TESTIMONY
OF
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE
THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING
THE PRESIDENT'S 2005 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEBRUARY
4, 2004
INTRODUCTION
Mr.
Chairman, members of the Committee, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the
progress in the global war on terrorism, our
transformation efforts, and to discuss the
President's 2005 budget request for the
Department of Defense.
First,
I want to commend the courageous men and
women in uniform and the Department
civilians who support them.
They are remarkable - and what they
have accomplished since our country was
attacked 28 months ago is truly impressive.
In less than 2½ years, they have:
·
Overthrown
two terrorist regimes, rescued two nations,
and liberated some 50 million people;
·
Captured
or killed 45 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq-
including Iraq's
deposed dictator, Saddam Hussein;
·
Hunted
down thousands of terrorists and regime
remnants in Iraq
and Afghanistan;
·
Captured
or killed close to two-thirds of known
senior al-Qaeda operatives;
·
Disrupted
terrorist cells on most continents; and
·
Likely
prevented a number of planned terrorist
attacks.
Our
forces are steadfast and determined.
We value their service and sacrifice,
and the sacrifice of their families, who
also serve.
And
we thank the members of this Committee for
the support you have shown for the troops
during the global war on terror.
With your support, we have the finest
Armed Forces on the face of the Earth.
We
have a common challenge:
to support the troops and to make
sure they have what they will need to defend
the nation in the years ahead.
We
are working to do that in a number of ways:
·
By
giving them the tools they need to win the
global war on terror;
·
By
transforming for the 21st
century, so they will have the training and
tools they need to prevail in the next wars
our nation may have to fight - wars which
could be notably different from today's
challenges;
·
And
by working to ensure that we manage the
force properly - so we can continue to
attract and retain the best and brightest,
and sustain the quality of the all-volunteer
force.
Each
represents a significant challenge in its
own right.
Yet we must accomplish all of these
critical tasks at once.
When
this Administration took office three years
ago, the President charged us with a mission
- to challenge the status quo, and prepare
the Department of Defense to meet the new
threats our nation will face as the 21st
century unfolds.
We
have done a good deal to meet that charge.
Consider just some of what has been
accomplished:
·
We
have fashioned a new defense strategy, a new
force sizing construct, and a new approach
to balancing risks - one that takes into
account not just the risks in immediate war
plans, but also the risks to people and
transformation.
·
We
have moved from a "threat-based"
to a "capabilities-based" approach
to defense planning, focusing not only on
who might threaten us, or where, or when -
but more on how we might be
threatened, and what portfolio of
capabilities we will need to deter and
defend against those new threats.
·
We
have fashioned a new Unified Command Plan,
with
-
A
new Northern Command, that became fully
operational last September, to better defend
the homeland;
-
The
Joint Forces Command focused on
transformation; and
-
A
new Strategic Command responsible for early
warning of, and defense against, missile
attack and the conduct of long-range
attacks.
·
We
have also transformed the Special Operations
Command, expanding its capabilities and its
missions, so that it can not only support
missions directed by the regional combatant
commanders, but also plan and execute its
own missions in the global war on terror,
supported by other combatant commands.
·
We
have taken critical steps to attract and
retain talent in our Armed Forces
-- including targeted pay raises and
quality of life improvements for the troops
and their families.
·
We
have instituted realistic budgeting, so the
Department now looks to emergency
supplementals for the unknown costs of
fighting wars, not to sustain readiness.
·
We
have reorganized the Department to better
focus our space activities.
·
Congress
has established a new Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
·
We
have completed the Nuclear Posture Review,
and adopted a new approach to deterrence
that will enhance our security, while
permitting historic deep reductions in
offensive nuclear weapons.
·
We
have pursued a new approach to developing
military capabilities.
Instead of developing a picture of
the perfect system, and then building the
system to meet that vision of perfection -
however long it takes or costs - the new
approach is to start with the basics, roll
out early models faster, and then add
capabilities to the basic system as they
become available.
·
We
have reorganized and revitalized the missile
defense research, development and testing
program - and are on track to begin
deployment of our nation's first
rudimentary ballistic missile defenses later
this year.
·
We
have established new
strategic relationships, that would have
been unimaginable just a decade ago, with
nations in Central
Asia,
the Caucasus,
and other critical areas of the world.
