as prepared for delivery by Director of Central
Intelligence George J. Tenet at Georgetown
University: Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
5 February, 2004
I have come
here today to talk to youand to the American
peopleabout something important to our nation and central
to our future: how the United States intelligence community evaluated
Iraqs weapons of mass destruction programs over the past
decade, leading to a National Intelligence Estimate in October
I want to tell
you about our information and how we reached our judgments.
I will tell
you what I thinkhonestly and directly.
There are several
reasons to do this. Because the American people
deserve to know. Because intelligence has never been more important
to the security of our country.
As a nation,
we have over the past seven years been rebuilding our intelligencewith powerful capabilitiesthat many
thought we would no longer need after the end of the Cold War. We
have been rebuilding our Clandestine Service, our satellite and
other technical collection, our analytic depth and expertise.
Both here and
around the world, the men and women of American intelligence
support our military, to stop terrorism, and to break up networks
The risks are
always high. Success and perfect outcomes never
guaranteed. But there is one unassailable factwe will always
call it as we see it. Our professional ethic demands no less.
a difficult topic like Iraq takes patience and care. Unfortunately,
you rarely hear a patient, careful or thoughtfuldiscussion
of intelligence these days.
But these times
demand it. Because the alternativepoliticized,
haphazard evaluation, without the benefit of time and factsmay
well result in an intelligence community that is damaged, and a
country that is more at risk.
The Nature of the Business
about Iraqs weapons of mass destruction,
I want to set the stage with a few words about intelligence collection
and analysishow they actually happen in the real world. This
context is completely missing from the current public debate.
- By definition,
intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown, the deliberately
hidden. What the enemies of the United States
hope to deny, we work to reveal.
- The question
being asked about Iraq in the starkest of terms is: were we right or were we wrong.
- In the intelligence business, you are almost never completely
wrong or completely right.
in full to the question of Saddams weapons
of mass destruction. And, like many of the toughest intelligence
challenges, when the facts on Iraq are all in, we will be neither
completely right nor completely wrong.
professionals, we go where the information takes us. We fear no fact or finding, whether it bears us out or not. Because
we work for high goalsthe protection of the American peoplewe
must be judged by high standards.
turn to Iraq.
Reviewing the Record on Iraq
Much of the
current controversy centers on our prewar intelligence on Iraq,
in the National Intelligence Estimate of October
2002. National Estimates are publications where the intelligence
community as a whole seeks to sum up what we know about a subject,
what we do not know, what we suspect may be happening, and where
we differ on key issues.
asked if Iraq had chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and
means to deliver them. We concluded that in some
of these categories, Iraq had weapons. And that in otherswhere
it did not have themit was trying to develop them.
Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important aspects
of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate.
said there was an imminent threat. Rather,
they painted an objective assessment for our policymakers of a
brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build
programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests.
No one told us what to say or how to say it.
How did we
reach our conclusions? We had three streams of informationnone
perfect, but each important.
Iraqs history. Everyone knew that Iraq
had chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s and 1990s. Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and his own people
on at least 10 different occasions. He launched missiles against
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. And we couldnt forget
that in the early 1990s, we saw that Iraq was just a few years
way from a nuclear weaponthis was no theoretical program.
It turned out that we and the other intelligence services of
the world had significantly underestimated his progress. And,
finally, we could not forget that Iraq lied repeatedly about
its unconventional weapons.
- So, to
conclude before the war that Saddam had no interest in rebuilding
WMD programs, we would have had to ignore his
long and brutal history of using them.
- Our second stream of information was
that the United Nations could notand Saddam would notaccount
for all the weapons the Iraqis had: tons of chemical weapons
precursors, hundreds of artillery shells and bombs filled with
chemical or biological agents.
- We did
not take this data at face value. We did take it seriously. We
worked with the inspectors, giving them leads, helping them fight
Saddams deception strategy of cheat and retreat.
- Over eight
years of inspections, Saddams deceptionsand
the increasingly restrictive rules of engagement UN inspectors
were forced to negotiate with the regimeundermined efforts
to disarm him.
