
29 April 2004
State Dept. Issues Overview of Terrorist Threat in the Americas
New report says terrorist threat in region was low in 2003
The threat of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere in 2003 remained
low compared to other regions of the world, the U.S. State Department
says in a new report.
Despite that, the hemisphere is not exempt from exploitation by
groups that would use the region to seek "safe haven, financing,
illegal travel documentation, or access to the United States" through
narcotics and migrant-smuggling routes, the State Department said
in "Patterns of Global Terrorism," a report released
April 29. The report covers the year 2003.
The State Department indicated that on a country-by-country level
for the Western Hemisphere, the domestic terrorist threat was particularly
serious in Colombia, and to a lesser degree in Peru.
In Colombia, the State Department said that the Andean country
continued to experience terrorist violence as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other narco-terrorist groups
sought to respond to an "increasingly aggressive Colombian
military posture with wanton terrorist attacks against civilians
in Colombia's urban areas."
But on the positive side, the State Department said that under
the leadership of Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe, the Colombian
military, police and intelligence forces scored significant victories
in 2003 against the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) terrorist groups.
The State Department said the Colombian government began to strike
hard at the FARC's leadership ranks with targeted operations, and
spurred a sharp increase in desertions from the terrorist ranks;
the government also initiated peace talks and a pilot demobilization
program with large elements of the AUC, invigorated anti-kidnapping
efforts, and eradicated record levels of coca and poppy cultivation
to cut off sources of funding for narco-terrorists.
On the subject of Peru, the State Department said that the country
continued to take many actions against both international and domestic
terrorism in 2003. Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo made combating
terrorism one of the keynotes in his annual state-of-the-nation
speech in July, pledging increased funding for security forces
and social development projects in areas where the domestic Shining
Path (Sendero Luminoso) terror group operates, the State Department
said.
The foreign and defense ministers of Peru "consistently condemned
terrorism and implemented counterterrorism actions," the State
Department said, adding that on August 15, 2003, Peru signed the
Asuncion Declaration in which several South American nations committed
themselves to support Colombia in its ongoing struggle against
terrorism and drug trafficking. In addition, Peru ratified in June
2003 the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism.
Another danger zone was the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay, where the three countries converge, the State Department
said. That area has "long been characterized as a regional
hub" for the terrorist Hizballah and Hamas groups to engage
in fundraising activities, the Department said. But the area also
is used for arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document
and currency fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement
of pirated goods, the State Department said, adding that "there
continued to be reports in 2003 of an al-Qaida presence" in
the tri-border area, but "these reports remained uncorroborated
by intelligence and law-enforcement officials."
Overall, "political will" to combat terrorism remained
steady in the Western Hemisphere during 2003, although efforts
to update essential counterterrorism legislation were "uneven," the
State Department said.
In its report, the State Department added that "operational
counterterrorism capacity and expertise" remains lacking in
many countries in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, the State Department
said that "countries in the region actively continued efforts
to fortify hemispheric border and financial controls to prevent
or disrupt terrorism-related activities on their territories to
the greatest extent possible."
Cuba, one of the world's seven state sponsors of terrorism, is
discussed in the "state sponsorship" section of the overall
report. In that section, the State Department said that Cuba remained
opposed to the U.S.-led coalition prosecuting the global war on
terrorism and continued to provide support to designated foreign
terrorist organizations and to host several terrorists and dozens
of fugitives from U.S. state and federal justice.
The State Department said that Cuba allowed Basque Fatherland
and Liberty (ETA) members to reside in the country, and provided
support and safe haven to members of the FARC and the ELN.
Following is the text of the report's overview of the Western
Hemisphere:
(begin text)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE -- "Patterns of Global Terrorism
2003"
Western Hemisphere Overview
The international terrorism threat in the Western Hemisphere remained
low during 2003 compared to other world regions. Even so, the region
is by no means exempt from exploitation by groups that would use
it to seek safe haven, financing, illegal travel documentation,
or access to the United States via long-established narcotics and
migrant-smuggling routes. The domestic terrorist threat remained
high in Colombia and to a lesser extent in Peru.
Political will to combat terrorism remained steady in the Western
Hemisphere during 2003, although efforts to update essential counterterrorism
legislation were uneven. In addition, operational counterterrorism
capacity and expertise remains lacking in many states in the hemisphere.
Nevertheless, countries in the region actively continued efforts
to fortify hemispheric border and financial controls to prevent
or disrupt terrorism-related activities on their territories to
the greatest extent possible.
The Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Committee
Against Terrorism (CICTE, Spanish-language acronym) -- a body under
the Organization of American States -- continues to set the standard
among regional institutions through its effort to institutionalize
the long-term international campaign against terrorism, according
to the chair of the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee in
March 2003. During a very active year under strong Salvadoran leadership,
CICTE convened the first meeting of its National Points of Contact
in Washington in July with the aim of fostering working-level contact
and information sharing throughout the year. In July 2003, the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism entered into force
after six countries deposited their instruments of ratification
(Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and
Peru). As 2004 commenced, another two states -- Panama and Venezuela
-- ratified the convention. During its successful Fourth Regular
Session in Montevideo, OAS member states agreed to enhance CICTE's
mandate to effectively address threats to seaport and aviation
security, as well as cybersecurity.