·
We
have transformed the way the Department
prepares its war plans - reducing the time
it takes to develop those plans, increasing
the frequency with which they are updated,
and structuring our plans to be flexible and
adaptable to changes in the security
environment.
·
We
adopted a new "Lessons Learned" approach
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, embedding a
team with U.S. Central Command that not only
studied lessons for future military
campaigns, but provided real-time feedback
that had an immediate impact on our success
in Iraq.
·
We
made a number of key program decisions that
are already having a favorable impact on the
capability of the force.
Among others:
-
We
are converting 4 Trident nuclear SSBN subs
into conventional SSGN subs capable of
delivering special forces and cruise
missiles into denied areas.
-
The
Army has deployed its first Stryker brigade
to Iraq,
is completing conversion of the second, and
is replacing the Crusader with a new family
of precision artillery that is being
developed for the Future Combat System.
-
We
have revitalized the B-1 bomber fleet by
reducing its size and using the savings to
modernize the remaining aircraft with
precision weapons and other critical
upgrades.
·
We
have also undertaken a comprehensive review
of our global force posture, so we can
transform U.S.
global capabilities from a structure driven
by where the wars of the 20th
century ended, to one that positions us to
deal with the new threats of the 21st
century security environment.
·
Using
authority granted us last year, we have
established a
new Joint National Training Capability, that
will help us push joint operational concepts
throughout the Department, so our forces
train and prepare for war the way they will
fight it - jointly.
·
We
have worked with our Allies to bring NATO
into the 21st century -
standing up a new NATO Response Force that
can deploy in days and weeks instead of
months or years, and transforming the NATO
Command Structure - including the creation
of a new NATO command to drive Alliance
transformation.
·
With
the help of Congress last year, we are now
establishing a new National Security
Personnel System that should help us better
manage our 746,000 civilian employees, and
we are using the new authorities granted us
last year to preserve military training
ranges while keeping our commitment to
responsible stewardship of the environment.
The
scope and scale of what has been
accomplished is remarkable.
It will have an impact on the
capability of our Armed Forces for many
years to come.
We
will need your continued support as we go
into the critical year ahead.
Our
challenge is to build on these successes,
and continue the transformation efforts that
are now underway.
In 2004, our objectives are to:
·
Successfully
prosecute the global war on terror;
·
Further
strengthen our combined and joint war
fighting capabilities;
·
Continue
transforming the joint force, making it
lighter, more agile and more easily
deployable, and instilling a culture that
rewards innovation and intelligent
risk-taking;
·
Strengthen
our intelligence capabilities, and refocus
our intelligence efforts to support the new
defense strategy and our contingency plans;
·
Reverse
the existing WMD capabilities of unfriendly
states and non-state actors, and stop the
global spread of WMD;
·
Improve
our management of the force;
·
Refocus
our overseas presence, further strengthen
key alliances, and improve our security
cooperation with nations that are likely
partners in future contingencies;
·
Continue
improving and refining DoD's role in
homeland security and homeland defense; and
·
Further
streamline DoD processes, continuing
financial management reform and shortening
acquisition cycle times.
So,
we have an ambitious agenda.
But none of these tasks can be put
off.
Our
task is to prepare now for the tomorrow's
challenges, even as we fight today's war
on terror.
MANAGING
THE FORCE
One
effect of the global war on terror has been
a significant increase in operational tempo,
which has resulted in an increased demand on
the force.
Managing the demand on the force is
one of our top priorities.
But to do so, we must be clear about
the problem - so we can work together to
fashion the appropriate solutions.
The
increased demand on the force we are
experiencing today is likely a "spike,"
driven by the deployment of nearly 115,000
troops in Iraq.
We hope and anticipate that that
spike will be temporary.
We do not expect to have 115,000
troops permanently deployed in any one
campaign.
But
for the moment, the increased demand is real
- and we are taking a number of immediate
actions.
Among other things:
·
We
are increasing international military
participation in Iraq.
-
As
the President noted in his State of the
Union address, 34 countries now have forces
deployed in Iraq
with U.S.
forces and Iraqi security forces.
-
Japan
began deploying its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq
last month - the first time Japanese
forces have been deployed outside their
country since the end of World War II.
·
As
more international forces deploy, we have
accelerated the training of Iraqi security
forces - now more than 200,000-strong -
to hasten the day when the Iraqis themselves
will be able to take responsibility for the
security and stability of their country, and
all foreign forces can leave.
