Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Updated November 7, 2002

Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Historical Background

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
  Post-9/11

Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
  Russia’s Role

Obstacles to Peace and Independence
  Regional Tensions and Conflicts

Democratization and Human Rights

Security and Arms Control
  Weapons of Mass Destruction

Trade and Investment
  Energy Resources

Aid Overview
Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

SUMMARY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and established diplomatic relations with each by mid-March 1992. The United States also supported their admission to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, and approved the Freedom Support Act and other legislation for this purpose.

After the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. Since then, the United States has boosted its security assistance throughout the region for anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, border and customs, and defense cooperation programs, while also increasing aid for democratization and free market reforms.

U.S. policy goals in Central Asia include fostering stability, democratization, free market economies, free trade and transport throughout the Eurasian corridor, de-nuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. An over-arching U.S. priority is to discourage attempts by extremest regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals. Administration policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. The Administration is concerned about human rights and civil liberties problems in all the states. The Administration’s policy goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the security and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid increasingly focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Some have called for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some have disputed the importance of energy resources to U.S. national security. Others point to civil and ethnic tensions in the region as possibly endangering U.S. lives and investments. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of “Silk Road” language in late 1999 (P.L.106-113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states.
Central Asia: Basic Facts

Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.

Population: 56.4 million (2001 est., Economist Intelligence Unit), somewhat less than France; Kazakhstan: 14.8 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 4.9 m.; Tajikistan: 6.3 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.3 m.; Uzbekistan: 25.1 m.

Gross Domestic Product: $41.6 billion in 2001; per capita GDP is about $740; poverty is rampant. Kazakhstan: $22.0b.; Kyrgyzstan: $1.5b.; Tajikistan: $1.0b.; Turkmenistan: $6.0 b.; Uzbekistan: $11.1b. (EIU, current prices)

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics. Citing the dangers they faced from Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were established...
with all five new states by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that
the Administration devise a policy on aiding the new Eurasian states, former President Bush
sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was amended and signed into law in
October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, Congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk
Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (contained in Consolidated Appropriations for
FY2000; P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration,
humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls,
democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Post-9/11. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on three inter-related
activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development. The 9/11
attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the
United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries,”
according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony on June 27,
2002. While then-U.S. Caspian emissary Elizabeth Jones (currently Assistant Secretary of
State) in April 2001 carefully elucidated that the United States would not intervene militarily
to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into Central Asia, this stance was effectively reversed
after 9/11. U.S. military counter-terrorism efforts were undertaken in Afghanistan, including
against terrorists harbored in Afghanistan who aimed to overthrow Central Asian
governments and who were assisting in Taliban fighting against the coalition. Added
security training and equipment were provided to the Central Asian states, supplemented by
more aid to promote democratization, human rights, and economic reforms, because the latter
aid addressed “root causes of terrorism,” according to Jones in testimony on December 13,
2001. She averred that “we rely on [Central Asian] governments for the security and well-
being of our troops, and for vital intelligence,” and that the United States “will not abandon
Central Asia” after peace is achieved in Afghanistan.

Immediately after 9/11, the Central Asian governments condemned the attacks, but over
the next two weeks, as U.S. attention focused on Afghanistan, none unambiguously offered
to permit overflight rights or U.S. military airbase access. At first, Turkmenistan’s foreign
minister reiterated its policy of neutrality and its friendship with the Taliban in refusing to
cooperate in a U.S.-led military campaign. Tajikistan, host to the largest Russian military
presence in Central Asia and largely dependent on Russia to police its border with
Afghanistan, was hesitant to cooperate with the United States without permission from
Moscow. However, since Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Northern
Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, they were predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing
for the Northern Alliance. These Central Asian states, along with Kyrgyzstan, also had
suffered from incursions by the IMU and other terrorists, who were harbored by the Taliban.

