Table of Content
Commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory
at minimal cost. They integrate and coordinate a variety of functions
with the elements of combat power to sustain it at the operational and
C2W, CA, and PA are interrelated operations1
that are conducted to support the Army objective of achieving
information dominance in any operational environment-combat or peace.
This chapter discusses each element of C2W and the functions of CA and
PA and how they support achieving information dominance. CA and PA operations
provide liaison and connectivity with essential actors and influences
in the GIE and interact with specific elements of C2W. Grouping C2W,
CA, and PA together as specific IO provides a framework to promote synergy
and facilitate staff planning and execution. This idea is reinforced
by including the CA and PA staff representatives in the IO cell or on
the information operations battle staff (IOBS) in routine staff coordination
(see Appendix D). This construct conceptually
provides for greater integration and synchronization of CA and PA with
the more traditional warfighting elements of C2W.
Major emphasis was placed on C2W, CA, and PA activities during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Commanders integrated OPSEC, military
deception, PSYOP, and EW efforts during Desert Shield to pave the way
for successful combat operations. During planning for Desert Storm, the
senior leadership recognized that Iraq's C2 was a critical vulnerability
whose destruction could enable victory with minimal friendly loss. This
is evident from the Secretary of Defense's guidance outlining the military
objectives for Desert Storm:
- Neutralize the Iraqi national command authority's ability to direct
- Eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait.
- Destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard.
- Destroy Iraqi ballistic missile and nuclear, biological, and chemical
- Assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
During Desert Storm's air operations, the enemy was selectively blinded
by EW and physical destruction to mask friendly force movements and operations.
Deception operations continued to enforce erroneous enemy perceptions
of the CINC's intentions. EW and precision air strikes against C2 targets
were used to disorganize and isolate Iraqi forces. When the ground attack
commenced, Iraqi forces were close to disintegration, with numerous formations
unable to coordinate their efforts. The need for synchronization was an
early lesson learned and demonstrated immediate payoffs. Successfully
denying Saddam Hussein the ability to command and control his forces substantially
reduced casualties on all sides and significantly reduced the time required
to achieve coalition objectives.
Fully aware that the enemy, as well as the public at home, was focused
on PA coverage of the confrontation, the coalition used that coverage
to confuse the enemy by encouraging speculation on the place, time, and
size of the impending attack. At the same time, the coalition learned
that immediacy of media attention could have unforeseen consequences for
its own strategic, operational, and tactical planning. After the cessation
of hostilities, CA elements enhanced the restoration of Kuwaiti governmental
and social order and responded promptly and effectively to one of the
central unanticipated consequences of the war as Iraqi forces created
an enormous refugee crisis in the northern Kurdish provinces of Iraq and
in southern Turkey.
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE
To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the commander's
concept of the operation and synchronized with other operations. The
synchronization of these actions will require rapid and reliable intelligence
support and communications. JFCs [joint force commanders] should ensure
that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities.
C2W directly supports the Army goal of achieving information dominance
and winning any conflict or succeeding in any OOTW quickly, decisively,
and with minimum casualties. C2W incorporates both the sword against
anadversary's C2 system and the shield against the C2-attack actions
of the adversary. This combination of both offensive and defensive aspects
into an integrated capability provides expanded opportunities for synergy
in warfare. C2W allows the Army and individual commanders to accomplish
missions with fewer risks, in shorter time frames, and with fewer resources.
Role of C2W
C2W applies to all phases of operations, including those before, during,
and after actual hostilities. Even in OOTW, C2W offers the military commander
lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the assigned mission while deterring
war and/or promoting peace. The offensive aspect ofC2W can slow the adversary's
operational tempo, disrupt his plans and ability to focus combat power,
and influence his estimate of the situation. The defensive aspects of
C2W minimize friendly C2 system vulnerabilities and mutual interference.
C2W is defined as--
The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception,
psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical
destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to,
influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting
friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare
applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict.
CJCSI 3210.03, 31 March 1996
The foundation for C2W is robust and redundant command, control, communications,
and computer (C4) INFOSYS, coupled with seamless, national-to-tactical,
relevant information and intelligence support. The building blocks, or
elements, of C2W include-
- Military deception.
