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References


The following list of references are from an excellent paper written by Daniel E. Magsig titled Information Warfare: In the Information Age. Thanks to Daniel for all the effort in compiling this list with abstracts:

[1] Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Haynes. "Information Warfare

Workshop: Decision Support Working Group Report." First International

Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995):

569-76.



Discusses information warfare decision support, and offensive and defensive

information warfare issues. Highlights pervasive nature of information

warfare. Recommends one consistent, widely disseminated policy on

information warfare, full integration of information warfare into military

operations, emphasis on defensive information warfare, and attention to

psychological and coalition warfare issues.





[2] Alberts, David S., and Richard E. Haynes. "The Realm of Information

Dominance: Beyond Information War." First International Symposium on

Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 560-65.



Examines the concept of information dominance. Suggests a data,

information, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom typology of information.

Defines information space across arenas, levels, and natures of interaction

between entities. Highlights danger of focusing too narrowly on commonly

discussed elements of information warfare.





[3] Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. "Cyberwar is Coming!" Comparative

Strategy 12 (April-June 1993): 141-65.



Classic paper introduces terms "cyberwar" and "netwar". Argues mass and

mobility will no longer decide the outcome of conflict. Instead,

decentralized, networked forces with superior command, control, and

information systems will disperse the fog of war while enshrouding the

enemy in it. Provides excellent example of twelfth and thirteenth century

Mongol armies successfully employing such doctrine.





[4] Arquilla, John. "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance."

Strategic Review (Summer 1994): 24-30.



Focuses on the importance of information dominance over traditional

attritional and maneuver techniques. Introduces control warfare and

advocates a systems approach to identifying and attacking an adversary's

"center of gravity". Identifies the links between systemic elements as key

targets.





[5] Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War: The Story of

Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf

War. (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992.)



Often cited reference on the role of information, communications, command,

control, and electronic warfare in the Persian Gulf War.





[6] Campen, Alan D. "Information Warfare is Rife with Promise, Peril."

Signal 48 (November 1993): 19-20.



Argues military leaders must understand the nature of change in warfare

inherent in information based warfare. The right changes will act as

effective force multipliers. The wrong changes, or failure to change, will

leave the United States dangerously exposed. Discusses specific military

issues.





[7] Campen, Alan D. "Vulnerability of Info Systems Demands Immediate

Action: Reliance by Military on Commercial Communications Infrastructure

Poses Significant Peril to United States." National Defense (November

1995): 26-7.



Focuses on military reliance on commercial communications and market driven

security policy. Argues for stronger government role in assuring the

security of the National Information Infrastructure.





[8] Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.)



Classic text on warfare that has dominated military thinking for over a

century. Clausewitz regards information as generally unreliable in war.

This can be explained by his focus on operational and tactical level

issues, and his pre-Industrial Age frame of reference. Unfortunately,

Clausewitz so dominates military thinking that his bias against information

and intelligence has in some cases undermined acceptance of the precepts

information warfare.





[9] Dubik, James M., and Gordon R. Sullivan. "War in the Information Age."

AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, Landpower Essay Series 94-4 (May 1994): 16

pages.



Parallels the changes needed in today's Information Age military with the

changes that were necessary in the Industrial Age military at the turn of

the century. Specifically, the network as the model replaces the machine as

the model; near-simultaneous, continuous, short-run production replaces

paced, sequential, continuous, long run production; and, mass-customized

products, precisely targeted, with near-instantaneous distribution replaces

mass output.





[10] Franks, Frederick M., Jr. "Winning the Information War" Vital Speeches

of the Day 60 (May 15, 1994): 453-8.



Discusses the shift from hierarchical organizations to networked

organizations necessary in information based warfare. Traces the evolution

of command, control, communications, and intelligence through major wars.

Emphasizes the need for rapid, reliable sharing of information across units

and at different levels instead of traditional stove-piped intelligence

activities.





[11] Grier, Peter. "Information Warfare." Air Force Magazine (March 1995):

34-7.



Provides overview of information warfare from the U.S. military

perspective. Pulls together information from many sources highlighting key

topics.





[12] Handel, Michael I. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared. (Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1991.)