Money flowing to Islamic terrorist organizations continued to
be a primary counterterrorism focus. To strengthen the efforts
of friends in the region to disrupt potential terrorism fundraising
activity, the United States continued to actively support the development
of the "Three Plus One" (3+1) Counterterrorism Dialogue
with partners Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Meetings in Brasilia
and Asuncion during 2003 led to new agreements on mutual capacity
building in the areas of border security and financial controls.
The United States looks forward to participating in 3+1 -- sponsored
programs during 2004 and to hosting the next senior-level meeting
in Washington in the fall.
Governments throughout the Southern Cone were active on the legal
front against suspected terrorist activity. Uruguay, Paraguay,
and Brazil took action to convict or extradite suspected international
terrorists, either on terrorism or on criminal charges. The Argentine
investigating judge in the suspected Hizballah bombing of the Argentine-Jewish
cultural center in 1994, which killed 86 people, issued international
arrest warrants for several Iranian Government officials who were
assigned to Buenos Aires at the time, as well as the head of Hizballah's
terrorist wing. Efforts to extradite the former Iranian ambassador
to Argentina failed for a lack of evidence, and by the end of the
year, the investigating judge had been replaced by order of an
Argentine court. The trial, which began in 2001 against 20 Argentines
believed to form the local connection in the bombing, continued
into 2004.
Colombia continued to experience terrorist violence as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other narco-terrorist groups
sought to respond to an increasingly aggressive Colombian military
posture with wanton terrorist attacks against civilians in Colombia's
urban areas. The El Nogal Club car bomb in February that killed
36 innocent civilians drew a swift condemnation from the OAS. Also
in February, the FARC murdered American civilian contractor Thomas
Janis and Colombian soldier Luis Alcides Cruz, whose plane had
made an emergency crash landing in southern Colombia while conducting
a counter-drug mission. Three other American aircraft crew members
were taken hostage by FARC elements in the incident and at publication
press time remained in FARC hands, along with many others, mostly
Colombian hostages.
Under President Uribe, the Colombian military, police, and intelligence
forces scored significant victories in 2003 against the FARC, National
Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC) terrorist groups. They began to strike hard at the FARC's
leadership ranks with targeted operations, spurred a sharp increase
in desertions from the terrorist ranks, initiated peace talks and
a pilot demobilization program with large elements of the AUC,
invigorated anti-kidnapping efforts, and eradicated record levels
of coca and poppy cultivation to cut off sources of funding for
narco-terrorists.
The United States continued a long-term cooperative relationship
with Canada by hosting another session of the Bilateral Consultative
Group on Terrorism. Canada also was an active participant in the
second Top Officials terrorist incident response exercise in May,
and both countries are committed to supporting the capacity-building
work of the Counterterrorism Action Group assistance donor countries,
created by the G-8 countries in 2003.
The United States worked closely with several countries in the
region, particularly Mexico, to respond in a coordinated, prudent
fashion to emerging aviation security threats affecting American
and foreign citizens. The U.S. Government also has worked cooperatively
with Mexico to implement a security program on its border with
the United States.
Cuba, one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism, is discussed
in the state sponsorship portion of this report.
Bolivia
There were no significant acts of international terrorism in Bolivia
in 2003. The Government signed the Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism in 2002, but it has not yet been ratified. Bolivia's
financial investigations unit actively collaborated with the U.S.
Embassy to share information about possible terrorist-linked financial
transactions, prevent the abuse of Bolivian financial institutions
by terrorists, and enhance the monitoring and enforcement of financial
networks.
Despite many resource constraints, corruption, political tampering,
and lack of expertise in handling sophisticated international investigations,
the Government made progress in several -- mostly domestic -- terrorist-related
cases. Most significantly, suspected National Liberation Army --
Bolivia organizer Colombian Francisco Cortes and two Bolivian radical
members of the Movement Towards Socialism party were arrested in
2003 and charged with espionage, terrorism, and subversion after
they were found with weapons and organizational materials about
guerrilla networks and plans to instigate violent revolution in
Bolivia.
On 15 August, the Government of Bolivia signed the Asuncion Declaration
in which several South American nations committed themselves to
support Colombia in its ongoing struggle against terrorism and
drug trafficking.
Bolivia's Government maintained the policy of forcibly eradicating
illegal coca plants to help ensure that Bolivia does not revert
to its former status as a major source of cocaine, which is the
major economic underpinning of terrorism in the Andes. Militant
illegal coca growers (cocaleros) are thought to be responsible
for various domestic terrorism events, and there is concern that
they may have foreign help to make their attacks more deadly. On
12 November, eight counternarcotics agents were kidnapped and beaten
in the Yungas region. Similarly, in the Chapare region five members
of the security forces were killed and 25 wounded through November
by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that exploded during coca
eradication operations. Cocaleros are suspected of planting devices
that have become increasingly sophisticated and may indicate outside
technical assistance. Three cocaleros have been indicted for planting
IEDs; others are suspected of sniper ambushes of security forces.
Likewise, in the Chapare, in 2003 prosecutors made progress in
the case of torture, rape, and murder of policeman David Andrade
and his wife in 2000, and several cocaleros have been indicted
or implicated in the crimes.
Bolivia is party to all 12 United Nations conventions and protocols
related to terrorism and to one OAS counterterrorism convention.
