Table of Content
Sample C2W Annex
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group of Signature
Annex D to ( ) Corps OPORD Exercise Xxxx Xxxx
Command and Control Warfare (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List appropriate joint and Army publications or
documents on IO such as the following:
a. CJCSI 3210.03, Joint Command and Control Warfare Policy, 8
b. CJCS MOP 6, Electronic Warfare, 3 March 1993.
c. Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare
Operations, 7 February 1996.
d. Joint Pub 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations,
30 June 1991.
e. Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine,
30 July 1993.
f. Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, 27
August 1991 (Change 1, 14 April 1994).
g. Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 6
h. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, 27 September
1. (U) SITUATION. Thoroughly describe the operational environment
as it applies to IO, as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment
that may impact IO. Include tactical considerations important to IO in
the early phases of an operation and establish the adversary's most probable
C2-attack course of action. Indicate trigger events that would signal
execution of specific components of an IO within the OPORD.
a. Enemy. Expand discussion of the enemy situation in terms
of C2W, to include both strengths and weaknesses. Information components
should include the following:
(1) A summary of information concerning the AO, which consists of--
(a) A strategic overview of the area that includes how the climate,
politics, geography, topography, demography, economics, and social
and cultural factors, as well as those of adjacent nation neighbors,
may affect IO.
(b) Specific, localized information, particularly about conditions
affecting the early phases of the operation. Include availability
of advanced technologies within the area such as national, multinational,
or commercial information networks (telephone, telegraph, television,
satellite linkages, and frequency spectrum), and the value of protecting
or disrupting key capabilities of the country.
(2) A description of the adversary, which consists of--
(a) Strategic and operational factors such as the level of sophistication
of the adversary's use of information technology to disseminate
information to counter US efforts against its people. Ability of
the adversary to restore key disrupted information facilities and
maintain the initiative in the informational arena. The adversary's
past experience in dealing with disruption over long periods of
time (natural disasters, internal dissent, or subsystem failures
such as loss of electric power, wear-out of components), stockpiling
of key components, and vulnerability to disruptions in supply of
key information equipment from outside the country.
(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the
operation are dispersal of information equipment within the country
and locations of qualified repair, broadcast, and production technicians
and operators. Additional factors are the adversary's use of space-based
communications, navigation, imagery, and weather systems, as well
as C2 W capabilities. Understanding the origin of the technology
base enables easier disruption of the adversary's systems.
(c) Information about affiliations of the adversary that could
counter US efforts against the adversary. Include order-of-battle
information, numbers of INFOSYS, personalities of leaders, and levels
of training or combat experience.
b. Friendly. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept
of operation as it applies to IO/IW of the joint or multinational command
to which the ARFOR is subordinate. These are normally as written in
the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals
know and understand the higher joint or multinational commander's intent,
the end state desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their
actions mesh with the attainment of joint or multinational goals.
(1) Higher headquarters. Include the mission, concept, and
intent of the unified/joint theater CINC. His concept determines the
contributions of various informational elements and from which services
or nations they are likely to be provided. His charter is to achieve
US interests in the theater and should be stated so that the ASCC/ARFOR,
his staff, and subordinates know and understand the part they play
in achieving the CINC's strategic aim.
(2) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps components of the unified command in IO/IW.
(3) Joint, unified, and subunified commands and DOD agencies.
Highlight the roles of these other commands and agencies that
(4) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities,
and activities of friendly nations in the operation as they affect
IO. Emphasize the capabilities of their military forces and other
assets that their participation may bring. State their roles and missions
that support the CINC's objectives to further US policies.
(5) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of
SOF in the region that affect the operation, to include expected information
activities of these forces.
(6) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of US
embassies and country teams as they support IO of the force.
(7) Other Non-DOD US Agencies. Describe the activities of
US Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA
and USAID, as they affect IO.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Highlight critical elements
of the Task Organization/Command Relationship section (Annex
A) that may provide additional capabilities as the IO unfolds.
d. Assumptions. Include predictions and presumptions concerning
(1) Information conditions within host countries and other nations
in the region.
(2) Previous US policies in the region that affect speed or ability
to change informational themes.
(3) Involvement by other powers, both outside and within the region,
in the internal affairs of nations in the theater, which could result
in changes to IO.
(4) Effects of US actions in IO on relations with nations adjacent
to the adversary nation.