Compares the two most highly regarded classic texts on warfare. Section on

deception, surprise, intelligence, and command and control speaks to issues

related to information warfare.





[13] Jensen, Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War."

Airpower Journal (Winter 1994): 35-43.



Summarizes War and Anti-War [31] and proposes eight principles of

information warfare grouped into four categories summarized as: "(1)

thicken the fog of war for our enemy, (2) lift the fog of war for ourselves

to create a transparent battlefield, (3) ensure that our enemies can't turn

these tables on us, and (4) always fight the information war with full

intensity."





[14] Johnson, Stuart E., and Martin C. Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace

Knowledge: The Winning Edge. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University

Press, 1995.)



Introduces the concept of dominant battlespace knowledge which is the

ability to collect real-time battlefield information, understand that

information, and turn that knowledge into a decisive battlespace advantage.

Discusses necessary doctrinal changes.





[15] Lawrence, R. E., and A. J. Ross. "Equities: Dissemination vs.

Protection: Information Warfare Workshop Results." First International

Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995):

566-8.



Recommends action to raise public awareness of the threat of information

warfare. Recognizes vulnerabilities to national information infrastructure.

Argues information needs to be shared instead of overprotected, on the

premise that some adversaries, notably hackers, have achieved their

relative effectiveness largely through the practice of information sharing.





[16] Libicki, Martin C. What is Information Warfare? (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University Press, 1995.)



Proposes seven distinct forms of information warfare: command and control

warfare, intelligence based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological

warfare, "hacker" warfare, economic information warfare, and cyberwarfare.

Posits that the concept of information dominance is hollow.





[17] Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press, 1995.)



Analyzes the "revolution in information technology." Argues that technology

begets doctrine and doctrine begets organization, implying a possible need

for organizational changes in the military. Examines a proposed

"Information Corps".





[18] Libicki, Martin C., and James A. Hazlett. "Do We Need an Information

Corps?" Joint Forces Quarterly 1 (Autumn 1993): 88-97.



Examines the debate as to whether a separate Information Corps should be

created. The benefits would be common doctrine, inherent standardization,

and increased innovation. The downside would be a lack of integration with

other forces.





[19] Libicki, Martin C. "Dominant Battlefield Awareness and its

Consequences." First International Symposium on Command and Control

Research and Technology (June 1995): 550-9.



Introduces the concept of dominant battlefield awareness. Predicts the

ability to achieve perfect knowledge of a 200 mile square battlefield by

the year 2008. Discusses the technological requirements for achieving

dominant battlefield awareness. Examines the pros and cons of related

issues.





[20] Lucky, Robert W. Silicon Dreams: Information, Man, and Machine. (New

York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989.)



Discusses in layman's terms the concept of information, information theory,

and information processing. Provides even coverage of philosophical and

technical issues. Touches on almost every important aspect of information.





[21] Mann, Edward. "Desert Storm: The First Information War?" Airpower

Journal (Winter 1994): 4-14.



Takes the theory of information warfare and ties it together with specific

examples from the Persian Gulf War. Discusses many key concepts in concise,

readable terms.





[22] Nielson, Robert E., and Charles B. Gaisson. "Information - The

Ultimate Weapon." First International Symposium on Command and Control

Research and Technology (June 1995): 545-549.



Examines the differences between war in the Industrial Age and war in the

Information Age. Focuses in on the decision environment and the old and new

paradigms for decision making. Argues for greater technological support for

decision making to reduce need for fallible intuition.





[23] Peterson, A. Padgett. "Tactical Computers Vulnerable to Malicious

Software Attacks." Signal 48 (November 1993): 74-5.



Highlights the role of tactical computers in warfare, examining their

vulnerability to viruses. Discusses the history of viruses, how they work,

what they are capable of, and theoretical reasons why no perfect defense

can be established. Examines practical measures that can be taken with

tactical computers to reduce the threat.





[24] Ryan, Donald E., Jr. "Implications of Information Based Warfare."

Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn-Winter 1994-5): 114-6.



Discusses the need to re-examine doctrine in light of advances in

technology. Draws analogies between traditional Industrial Age warfare

doctrinal elements and proposed future doctrine.





