Senate Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee Hearing:
Statement of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
May 14, 2003
and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to
update the Committee on our progress in strengthening the Department
of Defense for the 21st century challenges, and to discuss the
President's budget request for FY 2004-2009.
I also want
to thank you and the members for your action on the President's
emergency supplemental request for the global war on terror. Your
prompt passage of that legislation will help to provide for our
fighting men and women as they prosecute the global war on terror
in the weeks and months ahead.
are doing a superb job and deserve our thanks for their courage
and dedication to duty.
forces have accomplished in Operation Iraqi Freedom is remarkable.
They crossed hundreds of miles in Iraq-facing death squads and
dust storms-to liberate Baghdad in less than a month.
of coalition forces' tenacity and skill, the regime of Saddam
Hussein is no longer-and the Iraqi people are free to determine
their own destiny.
with the troops, I told them that what they accomplished will
go down in the history books. And it will. But at the Department,
we cannot afford to wait for history to be written. The threats
we face in this dangerous new century are emerging, often without
warning. We need to apply the lessons from the experience in Iraq
to transform how the Department and the Services organize, train
and equip for the 21st century.
learned" process for Operation Iraqi Freedom is well underway.
It will likely impact budgets and procedures, training and doctrine,
and the security of our country for some years to come. But even
now, while that process is still in its early stages, we can already
see that the experience in Iraq has validated a number of the
strategic decisions that were made in our defense reviews over
the past two years-decisions that drove the development of this
a few of those lessons:
is that speed matters. Coalition forces pressed through Southern
Iraq in a matter of weeks, racing towards Baghdad. The enemy was
unable to mount a coherent defense, use WMD, attack neighboring
countries with SCUD missiles, destroy oil wells, or blow up dams,
bridges and infrastructure-in part, we believe -- because the
coalition advance was so fast. This experience highlights the
value of capabilities that can move quickly into theater and reach
targets with speed and agility.
the importance of intelligence-and the ability to act on that
intelligence rapidly. In Iraq, using "Time Sensitive Targeting
Cells," the coalition was able to launch attacks on enemy targets,
in some cases within 20 minutes of receiving the intelligence
information. Planes taking off for bombing runs on occasion did
not receive their targeting information until they were in the
air and well on their way. Ground forces were able to stay "in
contact" with the enemy forces, and attack them with great effect,
even as those forces made every effort to avoid contact. The success
of these efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom validates the recommendation
in this budget for increased investments in command, control,
communications, intelligence, and persistent surveillance.
the importance of precision. The capabilities employed in Iraq
were discreet. One new weapon used for the first time in Iraq-a
"thermobaric" Hellfire missile-can take out the first floor of
a building without damaging the floors above, and is capable of
reaching around corners, into niches and behind walls to strike
enemy forces hiding in caves, bunkers and hardened multi-room
complexes. It went from development to deployment in less than
a year. Coalition military planners also used a sophisticated
computer model to determine the precise direction, angle of attack
and type of weapon needed to destroy a desired target, while sparing
nearby civilian facilities.
precision allowed the coalition to fight this war with unprecedented
care-protecting innocent lives while delivering devastating damage
to the Iraqi regime. There was no refugee crisis because Iraqis
felt safe to stay in the cities as long as they stayed clear of
military targets. As a result, the Iraqi people saw that this
war was being waged not against a country, or a people or a religion,
but against a regime-and that we were coming not as conquerors
but as liberators. We believe these experiences support the decision
to request increases in the 2004 budget for research, development,
testing and evaluation, and for procurement, as well as the decision
to change how we develop those new capabilities-by employing "spiral
development" to allow us to bring new weapons to the field in
months or years instead of decades.
in Iraq was the importance of joint operations. U.S. forces did
not fight as individual deconflicted services. Instead, they fought
as a truly joint force. One example is the rescue of Pfc. Jessica
Lynch-it was made possible by a joint team of Navy SEALs, Army
Rangers, Marines, and Air Force Special operators-with the help
of an Iraqi citizen. The joint war fighting experience in Iraq
supports the request in the 2004 budget to make new investments
in joint training and in joint war fighting capabilities.
was the critical importance of special operations forces. In Iraq,
special operators were the first coalition forces to hit the ground-some
of them before the war formally began-with hundreds more pouring
into Western Iraq and other regions just before the ground invasion-securing
airfields, attacking terrorist facilities and regime targets,
and taking out the regime's capability to launch attacks against
neighboring countries. These experiences-as well as the remarkable
performance of special operators in Afghanistan-support the decisions
to transform the Special Operations Command and to request needed
new investments in Special Operations in the 2004 budget.
be other important lessons as we study Operation Iraqi Freedom.
