
Purpose
- Review the Basics of Information Superiority and Network Centric
Warfare
- Provide Examples of the Growing Body of Evidence
- Discuss IS and NCW-related Experimentation
|
Agenda
- Purpose
- Information Superiority
- Network Centric Warfare
- Thoughts on Experimentation
|
Information is Different
- Develop Once - Use Many Times - and Simultaneously
- Value is Not Created Until the End of the Last Mile
Value Enhancers
Sharing
Timeliness
Assured Availability
Security and Confidence
Context and Confusion
The Wheat
Accuracy and Completeness
|
Value Detractors
Lack of Interoperability and Disconnects
Delays
Disruptions and Lack of Reliability
Compromise
Stovepiped Information
The Chaff and Overload
Poor Quality
|
- A Vulnerability Created by One is a Vulnerability Imposed
upon All
- A Deficiency Created by One is a Deficiency for All
| DoD-Wide Solution is Necessary
to Create and Protect Value |
|
Information Superiority: What is it?
The
RIGHT
Information from Sources
to People at Time and
Place in Format.DPG
|
Assured
Information on
Demand
Anywhere in
Real Time with
Zero Error |
|
| The capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information
while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to
do the same. DPG and Joint Pub 9-13 |

| Different
Perspectives, the Same Bottom Line: More for Us; Less
for Them |
|

| Seamless Joint and Combined
Interoperability |
|
|
Two Sides of Information Superiority
|
Information Superiority
A Relative State
achieved when a
Competative Advantage
is Derived from the
Ability to Exploit an
Imformaiton Advantage
The
ability to develop and use information
while denying an adversary the same capability
|
Elements of Information Superiority
|
Awareness & Knowledge
Network-intensive
People-intensive
|
- Battlespace Awareness results from the fusion of key
elements of information which characterize the battlespace
- Explicit Information (e.g. position of forces, geography,
and weather)
- Requires Little Interpretation
- Can be communicated quickly and easily
- Battlespace Knowledge yields predictive ability based
upon interpretations based upon experience and a priori
knowledge
- Tacit Information (e,g,. capability and tactics of
an adversary, local customs, intent)
- Supporting facts can be easily transferred, the underlying
organizing logic can seldom be transferred quickly and
easily.
|
| Requires
a Knowledge-Based Workforce |
|
Sharing
- Sharing Lies at the Core of IS & NCW
- Entry Fee is the "Network" (the GIG)
- Sharing Has an Organizational, a Behavioral, and a Technical
Component
- Interoperability v. Cooperability
- Technical Component Enables
- Organizational and Behavioral Components Generate Value
| A Basic
Paradigm Shift in Dealing With Information |
|
Collaboration
- Collaboration in the Information Domain Creates an Information
Advantage
- Collaboration in the Operational Domain Creates Value by Exploiting
an Information Advantage to Create a Competitive Advantage
- Collaboration Takes Places "on the Net"or is Reflected "in
the Net"
- The Ability to Share Creates New Forms of Collaboration
- e.g., Self-Synchronization
|
Protect, Deny, and Exploit
 |
IO is
Dynamic and N-Sided
- Blue, Red, Others (e.g. CNN)
| The
Objective is to Improve Blue's Relative Information
Position |
|
|
Agenda
- Purpose
- Information Superiority
- Network Centric Warfare
- Thoughts on Experimentation
|
Network Centric Warfare
A Warfighting Concept
that Enables a Network Centric Force
to Significantly Increase Combat Power by Achieving
Network Centric Warfare Translates
Information Superiority into Combat Power
|
Networking the Force
- A network-centric force is an interoperable
force
- A network-centric force provides Commanders with the capability
to dynamically network (connect, share, and collaborate)
- Sensors (regardless of platform)
- Decision-makers (regardless of location)
- Shooters (regardless of service)