- Physical destruction.
Thesebuilding blocks contribute to protection of the force and mission
accomplishment in various ways, depending on the situation. This situation
dependence leads to the building blocks that are shown in a constantly
changing pattern in Figure 3-1. The integrated
employment of these five elements leads to synergy on the battlefield
and results in the most effective execution ofC2-attack and/or C2-protect
tasks. The commander drives this C2W process to achieve agility by focusing
attacks on the adversary's ability to command and control his forces while
simultaneously protecting friendly C2.
Figure 3-1. C2W Construct
Operations security is defined as--
A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities;
identifying those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence
systems; determining indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain
that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information
in time to be useful to adversaries; and selecting and executing measures
that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of
friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
OPSEC is the key to denial. It gives the commander the capability to
identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence
systems. It can provide an awareness of the potentially friendly indicators
that adversary intelligence systems might obtain. Such an awareness could
be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information regarding
friendly force dispositions, intent, and/or courses of action that must
be protected. The goal of OPSEC is to identify, select, and execute measures
that eliminate, or reduce to an acceptable level, indications and other
sources of information that may be exploited by an adversary.
OPSEC planning is severely challenged by the new family of global commercial
capabilities, to include imaging, positioning, andcellular systems that
offer potential adversaries access to an unprecedented level of information
against friendly forces. The inevitable presence of the news media during
military operations complicates OPSEC. The capability of the media to
transmit real-time information to a worldwide audience could be a lucrative
source of information to an adversary. OPSEC planners, working closely
with PA personnel, must develop the EEFI used to preclude inadvertent
public disclosure of critical or sensitive information.
Many different measures impact OPSEC. These includecounterintelligence,
information security (INFOSEC), transmission security (TRANSEC), communications
security (COMSEC), and signal security (SIGSEC). As more and more of the
force is digitized, INFOSEC takes on an ever-growing importance.
Military deception is defined as--
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations,
thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions)
that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Military deception is the primary means to influence the adversary commander's
decisions through distortion, concealment, and/or falsification of friendly
intentions, status, dispositions, capabilities, courses of action, and
strengths. The goal of deception is to cause the opposing military commander
to act in a manner that serves the friendly commander's objectives.
Tactical deception had significant positive impacts on the success of
Operation Overlord, and, thus the retaking of the European continent in
World War II. Deception worked hand in hand with OPSEC to keep the organization
and location of the real Overlord cantonments, training sites, dumps,
movements, and embarkations carefully hidden. Unbelievable effort was
put into creating mock airfields and ports, phony ships, boats, planes,
tanks, vehicles, and troop movements, both real and staged. A new era
of deception was introduced-the electronic one. German coastal defense
radars were destroyed in a calculated pattern. Deception planners purposely
left some intact in the Calais region.
The night the invasion was launched, the Allies began massively jamming
German radars with chaff. But they purposely did not completely cover
their targets. German radar operators could "see" between Allied
jamming curtains. And, what they saw was a ghost fleet of small ships
towing barges and blimps headed for Calais at eight knots-or the speed
of an amphibious fleet. Powerful electronic emitters received the pulse
of the German radar and sent it strongly back to the German receivers.
For each repetition of this deception it looked to the German operators
like a 10,000-ton ship was out there. The small ships also had the recorded
sounds of the amphibious assault at Salerno to play over speakers from
10 miles out. German troops ashore could hear the Allies "getting
into their landing craft" for the run into the beach. This information
threw German intelligence into chaos for several precious hours and played
a major role in delaying German counteractions to the actual invasion
taking place at Normandy.
Psychological operations are defined as--
Operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and,
ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
PSYOP are based on projection of truth and credible message. PSYOP are
an essential tool in both C2-protect and C2-attack operations. The Army
has shown considerable strength in applying both PSYOP and deception to
military operations. PSYOP can proliferate discrete messages to adversary
C4I collectors, enhance joint combat power demonstrations with surrender
appeals, and magnify the image of US technological superiority. PSYOP
elements must work closely with other C2W elements and PA strategists
to maximize the advantage of IO. As an example, the Army has shown considerable
strength in applying both PSYOP and deception to military operations.
