1. For example, Russian specialists put a physiological-psychological spin on Pavlov's reflexive control, while Westerners saw it as a biological process.
2. Alexander Yegorov (interview with Victor Bazhenov), "Kak izmenit' 'voyennyy intellekt'" (How to Change the 'Military Intellect'), Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) 3 August 1996, p. 5.
3. Dmitriy Semenovich Chereshkin and V.A. Virkovskogo, "Kontseptsiya informatsionnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoye Federatsii" (proekt) (The Concept of Information Security of the Russian Federation) (draft), Moscow, 1994.
4. Ibid., pp. 19, 20.
5. Ibid., p. 20.
6. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
7. Ibid., p. 21.
8. Ibid., p. 21.
9. Some of these laws, edicts, and statues include the following: Draft: "Concept of Information Security of the Russian Federation," 1994; Law: "Federal Law on Communications," passed by the State Duma on 20 January 1995; Edict No. 65: "On the Ratification of the Statute on the Russian Federation Presidential Staff's Information Administration"; Law: "Russian Federation 'Federal Law on Information, Informatization, and the Protection of Information,' enacted by the State Duma on 25 January 1995"; Directive: "On the Confirmation of Lists of Information, Relating to State Security," 30 November 1995; Edict: "Edict of the President of the Russian Federation, 'Measures to Regulate the Development, Production, Sale, and purchase for Purposes of Selling, Importing into or Exporting out of the Russian Federation, as Well as the Use of Special Technical Equipment Intended for Secretly Obtaining Information," January 1996; Statue: "Statue on the Council of Heads of State Information Agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States," February 1996; Directive: "On the Development of a Situation Center within the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency (FAPSI)," April 1996; Decree: "On a Special Comprehensive Program for Creating Communications, Television, and Radio Broadcasting technologies," May 1996; Law: "On Participation in International Information Exchanges," July 1996.
10. Professor V.I. Tsymbal, "Kontseptsiya 'informatsionnoy voyny'" ("Concept of Information War"), paper received at conference with the Russian Academy of Civil Service in Moscow, 14 September 1995, p. 2.
11. Russia Reform Monitor, No. 215, January 10, 1997, American Foreign Policy Council, "Former KGB Reportedly Tries to Control Internet in Russia."
12. From a speech delivered in Brussels in May 1996 by Admiral Vladimir Pirumov entitled "Nekotorye aspekty informatsionnoy voyny" (Certain Aspects of Information Warfare), p. 2.
14. Tysmbal, pp. 3-6.
15. S. A. Komov, "Information Warfare in Modern War: Theoretical Problems," Military Thought, May-June 1996, pp. 76-80.
16. Pirumov, pp. 3, 4. The laws and principles in the text are taken from these pages of Pirumov's report.
17. Pirumov, p. 9.
18. Pirumov, pp, 9, 12, 13. The writeup of the wartime use of IW, as well as the methods and forms of IW, is a summary of the main points of these three pages of Pirumov's text.
19. Pirumov, p. 5.
20. Gennadiy Zyuganov, "On the Threshold of a 'Government of Seven Boyars,'" Sovestskaya Rossiya, 26 October 1996, pp. 1, 2.
21. Victor I. Solntsev, "Information War and Some Aspects of a Computer Operator's Defense," paper presented at the InfoWarCon 5, Washington, D.C., 4-6 September, 1996, pp. 2-7.
22. Ibid., p. 7.
23. "New Trends in Power Deterrence," Armeyskiy Sbornik, No. 9, September 1995, pp. 12-19, as reported in FBIS-UMA-96-011-S, 17 January 1996, p. 12.
24. Georgiy Smolyan, Vitaliy Tsygichko, and Dmitriy Chereshkin, "A Weapon that may be more Dangerous than a Nuclear Weapon: The Realities of Information Warfare," Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta), 18 November 1995, No. 3, pp. 1-2, as reported in FBIS-UMA-95-234-S, 6 December 1995.
25. Pirumov, pp. 14, 15.
26. Tsymbal, pp. 11, 12.
27. Sergey Grigoryev, "Who Will Fire First? The Eyes, Ears, and Nervous System of the Ground Troops," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 August 1996, No. 16 (20), p. 6.
28. V. Ye. Shulgin and Yu. N. Fesenko, "Effective Target Engagement Planning in Combined-Arms Operations," Military Thought, Jan-Feb 1996, pp. 33, 34.
29. N. M. Dimidyuk, "Principles of Effective Target Engagement: Summing Up the Discussion," Military Thought, May-June 1996, p. 16.
30. Ibid., p. 15.
32. Ibid., p. 16. Dimidyuk added three pages later that "the importance of the group's coordinating role grows especially in implementing the zonal-target principle of ETE planning. It is called upon to ensure, above all, an efficient coordination of fire delivery with ETE assets under the control of the superior commander in the area of responsibility of subordinate levels; and coordination of actions by ETE and EW assets of the air force, missile forces and artillery, and air defense forces, and special troops, and in maritime sectors those of battle front forces, in delivering massed and concentrated strikes. The need for coordinating the ETE plan with the operation's overall objective and concept highlights the necessity to relate the indicators characterizing the expected ETE results with the results of the operation as a whole. Furthermore, it is key to provide for the possibility of ensuring the integration of the ETE indicator (measure) into the operational criterion used in elaborating the concept and objectives of an operation, and in decision-making. Considering that this indicator is the correlation of the sides' forces, calculated through the combat capabilities of their contingents, one indicator of the effectiveness of the engagement of enemy forces, as a number of authors pointed out during the discussion, can be the extent to which their (the forces') combat potentials are reduced--a measure that in the present situation is assumed as their combat incapacitation rate expectation."
33. Ibid., pp. 20, 21.
34. Andrey Fonotov, "Science and Technology Policy," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 8 August 1996, p. 6, as translated in FBIS-UST-96-037, 8 August 1996.
35. INTERFAX, 14 February 1996, as reported in FBIS-UMA-96-040-S, 28 February 1996, p. 64.
36. Based on a discussion with modelers at the Russian General Staff Academy in December, 1991, during a visit by a Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff delegation.
37. Nikolay Turko, Sergey Modestov, and Nikolay Shvets, "...And Data Confrontation," Armeyskiy Sbornik, October 1996, No. 10, pp. 92, 93.
38. Author's discussion with General-Major (retired) V. D. Riabchuk, Fort Leavenworth, September 1996.
40. A. N. Kukashkin and A. I. Yefimov, "The Security of the Infosphere of Strategic Defense Systems," Military Thought, No. 5, 1995, pp. 45-48.
41. Ibid., p. 46.
42. A. Vladimirov, "Informatsionnoe Oruzhie: Mif ili Real'nost? (Information Weapons: Myth or Reality?)," Krasnaya Zvesda (Red Star), 5 October 1991, p. 3.
43. Aleksandr Pozdnyakov, "Informatsionaya bezopasnost'" (Information Security), Granitsa Rossii (The Borders of Russia), September 1995, No. 33, pp. 6-7; translated in FBIS-UMA-95-239-S, 13 December 1995, pp. 41-44.
These viruses are:
44. B.P. Pal'chun and R.M. Yusupov, "Obespecheniye bezopasnosti komp'yuternoy infosfery" (Providing Security in the Computer Infosphere), Vooruzheniye, politika, konversiya (Armaments, Policy, Conversion) No. 3, 1993.
45. M. Boytsov, "Informatsionnaya voyna (Information Warfare)," Morskoy sbornik, No. 10, 1995, pp 69-73.
Dialectical Versus Empirical Thinking