Chile
The Government of Chile is a consistent and active supporter of
U.S. counterterrorism efforts and has taken an active interest
in the activities of Islamic extremists connected to the Triborder
area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and their potential links
to the Free Trade Zone in Iquique, Chile. Chile continued its active
support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in various international
forums. Chile holds the chair of the U.N.'s al-Qaida and Taliban
sanctions committee and worked to improve the effectiveness of
the sanctions. With Chile hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
in 2004, President Ricardo Lagos listed security as the first of
four points on which Chile would focus -- in particular, security
of trade and travel. In the Asuncion Declaration signed 15 August,
President Lagos joined other South American leaders in condemning
terrorism and drug trafficking. The declaration also expressed
solidarity with Colombia in its domestic fight against terrorism.
Similarly, Chile's U.N. Ambassador noted current U.N. sanctions
were only partially enforced in many countries, and some were reluctant
to submit terrorists' names to the U.N. The Foreign Minister added
that Chile was "a country willing to assume challenges and
responsibilities."
Chilean law enforcement agencies were consistently cooperative
in investigating links to international terrorism. The ability
to conduct counterterrorist activities is hampered by a requirement
that any investigation be directly related to prosecutable criminal
offenses. The plainclothes investigations police (PICH-roughly
equivalent to the FBI) continued to investigate several terrorism-related
cases, but no prosecutions were developed.
The Chilean Congress passed a new money-laundering statute in
September 2003 to cover terrorist finances and expand the Government's
ability to freeze and seize assets. The new provisions have yet
to be applied in a criminal case, and it remains unclear how the
statute will operate in practice or how swiftly Chile will be able
to react against terrorist assets identified by other governments
or international institutions. The same legislation created a Financial
Analysis Unit (UAF) to investigate suspicious transactions reported
by financial institutions, but the Constitutional Tribunal ruled
some of the UAF provisions to be unconstitutional. The Government
is working to restore the UAF's ability to operate effectively
and constitutionally. The current extradition treaty between Chile
and the United States is more than 100 years old and has never
been updated. Efforts are under way to explore negotiation of a
new and viable extradition treaty.
Although no incidents of explicit terrorism occurred in Chile
in 2003, terrorist-like tactics were employed in several cases,
particularly in protest to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. For example,
a protester threw a Molotov cocktail at the U.S. Embassy perimeter
wall in March to protest policy on Iraq. Carabineros (uniformed
police) guarding the embassy quickly arrested the perpetrator.
Although two suspicious letters containing white powder delivered
to the embassy and a telephonic bomb threat were all determined
to be hoaxes, the Carabineros supplied HAZMAT teams and bomb-sniffing
dogs in short order. In March, small bombs targeted Bank of Boston
branches in Santiago and a BellSouth office in Concepcion. A similar
bomb exploded at the Court of Appeals in Temuco. There were no
injuries, no claim of responsibility, and no arrests made in any
of the blasts. In March and April, the Chilean-American Binational
Centers were subject to violent protests, some vandalism, and bomb
threats by Chileans opposed to U.S. policy in Iraq.
In August 2002, Chile requested the extradition from Brazil of
former Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front leader Mauricio Hernandez
Norambuena to finish his sentence for the murder of rightwing Chilean
Senator Jaime Guzman in 1991. Hernandez escaped prison in 1996.
The Brazilian Attorney General ruled that Hernandez should be extradited
to Chile, but the Brazilian Supreme Court must approve the decision
-- a process said to be in the final stages and likely to result
in extradition in the near term.
Chile is a party to all of the 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism.
Colombia
Colombia fully comprehends the devastation caused by terrorism
as it has faced large-scale domestic terrorism for several decades.
From the day the Uribe Administration assumed office in August
2002, it has demonstrated a firm resolve to combat terrorists of
all stripes. The Government of Colombia is supportive of U.S. Government
efforts to combat terrorist acts, target terrorist finances, and
cooperate with extradition requests. Colombia continued to speak
out forcefully and often against terrorist organizations throughout
the year.
Colombia continued its struggle against the country's three main
terrorist groups -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- all of which were redesignated by the
United States as Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2003. In June,
the United States also designated the FARC and the AUC as significant
foreign narcotics traffickers under the Kingpin Act.
Colombia suffered many large and small domestic terrorist attacks
throughout 2003. Car bombs, kidnapping, political murders, the
indiscriminant use of landmines, and economic sabotage were common
occurrences. Some of the more noteworthy examples included the
FARC's car bombing in February of Bogota's El Nogal Club killing
34 and wounding more than 160; the FARC hostage-taking of three
U.S. contractors and killing of another American and a Colombian
when their plane crashed near Florencia, Caqueta Department (the
three Americans remain hostages) in February; a "house bomb" in
February in Neiva that killed 16 and wounded more than 40; an ELN
kidnapping in September of eight foreign tourists visiting archaeological
ruins (one escaped, two were released in November, and five were
freed in December); a grenade attack in November by the FARC that
wounded Americans in Bogota's restaurant district; and attacks
in November and December utilizing antitank rockets. Both FARC
and the ELN continued attacks against the country's infrastructure
and oil pipelines in 2003, albeit at reduced levels. Many more
attacks were thwarted nationwide through excellent intelligence
and security work.