·
And
as we increase Iraq's
capability to defend itself, our forces are
dealing aggressively with the threat -
hunting down those who threaten Iraq's
stability and transition to self-reliance.
Another
way to deal with the increased demand on the
force is to add more people.
We have already done so.
Using the special powers granted by
Congress, we have increased force levels by
nearly 33,000 above the pre-emergency
authorized end strength.
·
The
Army is up roughly 7,800 above authorized
end strength;
·
The
Navy is up roughly 6,000;
·
The
Marine Corps is up some 2,000, and
·
The
Air Force is up about 17,000.
If
the war on terror demands it, we will not
hesitate to increase force levels even more
using our emergency authorities.
And because we are using emergency
powers, we have the flexibility
to reduce force levels in the period ahead,
as the security situation permits, and as
our transformation efficiencies bear fruit.
But
it should give us pause that even a
temporary increase in our force levels was,
and remains, necessary.
Think about it:
At this moment we have a force of 2.6
million people, both active and reserve:
·
1.4 million active forces,
·
876,000
in the Selected Reserve - that is the
guard and reserve forces
in units;
·
And
an additional 287,000 in the Individual
Ready Reserves.
Yet,
despite these large numbers, the deployment
of 115,000 troops in Iraq
has required that we temporarily increase
the size of the force by some 33,000.
That
should tell us a great deal about how our
forces are organized.
It
suggests strongly that the real problem is
not the size of the force, per se,
but rather the way the force has been managed,
and the mix of capabilities at our disposal.
And it suggests that our challenge is
considerably more complex than simply adding
more troops.
General
Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff,
compares the problem to a barrel of
rainwater, on which the spigot is placed too
high up.
When you turn it on, it only draws
water off the top, while the water at the
bottom can't be used.
The answer to this problem is most
certainly not a bigger rain barrel; the
answer is to move the spigot down, so that
more of the water is accessible and can be
used.
In
other words, our challenge today is not
simply one of increasing the size of the
force. Rather,
we must better manage the force we have --
to make sure we have enough people in the
right skill sets and so that we take full
advantage of the skills and talents of
everyone who steps forward and volunteers to
serve.
Consider
another example:
I keep hearing people talk about the
stress on the Guard and Reserve - that we
can't keep calling them up for repeated
mobilizations.
Well the fact is, since September
11, 2001,
we have mobilized roughly 36% of the
Selected Reserve - a little over one-third
of the available forces -- and most of those
mobilizations are concentrated in certain
skill sets.
For example:
·
We
have called up 86% of enlisted installation
security forces
·
69%
of enlisted law enforcement forces
·
67%
of enlisted air crews
·
65%
of enlisted special forces
·
56%
of civil affairs officers
·
51%
of military police officers
·
48%
of intelligence officers
But,
while certain skills are in demand, only a
tiny fraction of the Guard and Reserve -
just 7.15
percent -- have been called up more than
once since 1990.
And the vast majority of our Guard
and Reserve forces - over 60% - have not
been mobilized to fight the global war on
terror.
Indeed, I am told that a full 58% of
the current Selected Reserve - or about
500,000 troops - have not
been involuntarily mobilized in the past 10
years.
What
does that tell us?
- First,
it argues that we have too few Guard and
Reserve forces with certain skill sets
that are high demand - and too many
Guard and Reserve with skills that are
in little or no demand.
- Second,
it indicates that we need to rebalance
the skill sets within the reserve
component, and between the active and
reserve components, so we have enough of
the right kinds of forces available to
accomplish our missions.
- And
third, it suggests that we need to do a
far better job of managing the force.
That requires that we focus not
just on the number of troops available
today - though that is important -
but on transforming the forces for the
future, making sure we continue to increase
the capability of the force,
and
thus our ability to do more with fewer
forces.
And
we are working to do just that.
MASS
VS. CAPABILITY
One
thing we have learned in the global war on
terror is that, in the 21st century, what is
critical to success in military conflict is
not necessarily mass as much as it is
capability.
In
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Coalition forces
defeated a larger adversary.
They did it not by bringing more
troops to the fight, which we could have
done, but by overmatching the enemy with
superior speed, power, precision and
agility.