PSYOP's main objective in C2-protect is to minimize the effects of an
adversary's hostile propaganda and disinformation campaign against US
forces. Discrediting adversary propaganda or misinformation against the
operations of US/coalition forces is critical to maintaining favorable
As an early commander of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort, it
is my belief that much of the success achieved during Operation Provide
Comfort can be attributed to the successful integration of PSYOP in
support of the overall humanitarian assistance mission. Over five million
PSYOP products were dispersed over northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey
in support of the Operation's goals and objectives. PSYOP is a true
General John M. Shalikashvili
Electronic warfare is defined as--
Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) or to attack the
enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic
attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support
EA is the use of jamming, electronic deception, or directed energy
to degrade, exploit, or destroy the adversary's use of the EMS. EA can
attack the adversary anywhere-from his tactical formations, back to his
EP is the protection of the friendly use of the EMS. EP covers the
gamut of personnel, equipment, and facilities. EP is part of survivability.
As an example, self and area protection systems can interfere with the
adversary's target acquisition and engagement systems to prevent destruction
of friendly systems and forces.
Electronic Warfare Support
ES is conflict-related information that involves actions tasked by
or under the direct control of an operational commander to search for,
intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional
radiated electromagnetic energy to detect immediate threats. ES is the
embodiment of combat information and capitalizes on the timeliness of
Physical destruction is defined as--
The application of combat power to destroy or neutralize enemy forces
and installations. It includes direct and indirect fires from ground,
sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations
The destruction of a hostile C2 target means that adversary C2 capabilities
are degraded for a period of time or, if necessary, permanently shut down.
Physical destruction is used only after a full, comparative assessment-strategic-through-tactical
perspectives-of the trade-offs between preserving the target versus its
On April 14, 1943, US intelligence experts intercepted and decoded a
message revealing that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of
Japan's Navy, would be flying to Bougainville in four days. When analysis
determined that Bougainville lay just within the extended range of US
P-38 fighters at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, Allied planners recognized
the opportunity to strike at the heart of Japanese command and control
and strategic planning in the Pacific.
In less than 48 hours, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's forces planned and
coordinated an operation to shoot down Yamamoto's plane and obtained approval
from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and President Roosevelt.
Yamamoto was known to be invariably punctual, and American planners were
confident that his plane would appear over Bougainville on schedule-9:39
am, April 18. At that moment, 16 carefully positioned P-38s from Henderson
Field spotted the two Japanese Betty bombers of Yamamoto's party
Both aircraft were quickly sent plummeting to the ground, completing
a classic information operation that took less than four days from start
to finish and rendered irreparable damage to Japanese command and control.
The Japanese would feel the impact of this single mission throughout the
remainder of the war.
The two disciplines that comprise C2W are C2-attack and C2-protect.
C2-attack is defined as--
The synchronized execution of actions taken to accomplish established
objectives that prevent effective C2 of adversarial forces by denying
information to, by influencing, by degrading, or by destroying the adversary
- Plan based on the unit's mission, commander's intent, and concept
- Synchronize with and support the commander's plan.
- Take and hold the initiative by degrading the adversary's INFOSYS
and forcing the adversary to be reactive. Reactive means that
C2-attack slows the adversary's tempo, disrupts the adversary's planning
and decision cycles, disrupts the adversary commander's ability to generate
combat power, and degrades the adversary commander's means for executing
mission orders and controlling subordinate unit operations.
Figures 3-2 and 3-3
illustrate some of the potential relationships between the elements of
In general terms, C2-attack has four effects that focus on the adversary's
C2 infrastructure and information flow to produce a lower quality and
slower decision-making process.
- First, the adversary is denied information by disrupting his observation,
degrading his orientation and decision formulation, and degrading information
collection. Information collection can be degraded by destroying collection
means, by influencing the information the adversary gets, or by causing
the adversary not to collect at all.
- Second, the adversary commander is influenced by manipulating perception
and causing disorientation of his decision cycle.
- Third, adversary IO are degraded by selectively disrupting C4I systems.
- Fourth, adversary information capabilities can be neutralized or destroyed
by physical destruction of nodes and links. Destruction operations are
most effective when timed to occur just before the adversary needs a
certain C2 function or when focused on a target that is resource-intensive
and hard to reconstitute.