But the point is this: the 2004 budget was developed with warfare
of this kind in mind-and the experiences in fighting this war
have confirmed the decisions made in the defense review which
are reflected in the budget before the Committee today.
over the past two years, the senior civilian and military leaders
of the Department have been working to determine how DoD can best
transform to meet the changing threats of a new century. Together
we have: . Fashioned a new defense strategy. . Replaced the decade-old
two Major Theater War approach to sizing our forces with an approach
more appropriate for the 21st century. . Developed a new approach
to balancing risks that takes into account the risks in contingency
plans and also the risks to the force, to modernization and to
transformation. . Reorganized the Department to better focus our
space activities. . Adopted a new Unified Command Plan, which
establishes the new Northern Command to better defend the homeland;
a Joint Forces Command that focuses on transformation; and a new
Strategic Command responsible for early warning of, and defense
against, missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks.
. Expanded the mission of the Special Operations Command, so that
it can not only support missions directed by the regional combatant
commanders, but also plan and execute its own missions in the
global war on terror. . Worked with Allies to develop a new NATO
command structure and begin the development of a NATO Response
Force that must be able to deploy in days and weeks, instead of
months. . Taken steps to attract and retain needed skills in the
Armed Forces, with targeted pay raises and quality of life improvements.
. Reorganized and revitalized the missile defense research, development
and testing program, freed from the constraints of the ABM Treaty.
. Completed the Nuclear Posture Review, with a new approach to
deterrence that will enhance our security, while permitting historic
deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. . Moved from a "threat-based"
to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning, focusing
not only on who might threaten us, or where, or when-but also
on how we might be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities
we will need to deter and defend against those new asymmetric
threats. These are significant changes. Last year's budget-the
2003 request-was finalized just as this defense review process
was nearing completion. So while it included a top-line increase,
and made important, and long-delayed investments in readiness,
people, maintenance, and replacement of aging systems and facilities,
we were only able to begin funding some transforming initiatives
as the new defense strategy came into focus. But this year's budget-the
2004 request before you today-is the first to fully reflect the
new defense strategies and policies and the lessons of the global
war on terror. Our defense review identified six goals that drive
our transformation efforts: . First, we must be able to defend
the U.S. homeland and bases of operation overseas; . Second, we
must be able to project and sustain forces in distant theaters;
. Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary; . Fourth,
we must improve our space capabilities and maintain unhindered
access to space; . Fifth, we must harness our substantial advantages
in information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces,
so they can fight jointly; and . Sixth, we must be able to protect
U.S. information networks from attack-and to disable the information
networks of our adversaries.
2004 budget requests funds for investments that will support these
transformational goals. For example:
. For programs
to help defend the U.S. homeland and bases of operation overseas-such
as missile defense-we are requesting $7.9 billion in the 2004
budget, and $55 billion over the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP). . For programs to project and sustain forces in distant
theaters-such as the new unmanned underwater vehicle program and
the Future Combat Systems-we are requesting $8 billion in 2004,
and $96 billion over the FYDP. . For programs to deny enemies
sanctuary-such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and the conversion
of SSBN to SSGN submarines-we are requesting $5.2 billion in 2004
and $49 billion over the FYDP. . For programs to enhance U.S.
space capabilities-such as Space Control Systems-we are requesting
$300 million in 2004 and $5 billion over the FYDP. . For programs
to harness our advantages in information technology-such as laser
satellite communications, Joint Tactical Radio, and the Deployable
Joint Command and Control System-we are requesting $2.7 billion
in 2004 and $28 billion over the FYDP. . For programs to protect
U.S. information networks and attack those of our adversaries-such
as the Air and Space Operations Center-we are requesting $200
million in 2004 and $6 billion over the FYDP.
next six years, we have proposed a 30% increase in procurement
funding and a 65% increase in funding for research, development,
testing and evaluation (RDT&E) above the 2002 baseline budget-an
investment of roughly $150 billion annually.
to these increases, RDT&E spending will rise from 36% to 42% of
the overall investment budget. This shift reflects a decision
to accept some near-term risk in order to accelerate the development
of needed next generation systems.
more important transformational investments we propose is a request
for funds to establish a new Joint National Training Capability.
As we saw in Iraq, wars in the 21st century will be fought jointly.
Yet too often our forces still train and prepare for war as individual
services. That needs to change.
that U.S. forces train like they fight and fight like they train,
we have budgeted $1.8 billion over the next six years to fund
range improvements and permit more of both live and virtual joint
training-an annual investment of $300 million.
investment in transforming military capabilities in the 2004 request
is $24.3 billion, and about $240 billion over the FYDP.
not only transforming the capabilities at our disposal, but also
the way we develop new capabilities. The old way was to develop
a picture of the perfect system, and then build the system to
meet that vision of perfection, however long it took or cost.