To
win the wars of the 21st century,
the task is to make certain our forces are
arranged in a way to ensure we can defeat
any adversary - and conduct all of the
operations necessary to achieve our
strategic objectives.
In
looking at our global force posture review,
some observers have focused on the number of
troops, tanks, or ships that we might add or
remove in a given part of the world.
I would submit that that may well not
be the best measure.
If
you have 10 of something - say ships, for
the sake of argument - and you reduce the
number by five, you end up with 50 percent
fewer of them.
But if you replace the remaining five
ships with ships that have double the
capability of those removed, then obviously
you have not reduced capability even though
the numbers have been reduced.
The
same is true as we look at the overall size
of the force.
What is critical is the capability of
the Armed Forces to project power quickly,
precisely, and effectively anywhere in the
world.
For
example, today the Navy is reducing force
levels.
Yet because of the way they are
arranging themselves, they will have more
combat power available than they did when
they had more people.
In
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Navy surged
more than half the fleet to the Persian
Gulf
region for the fight.
With the end of major combat
operations, instead of keeping two or three
carrier strike groups forward deployed, as
has been traditional Navy practice, they
quickly redeployed all their carrier strike
groups to home base.
By doing so, they reset their force
in a way that will allow them to surge over
50% more combat power on short notice to
deal with future contingencies.
The
result?
Today, six aircraft carrier strike
groups are available to respond immediately
to any crisis that might confront us.
That capability, coupled with the
application of new technologies, gives the
Navy growing combat power and greater
flexibility to deal with global crises -
all while the Navy is moderately reducing
the size of its active force.
The
Army, by contrast, has put forward a plan
that, by using emergency powers, will
increase the size of its active force by
roughly 6% or up to 30,000 troops above
authorized end strength.
But because of the
way they will do it, General Schoomaker
estimates the Army will be adding not 6%,
but up to 30% more combat power.
This
is possible because, instead of adding more
divisions, the Army is moving away from the
Napoleonic division structure designed in
the 19th century, focusing
instead on creating a 21st
century "Modular Army" made up of
self-contained, more self-sustaining
brigades that are available to work for any
division commander.
So,
for example, in the event of a crisis, the 4th
Infantry Division commander could gather two
of his own brigades, and combine them with
available brigades from, say, the 1st
Armored Division and the National Guard, and
deploy them together.
The result of this approach is
jointness within the service,
as well as between the
services.
And that jointness - combined with
other measures - means that 75% of the
Army's brigade structure should always be
ready in the event of a crisis.
The
Army's plan would increase
the number of active and reserve brigades
significantly over the next four years.
But because we will be using
emergency powers, we will have the
flexibility to reduce the number of troops
if the security situation permits - so the
Army would not be faced
with the substantial cost of supporting a
larger force as the security situation and
the efficiencies permit.
Yet
even if the security situation, and our
progress in transformation, were to permit
the Army to draw down the force, the new way
they are arranging their forces will ensure
the U.S.
still has more ground combat power - more
capability.
So
we have two different approaches:
·
In
one case, the Navy is reducing force levels
while increasing capability;
·
In
the other, the Army is increasing troop
levels - but doing so in a way that will
significantly increase its capability.
·
And
in both cases, the increase in capability of
each service will be significant.
The
point is:
our focus needs to be on more than
just numbers of troops.
It should be on finding ways to
better manage the forces we have, and by
increasing the speed, agility, modularity,
capability, and usability of those forces.
DoD
INITIATIVES
Today,
using
authorities and flexibility Congress has
provided, DoD has several dozen
initiatives underway to improve management
of the force, and increase its capability.
Among
other things:
·
We
are investing
in new information age technologies,
precision weapons, unmanned air and sea
vehicles, and other less manpower-intensive
platforms and technologies.
·
We
are working to increase
the jointness of our forces, creating
power that exceeds the sum of individual
services.
·
We
are using
new flexibility under the Defense
Transformation Act to take civilian
tasks currently done by uniformed personnel
and convert them into civilian jobs -
freeing military personnel for military
tasks.
-
This
year, we will begin to move 10,000 military
personnel out of civilian tasks and return
them to the operational force -
effectively increasing force levels by an
additional 10,000 service members in 2004.
An additional 10,000 conversions are
planned for 2005.
·
We
have begun consultations with allies and
friends about ways to transform our global
force posture to further increase
capability.