Heraclitus of Ephesus in sixth century BC noted that "if you do
not expect the unexpected, you will not find it." During the German
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Germans recognized,
but the Russians did not, exploitable deficiencies in the existing Soviet
C2 system. Employing the tools of C2W in an interrelated fashion, the
Germans were able to effectively disrupt, exploit, and destroy the Soviet
C2 system. Using weapons specifically built for C2W, the Germans attacked
elements of the Soviet system by air, artillery, and sabotage. The results
of these attacks were startling. Due to cross-border German sabotage efforts,
many of the Soviet units "did not receive the war alert order when
it was issued [from Moscow] on the night of 20-21 June 1941."
By 24 June, large gaps had already been torn in the Soviet communications
network, thus forcing commanders to rely on easily exploitable, unprotected,
radio networks. This, in turn, led to the successful targeting of exposed
command posts and associated units throughout the theater. These attacks,
because of their effectiveness, led Soviet commanders to prohibit the
use of radios because they might give positions away. Using C2W, the Germans
had effectively shut down the Soviet C2 system, creating an operational
environment that quickly led to a general collapse of the entire eastern
Figure 3-2. Mutual Support Within the Elements of C2W
Figure 3-3. Potential Conflicts Within C2-Attack
C2-protect is defined as--
The maintenance of effective C2 of ones own forces by turning to
friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information
to, to influence, to degrade, or to destroy the friendly C2 system.
C2-protect can be offensive or defensive. Offensive C2-protect uses the
five elements of C2W to reduce the adversary's ability to conduct C2-attack.
Defensive C2-protect reduces friendly C2 vulnerabilities to adversary
C2-attack by employing adequate physical, electronic, and intelligence
The C2-protect process can best be understood by reverse engineering
our C2-attack process. Commanders ask how the adversary can employ destruction,
EW, military deception, OPSEC, and PSYOP to disrupt our C2 systems and
decision-making process. Having wargamed the adversary's C2-attack courses
of action, the commander can develop a comprehensive protect operation,
synchronized with the main effort and C2-attack. The commander is guided
by the five principles of C2-protect.
- To gain C2 superiority. This principle includes functions such as
the unimpeded friendly processing of information, accurate development
of courses of action, valid decision making, and efficient communications
to and from subordinates.
- To stay inside the adversary's decision cycle. This is done by denying,
influencing, degrading, and/or destroying the adversary's C2 personnel,
equipment, and systems.
- To reduce the adversary's ability to conduct C2-attack.
- To reduce friendly C2 vulnerabilities using C2-protect measures. As
an example, countering the effects of adversary propaganda or misinformation
through PSYOP and PA.
- To reduce friendly interference in our C2 systems throughout the EMS
(deconfliction and coordination).
The history of the Information Age is being made now. In 1988 we saw
the first well-publicized case of a computer virus. This insidious, self-replicating
virus known as the Internet Worm penetrated the computer system
at the University of California at Berkeley, corrupting thousands of computers
on the internet. A computer emergency response team (CERT) had been created
at Carnegie Mellon University. In 1993 they had their first large event
as they put out a warning to network administrators that a band of intruders
had stolen tens of thousands of internet passwords.
When CERT began in the late 1980s, they processed less than 50 events
per year. Now they are in the thousands per year. The military is a target
of this attack. Recent stories have told of a 16-year-old who compromised
the security of more than 30 military systems and more than 100 other
systems before he was caught after a 26-day international electronic manhunt.
This experience hints at the impact a professional, well-financed effort
could have against computer nets. The lesson this evolving history is
showing us vividly today is that the information highway is creating a
great vulnerability to US forces. We are all familiar with the security
of transmitting information over a radio or telephone. But there is an
even greater weak spot now in computers, data bases, software (such as
decision-making aids and tools), servers, routers, and switches. This
vulnerability exists today and is growing in geometric proportions.