|
Networking the Force
| Sensor
/ Awareness |
Shooter
/ Transaction |
 |
Sensor
Networks:
Joint Composite
Tracking Network
(CEC)
< 100 Users
Joint Data
Network
(Link 16/11)
< 500 Users
Joint Planning
Network
(GCCS)
~1000 Users
|
 |
Sensor Fusion
Weapons
Control
Force
Control
Self-Synchronizing
Forces
Force
Coordination
|
 |
CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability
GCCS: Global Command and Control System |
| Variable
Quality of Service |
|
|
Networking the Force
- A network-centric force has the capability to generate shared
battlespace awareness
The
generation of shared battlespace awareness requires
the robust networking of the blue force. |
|
Increased Awareness
A network-centric
force increases battlespace awareness
by overcoming the limitations of standalone sensors
through employment of sensor networks |
 |
- Sensor Networks enable Commanders to
- Rapidly generate Battlespace
Awareness
- Syncronized with operations
- Components of Sensor Networks
- Space, Air, Sea, Ground and Cyberspace
Based Sensors
- Operational Capabilities
- Improved Data Fusion
- Dynamic Sensor Tasking
- Universal Sensor Recruitment
|
|
Increased Battlespace Awareness
Current Capabilities to Generate Engagement
Quality Awareness
Against Adversary Forces Across Various Battlespaces

|
Threat Trends
Signiture and "Volatility" Trends Stress
Both Sensing and Engagement
Time Lines
Reduced
Signature
Normal |
|
 |
| Stationary |
Transient |
Operational
"Volatility"
|
|
Increased Awareness

|
Payoff of Sensor Fusion

|
Cooperative Engagement
Sensor Network
|
E-C2 Hawkeyes

Sensor
Data Fusion Decreases
Time Required to
Generate
Engagement Quality Awareness |
|
|
- Generates engagement quality
Battlespace Awareness with reduced timelines
- Fuses multi-sensor data
- Quantum improvement in track accuracy, continuity, and
target identification
- Extends detection ranges
Track
Accuracy
(Uncertainty)
Engagement
Quality
Accuracy
|
 |
|
|
Benefits of Real-Time Fusion
|
Task Force XXI AWE

Increased
Battlespace
Awareness
-
Where Am I?
- Where Are My
Buddies
- Where Is te
Enemy?
|
|
|
|
Increased Combat Effectiveness
| |
|
Before/After |
OPTEMPO |
Lethality |
Survivability |
| Plan Development (Div) |
|
72 vs 12 hrs. |
 |
|
|
| Call for Fire |
|
3 vs 0.5 min. |
|
 |
|
| Deliberate Attack (Co) |
|
40 vs 20 min. |
 |
 |
 |
| Hasty Attack (Co)* |
|
39 x 112 Red Loss |
 |
 |
|
| Defense in Sector* |
|
Loss vs Win |
|
 |
 |
| Movement to Contract* |
|
91 vs 128 Red Loss |
|
 |
 |
Source:
Army Digitization Overview -
BG William L. Bond, 20 may 98 |
The Bottom
Line is: |
The EXFOR Division killed
over twice the enemy in
half the time,
over three times the Battlespace,
with 25% fewer Combat
Platforms
using Information Age Technology.
|
Task Force XXI
AWE Integrated Report:
Post-NTC Modeling of Opportunities |
Source:
Military CIS '98 -
BG William L. Bond, 20 April 1998 |
|
Counter SOF
| |
Navy Component Commander's
Number One Problem |
Network-Centric Warfighting Concept:
Land-Sea engaggement network
- Shared awareness
- Increased engagements
Efficient resource allocation
- Weapon-target pairing
- Self-syncronization
Multi-service solution
- Coordination at "the seams"
Source: NWDC Briefing to DRB for RMA
Oversight
- 14 Jan 99
FBE
Delta Quick Look Report
|
 |
|
FBE Results and Implications
| |
|
Before/After |
Self
Synchonization |
OTEMPO |
Lethality |
| Avg Decision Cycle |
|
43 vs 23 min. |
 |
 |
|
| Mission Timeline |
|
50% Decrease |
 |
 |
|
| Shooter Effectiveness |
|
50% Increase |
 |
|
 |
| Assets Scrambled |
|
15% Decrease |
 |
 |
|
| Leakers |
|
10x Decrease |
 |
|
 |
The Bottom
Line is: |
FBE Delta demonstrated the potential
for a networked force provided with shared
awareness to self-synchronize
and to accomplish the
CSOF mission in half the
time and to reduce SOF
leakers by an order of magnitude.
|
Source: Fleet Battle Experiment
Delta Quick Look Report
An Assessment of IT-21 Warfighting Value-Added |
|
EFX '98 Sharing and Collaboration
| |
Before/After
|
| Deployed Footprint |
1500-2000 vs. 100-300 |
| Deployment Timeline |
10-15 Days vs. 1-2 Days |
| Air Lift Required |
25 C-17 Loads vs. 2-3 C-17 Loads |
| |
Virtual Collaboration:
Moving Information - Not People |
 |
 |
| Source:
EFX '98 Final Report |
|
Network Centric Attack Ops
| F15-C Air Ops: Active Missle Counter
Tactics |
| |
Without JTIDS / With JTIDS |
- Information Advantage
- OODA Loop
- Kill Ratio
|
Voice Only vs. Shared Tactical Picture
Baseline Compressed with Self-Synchonization
3.30:3 vs. 8.11:1
|
|
|
JTIDS Operational Special Project
demonstrated networked air crews
fighting with shared awareness
could increase combat power by
over 100%
|
| Source: JTIDS
Operational Special Project - Report to Congress |
Network Centric Operations
|
Summary of Emerging Evidence
Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment
Faster, precision
maneuver for lethal, evasive engagement of enemy
ground force
based on shared battlesspace awareness & tactical
synchronization
Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Delta
Internetting
of AEGIS and Firefinder radars for counter-battery fires.
Aggressive
prosecution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) threat based
on shared
awareness and rapid, self-synchronized engagement
Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX)'98
Joint Forces
Air Component Commander (JFACC) Enroute Bombers
linked into
tactical info grid for beyond-line-of-sight retargeting Reduced
Joint Air
Operations Center (JOAC) forward footprint
JTIDS Operational Special Project
Attack Operations
with Tactical Data Links
Operation Allied Force
|
|
Agenda
- Purpose
- Information Superiority
- Network Centric Warfare
- Thoughts on Experimentation
|
From Concept to Capability