In 2003, President Uribe increased military pressure on illegal
armed groups and implemented an ambitious national security strategy
including securing passage of antiterrorism legislation, promoting
the desertion and reintegration of former illegal armed militants,
and engaging the AUC in demobilization negotiations. President
Uribe submitted to Congress two important draft laws with significant
public security implications -- the Antiterrorism Bill and a Conditional
Parole Bill. The Anti-Terrorism Bill was approved by Congress on
10 December and allows the Government to conduct wiretaps, search
residences, and detain suspects more easily. The conditional parole
legislation is connected to the broader peace process and would
provide the Government the means to waive prison sentences in exchange
for demobilization. Through legislation and with possible U.S.
assistance, the Government of Colombia expected the voluntary surrender
of more than 4,000 illegal armed militants in 2003 (an increase
of 84 percent over 2002) and the demobilization in December of
some 1,000 paramilitaries with more planned for 2004.
Overall, Colombia's ambitious security strategy produced substantial
achievements in 2003. Murders decreased by 16 percent, assassinations
of trade unionists were down 68 percent, and kidnappings were 30
percent lower in 2003. The military completed the early phases
of its national defense plan with significant successes, including
the killing of at least five midlevel FARC commanders in Cundinamarca
Department near Bogota. In January 2004, the most senior FARC official
ever to be captured was detained by Ecuadorian National Police
in Quito and deported to Colombia. Another major accomplishment
was the restoration of a Government presence in every one of the
country's 1,098 municipalities (county seats) by the end of 2003.
Colombia cooperated fully in blocking terrorist assets. A Colombian
Financial Information and Analysis Unit, created in 2001 following
the model of the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (FinCEN),
collaborated closely with the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control. U.S. Anti-Terrorist Assistance in August inaugurated
a school for Colombian military and police who specialize in anti-kidnapping.
Kidnappings are sources of revenue for the FARC and the ELN and
a means to influence the political process. The Government also
took steps at self-improvement by expanding an antiterrorism unit
in the Prosecutor General's Office. Lessons learned in the counternarcotics
fight have led to better prosecutions of those who attack the nation's
infrastructure, particularly in oil-producing areas.
Colombia made significant strides in combating narco-trafficking,
a primary source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that coca cultivation could
be reduced by aerial eradication as much as 50 percent in 2003.
Eradication programs targeting coca and opium poppies continued
throughout the year. In August, the United States resumed the Air
Bridge Denial Program that assists Colombia in intercepting aircraft
trafficking in narcotics and illegal weapons.
Colombia was particularly cooperative in cases and investigations
involving Americans, such as the hostage taking of Defense Department
civilian contractors in February and the grenade attack in Bogota
in December. The U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship continues
to be one of the most successful in the world; Colombia extradited
67 persons to the United States in 2003. In May 2003, Colombia
extradited Nelson Vargas Rueda, the first FARC member to be extradited
to the United States. Vargas is accused of the kidnapping and murder
of three American NGO activists working with Colombian indigenous
groups in northern Colombia in 1999. Colombia also extradited Gerardo
Herrera Iles, accused of kidnapping foreign and U.S. oil workers,
to the United States in 2003.
Colombia has signed eight of the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and is a party to six.
Ecuador
The Government of Ecuador supports the war on terrorism in all
international and bilateral forums. Quito signed the Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism but has not yet ratified it. President
Gutierrez, during a visit in February to the United States, expressed
his intent to make Ecuador a solid ally in the war on terrorism.
Nevertheless, resource constraints, a lack of training, and sometimes-corrupt
governmental organizations impede progress in the battle against
both international and regional terrorism. Ecuador's judicial system,
which is susceptible to outside pressure and corruption, adjudicated
no terrorist cases in 2003.
At the working level, the National Police (ENP) supported U.S.
counterterrorrism initiatives throughout 2003 and into 2004. In
January 2004, the most senior FARC official ever to be captured
was detained by Ecuadorian National Police in Quito and deported
to Colombia in a concrete example of Ecuador's will to defeat the
narco-terrorist threat in the region. In March, the ENP arrested
an Ecuadorian citizen who detonated two bombs at a Government office
in Guayaquil. A string of weapons seizures in Ecuador demonstrated
the arms trade in Ecuador supporting Colombian narco-terrorists.
In August 2003, the police broke up an arms smuggling operation
supplying Colombian narco-terrorists. In September, an Army captain
was arrested and accused of providing operational information to
the Colombian FARC. In addition, a DEA-trained counter-drug policeman
apprehended an Italian citizen trying to board Continental Airlines
in Quito with explosives and a firearm in November.
Although no terrorist-related incidents were launched from Ecuador,
its porous borders, endemic corruption, and well-established illegal
migrant networks make it an attractive entry point for would-be
terrorists. Ecuador has been historically lax in securing the northern
border from Colombian illegal armed groups. Only in recent years
has the Government recognized the threat from Colombia and undertaken
serious efforts to impose control along the border. Ecuador's security
forces disrupted several Colombian narco-terrorist encampments
in Ecuador from late 2002 through October 2003. Although the FARC
still operates in the area, it realizes now that Ecuador is less
hospitable than before.
The Government of Ecuador banking superintendency acts swiftly
to include suspect individuals and groups into bank lookout databases
upon receipt of terrorism finance information. In 2003, Ecuador
ordered two pharmacies closed because of information from the United
States that proved ties to Colombian drug-trafficking organizations.
Unfortunately, due to ineffective enforcement, the companies were
still operating at the end of the year.
Ecuador is party to 10 of the 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism.