The effects of C2-protect mirror those of C2-attack. We can deny information
the adversary needs to take effective action. We can influence the adversary
not to take action, to take the wrong action, or to take action at the
wrong time. We can degrade and destroy his capabilities to perform C2-attack
against friendly forces. PSYOP and PA supports C2-protect. PSYOP can drive
a wedge between the adversary leadership and its populace to undermine
the adversary leadership's confidence and effectiveness. The Commander's
Internal Information Program (formerly the Command Information Program),
publicized by the PAO, can be extremely beneficial in countering adversary
propaganda in the US and among the deployed forces. PA specialists, working
with PSYOP and intelligence personnel, can also develop information products
that commanders can use to help protect soldiers against the effects of
adversary disinformation or misinformation.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
CA activities encompass the relationship between military forces, civil
authorities, and people in a friendly or foreign country or area. CA activities
support national policy and implement US national objectives by coordinating
with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures
in operational areas. CA secures local acceptance of and support for US
forces. CA is important to gain information dominance because of its ability
to interface with key organizations and individuals in the GIE; for example,
CA's traditional relationship with NGOs and PVOs such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
Commanders fully integrate civil-military operations (CMO) into all operations
and use CMO to influence, coordinate, control, or develop civilian activities
and civil organizations. CA activities play a command support role in
all operational environments and across the operational continuum. However,
CA operations are most common when supporting the lower end of the operational
Many CA activities require specific civilian skills. CA activities most
relevant to the GIE and supporting IO are categorized into four major
Public administration provides liaison to the civilian government.
Economics and commerce monitors government economic and commercial
agencies, normally only in a civil administration mission.
PUBLIC FACILITIES SECTION
Public communications allocates civilian communications resources
for civilian and military use and directs civil communications agencies
as required, normally only in a civil administration mission.
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS SECTION
Civil information advises, assists, supervises, controls, or operates
civil information agencies and provides TV, radio, or newspaper services.
The nature of CA activities and the need for CA personnel to develop
and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace puts them
in a favorable position to collect information. CA information collection
activities encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political,
and economic issues within the present or potential area of operations.
In their daily operations, CA personnel deal with people, equipment, and
documents that are prime sources of information. Information collected
is often important to other units' staff sections or agencies and supports
CA units are included in the information collection plan of the supported
unit. CA units report information that meets the criteria of the supported
unit's collection plan. Prime sources of information available to CA units
include, but are not limited to-
- Civilians who were housed with, catered to, or associated with enemy
- Dislocated civilians and other personnel participating in movement
control, relief, or other assistance (normally referred to appropriate
- Government documents, libraries, or archives.
- Files of newspapers or periodicals.
- Industrial and commercial records.
- Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest
related to transportation, signal, engineer, and medical fields.
The information collected can supplement the intelligence effort. US
forces need timely and accurate information and intelligence to plan missions,
secure the element of surprise, identify and develop targets, and protect
US interests across the operational continuum. CA activities are closely
tied to the intelligence functions and operations associated with the
overall tactical mission.
CA personnel are not, and must not have the appearance of being, intelligence
agents. The mission of the unit drives the intelligence cycle. As operational
planning begins, so does intelligence planning. Requirements for operational
planning are normally for finished intelligence studies, estimates, or
briefings. CA planners prepare their estimates from basic intelligence
documents that are not primarily written for CA use, such as an area study.
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation,
and processing of information.
Overall, CA elements collect information that the G2/J2 turns into intelligence.
CA forces, if used correctly, can complement the intelligence collection
process, especially HUMINT. In some cases, CA elements can also enhance
the capabilities of technical intelligence (TECHINT) or intelligence concerning
foreign technological development that may have eventual application for
Coordination and Support
All CA activities require close coordination with military forces, US
and foreign government agencies, and nonmilitary agencies with a vested
interest in military operations. CA planners must consider all available
support to ensure successful completion of the CA mission. In most cases,
CA planners directly or indirectly support the agencies assigned by law
to carry out national policy. CA planning is a command responsibility.
It must be coordinated, at a minimum, with all other staff planners. To
ensure success, coordination and cooperation with the following are vital
to the conduct of all operations: other US staffs and units, host nation
military, coalition military, US Government, foreign governments, international
agencies, PVOs, and NGOs.