- To conclude
before the war that Saddam had destroyed his existing weapons,
would have had to ignore what the United Nations
and allied intelligence said they could not verify.
- The third
stream of information came after the UN inspectors left Iraq
in 1998. We
gathered intelligence through human agents, satellite photos,
and communications intercepts.
- Other foreign
intelligence services were clearly focused on Iraq and assisted
in the effort.
In intercepts of conversations
and other transactions, we heard Iraqis seeking to hide prohibited
items, worrying about their cover stories, and trying to procure
items Iraq was not permitted to have.
- Satellite photos showed
a pattern of activity designed to conceal movement of material
from places where chemical weapons
had been stored in the past.
- We also
saw reconstruction of dual purpose facilities previously used
to make biological
agents or chemical precursors.
- And human
sources told us of efforts to acquire and hide materials used
production of such weapons.
- And to come to conclusions before the war other than those
we reached, we would have had to ignore all the intelligence
gathered from multiple sources after 1998.
Did these strands
of information weave into a perfect picturecould
they answer every question? Nofar from it. But, taken together,
this information provided a solid basis on which to estimate whether
Iraq did or did not have weapons of mass destruction and the means
to deliver them. It is important to underline the word estimate. Because
not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute
Now, what exactly
was in the October Estimate? Why did we say
it? And what does the postwar evidence thus far show?
Before we start,
let me be direct about an important factas
we meet here todaythe Iraq Survey Group is continuing its
important search for weapons, people, and data.
some public statements, we are nowhere near 85% finished. The
men and women who work in that dangerous environment are adamant
about that fact.
Any call I make today is necessarily provisional. Why? Because
we need more time and we need more data.
So, what did our estimate say?
Lets start with missile and other delivery systems for WMD. Our
community said with high confidence that Saddam was continuing
and expanding his missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. He
had missiles and other systems with ranges in excess of UN restrictions
and was seeking missiles with even longer ranges.
What do we know today?
- Since the war, we have found an aggressive Iraqi missile program
concealed from the international community.
- In fact David Kay said
just last fall that the Iraq Survey Group discovered sufficient
evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed
to delivery system improvements that would have, if [Operation
Iraqi Freedom] had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions
placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf war.
- We have
also found that Iraq had plans and advanced design work for
missiles with ranges up to 1000 km activity
that Iraq did not report to the UN and which could have placed
large portions of the Middle East in jeopardy.
- We have confirmed that Iraq had new work underway on prohibited
solid propellant missiles that were also concealed from the UN.
- Significantly, the Iraq Survey Group has also confirmed prewar
intelligence that Iraq was in secret negotiations with North
Korea to obtain some of its most dangerous missile technology.
- My provisional
bottom line today: On missiles, we were generally
Let me turn to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The
Estimate said that Iraq had been developing an Unmanned Aerial
intended to deliver biological warfare agents. Baghdads
existing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles could threaten its neighbors,
US forces in the Persian Gulf, andif a small Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle was brought close to our shores -- the United States itself.
we know today?
The Iraq Survey
Group found that two separate groups in Iraq were working on
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle designs that were
hidden from the UN until Iraqs Declaration of December 2002. Now
we know that important design elements were never fully declared.
of intentespecially regarding the smaller Unmanned
Aerial Vehiclesis still out there. But we should remember
that the Iraqis flight-tested an aerial Biological Weapon spray
system intended for a large Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
senior Iraqi official has now admitted that their two large Unmanned
Aerial Vehiclesone developed in
the early 90s and the other under development in late 2000were
intended for delivery of biological weapons.
bottom line today: We detected the development of prohibited
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. But the
jury is still out on whether Iraq intended to use its newer, smaller
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to deliver biological weapons.
Let me turn to the nuclear issue. In
the Estimate, all agencies agreed that Saddam wanted nuclear weapons. Most
were convinced that he still had a program and if he obtained fissile
material he could have a weapon within a year. But we detected
no such acquisition.
- We made
two judgments that get overlooked these daysWe
said Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon and, probably
would have been unable to make one until 2007 to 2009.