We
are also working to rebalance
the active and reserve components.
We are taking skills that are now
found almost exclusively in reserve
components and moving them into the active
force, so that we are not completely reliant
on the Guard and Reserve for those needed
skills.
And in both the active and reserve
components, we are moving forces out
of low demand specialties, such as heavy
artillery, and into high-demand capabilities
such as military police, civil affairs, and
special operations forces.
Already,
in 2003, the services have rebalanced some
10,000 positions within and between the
active and reserve components.
For example, the Army is already
transforming 18 Reserve field artillery
batteries into military police.
We intend to expand those efforts
this year, with the Services rebalancing an
additional 20,000 positions in 2004, and
20,000 more in 2005 - for a total of
50,000 rebalanced positions by the end of
next year.
We
are also working to establish a new approach
to military force management called
"Continuum of Service."
The idea is to create a bridge
between the Active and Reserve Components
- allowing both active and reserve forces
greater flexibility to move back and forth
between full-time and part-time status, and
facilitating different levels of
participation along that continuum.
Under
this approach, a Reservist who normally
trains 38 days a year could volunteer to
move to full time service for a period of
time - or some increased level of service
between full-time and his normal reserve
commitment, offering options for expanded
service that do not require abandoning
civilian life.
Similarly, an active service member
could request transfer into the Reserve
component for a period of time, or some
status in between, without jeopardizing his
or her career and opportunity for promotion.
And it would give military retirees
with needed skills an opportunity to return
to the service on a flexible basis - and
create opportunities for others with
specialized skills to serve, so we can take
advantage of their experience when the
country needs it.
For
example, Coalition forces in Iraq
need skilled linguists - so under the
Continuum of Service approach we have
recruited 164 Iraqi-Americans into a special
Individual Ready Reserve program, and expect
to deploy the first program graduates to Iraq
this spring.
The
"Continuum of Service" would allow the
Armed Forces to better take advantage of the
high-tech skills many Reservists have
developed by virtue of their private sector
experience - while at the same time
creating opportunities for those in the
Active force to acquire those kinds of
skills and experiences.
It encourages volunteerism, and
improves our capability to manage the
military workforce in a flexible manner,
with options that currently exist only in
the private sector.
We
have also been working to fix the
mobilization process.
We have worked hard over the past
year to add more refined planning tools to
the process, and make it more respectful of
the troops, their families, and their
employers.
Among other things:
·
We
have tried to provide earlier notifications,
giving troops as much notice as possible
before they are mobilized, so they can
prepare and arrange their lives before being
called up;
·
We
have worked to ensure that when they are
called up, it is for something important and
needed - and not to replace someone in
task that could wait until a contingency is
over;
·
We've
tried to ensure that the number of people
who have been recently mobilized is as small
as possible, and that as many of the forces
as possible that are remobilized or extended
are volunteers;
·
We
have tried to limit tours, and give the
troops some certainty about the maximum
length of their mobilization and when they
can expect to resume civilian life.
We are doing better, but in my
opinion, the process is still not good
enough.
And
we are working each day to make the process
better, and more respectful of the brave men
and women who make up the Guard and Reserve.
As
you can see, we have a number of initiatives
underway that we are confident will improve
the management and treatment of the Guard
and Reserve forces.
The
men and women who make up the Guard and
Reserve are all volunteers.
They signed up because they love
their country, and want to serve when the
country needs them.
A
number of you on this Committee have served
in the Guard and Reserve, as have I.
Each of us knew when we
signed up, it was not to serve one weekend a
month and two weeks active duty.
We signed up so that if war was
visited upon our country, we would be ready
to leave our work and family, and become
part of the active duty force.
Well,
on September 11th, war was
visited on our country.
Our nation was attacked - more than
3,000 innocent men, women, and children were
killed in an instant.
And at this moment, in caves and
underground bunkers half-a-world away,
dangerous adversaries are planning new
attacks - attacks they hope will be even
more deadly than the one on September 11th.
We
are a nation at war.
If we were not to call up the Guard
and Reserves today, then why would we want
to have them at all?
Why were we asking them to sacrifice
time with their families every month to
train? And
why are the taxpayers paying for postservice
benefits, including healthcare and
retirement pay, that add up to between
$250,000 and $500,000 per reservist?