The result was that, as technology advanced, and with it dreams
of what a perfect system could do, capabilities were taking longer
and longer to develop and the cost of systems increased again
and again -- Time is money.
approach is to start with the basics, simpler items, and roll
out early models faster-and then add capabilities to the basic
system as they become available. This is what the private sector
does-companies bring a new car or aircraft on line, for example,
and then update it over a period of years with new designs and
technologies. We need to do the same.
example, the approach to ballistic missile defense. Instead of
taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a "perfect"
shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place a
rudimentary system by 2004-one which should make us somewhat safer
than we are now-and then build on that foundation with increasingly
effective capabilities as the technologies mature.
to apply this "spiral development" approach to a number of systems,
restructured programs and new starts alike over the course of
the FYDP. The result should be that new capabilities will be available
faster, so we can better respond to fast moving adversaries and
newly emerging threats.
Even as we
accept some increased near-term risk so we can prepare for the
future, this budget also recognizes that new and unexpected dangers
will likely be waiting just over the horizon-and that we must
be flexible to face them.
That is why
the 2004 budget requests increased investments in critical areas
such as: readiness, quality of life improvements for the men and
women in uniform, and to make certain existing capabilities are
properly maintained and replenished.
next six years, the President has requested a 15% increase for
Military Personnel accounts, above the 2002 baseline budget, and
an increase in funding for family housing by 10% over the same
period. The 2004 budget includes $1 billion for targeted military
pay raises, ranging from 2% to 6.25%. Out of pocket expenses for
those living in private housing drop from 7.5% to 3.5% in 2004,
and are on a path to total elimination by 2005.
next six years, we have requested a 20% increase for Operations
and Maintenance accounts above the 2002 baseline budget. We have
proposed $40 billion for readiness of all the services and $6
billion for facilities sustainment over the same period.
should stabilize funding for training, spares and OPTEMPO, and
put a stop to the past practice of raiding the investment accounts
to pay for the immediate operations and maintenance needs, so
we stop robbing the future to pay today's urgent bills.
In our 2004
. We increased
the shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion, making good on our hope
last year that we could increase shipbuilding from five to seven
ships. . We increased the Special Operations budget by $1.5 billion,
to pay for equipment lost in the global war on terror and for
an additional 1,890 personnel. . We increased military and civilian
pay by $3.7 billion. . We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion,
including increased funds for research and development of promising
new technologies, and to deploy a small number of interceptors
beginning in 2004.
has asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion for fiscal year
2004-a $15.3 billion increase over last year's budget. That is
a large amount of the taxpayers' hard-earned money. But even that
increase only moves us part of the way.
is to do three difficult things at once:
. Win the
global war on terror; . Prepare for the threats we will face later
this decade; and . Continue transforming for the threats we will
face in 2010 and beyond.
Any one of
those challenges is difficult-and expensive. Taking on all three,
as we must, required us to make tough choices between competing
demands-which meant that, inevitably, some desirable capabilities
do not get funded. For example: . Despite the significant increase
in shipbuilding, we did not get the shipbuilding rate up to the
desired steady state of 10 ships per year. Because of planned
retirements of other ships, we will drop below a 300-ship fleet
during the course of the FYDP. The Navy is in the process of transforming,
and has two studies underway for amphibious ships and for submarines-we
have increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do not want to lock
ourselves into a shipbuilding program now until we know precisely
which ships we will want to build in the out-years. . We have
not been able to modernize our tactical air forces fast enough
to reduce the average age of our aircraft fleet. . We have had
to delay elimination of all inadequate family housing by 2007-though
we got close! . We have not fully resolved our so-called "high-demand/low
density" problems-systems like JSTARS, which, because they have
been chronically under funded in the past, will still be in short
supply in this budget. . We opted not to modernize a number of
legacy programs-taking on some near-term risks to fund transforming
capabilities we will need in this fast moving world. . We did
not achieve the level of growth in the Science and Technology
(S&T) accounts we had hoped for. Our request is $10.2 billion,
or 2.69% of the 2004 budget. . We have delayed investments to
completely fix the recapitalization rate for DoD infrastructure.