Peru
Peru continued to take many actions against both international
and domestic terrorism in 2003. President Toledo made combating
terrorism one of the keynotes in his annual state-of-the-nation
speech in July, pledging increased funding for security forces
and social development projects in areas where the domestic Shining
Path (Sendero Luminoso-SL) operates. The Foreign and Defense Ministers
consistently condemned terrorism and implemented counterterrorism
actions. On 15 August, the Government of Peru signed the Asuncion
Declaration in which several South American nations committed themselves
to support the Government of Colombia in its ongoing struggle against
terrorism and drug trafficking. Peru ratified the Inter-American
Convention against Terrorism in June 2003.
A director for the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), established
in 2002, was named in April 2003. He expanded the staff and began
receiving reports of suspicious activity from banks. The U.S. Embassy
worked closely with the FIU to provide a technical advisor and
funding for the acquisition of hardware and software.
The Peruvian Congress created a national security system designed
to improve intergovernmental cooperation and strengthen prosecutors.
Meanwhile, the National Police (PNP) Directorate of Counterterrorism
continued its strong cooperation with the Embassy in counterterrorism
activities. The United States did not make any extradition requests
to Peru for terrorists in 2003.
Peru has aggressively prosecuted terrorist suspects. In January,
the Constitutional Tribunal overturned numerous provisions in Fujimori-era
decree laws on terrorism, in conformance with decisions of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Military court convictions
in approximately 2,000 cases were vacated and reviewed for retrial.
President Toledo issued decree legislation revising Peru's antiterrorism
legislation in line with the Constitutional Tribunal decision and
established the procedures for reviewing and retrying terrorism
cases. Some were dropped because sentences are nearing completion,
and some 750 cases are sufficiently strong to be retried beginning
in 2004.
In September, four Chilean defendants were retried and convicted
of membership in the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and participation
in an attack on the Peru-North American Cultural Institute and
a kidnapping-murder in 1993.
Eight members of SL remain in custody awaiting trial. They were
arrested for complicity in the bombing in March 2002 across the
street from the U.S. Embassy that killed 10 people. Peru successfully
sought the extradition from Spain of Adolfo Hector Olaechea, a
suspected SL official, in 2003. He was released from custody but
ordered to remain in Peru while the public prosecutor prepares
the case for trial.
The most serious SL event in 2003 was the kidnapping of 68 workers
and three police guards in June at a Camisea gas pipeline project
in Toccate, Ayacucho Department. The SL abandoned the hostages
two days after the kidnapping and a rapid military response; a
ransom may or may not have been paid to the SL. The PNP also broke
up many SL camps and captured many members and leaders in 2003.
More than 200 indigenous people held in virtual slavery by the
SL were released in the process. Terrorist incidents fell to 96
by late October, projecting an annual rate of 115 or a 15-percent
drop from the 134 kidnappings and armed attacks in 2002. Six military
and three self-defense personnel were killed in 2003, while six
SL militants were killed and 209 captured.
Peru is a party to all 12 of the conventions and protocols relating
to terrorism.
Triborder Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay)
The Triborder area (TBA) -- where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay
converge -- has long been characterized as a regional hub for Hizballah
and HAMAS fundraising activities, but it is also used for arms
and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, document and currency
fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of pirated
goods. Although there continued to be reports in 2003 of an al-Qaida
presence in the TBA, these reports remained uncorroborated by intelligence
and law-enforcement officials.
In December, a high-level interagency delegation from the United
States attended a special meeting in Asuncion, Paraguay, of the
Tripartite Commission of the Triple Frontier, a security mechanism
established by the three TBA countries in 1998. This "Three
Plus One" meeting (the three TBA countries plus the United
States) serves as a continuing forum for counterterrorism cooperation
and prevention among all four countries. At the December talks,
the four countries exchanged current views on terrorism prevention
in the region and on measures to enhance cooperation, including
proposals to establish a joint regional intelligence center, convene
a conference of "Three Plus One" partner financial intelligence
units in the first half of 2004, deepen border security cooperation,
and increase dialogue among national prosecutors responsible for
counterterrorism cases. The parties concluded that available information
did not substantiate reports of operational activities by terrorists
in the TBA. However, international terrorist financing and money
laundering in the area remained an area of primary concern. A concerted
effort will be made to develop legitimate economic activity in
the TBA.
Argentina continued to express strong support for the global war
on terrorism and worked closely with the United Nations, the OAS,
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR -- Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay,
and associate members Bolivia and Chile), and the United States
to ensure full implementation of existing agreements. The Argentine
Government, executive branch officials, and the Central Bank were
extremely cooperative and responded quickly and effectively to
ensure the assets of terrorist groups identified by the United
States or U.N. would be blocked if detected in Argentine financial
institutions. Though no leads were found in 2003, the Government
of Argentina continually expressed its willingness to freeze assets
in compliance with international agreements.
Diplomatically, Argentina cooperated fully in 2003 with all significant
international counterterrorism efforts in the U.N., the OAS, and
the "Three Plus One" Counterterrorism Dialogue to strengthen
security and search for terrorist support networks, especially
in the Triborder area. Argentina worked within existing regional
and international forums to elicit strong condemnations of terrorism
and support to organizations combating terror. Argentina maintains
an active role in the OAS CICTE, established in response to an
Argentine initiative in the 1990s. Multilateral Meetings -- including
high-level U.S. officials with counterterrorism responsibilities
-- were held in Brasilia in May 2003 and Asuncion in December to
focus on the Triborder.