This
is the purpose of the Guard and Reserve.
It is what they signed up for.
And I know that the vast majority are
eager to be in the fight - a fact born out
by the large number of those who stepped
forward and volunteered to be mobilized for
service in Iraq.
Our
challenge - our responsibility -- is to do
everything we can to see that they are
treated respectfully, managed effectively,
and that they have the tools they need to
win today's war, and to deter future wars.
We
are working to do just that -- to better
manage the force, and to transform the force
to make it more capable for the 21st
century.
Today,
with authority granted by Congress, DoD has
the flexibility to adjust troop levels, as the security situation
requires.
·
We
have authority to increase or decrease,
as need arises.
·
We
are using that authority;
and
·
We
are working on a number of new initiatives
that will allow us to better manage and
transform the force.
However,
we believe that a statutory end strength
increase would take away our current flexibility to manage the force:
·
First,
if the current increased demand turns out to
be a spike and if we are successful in the
transformation and rebalancing initiatives
underway, the Department would face the
substantial cost of supporting a larger
force when it may no longer be needed -
pay and benefits, such as lifetime
healthcare, for each service member added,
not to mention the additional costs in
equipment, facilities, and force protection.
·
Second,
if we permanently increase statutory end
strength, instead of using the already
available emergency powers, we will have to take
the cost out of our top line.
That will require cuts in other parts
of the defense budget -- crowding out
investments in the very programs that will
allow us to manage the force and make it
more capable.
None
of us has a crystal ball to see into the
future.
You have given us the authority to
adjust the size of the force, and the
flexibility to deal with unknowns.
We have been using that authority
over the past two plus years, even as we
work to implement comprehensive measures to
better manage the force.
I urge Congress to not lock us into a
force size and structure that may or may not
be appropriate in the period ahead.
Instead,
help us to support the Armed Services with
the transformational initiatives they now
have underway; help us rebalance the active
and reserve force, and give the troops more
options to contribute along an expanded
continuum of service; help us add
capability, and transform the force for the
future.
2005
BUDGET
The
President's 2005 budget requests the funds
to do just that.
The
President's first defense budgets were
designed while our defense strategy review
was still taking place.
It was last year's budget - the
2004 request - that was the first to fully
reflect the new defense strategies and
policies.
One
of the key budget reforms we implemented
last year is the establishment of a 2-year
budgeting process in the Department of
Defense - so
that the hundreds of people who invest time
and energy to rebuild major programs every
year can be freed up and not be required to
do so on an annual basis, and can focus more
effectively on implementation.
The
2005 budget before you is, in a real sense,
a request for the second installment of
funding for the priorities set out in the
President's 2004 request.
We
did not rebuild every program.
We made changes to just 5% of the
Department's planned 2005 budget, and then
only on high-interest and must-fix issues
- and then only when the costs
incurred to mitigate risks could be matched
by savings elsewhere in the budget.
The
President's 2005 budget requests
continued investments to support the
six transformational goals we identified in
our 2001 defense review:
·
First,
we must be able to defend the U.S.
homeland and bases of operation
overseas;
·
Second,
we must be able to project and sustain
forces in distant theaters;
·
Third,
we must be able to deny enemies
sanctuary;
·
Fourth,
we must improve our space capabilities and
maintain unhindered access to space;
·
Fifth,
we must harness our advantages in
information technology to link up different
kinds of U.S.
forces, so they can fight jointly; and
·
Sixth,
we must be able to protect U.S.
information networks from attack -- and to
disable the information networks of our
adversaries.
In
all, in 2005, we have requested $29 billion
for investments in transforming military
capabilities that will support each of these
critical objectives.
The
President's 2005 budget requests $10.3
billion for missile defense, including:
·
$9.2
billion for the Missile Defense Agency -
an increase of
$1.5 billion above the President's
2004 request; and
·
$1
billion for Patriot Advanced Capability-3,
the Medium Extended Air Defense System, and
other short and medium range capabilities;
The
budget also includes $239 million in funding
for accelerated development of Cruise
Missile Defense, with the goal of fielding
an initial capability in 2008;
The
2005 budget request includes critical funds
for Army Transformation, including:
·
$3.2
billion to support continued development of
the Future Combat Systems -- an increase of
$1.5 billion over the 2004 budget; and
·
$1.0
billion to fund continued deployment of the
new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, such as
the one now serving in Iraq.