We still intend to get the rate down from 148 years to 67 years
by 2008, and we expect to accelerate facilities investments in
2006 after we have made the needed decisions with respect to the
appropriate base structure, at home and abroad. We are reviewing
our worldwide base structure, and starting the steps to prepare
for the 2005 BRAC. We want to think carefully about how best to
match our base structure and force structure.
bad news. But there is good news as well. In making those difficult
decisions, we believe we made better choices this year because
we followed the new approach to balancing risks that we developed
in last year's defense review-an approach that takes into account
not just the risks in operations and contingency plans, but also
the risks to our force - the people, and risks to modernization
and to the future-risks that, in the past, often had been crowded
out by more immediate pressing demands. The result, we believe,
is a more balanced approach and a more coherent program.
To help free
resources, the services have stepped up, and will be canceling,
slowing or restructuring a number of programs so they can invest
those savings in transforming capabilities. For example:
. The Army
came up with savings of some $22 billion over the six-year FYDP,
by terminating 24 systems, including Crusader, the Bradley A3
and Abrams upgrades and reducing or restructuring another 24,
including Medium Tactical Vehicles. The Army used these savings
to help pay for new transformational capabilities, such as the
Future Combat Systems.
. The Navy
reallocated nearly $39 billion over the FYDP, by retiring 26 ships
and 259 aircraft, and merging the Navy & Marine air forces. They
invested these savings in new ship designs and aircraft.
. The Air
Force shifted funds and changed its business practices to account
for nearly $21 billion over the FYDP. It will retire 114 fighter
and 115 mobility/tanker aircraft. The savings will be invested
in readiness, people, modernization and new system starts and
cutting edge systems like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).
In all, by
retiring or restructuring less urgent programs, we believe we
can achieve savings of some $80 billion over the FYDP-money that
will be reinvested by the services in capabilities for the 21st
We feel a
deep obligation to not waste the taxpayers' dollars. We need to
show the taxpayers that we are willing to stop doing things that
we don't need to be doing, and take that money and put it into
investments we do need.
As you consider
this budget, I am sure you will hear pleading for a number of
programs-and plausible arguments for why this or that program
should be saved or funded at a higher rate. I suspect some may
disagree with decisions that have been made, and may want to make
changes in this budget proposal. As a former Member of Congress,
I recognize that the Congress is Article 1 of the Constitution-the
President proposes and Congress disposes. But it is also important
that, as the Committee considers potential changes, it recognizes
that this budget has been crafted to balance a number of risks.
And with every change, that balance of risks is affected.
This is not
to suggest that the budget before you is perfect-no one has a
monopoly on wisdom. And there are numerous examples of instances
when Congress pressed the executive branch to invest in programs-such
as JSTARS and UAVs-that later proved critical. What I am suggesting
is that if changes are made, they be made in a coherent way-that
we talk them through, and that the decisions be made with a full
understanding of the effects they may have-not only on the program
in question, but the costs in terms of the investments in other
areas that will be put off as a result.
We have done
our best to develop this budget with what we believe has been
unprecedented transparency-providing detailed briefings to those
interested in defense here on Capitol Hill. Congress was not simply
presented with the President's budget-it was kept in the loop
as decisions were being made. I am told that the extent of consultation
from the Defense Department to the Congress this year has been
unprecedented. We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation
will continue as Congress deliberates-so that the final budget
is crafted in a way that preserves the balance of risks.
is that, with this budget, we can further transform not only our
military capabilities, but also the relationship between the Defense
Department and the Congress-by establishing a new spirit of trust
As a result
of these strategic investments and decisions, we can now see the
effects of transforming begin to unfold. Consider just some of
the changes that are taking place:
the missile defense research, development and testing program
has been revitalized and we are on track for limited land/sea
deployment in 2004-5.
the Space Based Radar, which will help provide near-persistent
24/7/365 coverage of the globe, is scheduled to be ready in 2012
. In this
budget, we believe SBIRS-High is properly funded.
we are converting 4 Trident SSBN subs into conventional SSGNs,
capable of delivering special forces and cruise missiles to denied
we are proposing to build the CVN-21 aircraft carrier in 2007,
which will include many new capabilities that were previously
scheduled to be introduced only in 2011.
instead of 1 UCAV program in development, the X-45, which was
designed for a limited mission of suppression of enemy air defense,
we have set up competition among a number of programs that should
produce UCAVs able to conduct a broad range of missions.
we are revitalizing the B-1 fleet by reducing its size and using
savings to modernize remaining aircraft with precision weapons,
self-protection systems, and reliability upgrades-and thanks to
these efforts, we are told the B-1 now has the highest mission
capable rates in the history of the program.
in place of the Crusader, the Army is building a new family of
precision artillery-including precision munitions and Non-Line-of-Sight
Cannon for the Future Combat Systems.
we have seen targeted pay raises and other reforms help retain
mid-career officers and NCOs, so that fewer of them leave the
service while still in their prime, so the country can continue
to benefit from their talent and experience.
positive changes that will ensure that our country will have the
capabilities needed to defend our people, as well as a menu of
choices from which we can select to shape the direction of the
Department, as the 21st century security environment continues
to change and evolve.