On 15 August, the Government of Argentina signed the Asuncion
Declaration in which several South American nations committed themselves
to support the Government of Colombia in its ongoing struggle against
terrorism and drug trafficking.
Although there were no acts of international terrorism in Argentina
in 2003, investigations into the bombing of the Israeli Embassy
in 1992, in which 29 persons were killed, and the bombing in 1994
of the Argentina-Israeli Community Center (AMIA), in which 86 persons
were killed, continued. The trials of 20 suspects in the AMIA bombing
-- of whom 15 are former police officers -- continued throughout
2003 and appeared to be nearing a close. The judge in the AMIA
case indicted 12 Iranian officials, including diplomats stationed
in Buenos Aires in 1994 and one Lebanese official believed to head
Hizballah's terrorist wing. Although no countries requested terror-related
extraditions from Argentina, Argentina requested the extradition
of the former Iranian ambassador to Argentina from the United Kingdom,
indicted in the AMIA case. The request was denied due to a lack
of evidence presented by Argentina.
Proposed antiterrorism legislation has long provoked an active
debate over the balance between civil rights and the need to address
potential terrorism. As a result, there has been little progress
toward the passage of new comprehensive antiterrorism legislation.
Nevertheless, the Government strongly and consistently deplored
terrorist acts when they occurred. In 2003, both ex-President Duhalde
and his successor, Nestor Kirchner, publicly condemned terrorism
and reiterated Argentina's support for the war on terrorism. Despite
the lack of new legislation, Argentina continued to improve intragovernmental
coordination on counterterrorism to enhance the framework within
which better international cooperation can occur.
Argentina has signed all of the 12 conventions and protocols relating
to terrorism and is a party to 10.
Brazil has extended practical, effective support to U.S. counterterrorism
actions. The Government of Brazil has been cooperative in checking
records provided by U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and financial
agencies regarding hundreds of terrorist suspects. For example,
Brazilian authorities actively followed up on press reports in
March 2003 that al-Qaida operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed visited
the Triborder area in 1995.
Although the Government of Brazil is politically committed to
the fight against terrorism, lack of resources and training sometimes
hamper its response. The United States continues to work with Brazil
in several bilateral, multilateral, and international forums to
identify groups and individuals suspected of possible ties to terrorist
activity. Brazil hosted a working group meeting under the 3+1 Counterterrorism
Dialogue in May, which focused on technical cooperation related
to the fight against terrorism financing. Technical specialists
from the United States are fully engaged with elements of the Brazilian
Government responsible for combating terrorism, including the Federal
Police. Brazil is willing and increasingly capable of monitoring
domestic financial operations and has effectively utilized its
Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF). Bilateral assistance
and training of the COAF began in 1998 and emphasized upgrades
to its database in 2003.
Since taking office in January 2003, President Lula da Silva has
vigorously condemned terrorism and called the attack on the U.N.
building in Baghdad "the insanity of perpetrators of terrorism." In
January, Brazil backed the CICTE with a financial contribution.
In July 2003, Brazil approved legislation criminalizing the financing
of terrorist activities. On 15 August, the Government of Brazil
signed the Asuncion Declaration in which several South American
nations committed themselves to support Colombia in its ongoing
struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking.
In addition, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies passed a bill on
cybercrime -- to prevent terrorist hack attacks -- that awaits
Senate consideration.
There are no significant impediments to the prosecution or extradition
of suspected terrorists by Brazil. The Brazilian extradition law
prohibits the extradition of Brazilian citizens but allows very
measured and careful consideration for the extradition of naturalized
citizens (for previous crimes and drug trafficking only) and foreigners
(not for ideological or political crimes). In November 2003, Brazil
extradited Assad Ahmad Barakat to Paraguay. Barakat was arrested
in June 2002 by Brazilian authorities in Foz do Iguacu, Parana,
in the TBA acting on a Paraguayan extradition request related to
criminal charges. Barakat is a naturalized Paraguayan of Lebanese
origin who lived in the TBA for approximately seven years and was
known to have been involved in political and financial activities
supporting Hizballah organizations.
In February 2003, Brazil declined a request from Colombia to designate
the FARC as a terrorist organization. Brazil stated it did not
maintain a formal list of terrorist groups but condemns specific
terrorist actions taken by the FARC and other groups. Brazilian
security forces continued to investigate possible links between
domestic criminal groups -- especially drug traffickers and those
with no discernible political agenda -- that sometimes employed
terrorist tactics. In 2003, organized crime groups at times shut
down Rio de Janeiro tourist and business areas and systematically
attacked police stations in Sao Paulo to weaken Government resolve
to combat them. At the end of 2003, Brazil had increased it readiness
to confront domestic groups and reinforce against FARC incursions
in northwestern Brazil. The Brazilian Army augmented its Special
Forces capabilities -- including counterterrorism -- and began
compiling data on global terrorist threats to enhance its ability
to respond.
Brazil signed all of the 12 U.N. conventions on terrorism and
is a party to nine.
Paraguay has aided the global Coalition against terrorism by ratifying
a number of international treaties and conventions and actively
supporting counterterrorism at the U.N. and the OAS. On 15 August,
Paraguay signed the Asuncion Declaration in which several South
American nations committed themselves to support the Government
of Colombia in its ongoing struggle against terrorism and drug
trafficking.
