Appendix
B
Defense
Alternatives: Forces Required
by
General Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.)
The end
of the Cold War will require a review of United States National
Security Policy and a concomitant change in our National Defense
Strategy. This strategy will respond to the changes in the world's
security environment, including the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alliances
such as NATO and NORAD, the increased and unique threat posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the widening
of the spectrum of conflict which will challenge the peace and
security of our nation and its allies.
The causes
of conflict and the modes which threats to our security interests
will take have multiplied with the end of the Cold War. The nuclear
weapons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some considerable
time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to the declining
utility of these devices. For sure there will be continuing pressure
throughout the world to eliminate the presence of nuclear weapons
in conjunction with efforts to halt the production, stockpiling,
and deployment of chemical and biological weapons. It is likely
that START II will be followed by START III and IV, as nations
who claim ownership of nuclear weapons realize ownership has a
high cost and marginal payoff. However, progress will be slow
due to the immense importance of achieving symmetry during nuclear
disarmament and the cumbersome and exacting safeguards associated
with the disarmament process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future
the threat of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will
be less likely than before. The spectrum of national security
challenges will expand as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides.
The decisive
victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq during Desert
Storm should give future aggressors of major regional conflict
cause to pause. While this does not mean that the threat of conventional
warfare has vanished, it does mean that the national leader intending
to use major conflict to achieve political aims must carefully
craft strategy that will avoid the opportunity for confrontation
with a large coalition force lead by the United States. Such a
strategy might include surprise attack; short intense military
action; the threat or use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical
weapons; advanced surveillance measures and precision munitions;
and warfare carried out on a fragmented battlefield which includes
attacks on the capitals of other nations by means of ballistic
missiles or unconventional warfare forces. This will be warfare
for which the United States is ill trained and ill equipped.
Other challenges
to the world's security will take many forms to which the military
forces of the United States can play a constructive role. These
are commonly referred to as Operations Other Than War, even though
they may include the use of force to achieve desired political
goals. They include the increasingly familiar peacemaking, peacekeeping,
show of force, and humanitarian relief efforts. Success in these
operations may well require retraining, re-equipping, or reorganizing
our military forces. Each mission should be evaluated with respect
to what is required to accomplish its unique challenges. However,
the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military forces
should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold
War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major regional
conflict.
The political
goals upon which our national security strategy should be crafted
are fairly straightforward. First, we should seek to preserve
and invigorate the role of leadership the United States has maintained
since the end of World War II, or the end of the Cold War (you
take your pick). Second, and not apart from the first goal, the
United States must be sufficiently strong to prevent or deter
use of effective military power against us. It is not inconceivable
that our so-called superpower status could be defeated in battle
by a crafty and well-prepared adversary. Witness what happened
to the powerful victors of WW II in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military
forces must be of sufficient size, configuration, and readiness
to bring a major conventional conflict to a successful termination.
It goes without saying that during this process we need to reduce
nuclear weapons to numbers that do not threaten the virtual destruction
of the world. Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place.
Fourth and lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding
to all the other tasks and functions for which the national command
authority calls upon the military. This first of challenges should
be used to define the military forces we field, how we train them,
and the methods we use to employ them.
The strategic
geographic depth the United States enjoys, bounded by two oceans
on the east and west and non-threatening nations to the north
and south, means that our nation is somewhat immune from attack,
other than by means of infiltration such as a terrorist, or from
the skies by means of long-range aircraft, and cruise or ballistic
missiles. We will require some actions and defenses which address
these threats, but the major portion of our national defense effort
must be placed on building and sustaining offensive forces for
combat in environments other than our own soil. This dictates
that our projection forces must be capable of rapidly responding
to an unforeseen crisis anywhere in the world, keeping in mind
that quick, decisive surprise favors our potential enemies. Given
that we have proven unable to predict the outbreak of conflict
in the past, these forces must also be ready at all times to carry
out combat operations in most any place. There will not be time
to modernize their equipment or train reserve force units. They
must be capable of projecting and sustaining their military power
over long distances and operating in the environment of the enemy's
choosing. Last but not least, when required, they must be capable
of decisive combat, not by attrition of the enemy force in head-to-head
combat as was our nature in past wars, but by Shock and Awe so
that conflict resolution is achieved with a maximum of success
at the minimum loss of life in the shortest time. These characteristics
for our projection force cannot be achieved easily, as the processes
that defined our Cold War doctrines, force structures, equipment,
and ways of doing business are loath to change.
