Information Dominance
Point Paper
This point paper has been drafted
in conjunction with the development of a revised Information Operations(IO)
concept that focuses on Information Dominance (ID). This ID paper represents
current documentation and thoughts concerning what it is, how to get it
and how to know youve got it. Comments concerning recommended additions,
changes or deletions should be provided to one or both of the following
POCs:
Jim Winters, DSN 680-4351, (757) 727-4351,
FAX - 3199, wintersj@monroe.army.mil
John Giffin, DSN 680-3321, (757) 727-3321,
FAX -3199,
giffinj@monroe.army.mil
Information Dominance
This point paper outlines information
dominance -- what it is, how to get it and how to know youve got
it.
What is Information Dominance (ID)?
Information Dominance is
the degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use
information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage
in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war,
while denying those capabilities to the adversary (FM 100-6 definition).
ID attributes are as follows:
ID is a condition that results from
the use of offensive and defensive information operations (IO) to build
a comprehensive knowledge advantage at a time, place and on decision
issues critical to accomplishing the mission quickly and decisively.
ID applies in peace through war, including
nonstate actors through major competitors at all echelons. It is effected
by asymmetric threats and asymmetric information requirements.
ID is a transient condition with frequent
changes over time, space and echelon that depend upon effectiveness of
friendly and adversary offensive and defensive IO. Even when we possess
ID, enemy forces have niche capabilities that may overmatch some aspects
of friendly operations.
ID is a key condition requiring friendly
knowledge/understanding of the situation that is significantly more certain,
timely, and accurate than the adversarys. ID requires a significant
disparity between what we know about our battlespace and operations within
it... and what the enemy knows about his battlespace. If the disparity
is great enough, our leaders can make timely, informed decisions, while
the enemy is guessing at a decision with incomplete or erroneous information.
ID provides a temporary opportunity
that comes from a knowledge advantage, regardless of the information source,
e.g., RSTA data, intelligence, governmental/non governmental agency, open
system information and civil/public affairs.
Achieving ID involves two components:
1) building up and protecting friendly information; and 2) degrading information
received by your adversary.
How do we get Information Dominance?
The steps that yield ID at the decisive
time and place must be planned for, and worked for, to be achieved. The
building blocks that must be put in place to establish an operational
state of ID are as follows: (NOTE: The ID METL, the "how to",
is at Incl 1.)
Shape the "Inforspace".
The commander must establish his information requirements (EEFI/CCIR/PIR);
continuously adapt these requirements based on METT-T; maximize the use
of information acquisition means; dynamically task surveillance, reconnaissance
and intelligence collection assets; in sum - focus offensive and defensive
IO to achieve ID.
Provide Command and Control Protection
(C2 Protect). The commander must ensure the integration and application
of all necessary operational, technical engineering, security and intelligence
(or counter-intelligence) disciplines to provide the availability, integrity,
and confidentiality of information when and where it is needed throughout
the battlespace. The goal of this integration and application of disciplines
is an information infrastructure capable of providing complete and unaltered
information while withstanding natural and/or malicious (insider and adversary)
disruptions or attacks against the infrastructure.
Conduct Command and Control Attack
(C2 Attack). Attack lethality or nonlethality to delay, degrade, or
destroy the adversarys means of C2. Such attack requires significant
intelligence input to allow for the attack of the right links/nodes at
the proper time. C2 Attack must be integrated in the commanders
attack plan and synchronized across the elements of C2W.
Practice Spectrum Adaptability.
To achieve the maximum amount of freedom of action our use of the
electromagnetic spectrum must have the ability to adapt. Provision must
be made to deal with enemy attack across the spectrum; prevent it, reduce
its effects, and/or provide for redundancy or agility. Adaptability includes
aggressive, effective management measures concerning spectrum use (or
non-use) by friendly forces, host nations, and/or contiguous neutrals.
Electronic fratracide may be the worst enemy in the infospace. Finally,
we must account for effects of the environment - lightening, sun spots,
etc.
Establish Situation Understanding.
