Index
Executive Summary
The development of "information warfare" presents
international legal issues that will complicate nations' efforts both
to execute and to respond to certain information warfare attacks,
specifically those using computers, telecommunications, or networks
to attack adversary information systems. Some legal constraints will
certainly apply to information warfare, either because the constraints
explicitly regulate particular actions, or because more general principles
of international law govern the effects of those actions. Nevertheless,
the novelty of certain information warfare techniques may remove them
from application of established legal categories. Furthermore, the
ability of signals to travel across international networks and affect
systems in distant countries conflicts with the longstanding principle
of national, territorial sovereignty.
First, it has not been established that information
attacks, particularly when they are not directly lethal or physically
destructive, constitute the use of "force" or "armed
attack" under such provisions as the United Nations Charter.
Such attacks thus may be legal forms of coercion even in peacetime,
and the use of conventional armed force may not be an appropriate
response to such attacks; indeed, such a response might be considered
an act of aggression. No provision of international law prevents countries
from taking many actions against other states, such as embargoes,
that inflict great hardship on those states and their populations.
Second, it is equally unclear whether some of the damage that information
warfare attacks could inflict, as by disrupting government or private
databases and systems, is the sort of damage that international humanitarian
law is intended to restrain. Finally, where attacks can be executed
across international networks, the United States (among others) may
need to rely upon foreign assistance in identifying and responding
to those who have attacked it.
The ambiguous state of international law regarding information
warfare may leave space for the United States to pursue information
warfare activities. Conversely, it may permit adversaries to attack
the United States and its systems. When considering policy options,
U.S. decision makers must balance those offensive opportunities against
defensive vulnerabilities, a balance that is beyond the scope of this
report. Nevertheless, we can discuss several, nonexclusive international
legal approaches that the United States may pursue to protect its
systems or clarify its offensive, defensive, and retaliatory options.
First, the United States could pursue international
definitions of such concepts as "force" or "armed attack"
as they apply to information warfare; such definitions could help
establish when such attacks can be conducted and how countries may
respond to them. Second, the United States could pursue international
cooperation against information warfare attacks, encouraging cooperation
in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the
attacks, particularly terrorists and other criminals. Third, the United
States may pursue agreements to protect critical information systems,
either by putting them off limits for legitimate attacks, or creating
international protection regimes for particular systems. Fourth, some
have suggested that information warfare may be an appropriate area
for arms control agreements. However, several factors, including the
novelty of many information warfare technologies and techniques, the
wide dissemination, small size, and predominantly civilian nature
of much information technology, and the danger that arms control would
not apply to non-state actors, such as terrorists, all suggest that
the pursuit of arms control would be premature at best, especially
in connection to largely nonlethal technologies in which the United
States apparently leads other nations. Despite the apparent attractiveness
of taking legal measures to either protect U.S. systems or preserve
the availability of information weapons for U.S. use, law may not
be nimble enough to keep up with technological change, and thus will
not be a substitute for vigilance, preparedness, and ingenuity.
| Index | Acknowledgments
| Preface | Executive
Summary | Chapter 1 | Chapter
2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter
4 | About the Authors | Endnotes
|