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Title: Korean War Aftermath
Voice: In summary, the U.S. attempted to fight the Korean War the way it fought World War Two. However, circumstances surrounding this particular conflict were different. The nature of limited war precluded airpower from being used in a manner that would have led to a decisive military engagement. Furthermore, a true joint command was not empowered to provide guidance in the employment of airpower. In the end, no coherent air campaign was implemented against North Korea. In the aftermath of Korea, many leaders believed the limited war was an aberration that would not be repeated. The popular position was that the United States would never fight, nor prepare to fight, another war like Korea. Air Force leaders were only too willing to put Korea to rest and get on with the Cold War. Once again, deterrence became the watchword for the politicians and military strategists for the coming decades. The Air Force retained its stance on strategic nuclear bombing of the homeland and virtually disregarded the lessons from the limited war in Korea. When the United States entered the conventional war with Vietnam, the nuclear posture of the defense department, once again, left the Air Force ill-prepared to wage a conventional air war.
Action: Screen begins with a map of Korea towards the right side of the screen. The following bullets are shown on the left side of the screen in support of the narration:
Action: As the second bullet is shown, the map of Korea is overlapped with a ghosted image of Gen MacArthur on the right of the screen.
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