Effective CA activities require close contact between the US military,
the Department of State (DOS), and other US Government agencies. Because
DOS formulates and implements foreign policy, it has a vested interest
in CA activities. In the area of CA, DOS has primary or joint responsibility
with DOD for policy. Some examples are matters involving PSYOP, PA, CA,
civil information, or other measures to influence the attitude of the
populace and plans for turning CA activities over to civilian control
at the end of hostilities.
PVOs AND NGOs
The list of PVOs and NGOs that may be found in an AO could be very large.
Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian
relief operation are registered with the USAID. Commanders must consider
the presence and capabilities of PVOs and NGOs and, when appropriate,
coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. Because many of these organizations
may have been established in the AO in advance of the Army's presence,
they may be a good source of information and knowledge.
CA, PSYOP, AND PA ELEMENTS
CA, PSYOP, and PA elements are able to use the same communications media
with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and
PSYOP personnel address local populations and enemy forces, respectively,
while PA personnel address US forces and national and international news
media. Popular American public support contributes to the success of CA.
CA and PSYOP personnel provide news and information to the local populace
on the effects of combat operations.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
Commanders can establish a CMOC to perform liaison and coordination between
the military PVOs and NGOs, as well as other agencies and local authorities.
Figure 3-4 illustrates additional GIE players
that may interact with the CMOC. Relationships with nonmilitary agencies
are based on mutual respect, communication, and standardization of support.
NGOs and PVOs have valid missions and concerns, which at times may complicate
the mission of US forces. As an example, liaison with an organization
that is caring for the sick and injured of the local populace may reveal
that human rights abuses are occurring. This information could provoke
a response by DOS officials to warn local authorities to stop such abuse
from happening, as well as increasing the level of protection for the
local population by US forces.
CA operations must be integrated into the battle plan, to include providing
for timely and accurate reporting of the operation and combating distorted
or disinformation disseminated by the adversary. The CA representative
to the IOBS-
- Represents CA concerns in IO.
- Coordinates with PA and PSYOP representatives to ensure consistency
of messages and OPSEC without compromising CA credibility.
- Prepares CA estimates, assessments, and the annex to the OPLAN/OPORD
to identify and integrate CA support.
- Coordinates the use of local resources, facilities, and support. Examples
include civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance,
or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
- Provides liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
- Advises on cultural and moral considerations.
In concert with the G2/J2 and chief of staff, the CA staff officer (G5/J5)
controls, coordinates, and integrates the CA effort at each echelon. One
essential function is to prepare and issue a CA annex as part of the unit's
OPORDs or OPLANs. See Appendix A, Annex A.
Figure 3-4. Additional GIE Players
In the early spring of 1991, in the aftermath of its humiliating defeat
at the hands of US-led coalition forces, the Iraqi Army launched a violent
attack against the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. More than half a
million refugees fled across the border into southeastern Turkey. Huddling
on exposed mountainsides, they promptly began to become ill and die from
starvation, exposure to the bitter cold, and various diseases. The world
press reported that over a thousand Kurds, especially children and the
elderly, were dying each day.
On April 5, President Bush directed US military forces to "stop
the dying." Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, then deputy
commander of US Army Europe, was placed in command of the coalition task
force Provide Comfort. Elements of several CA units, active and reserve,
were redeployed from the Persian Gulf or deployed from Fort Bragg to Turkey
under the 353d Civil Affairs Command (USAR), Bronx, New York.
In Turkey, the CA soldiers joined with 10th Special Forces Group to aid
overwhelmed relief workers already on the scene. The latter included personnel
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the US Department
of State Office of Foreign Disaster Relief, the Turkish Red Crescent,
and more than 40 different civilian humanitarian relief organizations,
all of which were attempting to care for the Kurds in 40 or more scattered
locations. Shalikashvili's greatest problem became coordinating all the
organizations' efforts with the US Air Force-the primary means for transporting
emergency supplies into the region.