Mr. Chairman, we can't truly transform, unless we have the ability
to better manage this Department. To win the global war on terror,
our forces need to be flexible, light and agile-so they can respond
quickly to sudden changes. The same is true of the men and women
who support them in the Department of Defense. They also need
flexibility-so they can move money, shift people, and design and
buy new weapons more rapidly, and respond to the continuing changes
in our security environment.
do not have that kind of agility. In an age when terrorists move
information at the speed of an email, money at the speed of a
wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial jetliner,
the Defense Department is bogged down in the bureaucratic processes
of the industrial age-not the information age.
Some of our
difficulties are self-imposed by the Department, to be sure. Others,
however, are the result of law and regulation. Together they have
created a culture that too often stifles innovation. Consider
just a few of the obstacles we face each day: . This department
spends an average of $42 million an hour, and yet we are not allowed
to move $15 million from one account to another without getting
permission from four to six committees, a process that sometimes
takes months. . Instead of being streamlined for the fast-paced
21st century, the defense authorization bill has grown with each
passing year. Just consider the changes over my brief career:
. When I was first elected to Congress in 1962, the defense authorization
bill was one page. . The last time I was Secretary of Defense,
a quarter of a century ago, the 1977 authorization bill had grown
to 16 pages. . When I came back to the Pentagon for this second
tour, the 2001 authorization bill had grown to 534 pages. . I
can't even imagine what it will look like in another 25 years.
. Today we have some 320,000 uniformed people doing what are essentially
non-military jobs. And yet we are calling up Reserves to help
deal with the global war on terror. The inability to put civilians
in hundreds of thousands of jobs that do not need to be performed
by men and women in uniform puts unnecessary strain on our uniformed
personnel and added cost to the taxpayers. This has to be fixed.
. The department is required to prepare and submit some 26,000
pages of justification, and over 800 required reports to Congress
each year-many of marginal value, I am sure many not read, consuming
hundreds of thousands of man hours to develop, and untold number
of trees destroyed. . Despite 128 acquisition reform studies,
we have a system in the Defense Department that since 1975 has
doubled the time it takes to produce a new weapons system, in
an era when new technologies are arriving in years and months,
is this: we are fighting the first wars of the 21st century with
a Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the challenges
of the mid-20th century. We have an industrial age organization,
yet we are living in an information age world, where new threats
emerge suddenly, often without warning, to surprise us. We cannot
afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to live successfully
in this new world.
is already engaged in substantial transformation. We have reduced
management and headquarters staffs by 11 percent. We have streamlined
the acquisition process by eliminating hundreds of pages of unnecessary
rules and self-imposed red tape. And we have begun implementing
a new business management structure. These internal changes are
important-but they are not enough. We also need legislative relief.
proposal, the Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century,
would give the Department some of the needed flexibility, and
ability to more rapidly move resources, shift people and bring
new weapons systems on line more quickly, so we can adapt to changing
provisions in this legislation: . We have proposed more flexible
rules for the flow of money through the Department to give us
the ability to respond to urgent needs as they emerge. . We have
proposed elimination of some of the more onerous regulations that
make it difficult or virtually impossible for many small businesses
to do business with the Department of Defense. . We have proposed
expanded authority for competitive outsourcing so that we can
get military personnel out of non-military tasks and back into
the field. . We have proposed measures that would protect our
military training ranges so that our men and women will be able
to continue to train as they fight while honoring our steadfast
commitment to protecting the environment. . We have proposed measures
for transforming our system of personnel management, so that we
can gain more flexibility and agility in how we manage the more
than 700,000 civilians who provide the Department such vital support.
We need a performance-based promotion system for our civilian
workforce that rewards excellence-just like the one Congress insisted
on for our men and women in uniform.
U.S. government agencies, major portions of the national workforce
have already been freed from archaic rules and regulations. We
need similar relief. If the Department of Defense is to prepare
for the security challenges of 21st century, we must transform
not just our defense strategies, our military capabilities, and
the way we deter and defend, but also the way we conduct our daily
is not an event-it is a process. There is no point at which the
Defense Department will move from being "untransformed" to "transformed."
Our goal is to set in motion a process and a culture that will
keep the United States several steps ahead of potential adversaries.
To do that
we need not only resources, but equally, we need the flexibility
to use them with speed and agility, so we can respond quickly
to the new threats we will face as this century unfolds.
Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to respond to questions.