The Services'
and joint requirements oversight processes that define the equipment
provided our military forces place emphasis on force structure
and the traditional roles for those forces. This inertia can freeze
our land, sea, air, and space capabilities at current or near
current levels, but may prove inadequate to carry out new strategies.
There are few incentives for a Service or the Joint Staff to reward
innovation or divestiture of roles or missions in order to change
the character and mix of land, sea, air, and space forces and
to prepare them to fight the battles we must envisage for the
twenty-first century.
For example,
the Services claim lessons learned from Desert Storm which
reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and ignore the
troublesome aspects which loom in the future and threaten our
traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim the role of
precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the threat they pose
if they are in the hands of the enemy. What would be the lessons
learned if several hundred canisters of live Sensor Fused Weapons
were released by a red force ballistic missile on the 24th Division
during a Fort Irwin engagement? Certainly there would be profound
changes in tactics, doctrine, and equipment indicated for the
surviving U.S. Army force. What if radar homing Surface to Air
Missiles were employed by the red force during a Red Flag exercise
in the Nevada desert, not using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine,
but instead using decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations
as would be used by our best and brightest if unleashed from their
stagnant doctrines? I doubt that the Air Force would be spending
millions of dollars trying to build electronic countermeasures
to hide the large number of expensive and very non-stealthy aircraft
they continue to build, such as the F-15E.
Imagine the
shock on our populace if a single cruise missile were actually
allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson aircraft carrier
during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the attendant loss of
life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range. You would think the
maritime force would reexamine the method it provides air power
from the sea, vital yet today too vulnerable.
How many times
do we hear that the space forces are configured to provide intelligence
from overhead only to find in Iraq or Bosnia that the front line
forces receive products that are old, inaccurate and altered to
keep our Soviet foes from gaining knowledge of our capabilities?
Perhaps we if we would dual hat the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency to the position of J-2, or even Commander-in-Chief of a
regional unified command, there would be vast improvements in
the tasking, evaluation, and delivery of space-derived intelligence
to regional combat forces. Then we might see full understanding
of the increasing role of space forces and implement change to
make them more relevant to our national security strategies of
the next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because
we do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces
drive our operational level strategy to force-on-force engagements
in the attrition warfare model of the last century with its attendant
causalities and destruction of equipment. George Patton's dictum
still stands that directed his troops not to die for their country,
but to get the other SOB to die for his.
Military operations
will also place less emphasis on dying and destruction. The ever-present
television camera ensures that the horrors of war are broadcast
worldwide. War's immorality should some day lead to its banishment.
Unfortunately, that day is probably a long way away. Nonetheless,
weapons of war and their employment tactics must minimize death
and destruction. This is not a call for non-lethal weapons; it
is a call for military forces to get right to the heart of the
enemy and conclude operations as rapidly and efficiently as they
possibly can given their equipment, training, and doctrine. This
means there must be wide flexibility in how they may function.
Military operations will be across a wide spectrum of warfare
and will demand flexibility. Modern war will require our military
leadership to navigate through a changing spectrum of political
constraints and ever changing political goals as each scenario
unfolds. We must make our forces capable of dampening the capacity
of the enemy to use force by controlling the conflict rapidly
even when surprised. We failed to do that tactically in Desert
Storm in the case of the SCUD missile attacks, but were fortunate
that the Iraqis were equally inept at taking political advantage
of this card they held and skillfully employed on the battlefield.