|
Organizing Logic for Experimentation
- IS and NCW Concepts Provide an Organizing Logic for Concept-Based
Experimentation Based upon
- Elements of Information Superiority
- Attributes of a Network-Centric Force
- Hypotheses
- Metrics (dependent variables)
- Key Independent Variables ("treatments" and "conditions")
|
Evidence of Conversion
- The AOACMT Hypothesis
- "IF we can establish a multi-spectral, cross-cued sensor network
-- linked by
a responsive decision mechanism to precision
engagement means -- THEN
we will be able to ..."
- and the Decomposed Version
- Represent Evidence of Intellectual Convergence with respect
to Core IS and NCW Concepts and Metrics
- But We Need to Complete the Convergence
- Separate Means from Ends (e.g. Sensor Networks from Awareness)
- Develop Common Understanding of Key Cross-cutting Concepts
and
Metrics (e.g. Shared Awareness)
|
Experimental Space

|
Experimental Space

|
Power of IS / NCW Core Concepts
- They Get at the Fundamentals
- Facilitate Sharing of Experimental Results Across
Missions and Contexts
- Enable Creation of a Useful Body of Knowledge
- Bottom Line: More Bang for the Experimental Buck
|
|
Experimental Space

|
Illustrative Metrics
|
Experimentation Lessons "Recorded"
- There is a Learning Curve
- What Future Technology Can Do
- How to Co-Evolve MCPs
- The Value of the "Pre" and the "Post"
- Importance of Focus
- Value of Analysis
- Projecting Futre Technology is Necessary to Stay Ahead of
the Power Curve
- Information Superiority Advanced Technology Plan
|
Summary
- IS &
NCW translates into
Combat Power
- It is All About Creating and Leveraging an Information Advantage
- Sharing and Collaboration are the Key Processes
- "The emerging evidence for Network Centric Warfare as the
intellectual basis
for Joint Vision 2010 is compelling" General
Hugh Shelton, CJCS, June 22, 1999
- IS and NCW Core Concepts Provide an Effective Organizing Logic
for Concept-Based Experimentation
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