- Most agencies believed that Saddam had
begun to reconstitute his nuclear program, but they disagreed
on a number of issues such as which procurement activities
were designed to support his nuclear program. But let me be
clear, where there were differences, the Estimate laid out
the disputes clearly.
So what do
we know today?
- David Kay
told us last fall that
we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government
officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still
wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.
- Keep in
mind that no intelligence agency thought that Iraqs
efforts had progressed to the point of building an enrichment
facility or making fissile material. We said that such activities
were a few years away. Therefore it is not surprising that
the Iraq Survey Group has not yet found evidence of uranium enrichment
prohibited aluminum tubes a debate laid out
extensively in the Estimate and one that experts still argue
over -- were they for uranium enrichment or conventional weapons? We
have additional data to collect and more sources to question.
- Moreover, none of the tubes found in Iraq so far match the
high specification tubes Baghdad sought and may have never received
in the amounts needed. Our aggressive interdiction efforts may
have prevented Iraq from receiving all but a few of these prohibited
- My provisional
bottom line today: Saddam did not have a nuclear
weapon. He still wanted one and Iraq intended to reconstitute
a nuclear program at some point. But we have not yet found clear
evidence that the dual-use items Iraq sought were for nuclear
reconstitution. We do not know if any reconstitution efforts
had begun but we may have overestimated the progress Saddam was
Let me turn to biological weapons. The
Estimate said that Baghdad had them, and that all key aspects
of an offensive programResearch
and Development, production, and weaponizationwere still
active, and most elements were larger, and more advanced than before
the first Gulf war.
believed that Iraq had lethal Biological Weapon agents, including
which it could quickly produce
and weaponize for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers,
and covert operatives. But we said we had no specific information
on the types or quantities of weapons, agent, or stockpiles at
we know today?
- Last fall,
the Iraq Survey Group uncovered (quote) significant
informationincluding research and development of Biological
Weapons -applicable organisms, the involvement of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service (IIS) in possible Biological Weapons activities, and
deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq
after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused
on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated
quickly to surge the production of Biological Weapon agents. (unquote)
- The Iraq Survey Group found a network
of laboratories and safehouses controlled by Iraqi intelligence
and security services that contained equipment for chemical
and biological research and a prison laboratory complex possibly
used in human testing for Biological Weapon agents, that were
not declared to the UN.
also appears that Iraq had the infrastructure and talent to resume
productionbut we have yet to find that it actually did
so, nor have we found weapons. Until we get to the bottom of
the role played by the Iraqi security serviceswhich were
operating covert labswe will not know the full extent of
- Let me
also talk about the trailers discovered in Iraq last summer. We initially concluded that they resembled trailers
described by a human source for mobile biological warfare agent
production today. There is no consensus within our community
over whether the trailers were for that use or if they were used
for the production of hydrogen. Everyone agrees they are not
ideally configured for either process, but could be made to work
in either mode.
- To give
you some idea of the contrasting evidence we wrestle with,
some of the
Iraqis involved in making the trailers were
told they were intended to produce hydrogen for artillery units.
- But an
Iraqi artillery officer says they never used these types of
systems and that
the hydrogen for artillery units came
in canisters from a fixed production facility. We are trying
to get to the bottom of this story.
- And I must
tell you that we are finding discrepancies in some claims made
human sources about mobile Biological Weapons
production before the war. Because we lack direct access to
the most important sources on this question, we have as yet been
unable to resolve the differences.
- My provisional
bottom line today: Iraq intended to develop Biological Weapons. Clearly, research and development work was
underway that would have permitted a rapid shift to agent production
if seed stocks were available. But we do not know if production
took place and just as clearlywe have not yet found
Before I leave
the Biological Weapons story, an important fact you must remember. For years the UN searched unsuccessfully for
Saddams Biological Weapons program. His son-in-law, Husayn
Kamil, who controlled the hidden program defected, and only then
was the world able to confirm that Iraq indeed had an active and
dangerous biological weapons program. Indeed, history matters in
dealing with these complicated problems. While many of us want
instant answers, this search for Biological Weapons in Iraq will
take time and patience.
