[Skip to Content | Skip to Navigation | Skip to Lesson Index]
[ASPC Main Menu | Help | Back | Next]
Lesson Index: [ Introduction | Lesson Objective | Overview | Foundations of Doctrine | Air Corps Tactical School | WWII—Europe | WWII—Japan | WWII—Nuclear Weapons | Cold War Doctrine | Massive Retaliation | Cold War Technology | Flexible Response | The SIOP | Korea | Korean Command Structure | Korean War Aftermath | Prelude to Vietnam | Objectives in Vietnam | Vietnam War 1965–1973 | Rolling Thunder—Objectives | Rolling Thunder—Restrictions | Rolling Thunder—Outcome | Command Arrangements | Route Package System | Khe Sanh | Airpower at Khe Sanh | LINEBACKER II | Post-Vietnam Assessment | AirLand Battle | Impact of AirLand Battle | Operation EAGLE CLAW | Operation URGENT FURY | Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986 | Summary | Quiz ]
Voice: Shortly after entering the Cold War, the U.S. found itself involved in the Korean conflict. Since Korea was viewed only as a small part of a larger Soviet plot to dominate the entire world, U.S. leadership decided that the resources diverted to this war would be limited. This meant that nuclear weapons would not be employed. Thus, the use of strategic airpower did not offer the solution that many thought it would. For one thing, the World War Two style strategic bombing proved ineffective in a limited offensive against a non-industrialized country. As a result, strategic bombing in Korea did not produce the effects achieved during World War Two. In addition, the command structure implemented by the Commander in Chief of Far East Command, General Douglas MacArthur, caused numerous airpower coordination problems.
Action: Screen begins with a map of Korea. Major cities of North and South Korea are indicated on the map. The following bullets are shown in support of the narration:
[Back: The SIOP | Next: Korean Command Structure]