On 30 October, Congress ratified the CICTE. Paraguay is also strengthening
its domestic legal framework to deal more effectively with terrorism
and ancillary support activities. Paraguay hosted the successful
third meeting of the 3+1 Counterterrorism Dialogue in December
2003.
Paraguay has determined that there is a domestic problem with
fundraising that might support terrorist causes. It looks to assistance
from other governments -- including the United States -- to help
it fight the problem. The primary impediment to the prosecution
of suspected terrorists is the absence of an antiterrorist law.
Without such a law, the Government is forced to prosecute suspected
terrorist fundraisers for tax evasion or illegal financial activities.
Paraguay is drafting new legislation to strengthen its anti-money
laundering regime, as well as a specific antiterrorism bill. Both
bills are fully backed by the Duarte Administration and expected
to go before Congress in 2004.
Despite the lack of specific antiterrorist statutes, Paraguay
actively prosecuted known terrorist fundraisers. Two prominent
Hizballah fundraisers, Sobhi Fayad and Ali Nizar Dahroug, were
sentenced to lengthy prison terms in November 2002 and August 2003,
respectively. Paraguay's antiterrorist police continued to provide
excellent support for the arrest and prosecution of terrorists.
A major accomplishment in 2003 was the successful extradition request
for Hizballah fundraiser Assad Ahmad Barakat from Brazil on charges
of tax evasion. Additional charges of bank fraud are being considered
but will require Brazil's acquiescence under the terms for extradition.
Paraguay is a party to six of the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and is a signatory to an additional
five.
Uruguay
The Government of Uruguay is supportive of international terrorist
measures undertaken in a variety of international forums and cooperates
fully with the United States. Uruguayan officials routinely condemned
terrorism and specific terrorist acts. Although Uruguay is supportive
of the global Coalition against terrorism, it lacks the resources
to play a significant role. However, it does provide troops to
international peacekeeping forces in Africa and the Middle East.
Uruguay is active in the OAS CICTE and has seconded personnel
to its Executive Secretariat. Uruguay hosted the annual CICTE meeting
in Montevideo in January 2004 and assumed the CICTE chairmanship
through 2004. Uruguay is a member of a MERCOSUR permanent working
group on terrorism along with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Bolivia. The group facilitates cooperation and information
sharing among countries fighting terrorism and places special emphasis
on the Triborder area and the Uruguay-Brazil border. Uruguay is,
likewise, active in counterterrorism groups in the Rio Group and
in the OAS.
On 15 August, the Government of Uruguay signed the Asuncion Declaration
in which several South American nations committed themselves to
support the Government of Colombia in its ongoing struggle against
terrorism and drug trafficking.
In 2003, Uruguay ratified the International Conventions for Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material. The Government of Uruguay faces some challenges in fully
implementing U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1456, especially
in curtailing terrorist financing activities. This might have more
to do with the Government's uncertainty about its ability to effectively
track money laundering and terrorist financing -- in spite of the
creation of a unit for financial analysis in the central bank.
Uruguayan law enforcement authorities assisted with international
investigations of the movement and activities of suspected terrorists
in 2003, but Uruguay was not directly involved in terrorist events.
At present, there are no known terrorist operatives in Uruguay,
and Uruguayan banking and law enforcement officials have discovered
no terrorist assets in Uruguayan financial institutions. Banking
and law enforcement agencies cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism
efforts by pledging to search for bank accounts, individuals, and
groups with links to terrorism. Uruguay is assisting in the investigation
of potential terrorist support emanating from the Triborder area
and along Uruguay's northern frontier with Brazil.
Uruguay has no significant impediments to the prosecution or extradition
of suspected terrorists. The judicial system is independent of
external influences, but, as elsewhere, the judges' personal political
leanings can influence the outcome of some cases.
In July 2003, Uruguay extradited Al Said Hassan Mokhles to Egypt.
Egypt requested the extradition of the member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya,
possible associate of al-Qaida, in 2002. Egyptian authorities tied
Mokhles to a terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt, that killed 58 foreign
tourists in 1997. He was arrested in Uruguay on charges of document
fraud in 1999 after attempting to enter the country with a false
passport. Uruguayan authorities released him to Egypt under the
conditions that he not be subjected to the death penalty, permanent
imprisonment, or charged for document fraud (for which he already
served four years).
Uruguay has signed and ratified all 12 U.N. terrorism conventions
and protocols.
Venezuela
Venezuelan cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism
was inconsistent in 2003. Public recriminations against U.S. counterterrorism
policies by President Chavez and his close supporters continued
to overshadow and detract from the limited cooperation that exists
between specialists and technicians of the two nations.
President Chavez's stated ideological affinity with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian National Liberation
Army (ELN) limits Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating
terrorism. Venezuela is unwilling or unable to systematically police
the Venezuela-Colombia 1,400-mile border. The FARC and the ELN
often use the area for cross-border incursions and regard Venezuelan
territory near the border as a safe haven. In addition, weapons
and ammunition -- some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities
-- continued flowing from Venezuelan suppliers into the hands of
Colombian terrorist organizations. It is unclear to what extent
the Government of Venezuela approves of or condones material support
to Colombian terrorists and at what level. Efforts by Venezuelan
security forces to control their sides of the border and to interdict
arms flows to these groups are ineffective.