(5) Adequacy of interagency support, to include methods of increasing
the role of other information agencies to reduce, where possible,
sole military contributions.
(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent
of IO conducted within the overall operation.
(7) Availability of informational resources.
(8) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions as they affect
(9) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations that could
change the IO scheme.
(10) The timing of the use of special events in the IO.
2. (U) MISSION. Include an explicit statement of the C2W mission
to support the operation, such as the following: On order, ( ) Corps conducts
C2W operations to deter (country name) attack on (country name). If deterrence
fails, D-Day, H-Hour ( ) Corps conducts C2W operations to support combat
operations to disrupt (country name) C2 of operational forces and degrade
situational awareness of ( ) Corps operations, while protecting coalition
C2 capabilities from enemy disruption and destruction.
3. (U) EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations. Provide a detailed discussion of the
overall C2W operation, with the specific details developed in appendixes
organized around the five elements of C2W.
(1) Military Deception. This appendix includes a description
of the deception objective, the deception story, available resources,
excerpts of higher headquarters deception plans, and the active and
passive deception measures to be taken by subordinate organizations.
See Appendix A to this annex.
(2) Electronic Warfare. This appendix includes the EW mission,
enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination
with other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational
fires). See Appendix B to this annex.
(3) Operations Security. Deny the enemy information concerning
the speed and size of the US buildup, as well as the specific course
of action the US will execute in the decisive combat phase. Emphasis
in initial stages is on denying the enemy access to his own or foreign
intelligence capabilities. Deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction
all support these objectives. See Appendix C to this annex.
(4) Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence
annex, designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to
include its integration into higher headquarters plans and any deception
plan operations or related tasks for subordinate units. See Appendix
D to this annex.
(5) Physical Destruction. When employed in a C2W role, physical
destruction is used to destroy the enemy's communications, integrated
air defense system (IADS), and intelligence collection and fusion
capabilities and to destroy the enemy's ability to strike at friendly
C2 and C2W capabilities.
b. C2W Tasks. Review specified and unspecified tasks by command.
(1) Higher Headquarters.
(a) Exercise centralized coordinating authority of all theater
(b) Ensure that C2W cell responsibilities are accomplished as described
in CJCSI 3210.03.
(c) Advise component and supporting commanders of (_) Corps C2W
objectives and provide guidelines for their accomplishment.
(d) Develop the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) to support
(e) Provide oversight and ensure coordination of any reprogramming
(2) Component and Supporting Commands.
(a) Provide for a single C2W point of contact.
(b) Plan for and be prepared to conduct C2W operations.
(c) Identify any operations that may impact or degrade effective
C2 of coalition forces.
(d) Recommend to (_) Corps the intelligence collection requirements
necessary to support C2W operations.
(e) Direct reprogramming actions as required.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) The (_) Corps IO cell will coordinate, as appropriate, actions
associated with operations against (country name) C2. These actions
include physical destruction, EW, PSYOP, military deception, and OPSEC.
(2) Planning and support of C2W operations for (_) Corps should,
as appropriate, be coordinated and draw support from the following:
(a) Army forces.
(b) US Special Operations Command.
(c) National Security Agency.
(d) Central Intelligence Agency.
(e) Defense Intelligence Agency
(f) Land Information Warfare Activity.
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
b. Logistics. Increasingly, all operations entail another service,
such as the Navy or Air Force, providing some common support. During
these operations, the lack of specific standard support structures may
be overcome through enhanced information connectivity available through
common data bases and common hardware or software available across the
services or through liaison teams.
(1) Features of such mechanisms could reduce the number of soldiers
or units exposed to an operational environment, with a higher ratio
of combat troops to support troops in the operational location. Consider
some of the following areas for this type of idea:
(a) Personnel strength reports sent to Army component commands
(b) Telemedicine support reducing the number of specialized staff
deployed to an operational area.
(c) State of the art radio and television studios located out of
the immediate operational area that could be used in PSYOP.
(d) Local production of newspapers that could facilitate PSYOP
while reducing support infrastructures within an AO.
(2) Identify information network support facilities from friendly
third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures for making use
of these resources.
(3) Include procedures for IO support of contingency forces from
CONUS or other theaters.
(4) Highlight IO that routinely support force sustainment, to include
the operation of temporary installations.
5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL.
a. (_) Corps will centrally coordinate assets to be used in a C2W role.
G3 heads the command IO cell.
b. See Annex S.