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Title: AirLand Battle
Voice: The joint nature of the AirLand Battle concept required coordination between the Army and the Air Force. This coordination was established through a relationship between the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command, or TAC, and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC. During the 1980s, this relationship resulted in the Army’s doctrine of AirLand battle being elevated as the Air Force’s de facto doctrine and strategy for employing airpower in conventional conflicts. Under this doctrine, the Air Force was viewed as having a supporting role in conventional warfare. Its land-centric focus relegated the Air Force to a position of exclusively providing support to surface forces. The Air Force did not articulate the contributions of airpower at the operational level of war. This failure to address airpower’s capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, left the Air Force in the role advocated by many ground commanders in the 1930s.
Action: Screen begins with a faded picture of a tank and fighter planes in the background. The following bullets are shown in support of the narration:
Action: Midway through the narration, the background and the three showing bullet points are removed and replaced by a graphic that shows how the Air Force was relegated to being support for ground forces under the Airland Battle concept, as opposed to a separate force with its own objectives. Three-fourths of the way through the narration, the graphic is faded to the background and the text is brought back to the front with the fourth bullet now showing.
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