At US European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, an Army Reserve
CA captain with the 353d saw a possible solution. The captain, a software
engineer in civilian life, joined with three other CA reservists in an
intensive three-week effort, first in Stuttgart and later at Incirlik
Air Base, Turkey, to design and implement a unique relief supply data
base. Their program, later named the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information
System (DALIS), combined key data from agencies on the type of aid arriving,
storage locations, and intended destinations. DALIS allowed planners to
coordinate efforts and deliver the right supplies to the right locations
at the right time. These innovative soldiers used the power of the microprocessor
to unscramble what threatened to be a logistical, diplomatic, and humanitarian
nightmare. By combining data from multiple sources, they provided vital
information that reduced redundancy and avoided maldistribution of resources
at a critical moment, saving thousands of lives. Using IO, CA soldiers
became masters of the situation and made a decisive contribution to the
success of Provide Comfort.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
Public affairs must be integrated with other battlefield functions
to achieve the desired effect of an accurate, balanced, credible presentation
of information that leads to confidence in force and the operation
PA fulfills the commander's obligation to keep the American people and
the soldiers informed. PA operations help establish the conditions that
lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations.
Army operations are of interest to the public and subject to being covered
by the media. PA is therefore a function that supports both combat and
noncombat operations and contributes to success in war and other military
The inherent challenge is for commanders to understand the dynamics of
media coverage. The media can potentially have a quick and pervasive impact
on their plans and operations. Its coverage of the development of plans
and the conduct of operations may impact and influence strategic decisions
in a more profound and immediate way than in the past. PA operations enable
commanders to effectively operate with the media. Commanders must also
have a better appreciation for the immediacy of media coverage such as
personal interviews, live versus taped reports, film versus written dispatches,
methods of transmission, and so on.
The commander's information needs are not answered by a single source,
but by a combination of many systems and functions, including the news
media. The advances in information technology provide potential adversaries
with the capability to exploit (deny, distort, degrade, or destroy) information.
The PAO must have the capability to monitor the national and international
media and identify and assess information relevant to the operation.
The missions of PA, PSYOP, and CA involve communicating information to
critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of
the operation. Information communication must be fully coordinated to
eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and ensure unity of purpose.
Planning for these operations must be synchronized, and the messages they
communicate must be truthful and mutually supportive to ensure that credibility
is not undermined and mission success is achieved.
The PAO's support to the commander is multidimensional. The PAO advises
the commander on media relations and the PA implications of current and
future operations and events. He serves as the official command spokesperson
and implements the Commander's Internal Information Program. PA focuses
on achieving an accurate, balanced, and credible presentation of timely
information that communicates the commanders perspective to enhance confidence
in the force and the operation. It provides the critical battlefield function
of media facilitation by serving as the interface between the media and
With the broad scope and initiative given to soldiers and units today
at every level, one of the primary tools the commander uses is the internal
information program. Well-informed soldiers are likely to have higher
morale and perform better. Soldiers need and want information from both
external and internal sources and are interested in the public perception
of an operation. Therefore, PA operations use various communication methods
and channels to make this information available to soldiers, other Army
audiences, and external audiences. The broad range of missions the Army
executes today are done in an environment of global visibility. Media
coverage can be pivotal to the success of the operation and achieving
national strategic goals.
Impact of Change
Every aspect of every operation may be an issue of interest to the media
and consequently to the public. Existing and emerging technology puts
military operations onto the global stage, often in real time. Soldier
actions can induce public reactions, which in turn causes NCA reactions
that impact operations without ever engaging US forces. For example, real-time
or near real-time reports of the actions of a soldier manning a roadblock,
the results of a minor skirmish, or the effects of a major combat action
become the subject of discussion. Media personalities, politicians, pundits,
critics, academics, and the general public rapidly form positions and
opinions, often in pursuit of agendas well beyond the scope and purpose
of the operation being reported. They become active participants in the
international public debate of events and issues.
Adversaries can also attack the public opinion center of gravity
and affect operations without ever engaging US forces. All Army operations
can be influenced through planned or inadvertent messages communicated
via the GIE. PA and the associated GIE addresses simultaneous effects
that are integral to all levels of war (Figure 3-5).
In the Information Age, the old separation of public information and internal
information activities are compressed.
Providing accurate, timely news, information, and entertainment reduces
distractions, rumors, fear, and confusion that could cause stress and
undermine efficient operations. Such activities contribute to team building,
morale, and unit cohesion. They enhance soldier confidence and understanding.
They contribute to ethical behavior, respect for the law of war, private
property, the rights of civilians and noncombatants, and human dignity.