Let me now turn to Chemical Weapons. We
said in the Estimate with high confidence that Iraq had them. We also believed, though
with less certainty, that Saddam had stocked at least 100 metric
tons of agent. That may sound like a lot, but it would fit in
a few dorm rooms on this campus.
the community was skeptical about whether Iraq had restarted
agent production. Sources had reported
that Iraq had begun renewed production, and imagery and intercepts
gave us additional concerns.
But only when
analysts saw what they believed to be satellite photos of shipments
materials from ammunition sites did they
believe that Iraq was again producing Chemical Weapon agents.
What do we know now?
- The work
done so far shows a story similar to that of his biological
program. Saddam had rebuilt a dual-use industry. David
Kay reported that Saddam and his son Uday wanted to know how
long it would take for Iraq to produce chemical weapons. However,
while sources indicate Iraq may have conducted some experiments
related to developing chemical weapons, no physical evidence
has yet been uncovered. We need more time.
- My provisional bottom line today: Saddam had the intent and
the capability to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical
weapons production. However, we have not yet found the weapons
Ive now given you my provisional bottom lines. But it is
important to remember that Estimates are not written in a vacuum. Let
me tell you some of what was going on in the fall of 2002. Several
sensitive reports crossed my desk from two sources characterized
by our foreign partners as established and reliable.
from a source who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle
- Iraq was not in
possession of a nuclear weapon. However,
Iraq was aggressively and covertly developing such a weapon. Saddam
had recently called together his Nuclear Weapons Committee irate
that Iraq did not yet have a weapon because money was no object
and they possessed the scientific know how.
- The Committee
members assured Saddam that once the fissile material was in
a bomb could be ready in just 18-24 months.
The return of UN inspectors would cause minimal disruption because,
according to the source, Iraq was expert at denial and deception.
same source said Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons and
that equipment to produce
insecticides, under the oil-for-food program, had been diverted
to covert chemical weapons production.
source said that
- Iraqs weapons of last resort were "mobile
launchers armed with chemical weapons which would be fired
at enemy forces and Israel."
scientists were dabbling with biological
weapons, with limited success,
the quantities were not sufficient to constitute a real
A stream of reporting from a different sensitive source with access
to senior Iraqi officials said he believed:
- production of chemical and biological weapons was taking
- that biological agents were easy to produce and to hide,
chemicals were also being produced at dual-use facilities.
stated that a senior Iraqi official in Saddam's inner circle
a result of the UN inspections, Iraq knew the
inspectors weak points and how to take advantage of them. The
source said there was an elaborate plan to deceive inspectors and
ensure prohibited items would never be found.
Now, did this
information make a difference in my thinking? You
bet it did. As this and other information came across my desk,
it solidified and reinforced the judgments we had reached and my
own view of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein and I conveyed this
view to our nation's leaders.
Could I have
ignored or dismissed such reports at the time? Absolutely
Continuing the Search
Now, I am sure
you are asking: Why havent we found the weapons? I
have told you the search must continue and it will be difficult.
As David Kay
reminded us, the Iraqis systematically destroyed and looted forensic
before, during and after the war. We
have been faced with the organized destruction of documentary and
computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and
companies suspected of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts
is one of deliberate rather than random acts. Iraqis who have volunteered
information to us are still being intimidated and attacked.
things in Iraq is very tough. After the first
Gulf War, the U.S. Army blew up chemical weapons without knowing
it. They were mixed in with conventional weapons in Iraqi ammo
My new Special
Advisor, Charles Duelfer, will soon be in Iraq to join Major
Dayton commander of the Iraq
Survey Group to continue our effort to learn the truth. And,
when the truth emerges, we will report it to the American public no
REVIEWING OUR WORK
of Central Intelligence, I have an important responsibility. I
have a responsibility to evaluate our performance -- both our operational
work and our analytical tradecraft.
So what do I think about all of this?
Based on an assessment of the data we collected over the past
10 years, it would have been difficult for analysts to come to
any different conclusions than the ones reached in October of 2002.
our business that is not good enough.