We must also look for efficiency before we even join in battle.
Defense spending
has declined as a percent of federal outlays since the end of
the Cold War. Given the leadership role the United States plays
in the world, one could think a reasonable sum to devote to defense
might be three percent of our gross national product, certainly
an amount much smaller than what an average family expends for
its security by means of life, health, causality, car, medical
insurance, and retirement benefits. Given the prospect of long-term,
constant funding, the Department of Defense could then give more
thought to how to build the most modern, efficient military force
within the dollars available. We would no longer define our forces
against some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus
to protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to build
a team based on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay big
bucks for a B-2 superstar quarterback, but you will also need
lower cost and capable riflemen or destroyers to block and tackle.
Most of all, you would reward the Service or Agency who would
innovate to provide efficiency.
Manpower has
become the driving cost in the all-volunteer military force. Investment
cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite might be high, but
it is the operations and maintenance costs that will drive how
much resources we are required to expend to gain and maintain
a given military capability. Again turning to Desert Storm,
the huge advantages of overflight precision munitions dropped
from stealth aircraft has not been understood or accepted by the
operations analysts who argue what we should build or buy next.
If it had been, would the Navy have allowed the A-12 program to
fail, would the Air Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not
eventually billions of dollars into equipping forty year old B-52s
with conventional missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy
divisions at a personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership?
Why not build a Division force equivalent using technology and
doctrine to provide a "heavy division equivalent" force
using far fewer troops featuring speed, shock, precision fire
while avoiding the manpower costs of dollars that in peacetime
include added costs for recruitment, training, and sustaining
and in war have an even greater added cost computed in blood?
Why don't we do this? The answer is because it would require rare
innovation, trust, and support from the equally intransigent federal
funding authorities. Most importantly, the Services are not rewarded
for innovation which recognizes the contributions of another Service
or Ally.
Jointness
has become an altar at which all military personnel must worship
even if they don't understand or believe. Defenders of the status
quo argue that there is merit in duplication or redundancy and
these arguments have some validity. The question becomes how much
overlap or redundancy between land, sea, air, and space forces
can the nation afford, and what is the opportunity cost to the
core competency of the land, sea, air, or space force that builds
and/or maintains the duplicative force structure. A second yet
vastly different question arises when considering the unique capabilities
a Service provides to support itself and the other services. For
example, how much the Air Force should spend on airlift forces
is not cast in terms of what the envisaged requirement is for
airlift, ton miles per day, to support the mythical scenarios.
The alternative sea, land, and space lift requirements can be
postulated; however, if the Navy, Army, or Air Force do not satisfy
those sea, land, and space lift requirement, then there is a shortfall
which will in turn generate a need for more airlift!
During Desert
Storm, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equipment arrived
by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued their first
attack in August. A majority of overland movement was provided
by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and the Army had
neither the resources nor the responsiveness to activate reserve
forces needed to meet the truck and rail support requirements
of our military forces. As a result, costly airlift was used to
move forces that should have traveled by land and sea. If added
space capabilities had been needed, there was almost no capability
for the timely launch of a satellite. Would it not be wise to
index spending on land, sea, air, and space launch on one and
other, postulate lift requirements on what the new force needs
as it innovates and slims down. The need to respond on a moment's
notice adds to the value of airlift and prepositioned ships. The
outcome though would be not to allow any of the Services to divert
general support money into core competencies and thereby shift
the jointness burden to another Service.
Innovate.
Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly the fighters
aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded. Accept the
benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized during times
of national emergency as a costly, but ready augmentation to military
supply lines that has no cost during the much longer periods of
peacetime. Our nation has other industrial capacities that also
have duplicate military capabilities. They may be 80 percent solutions,
but the cost of ownership could prohibit creation and maintenance
of a military owned and operated 100 percent solution. Iridium
telephones may not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent
of the time they will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost.
Of course, this avoids the problem we have created for ourselves
with our medieval acquisition system.