Figure 3-5. Multiple Levels of Public Affairs
Coordination and Support
PA is a battlefield function and has a direct impact on the conduct of
operations. It must be fully integrated into the planning process at all
levels and across the full continuum of operations. A member of the PA
staff serves on the IOBS (see Appendix D).
The PA representative assesses media presence, capabilities, information
needs and interests, and content analysis of both traditional media and
electronic forums such as those on the internet and electronic bulletin
Finally, PA operations must be integrated into the battle plan, to include
providing for the timely and accurate reporting of the operation, combating
distorted or disinformation disseminated by the adversary. The PA representative
to the IOBS-
- Represents PA concerns in IO.
- Identifies, assesses, and advises the commander on information and
issues with PA implications.
- Reviews strategic and operational information with PA implications
such as events, missions, and propaganda.
- Coordinates with CA and PSYOP representatives to ensure consistency
of messages and OPSEC without compromising PA credibility.
- Facilitates availability of battlefield information for PA purposes,
for example, releasable visual imagery used to inform the public of
Army capabilities and accomplishments.
PA is integrated into the OPLAN/OPORD through the PA Annex. Appendix A,
Annex A provides the information to implement
PA media facilitation, news, information provisions, and force training
operations. This annex is coordinated with all staff agencies, especially
those that significantly impact the information environment, that is,
PSYOP, CA, signal, military intelligence, to ensure that PA activities
are synchronized with other activities.
At 1800 hours local (Riyadh) on 27 February 1991, the Gulf War CINCCENT
and ARCENT commanders agreed that in all likelihood no more than 24 hours
of battle remained. At 2100 hours during a briefing for the press
corps telecast live around the world, the CINCCENT reflected that opinion
and indicated that coalition forces would be pleased to stop fighting
when so ordered. The time of the briefing in CONUS (1300 hours EST) ensured
a wide audience, including the President of the United States, for at
least a portion. Reacting to the briefing, the President and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) conferred, and the CJCS called Riyadh
from the Oval Office, indicating the President's wish to stop the offensive
as soon as practicable. The CINC called his component commanders, stating
that the NCA was considering a cease-fire at 0500 (local) on 28 February.
Meanwhile, VII Corps had prepared a double envelopment movement,
passing 1st Cavalry Division around to the north of 1st Armored Division,
to crush what remained of the Iraqi Republican Guard. The corps intended
to execute the double envelopment beginning at 0500 on the 28th. In accordance
with an ARCENT warning order concerning the cease-fire, however, VII Corps
units assumed a local security posture, focusing on force protection.
An ARCENT frag order, published at 0200 and titled "Potential Temporary
Cease-Fire," reiterated the 0500 implementation time.
At 0300, CENTCOM notified ARCENT that the President had set 1200 am
eastern standard time on 28 February (0800 hours local) as the beginning
of the cease-fire time and urged the Army component to inflict the greatest
possible damage on the enemy before that hour. Accordingly, ARCENT published
a new FRAG order at 0330, calling for the resumption of offensive operations.
At 0406, the VII Corps commander ordered his division commanders
to execute the double envelopment with a new departure time of 0600, being
mindful of the 0800 cease-fire. Difficulties inherent in reordering battle
and executing the mission for maximum gain over the next four hours led
to confused communications, misunderstood commander's intent, and postwar
questions over operational and tactical execution.
In the space of 11 hours, a press conference that included unguarded
opinions about the past and future course of a war profoundly affected
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of that war. Commanders
on the front lines were neither informed nor consulted on the intent of
the public briefing, either before or after it had taken place. The ubiquitousness
and immediacy of press reportage effectively erased boundaries between
national and theater command authorities and dramatically compressed the
time between strategic decision and operational consequences.
Figure 3-6. Mutually Supported Roles of C2W, Civil Affairs, and
1 Joint Pub 3-13.1 states
that beyond the five fundamental elements of C2W "other capabilities
in practice may be employed as part of C2W to attack and protect."
The Army recognizes that C2W is the joint reference point for IO when
working with the joint staff and other services in the realm of IW. However,
the Army interprets this new paradigm more broadly and recognizes the
more comprehensive integration of other information activities as fundamental
to all IO; hence the term operations, which includes specifically C2W,
CA, and PA.