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Title: Korean Command Structure

Voice: Although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Far East Command to provide itself with a Joint Command Staff, the command operated for the first two-and-a-half years without a joint headquarters. An examination of the Far East command structure shows that airpower was parceled out and controlled by separate entities. The Navy controlled Navy airpower, the Marines controlled Marine airpower, and several commands controlled Air Force airpower. Lessons learned during World War Two indicated that airpower is best utilized through a centralized command structure. The failure to develop a true joint theater command structure in the Korean conflict caused numerous airpower employment problems and violated the basic doctrine of centralized control of airpower. The convoluted command structure in Korea reconfirmed many of the hard-learned lessons of World War Two.

Action: Lower right screen shows a small picture of B-29s in formation in the background. An organizational chart is overlaid to demonstrate the lack of a relationship between the air power forces of each of the armed services.

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