We must constantly review the quality of our work. For example,
the National Intelligence Council is reviewing the Estimate line-by-line.
ago we also commissioned an internal review to examine the tradecraft
our work on Iraqs weapons of mass destruction. And,
through this effort we are finding ways to improve our processes. For
example, we recently discovered that relevant analysts in the community
missed a notice that identified a source we had cited as providing
information that, in some cases was unreliable, and in other cases
was fabricated. We have acknowledged this mistake.
to these internal reviews, I asked Dick Kerr, a former Deputy
of Central Intelligence, and a team of retired
senior analysts to evaluate the Estimate.
Among the questions that we as a Community must ultimately reflect
- Did the history of our work, Saddam's deception and denial,
his lack of compliance with the international community, and
all that we know about this regime cause us to minimize, or ignore,
- Did the fact that we missed how close Saddam came to acquiring
a nuclear weapon in the early 1990s cause us to over-estimate
his nuclear or other programs in 2002?
- Did we carefully consider the absence of information flowing
from a repressive and intimidating regime, and would it have
made any difference in our bottom line judgments?
- Did we
clearly tell policy makers what we knew, what we didnt
know, what was not clear, and identify the gaps in our knowledge?
We are in the process of evaluating just such questions - and
while others will express views on the questions sooner, we ourselves
must come to our own bottom lines.
I will say
that our judgments were not single threaded. UN inspections
served as a baseline and we had multiple strands of reporting from
signals, imagery, and human intelligence.
After the UN
inspectors left Iraq in 1998, we made an aggressive effort to
Iraq. Our record was mixed.
While we had
voluminous reporting, the major judgments reached were based
on a narrower
band of data. This is not unusual.
by necessity, a strong reliance on technical data, which to be
sure was very
valuable, particularly in the imagery
of military and key dual use facilities, on missile and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle developments--and in particular on the efforts of
Iraqi front companies to falsify and deny us the ultimate destination
and use of dual use equipment.
We did not
have enough of our own human intelligence.
We did not
ourselves penetrate the inner sanctum - our agents were on the
of WMD activities, providing some useful
information. We had access to émigrés and defectors with more
direct access to WMD programs and we had a steady stream of reporting
with access to the Iraqi leadership come to us from a trusted foreign
partner. Other partners provided important information.
What we did
not collect ourselves, we evaluated as carefully as we could. Still, the lack of direct access to some of these sources
created some risk such is the nature of our business.
To be sure, we had difficulty penetrating the Iraqi regime with
human sources, but a blanket indictment of our human intelligence
around the world is simply wrong.
We have spent
the last seven years rebuilding our clandestine service. As
Director of Central Intelligence, this has been my highest priority.
When I came
to the CIA in the mid-90s our graduating class of case officers
low. Now, after years of rebuilding
our training programs and putting our best efforts to recruit the
most talented men and women, we are graduating more clandestine
officers than at any time in CIAs history.
It will take
an additional five years to finish the job of rebuilding our
but the results so far have been obvious:
- A CIA spy
led us to Khalid Sheik Muhammad, the mastermind of Al Qa'idas
September 11th attacks.
- Al Qa'idas operational chief in the Persian Gulf, Nashiri
the man who planned an executed the bombing of the USS COLE was
located and arrested based on our human reporting.
- Human sources
were critical to the capture of Hambali, the chief terrorist
South Asia. His organization killed hundreds
of people when they bombed a nightclub in Bali.
So when you
hear pundits say that we have no human intelligence capability
know what they are talking about.
Beyond Iraq: The
Larger Role of US Intelligence
that I address these misstatements because the American people
must know just how reliable American intelligence
is on the threats that confront our nation.
talk about Libya where a sitting regime has volunteered to dismantle
Weapons of Mass Destruction programs.
This was an
American and British intelligence officers understood the Libyan
- Only through
intelligence did we know each of the major programs Libya had
- Only through intelligence did we know when Libya started its
first nuclear weapon program, and then put it on the backburner
- Only through
intelligence did we know when the nuclear program took off
again. We knew because we had penetrated Libyas
foreign supplier network.