Finally, we
must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that will assure
the future force capability will be enduring. We cannot keep up
with technology using our current ways of acquiring military hardware
and training our people in how to use and maintain it. In many
areas we would be better off to throw it away when it breaks given
the low cost, durability, and reliability of modern solid state
electronics. Why train technicians? Give the troops a gold card
and a telephone number and they know how to spend money more efficiently
than do our government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do
buy not only integrates with that of other services and functions,
but that it can integrate with both older and newer equipment
designated to do the same function. The fighter aircraft secure
radio must be capable of communicating with the ground and sea
based forces command and control, as importantly it must be able
to communicate with the next generation fighter aircraft radio.
The added
dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to fight alone
in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from forming coalitions,
plus it makes up for the growing feeble force structure we maintain
in declining budget years. An enduring force must also recognize
the necessity to operate cooperatively with the forces of other
nations. This means we must more freely release our technologies
to foreign nations so that our military forces can fight side
by side, so that our deployment forces can draw from stocks of
others while our logistics system seeks to catch up with the rapidly
deployed combat force.
In the final
analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our military forces
will be for naught if there is not an equal change in the policy
side of the equation. What good are highly trained, efficient,
capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the implementing authorities
are incapable of defining principles, goals, and integrating strategies
for their employment? While this is not the province of the military
to solve, the military must understand how disjointed policy,
weak political leadership, or dysfunctional international cooperation
will preclude success on the battlefield.
Again, one
of the missed lessons of Desert Storm was the difficult
and successful integration of international leadership achieved
by the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National Command
Authorities as well as many others. It was this leadership, coupled
with the ineptness of the enemy, that covered over the failures
of our Cold War-equipped and trained forces that fought Desert
Storm. This does not take anything away from the military
victory, but it does make it difficult to glean the right lessons
for the future. Perhaps that is why we are so loathe to change
our forces at a time when change is demanded by a new strategic
environment and new threats to our national security. Defining
alternative forces in light of the changed national security environment,
goals and strategy raises two questions: what kind or mix of military
force and how much best balances the requirements and funds available.
Deep Strike:
A Key to Shock and Awe
In the world
of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign bases, all initial
responses to combat operations will be some form of deep strike.
Given strategic warning (don't bet on it) after deployment of
our military forces, Deep Strike is a term that relates to the
political boundaries or proximity to military forces. The geography
of the area of conflict will further define deep strike. But a
rule of thumb might be attacks on a target beyond range of surface-based
fires except for ballistic or cruise missiles. More important
than range is the characteristics of the Deep Strike targets.
Deep Strike targets could be classified as ones the enemy does
not wish to place at high levels of risk. They can be characterized
by the functions they perform, such as:
- Leadership
- Command
and Control (a function of leadership)
- Control
of Military Forces, especially air and space
- Logistics
and Sustainment
- National
Economic Base
- Internal
Security/Political
- National
Will, Theirs and Ours
Intelligence
used to nominate the targets for these strikes must examine the
functions and then define the physical objects or people who comprise
the system which is responsible for the successful operation of
the function. You define the system and then attack the critical
elements in order to achieve economy of force. Often these target
sets are difficult to define, as these functions often represent
the enemy's most valuable and therefore protected elements. The
intelligence collection associated with each function will vary
from target set to target set. Large, fixed infrastructure, such
as associated with an electrical grid, lends itself to traditional
reconnaissance and evaluation of technical analysis. Leadership
targets are better defined by using human intelligence and subjective
analysis. In all cases success starts with innovative intelligence
products, which has not been a hallmark of United States operations.
Such intelligence products must be examined through the eyes of
the enemy, their values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments
based on our viewpoint.
One target
system may serve the attainment of a number of different goals.