An accurate and timely relevant common picture of the friendly status,
adversary status (where applicable) and other state/non-state actors status
establishes situation awareness. The application of the commanders
knowledge, skills, judgement, intuition and experience result in achievement
of the level of understanding that is key to gaining information dominance,
and, in turn, full spectrum dominance.
Achieve High Performance. The
commander must understand the value of information and drive the processes
that bring the right information at the right time. The commander must
create a team that understands his intent, and can act in concert on an
internetted basis. The correct decision, at the optimum time, immediately
understood and executed as the commander envisions, is the essence of
victory.
How do we know when weve
got Information Dominance?
We know we have gained Information
Dominance when we can:
Provide the commander with timely,
accurate and relevant information/intelligence that satisfies the Commanders
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) -- intelligence, friendly forces
and non-military -- for planning and execution, i.e. provides situational
awareness and supports successful battlefield visualization.
Enable the commander to shape the
battlefield and make quicker, better combat decisions than the adversary
or more timely decisions in non-combat situations.
Gain time for the commander to refine
and implement the best course of action, while denying that time and flexibility
to the adversary.
Move forces faster based on situation
awareness and inability of the adversary to identify where our primary
forces are located and where they are moving.
Engage the adversary more precisely
and with greater lethal/non-lethal effects, because of our information
advantage and the enemys corresponding inability to move or protect
itself.
Protect our forces economically, resulting
from our ability to deny, degrade, destroy and/or effectively blind his
IO/C4I/C2W capabilities.
Create high performance units that
use information in a manner that allows them to accomplish their missions
more effectively and quickly with minimum casualties.
Information dominance can be assessed
qualitatively through the following processes:
Assess the knowledge of the friendly
and enemy/adversary decision-making processes to include the information
infrastructure that supports them.
Assess the ability of the friendly
versus enemy force to identify and manage critical requirements (CCIR,
PIR, EEFI, non-military) that support decision-making.
Assess friendly versus enemy ability
to acquire, use, manage, protect, exploit and deny information, i.e. conduct
information operations to include employing intelligence preparation of
the battlefield, information systems, spectrum management.
Assess friendly versus enemy ability
to filter, focus, fuse, act on and disseminate information/intelligence
for decision-making and Command and Control (C2), to include an evaluation
of the information/intelligence systems that support these activities.
Assess friendly versus enemy IO/C4I/C2W
vulnerabilities.
Assess friendly versus enemy employment
of synchronized C2W attack and protect means including OPSEC, deception,
PSYOP, EW, physical destruction, public affairs and civil affairs.
Assess the effect of friendly versus
enemy information operations on the objectives stated at the top of the
page.
ATCD-HW 30 Dec 96
Revised Information Dominance Mission
Essential Task List (METL)
1. Collect, analyze, focus, fuse and
report Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII), based
on established requirements.
Establish linked processes to collect,
process and provide critical information and intelligence, that supports
battlefield visualization, decision-making and information operations
- both defensive and offensive.
Identify commanders critical
information and intelligence requirements (CCIR/PIR) to support decisions.
Develop essential elements of friendly
information (EEFI) and non-military information requirements.
Assess friendly IO/C4I/C2W capabilities
and vulnerabilities.
Assess adversary IO/C4I/C2W capabilities
and vulnerabilities.
2. Employ Information Systems
to obtain, move, disseminate, display and release information.
Construct, maintain and protect the
information battlespace by establishing redundant, secure, global, dynamic
C4 networks.
Employ C4 link, transport, reachback
and extend capabilities (e.g., C4 on the move) to support battle command.
Employ models and simulations for
IO training, mission planning, mission rehearsal and decision making.
Establish information interfaces with
foreign and domestic governmental and non-governmental organizations;
establish media release systems.
3. Employ Operations to
achieve C2 protect and attack objectives.
Establish and integrate C2 Attack
targeting, planning and battle damage assessment systems.
Attack, deny, degrade, exploit and/or
influence adversary C4I/C2W across the full spectrum of military operations.
Employ measures to conceal friendly
information operations and protect friendly C2 from attack.
Employ Public Affairs to improve public/leader
understanding and influence coalition/adversary perceptions.
Employ Civil Affairs to gain information,
secure public acceptance and support of military forces/operations.
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