- And through
intelligence last fall when Libya was to receive a supply of
partswe worked with foreign partners
to locate and stop the shipment.
- Intelligence also knew that Libya was working with North Korea
to get longer-range ballistic missiles.
- And we learned all of this through the powerful combination
of technical intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work,
operational daring, and, yes, the classic kind of human intelligence
that people have led you to believe that we no longer have.
- This was
critical when the Libyans approached British and US intelligence
dismantling their chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons programs. They came to the British and American
intelligence because they knew we could keep the negotiations
- And in
repeated talks, when CIA officers were the only official Americans
Libya, we and our British colleagues made clear
just how much insight we had into their WMD and missile programs.
- When they
said they would show us their SCUD-Bs, we
said fine but we want to examine your longer range SCUD-Cs.
- It was
only when we convinced them we knew Libyas nuclear
program was a weapons program, that they showed us their weapon
- As should
be clear to you, Intelligence was the key that opened the door
Let me briefly
mention Iran. I cannot go into detail. I want
to assure you that recent Iranian admissions about their nuclear
programs validate our intelligence assessments. It is flat wrong
to say that we were surprised by reports from the Iranian
opposition last year.
And on North Korea, it was patient analysis of difficult-to-obtain
information that allowed our diplomats to confront the North Korean
regime about their pursuit of a different route to a nuclear weapon
that violated international agreements.
One final spy story:
Last year in
my annual World Wide Threat testimony before Congress in open
I talked about the emerging threat from private
proliferators, especially nuclear brokers.
- I was cryptic
about this in public, but I can tell you now that I was talking
A.Q. Khan. His network was shaving
years off the nuclear weapons development timelines of several
states including Libya.
Now, as you
know from the news coming out of Pakistan, Khan and his network
dealt a crushing blow, with several of his
senior officers in custody. Malaysian authorities have shut down
one of the networks largest plants. His network is now answering
to the world for years of nuclear profiteering.
What did intelligence have to do with this?
discovered the extent of Khans hidden network. We
tagged the proliferators. We detected the network stretching
from Pakistan to Europe to the Middle East to Asia offering its
wares to countries like North Korea and Iran.
with our British colleagues we pieced together the
picture of the network, revealing its subsidiaries, scientists,
front companies, agents, finances, and manufacturing plants
on three continents.
Our spies penetrated the network through
a series of daring operations over several years. Through
this unrelenting effort we confirmed the network was delivering
such things as
illicit uranium enrichment centrifuges.
And as you heard me say on the Libya case, we stopped deliveries of
I welcome the
Presidents Commission looking into proliferation. We
have a record and a story to tell and we want to tell it to those
willing to listen.
I came here
today to discuss our prewar estimate on Iraq and how we have
Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction
programs for well over ten years. It is absolutely essential to
do so openly and honestly.
I have argued
for patience as we continue to learn the truth. We are no where
near the end
of our work in Iraq, we need more
time. I have told you where we are and where our performance can
at the end of the day have a duty to inform and warn. They
did so honestly and with integrity when making judgments about
the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein.
Simply assessing stacks of reports does not speak to the wisdom
experienced analysts brought to bear on a difficult and deceptive
But as all
these reviews are underway, we must take care. We
cannot afford an environment to develop where analysts are afraid
to make a call. Where judgments are held back because analysts
fear they will be wrong. Their work and these judgments make vital
contributions to our nations security.
I came here today also to tell the American people that they must
know that they are served by dedicated, courageous professionals.
It is evident on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is evident by their work against proliferators.
And it is evident by the fact that well over two thirds of al-Qa'ida's
leaders can no longer hurt the American people.
We are a community that some thought would not be needed at the
end of the Cold War.
We have systematically been rebuilding all of our disciplines
with a focused strategy and care.
for the future is based on achieving capabilities that will provide
kind of intelligence the country deserves. The
President has ensured that this will be the case.
We constantly learn and improve.
And at no time, will we allow our integrity or our willingness
to make the tough calls be compromised.