We
have also requested additional funds to
strengthen intelligence, including critical
funds to increase DoD human intelligence (HUMINT)
capabilities, persistent surveillance, as
well as technical analysis and information
sharing to help us better "connect the
dots."
To
enhance our communications and intelligence
activities, we are requesting:
- $408
million to continue development of the Space
Based Radar (SBR) which will bring potent
and transformational capabilities to
joint warfighting -- the ability to
monitor both fixed and mobile targets,
deep behind enemy lines and over denied
areas, in any kind of weather.
SBR is the only system that can
provide such capability.
- $775
million for the Transformational
Communications Satellite (TSAT) which
will provide the joint warfighter
with unprecedented communication
capability.
To give you an idea of the speed
and situational awareness the TSAT will
provide, consider:
transmitting a Global Hawk
image over a current Milstar II, as we
do today, takes over 12 minutes --
with TSAT it will take less than a
second.
- $600
million for the Joint Tactical Radio
System, to provide wireless internet
capability to enable information
exchange among joint warfighters; and
The
budget also requests $700 million for Joint
Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) - a
program that consolidates all the various
unmanned combat air vehicle programs, and
focuses on developing a common operating
system.
The
budget requests $14.1 billion for major
tactical aircraft programs, including:
·
$4.6
billion for the restructured Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program;
·
$4.7
billion to continue procurement of the
F/A-22;
·
$3.1
billion to continue procurement of the
F/A-18E/F; and
·
$1.7
billion to support development and
procurement of 11 V-22 aircraft.
The
budget requests funds for Navy fleet
transformation, including $1 billion to
continue funding the new CVN-21
aircraft carrier, and $1.6 billion to
continue development of a family of 21st
century surface combatants including the DDX
destroyer, the littoral combat ship, and the
CG(X) cruiser.
We
have requested $11.1 billion to support
procurement of 9 ships in 2005.
Fiscal 2005 begins a period of
transition and transformation for
shipbuilding as the last DDG 51 destroyers
are built, and the first DD(X) destroyer and
Littoral Combat Ship are procured.
This increased commitment is further shown
in the average shipbuilding rate for fiscal
2005-2009 of 9.6 ships per year. This
will sustain the current force level and
significantly add to Navy capabilities.
In
all, the President has requested $75
billion for procurement in 2005 and $69
billion for Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation - funds that are vital to
our transformation efforts.
Another
area critical to transformation is joint
training.
Last year, Congress approved funding
to establish a new
Joint National Training Capability (JNTC),
an important initiative that will
fundamentally change the way our Armed
Forces train for 21st century
combat.
We
saw the power of joint war fighting in
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Our challenge is to bring that kind
of joint war fighting experience to the rest
of the forces, through both live and virtual
joint training and exercises.
Thanks to the funds authorized in the
2004 budget, the JNTC's initial operating
capability is scheduled to come online in
October of this year.
We have requested $191 million to
continue and expand the JNTC in 2005.
With
your help, we have put a stop to the past
practice of raiding investment accounts to
pay for the immediate operation and
maintenance needs.
The 2005 request continues that
practice.
We have requested full funding for
the military's readiness accounts,
providing $140.6 billion for Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) including $43 billion
for training and operations.
These funds are critical to
transformation - because they allow us to
pay today's urgent bills without robbing the
future to do so.
We
have
also requested funds to support pay and
quality of life improvements for the troops
-- including a 3.5 percent military base pay
raise. We
have requested funds in the 2005 budget that
will also help the Department keep its
commitment to eliminate 90% of inadequate
military family housing units by 2007, with
complete elimination projected for 2009.
And we have requested funds to
complete the elimination of out-of-pocket
housing costs for military personnel living
in private housing.
Before 2001, the average service
member had to absorb over 18 percent of
these costs.
By the end of FY 2005, it will be
zero. These
investments are important to the troops, and
also to their families, who also serve -
and deserve to live in decent and affordable
housing.
I
am also appointing a commission to conduct a
comprehensive review of military
compensation and benefits, with a view
toward simplifying and improving them.
Today, we have too many pay
categories that serve overlapping purposes,
or do no provide incentives where they are
most needed.
Before making major changes, I urge
you to allow the Department to first develop
a comprehensive and integrated set of
compensation proposals, which we will submit
to you next year.
