Ibid., p. 3-28.
25. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. V-2.
26. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 15. See also, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 100-20 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 5 December 1990), p. 4-8.
27. Interview with the RS President Nikola Poplasen. "Mother Country-Our Destiny," The Night Owl, The Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Cell, ACofS G2, 1st Cavalry Division, vol. 3, no. 363 (29 December 1998) .
28. Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, p. B-2. See also the "Peacekeeping" section, p. 3-28.
29. Ibid., p. 1-8.
30. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 10 July 1996), p. I-8.
31. See CALLCOMS file number: 10000-01825, "PSYOP Radio Shows as Information Operations," in B/H CAAT 9, Initial Impressions Report: Task Force Eagle Operations, p. 76.
32. See SSG Pat Johnson, "America's Voice in Bosnia," Talon, vol. 4, no. 47 (13 November 1998), p. 10.
33. See PFC Giovanni Lorente, "Working the Airwaves, Answering Questions for Bosnian Locals," Talon, vol. 4, no. 44, (23 October 1998), p. 11.
34. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 29 April 1994), p. VII-7. See also, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, p. 40, which makes a similar statement.
35. See CALLCOMS observation 10000-15876, "Unit-Level Information Operations Co-opt Civilian Radio Networks."
36. Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, p. 3-28.

Chapter Two: The Division IO Staff
Chapter Four: Information Operations in a Multinational Force