For example, attacks on the electrical power system of the enemy
may debilitate his capacity to command and control his military
forces, operate vital elements of the economy and thus degrade
the political support required to sustain the conflict. This same
target system may be attacked a variety of ways. Most common methods
would be using stealth aircraft and cruise missiles to bomb power
plants and switching centers. Areas with isolated populations
lend themselves to using special operations forces infiltrated
to destroy an isolated power grid node for transmission of energy
from one highly populated area to another. Now it is obvious that
computer signals used to command the power grid are targets as
intrusion into the enemy's control system provides the means to
simply turn off electricity to selected areas. Attacks by all
these means achieves even greater results than the sum of its
parts because enemy responses to restore electrical power will
be confused as elements such as computer intrusion are confused
with bombing destruction.
The characteristics
of value in attacking these important targets systems are simultaneity,
impunity, and timing. The greatest effect will be achieved when
the strikes are coordinated in such a manner as to inflict maximum
Shock and Awe on the enemy element. This means operations must
be coordinated and orchestrated carefully and flexibly as enemy
reaction to the attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is projected
when a combination of functions or target sets supporting a variety
of functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In order
to achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be evaluated
quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of the
system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system. Finally,
the attacker must be alert as to the interaction of the functions
as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In order
to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker must
know the current and projected effects of his strikes against
elements of the enemy's residual system. If the trick is to define
the system of targets needed to conduct successful Deep Strike,
it is even more important to know how to alter the initial plan
as the battle unfolds and timing becomes everything.
The characteristics
of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike are long range, flexibility,
precision, survivability, and speed. Cost of the operation is
a factor; however, system cost must include peacetime operations
and maintenance costs as well of the costs during actual combat.
There is also a human element in the cost of combat operations
which escalates rapidly as military force is misused. The total
cost of these operations must also address the cost of intelligence
used to support Deep Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the
most costly due to the importance of these targets to the enemy.
Alternatively, the human intelligence associated with these attacks
may be the most inexpensive since their national importance makes
them vulnerable to knowl-edgeable dissidents.
Stand-off
Deep Strike
is defined by distance, albeit relative distance. Some of the
target sets may lend themselves to circumstances beyond the nation's
control; for example, Seoul borders on North Korea. Our protective
oceans mean that likely conflict is offshore. The likelihood our
next adversary may have access to surveillance, precision munitions,
and long-range delivery systems dictates that much of our operations
will be at long range, lest our forces come under attack at their
ports, camps, and bases. There will be a need for systems capable
of projecting military force from distances of 10,000KM. A sizable
portion of the force must be able to deliver ordnance of enemy
targets from ranges in excess of 5,000KM. Launching attacks from
inside 1,000KM of the enemy forces will demand that friendly forces
be protected from attack by means of active and passive defenses
and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude achieving
levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous attack.
Survivability
Great cost
benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the attack
is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most demanding
conflict must also be flexible for other operations. Therefore,
while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed, and survivability
in reaching their target, their cost become prohibitive in large-scale
operations which endure beyond a few hours, or in smaller-scale
operations where the goals are modest and the demands on other
military forces are low. Simultaneous combat operations require
a number of expensive, expendable platforms in the opening hours
of the conflict if our response is to be timely and induce shock.
Awe is not achieved if the enemy is permitted to gain experience
in being attacked; at best you may make them numb. Alternatively,
reusable long-range survivable systems provide needed flexibility
to alter the Deep Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of
weapons systems ranges from the most valuable systems such as
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less
valuable, but useful, stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface
high trajectory fires.
Firepower
Discriminate
fires are important due to the likelihood of people and structures
being in close proximity to the desired target. It is not improbable
that the national command center is located next door to a children's
hospital.
Discriminate
fires require precision in target cordinate identification and
location. Precision does not mean "small warhead," although
there is a beneficial impact as the right amount of explosive
is placed on the target due the penalties imposed on the delivery
vehicle required to carry the warhead long distances. All operations
involving the use of firepower must also understand and evaluate
the beneficial aspects of using non-destructive elements in conjunction
with the attack to include all aspects of the so-called information
warfare.
Appendix C. Enduring Realities
and Rapid Dominance
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