We
are also making progress in getting our
facilities replacement and recapitalization
rate in proper alignment.
When we arrived in 2001, the
Department was replacing its buildings at a
totally unacceptable average of once every
192 years.
Today, we have moved the rate down
for the third straight year, though it is
still too high - to an average of 107
years. The
2005 budget requests $4.3 billion for
facilities recapitalization, keeping us on
track toward reaching our target rate of 67
years by 2008.
And we have funded 95 percent of
facilities maintenance requirements - up
from 93 percent in FY 2004.
The
budget also supports our continuing efforts
to transform the way DoD does business.
With the passage of the Defense
Transformation Act last year, we now have
the needed authority to establish a new
National Security Personnel System, so we
can better manage DoD's civilian
personnel.
Initial implementation will begin
this year, and cover roughly 300,000 of
DoD's 746,000 civilian employees.
Yet,
while progress has been made, the Defense
Department still remains bogged down by
bureaucratic processes of the industrial
age, not the information age.
We are working to change that.
To help us do so, we have requested
funds for a Business Management
Modernization Program that will help us
overhaul DoD management processes and the
information technology systems that support
them.
We
have also requested that Congress nearly
double Department's General Transfer
Authority, from the current limit of $2.1
billion to $4 billion, or roughly 1% of the
DoD budget.
In an age when terrorists move
information at the speed of an email, money
at the speed of a wire transfer, and people
at the speed of a commercial jetliner, it is
critical that we have the ability to shift
funds between priorities.
We
also need your continuing support for two
initiatives that are critical to 21st
century transformation:
the Global
Posture Review, and the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Commission round scheduled
for 2005.
Mr.
Chairman, I cannot overemphasize the
importance of proceeding with both of these
initiatives.
We
need BRAC to rationalize our infrastructure
with the new defense strategy, and to
eliminate unneeded bases and facilities that
are costing the taxpayers billions of
dollars to support.
And
we need the global posture review to help us
reposition our forces around the world -
so they are stationed not simply where the
wars of the 20th century ended,
but rather are arranged in a way that will
allow them to deter, and as necessary,
defeat potential adversaries who might
threaten our security, or that of our
friends and allies, in the 21st
century.
These
two efforts are inextricably linked.
It
is critical that we move forward with both
BRAC and the Global Posture Review - so we
can rationalize our foreign and domestic
force posture.
We appreciate Congress' decision to
authorize a BRAC round in 2005 - and will
continue to consult with you as we proceed
with the global posture review.
CONCLUSION
Mr.
Chairman, the President has asked Congress
for a total of $401.7 billion for fiscal
year 2005 -- an increase over last year's
budget.
Let there be no doubt:
it is a large amount of the
taxpayer's hard-earned money.
Such
investments will likely be required for a
number of years to come - because our
nation is engaged in a struggle that could
well go on for a number of years to come.
Our
objective is to ensure that our Armed Forces
remain the best trained, best equipped
fighting force in the world - and that we
treat the volunteers who make up the force
with respect commensurate with their
service, their sacrifice, and their
dedication.
Their
task is not easy:
they must fight and win a global war
on terror that is different from any our
nation as fought before.
And they must do it, while at the
same time preparing to fight the wars of
2010 and beyond - wars which may be as
different from today's conflict, as the
global war on terror is from the conflicts
of the 20th century.
So
much is at stake.
Opportunity
and prosperity are not possible without the
security and stability that our Armed Forces
provide.
The
United
States
can afford whatever is necessary to provide
for the security of our people and stability
in the world.
We can continue to live as free
people because the industriousness and
ingenuity of the American people have
provided the resources to build the most
powerful and capable Armed Forces in human
history -- and because we have been blessed
with the finest young men and women in
uniform - volunteers all - that the
world has known.
They
are courageous, they are selfless, and they
are determined.
They stand between this nation and
our adversaries, those who wish to visit
still further violence on our cities, our
homes and our places of work.
The men and women of the Armed Forces
are hunting the enemies of freedom down -
capturing or killing them in the far corners
of the world, so they will not kill still
more innocent men, women, and children here
at home.
We
are grateful to them and proud of them.
We stand ready to work with you to
ensure they are treated with the dignity
they deserve, and the respect they earn
every day.
Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd be pleased to respond to
questions.