[25] Schwartau, Winn. Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic

Superhighway. (New York, NY: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994.)



Popular text on information warfare in general. Full of anecdotes. Lacks

grounding in the theoretical basis of warfare. Divides information warfare

into personal, corporate, and global information warfare.





[26] Science Application International Corporation (SAIC). Information

Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy, and Organizational Considerations for

Assurance. (Prepared for the Joint Staff, 4 July, 1995.)



Exhaustive legal reference on the legal, regulatory, policy, and

organizational implications of information warfare. Cites specifics in

public law, executive orders, court decisions, etc.





[27] Starr, Stuart H., and Dale K. Pace. "Developing the Intellectual Tools

Needed by the Information Warfare Community." First International Symposium

on Command and Control Research and Technology (June 1995): 577-86.



Outlines a detailed conceptual framework for understanding information from

the military perspective. Leaves room for further definition of

non-military elements of information warfare. Examines toolsets applicable

to the support of the information warfare community.





[28] Stein, George J. "Information Warfare." Airpower Journal (Spring

1995): 31-39.



Discusses a definition of information warfare, development of a strategy

for information warfare, the U.S. Air Force perspective, and the danger of

failing to address information warfare. Sees the rise of information

warfare as similar to the rise of Airpower.





[29] Stoll, Clifford. The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of

Computer Espionage. (New York: Doubleday, 1989.)



Classic true story of international information warfare over the Internet.

Often referenced.





[30] Szafranski, Richard. "A Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for

2020." Airpower Journal (Spring 1995): 56-65.



Defines information and warfare. Focuses on psychological warfare aspects

on information warfare. Sees the primary target of information warfare as

the knowledge and belief systems of the adversary.





[31] Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War: Survival at the

Dawn of the 21st century. (New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.)



Traces the evolution of warfare through agrarian, industrial, and

informational warfare "waves." Forecasts the future of human conflict.

Constantly referenced and highly recommended by other authors on the

subject of information warfare.





[32] Tzu, Sun (Griffith, Samuel B., trans.) The Art of War. (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1963.)



Ancient text on warfare popularized due to Sun Tzu's holistic view of

warfare and the increasing irrelevance of Clausewitz's classic On War in

the Information Age. Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu regards information as

indispensable in reducing the uncertainty of war. Much of The Art of War is

arguably applicable to information warfare.





[33] Waller, Douglas. "Onward Cyber Soldiers." Time (August 24, 1995):

38-46.



Focuses mostly on examples and speculation to describe information warfare.

Provides a summary of some of the major papers on information warfare.

Includes many salient points.





[34] Wardynski, E. Casey. "The Labor Economics of Information Warfare."

Military Review (May-June 1995): 56-61.



Examines the economics of providing appropriate education in the nation's

public schools to ensure the numbers of quality workers that will be

required to support and defend the nation in the Information Age. Analyzes

the wages these people can expect to make and discusses the tradeoff

between developing technologies that require low skill, low wage workers,

versus developing technologies that require high skill, high wage workers.





[35] Cornerstones of Information Warfare. (Department of the Air Force,

1995.)



States the Air Force's definition of information warfare. Outlines the

traditional elements of warfare which comprise information warfare.

Discusses how Air Force doctrine should change to accommodate information

warfare.





[36] Jumpstart Information Warfare Briefing. (Department of the Air Force,

1995.)



Open source briefing ordered by the Air Force Chief of Staff to educate

Major Command and Numbered Air Force commanders and staffs on the subject

of information warfare. Contains numerous examples of information warfare

activities.





[37] National Defense University School of Information Warfare and Strategy

Syllabus, Academic Year 1995-96.



Details goals, objectives, lessons, and labs taught at the School of

Information Warfare and Strategy.





[38] U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6, Information Operations, 8 July,

1995 Working Draft.



States the Army's definition of information warfare. Discusses information

environment, threats, information dominance, information operations,

command and control warfare, intelligence, information systems, and

information activities.





[39] U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-9, Concept for Information Operations, 1

August, 1995.



"This concept describes the importance of information and how to win the

information war in military operations now and into the twenty-first

century."