Current Venezuelan law does not specifically mention crimes of
terrorism, although the UN Convention on Terrorist Bombings of
1997 and the U.N. Convention on Terrorism Financing of 1999 became
law in Venezuela on 8 July 2003. An organized crime bill pending
in the National Assembly would define terrorist activities, establish
punishments, and facilitate the prosecution and asset forfeiture
of terrorism financiers. Venezuela signed the OAS Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism in June 2002 and ratified it in January
2004.
Terrorist tactics were employed throughout 2003 by unidentified
domestic groups attempting to influence the tenuous political situation,
particularly in Caracas. A series of small bombs and threats throughout
the year were variously blamed on supporters of President Chavez
or the Government's political opponents.
Venezuela extradited one member of the terrorist organization
Basque Fatherland and Liberty to Spain and arrested another. Unconfirmed
press accounts continued to allege the presence of radical Islamic
operatives in Venezuela -- especially on Margarita Island. In February
2003, a Venezuelan national managed to fl y from Venezuela to London
with a hand grenade in his checked luggage, but his intent remains
unclear.
Venezuela is a party to six of the 12 international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism.
North America (Canada and Mexico)
The Government of Canada remained steadfast in its condemnation
of international and domestic terrorism and has been a helpful
and strong supporter of the United States in the fight against
international terror. Though there have been differences, overall
antiterrorism cooperation with Canada remains excellent and serves
as a model for bilateral cooperation. Day-to-day cooperation between
U.S. and Canadian law-enforcement agencies is close and continuous.
Canadian Armed Forces participated in Operation Enduring Freedom
in 2001, and Canada currently has some 1,900 soldiers in Afghanistan
where they will lead the International Security Assistance Force
in 2004. Canada has pledged $230 million to reconstruction efforts;
participated in a Justice Department-led international assessment
of Iraq's police, prisons, and court sectors; and is currently
involved in training the Iraqi police force.
Canada's 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act created measures to identify,
deter, disable, prosecute, convict, and punish terrorist groups.
It also provides investigative tools for Canadian law enforcement
agencies while providing substantial safeguards to privacy and
due process. As of November 2003, there were 34 organizations listed
under the statute as entities engaging in terrorist activities.
Although they are subject to prosecution under the Criminal Code
of Canada, the law is untested since no prosecutions have taken
place. Canada cooperates closely with the United States on investigations,
and there is a heavy volume of extradition requests between the
two countries. Canadian privacy laws, limited resources, and criminal
procedures more favorable to the defendant than in the United States
sometimes inhibit a more full and timely exchange of information
and exclude some potential supporters of terrorism.
Canada was the first country to ratify the Inter-American Convention
Against Terrorism in December 2002. Canada implements terrorist
finance listings in compliance with U.N. requirements and coordinates
closely with the United States on plans to freeze assets. Efforts
to counter terrorist financing include implementing UNSCR 1373,
promoting the Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of
the Financial Action Task Force, and actively participating in
the G-7, G-8, and G-20.
Canada and the United States take part in a number of joint counterterrorism
forums. In October 2003, they participated in a new round of talks
under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism
Cooperation (BCG, established in 1988). The BCG is tasked to review
international terrorist trends and to plan ways to intensify joint
counterterrorism efforts. Canada will host the next BCG meetings
in 2004. In May 2003, Canada and the United States participated
in the second Top Officials simulation to test local, state/province,
and federal disaster responses to a terrorist attack against civilian
populations. The U.S. Attorney General and Canadian Solicitor General
coordinated policy at the U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum.
The forum met in West Virginia in 2003 and established a counterterrorism
subgroup to enhance cooperation in law enforcement and prosecutions.
Future efforts include continued implementation of provisions of
the Smart Border Accord and the further integration of border enforcement
teams that are operating in 12 regions.
Canada has signed and ratified all 12 U.N. conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, under which Canada
has listed and frozen the assets of more than 420 entities.
The Government of Mexico remained a strong international and bilateral
partner in counterterrorism efforts throughout 2003. Mexico accepted
a new methodology of evaluating and regulating money laundering
and terrorism financing adopted by the IMF, the World Bank, and
the FATF.
Among the many bilateral initiatives undertaken, Mexico cooperated
fully with the United States in continuing to implement the U.S.-Mexico
Smart Border Accord -- a 22-point border action plan signed in
2002 that aims to improve border infrastructure, expedite the secure
flow of people, and facilitate the secure flow of goods across
the U.S.-Mexico border. Exchanges such as the Senior Law Enforcement
Plenary, the Binational Commission, and the Mexico-U.S. Committee
on Transborder Critical Infrastructure Protection helped improve
cooperation, trust, and confidence. Routine training, education,
and technical assistance at various levels took place throughout
2003.
Mexico's Federal Investigative Agency arrested six Spanish citizens
and three Mexicans at locations throughout Mexico on 18 July and
alleged they had ties to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).
In public statements, Mexican officials said the suspects were
laundering money to fund ETA terrorism and forging documents to
support ETA members.
A continuing issue of strategic concern to U.S.-Mexico counterterrorism
efforts is the existence and continued exploitation of longstanding
smuggling channels traversing the U.S.-Mexico border. These routes
have existed for many years to facilitate movement across the border
while avoiding U.S. and Mexican authorities. Despite active and
prolonged cooperation by the Mexican Government to address these
smuggling routes, many smugglers have avoided prosecution.
Mexico has ratified all 12 international conventions and protocols
against terrorism.
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