On September 24, 2001, Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov gave his consent for ground
transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian aid to support U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in
Afghanistan because “evil must be punished.” Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev also
offered airfields, military bases, and airspace. That evening, President Putin stated that
Russia would support U.S. efforts by providing intelligence, overflight rights for
humanitarian cargoes, access to Central Asian airbases, and support for the Northern
Alliance. The next day, Kyrgyz President Akayev indicated that he had received the backing
of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS’s) Collective
Security Treaty for U.S. use of Kyrgyz airspace for anti-terrorism in Afghanistan. Many
Uzbek officials were offended by a warning from the Taliban “foreign minister” on September 24, 2001, against permitting U.S. use of Uzbek territory to attack Afghanistan. Two days later, Uzbek President Karimov permitted U.S. use of Uzbek airspace against Afghan-based terrorists for “humanitarian and security purposes” if Uzbekistan’s security was guaranteed. This condition was met with a U.S.-Uzbek agreement signed on October 7, a Joint Statement issued on October 12, 2001, and a Declaration on the Strategic Partnership signed on March 12, 2002 (see below, Security).

The United States and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding on July 10, 2002, permitting U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airport in Almaty for emergency military landings. The accord was needed in part because military flights out of Kyrgyzstan’s Ganci airbase at Manas Airport, 120 miles away, can be disrupted by harsh weather. Sensitive to some Kazakh, Russian, and Chinese concerns, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry stressed that there would be no “permanent” U.S. military presence. A few days later, the United States and Kazakhstan reached another agreement providing increased U.S. military training and equipment for the Kazakh armed forces (see also below, Security).

While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on these interests, there are various views on the types and levels of U.S. involvement in the region. Many of those who endorse continued or enhanced U.S. support for Central Asia argue that political instability and the growth of terrorist groups in Central Asia can produce spillover effects both in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related technology in the region. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They stress that U.S. leadership in world aid efforts to foster reform will help alleviate the social distress exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups to gain new members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.

Some views of policymakers and academics, who previously objected to a more forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia, may appear less salient given post-9/11 or other recent developments. They argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that developments there were largely marginal to U.S. interests. They advocated limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests. They discounted fears that an anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to overturn secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. They questioned the existence of sizeable oil and gas resources in these new states and whether the energy could be economically developed and delivered to Western markets. Other still topical arguments include whether the United States should continue to try to foster democratization among cultures some view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and might even unwittingly be fueling the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. These observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation, trade, and investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights. Some
point to civil problems in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew major involvement that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.

**Fostering Pro-Western Orientations**

The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western organizations. The United States has supported these integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. These and other means are used to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists — who use repression or violence to oppose democratization — from attempts to gain influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns of other Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, *Central Asia’s Security.*)

**Russia’s Role.** The events of 9/11 may weaken Russia’s influence over the Central Asian states, though long-term impacts depend on the duration and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countering policies, and the fate of Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, the Putin Administration had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the growth of U.S. and other influence. On the other hand, while calling Central Asia an important or even “vital” interest of the United States, U.S. Administrations had generally deferred to Russia on regional security issues and had refused major U.S. military assistance to the states to combat terrorism. After 9/11, Uzbekistan reaffirmed its more assertive policy of lessening its security dependence on Russia by granting conditional overflight rights and other support, nudging a reluctant Putin regime to accede to a U.S. and coalition presence in the region in keeping with Russia’s own support to the region to combat the Taliban. Russia’s other reasons for permitting the increased U.S. and coalition presence included its interests in boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hope of regaining influence in a post-Taliban Afghanistan by continuing to support the Northern Alliance. Russia cooperated with Central Asia in supporting U.S. and coalition efforts, including by quickly sending military equipment and advisors to assist the Northern Alliance in attacks on the Taliban. On September 19, 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov indicated that the nature of support given by the Central Asian states to the U.S.-led coalition was up to each state, and President Putin reiterated this point on September 24, 2001, giving Russia’s accedence to cooperation between these states and the United States.

In accord with long-standing U.S. policy, the Bush Administration generally views a democratizing Russia as able to play a traditional stabilizing role in Central Asia, though emphasizes that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Assistant Secretary of State Jones most recently reiterated this policy on February 11, 2002, stating that “our goal with the Russians is to make sure they understand that ... we’re not trying to take over Central Asia from them, but we have ... international common interests that we will be transparent about as they play out in Central Asia.” While some observers continue to warn that Russia seeks to reabsorb Central Asia into a new
empire, most discount Russia’s capabilities, if not intentions, because of what they view as Russia’s deep economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree, however, that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that they do not infringe on the independence of other Eurasian states.

Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. By the late 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin may be seeking to reverse. About 11,000 Russian Border Troops (mostly ethnic Tajiks under Russian command) still defend “CIS borders” in Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In late 1999, the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. Russia justified a 1999 military base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.

In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. In April 2000, Security Council secretary Sergey Ivanov called for the members of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces, including in Central Asia, to combat terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. He also stated that such a force might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. A May 2001 CST summit approved the creation of a Central Asian force composed of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik country-based battalions and a headquarters in Bishkek. This initiative seemed in part aimed to protect Russian regional influence in the face of nascent U.S. and NATO anti-terrorism moves in the region against Afghanistan. CIS members in 2001 also approved the creation of a regional Anti-Terrorist Center (composed of intelligence agencies). Russia’s threats of pre-emptive strikes caused the Taliban in May 2000 to warn the Central Asian states of reprisals if they permitted Russia to use their bases for strikes. At the June 2000 U.S.-Russia summit, the two presidents agreed to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism, which held two meetings prior to 9/11. These events prior to 9/11 helped to ease the way to Russian and Central Asian assistance to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Soon after 9/11, Russia seemed to reverse the policy of drawing down its military presence in Central Asia by increasing its troop presence in Tajikistan by a reported 1,500. In mid-June 2002, Russia also signed military accords with Kyrgyzstan extending leases on military facilities to fifteen years (including, amazingly, a naval test base), opening shuttered Kyrgyz defense industries, and training Kyrgyz troops. Most significantly, Kyrgyzstan also agreed that its Kant airfield outside its capital of Bishkek could be used as a base for the Central Asian rapid reaction forces. In signing the accords, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov declared that they marked Russia’s help – along with the U.S.-led coalition and China – in combating terrorism, were necessary for Russia to monitor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and marked Russia’s intention to maintain a military presence in the region. According to some reports, Ivanov also convinced Kyrgyz authorities to announce that all U.S. and coalition use of the Manas airport had to end by mid-2003.
Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory. At the same time, Russia has avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia’s motives in the post-9/11 environment vis-a-vis a Western role in energy development in the Caspian remain complex and it does not appear that a coherent regional energy policy is being followed. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has softened but not reversed its attitude against construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline post-9/11, and the Russian government generally remains less willing than are Russian energy firms to accept a role for Western energy firms in the region. Perhaps indicating still-conflicting views within Russia, in late 2001, Russia’s LUKoil and Yukos oil companies indicated that they might want to participate in the consortium planning to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. However, LUKoil brusquely announced in May 2002 that it would not participate; leading some observers to speculate that elements in the Russian government quashed the overture. During Turkmen President Niyazov’s Moscow visit in January, 2002, President Putin called for Central Asian states to form a Eurasian Gas Alliance to “export through a single channel.” Russian media speculate that Putin advocates the alliance to protect Russia’s influence over the world gas market against the possibility of more U.S. energy influence in the region.

The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has in practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the “reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” Ethnic Russians residing in Central Asia have had rising concerns about employment, language, and other policies or practices they deem discriminatory and many have emigrated, contributing to their decline from 20 million in 1989 to 6.6 million in 2001. They now constitute 12% of the population of Central Asia, according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Remaining Russians tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become a majority.

Obstacles to Peace and Independence

The presidents of four out of five of the Central Asian states have been in power since independence, and were previous communist party heads or officials during the Soviet period. They have remained in place by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by limiting political freedoms. U.S. policymakers have warned, however, that political repression ultimately harms stability. The lack of obvious successors to the present leaders raises concern among many observers. Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled that President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution set a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming him president for life. Nazarbayev too in 2000 gained some official powers for life. A referendum in early 2002 extended Karimov’s term to 2007. Belying this appearance of stability, Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999 by explosions that Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (see below), and Karimov’s, Niyazov’s, and Akayev’s regimes faced popular protests during 2002 (For Kyrgyzstan, see below, Democratization).

Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the Central Asian states. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam.
Some in the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude that in the foreseeable future, the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it can be argued that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and non-populous region will need to embrace economic integration in order to develop.

Central Asia’s borders, described as among the world’s most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside their “national” borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan’s integrity. Akayev has faced popular criticism over a border accord with China that ceded some territory, and Tajikistan and China continue to wrangle over borders.

In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China (for details, see CRS Report RL31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States). In May 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO has played no real role in the post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign. According to the newspaper of the Chinese Liberation Army, the SCO at its meeting in June 2002 in St. Petersburg discussed how the members would “bear the brunt” if the U.S. military gets a “firm hold” in Central Asia.

_The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan._ After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of suspects, including political dissidents. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding the plot, along with Tohir Yuldoshev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh, Yuldoshev, and militia head Jama Namanganiy. Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), led by Yuldoshev and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldoshev, Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldoshev defense minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established. In November 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were tried in absentia. The absent Yuldoshev and Namanganiy were given death sentences and the absent Solikh, 15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process during the trial. Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in the IMU. Yuldoshev too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings but warned that more might occur if Karimov does not step down.
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by terrorist Osama bin Laden, according to the State Department, and it stressed that the “United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the violent actions of the IMU.” The Bush Administration supports Uzbekistan’s efforts to combat terrorism but stresses that such efforts should not include human rights abuses. Reportedly, besides the IMU, nearly a dozen Islamic extremist groups in Uzbekistan are attracting increasing popular support. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, IMU forces assisting the Taliban against U.S. and coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major losses, and Namanganiy may have been killed, but the IMU remains a regional threat.

The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.

Civil War in Tajikistan. State Department officials served as observers at the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after a peace settlement, indications of the Administration’s efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the Eurasian states. The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the effects of the Tajik civil war. The United States supported the presence of U.N. observers in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS “peacekeeping” forces to cooperate fully with them and to abide by international law. U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S. closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan, because of inadequate security. Beginning in 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled back and forth to Dushanbe. A site has been leased where a secure chancery will be built.

Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups – largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power – tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. These United Tajik Opposition (UTO) rebels variously received help from Iran and the IMU. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of Russian and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali
Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded. UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, and a small U.N. Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building (UNTOP) was set up to facilitate aid. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement.

Democratization and Human Rights

A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S. democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the United States has worked with the ex-Communist party officials who have led in four of the five states (except Tajikistan) since before independence, recognizing that they may continue to hold power for some time.

Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites, gradual transitions to more nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the Central Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would pursue democratization, but all have fallen short by varying degrees. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President Bush. In March 2002, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov and Secretary Powell signed a “Strategic Partnership” accord pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press.

According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, presidential power in all the Central Asian states overshadows legislative and judicial power, and that they have lost ground in democratization. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as the most repressive, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan permit some limited free expression and other rights. Tajikistan experienced many conflict-related human rights abuses in the course of its 1992-2000 civil war, but during its fragile peace there have been a few human rights improvements. In most of the states, religious freedom is threatened by repression against nonfavored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims who tend to be viewed as extremists. Unfair elections and unseemly extensions of presidential terms in Central Asia increase political alienation and frustration among the populations and contribute to the formation of clandestine groups seeking to overthrow the regimes.

In testimony to Congress on June 27, 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner referred to Central Asia in stating that “even while we ramp up our military cooperation with governments that have troubling human rights records, we also see this as an opportunity to
enhance our engagement and impact on issues of democracy and human rights.” He also repeated past Administration vows that “any deepening and broadening of our cooperation will depend on continual progress in respecting human rights and democracy.” In Congress, conferees on H.R. 4775 (H.Rept.107-593; an emergency supplemental for FY2002; P.L.107-206) called for added Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to Uzbekistan to be conditioned on a report by the Secretary of State that it is making progress in meeting its human rights commitments under the “Strategic Partnership” agreement. S.J. Res. 50, introduced on October 17, 2002, criticizes Central Asian governments for human rights abuses such as arbitrary arrests, restrictions on opposition party activity, and religious persecution, and calls on the President to condition U.S. political, economic and military relations with the regional governments on their respect for human rights and democracy.

Security and Arms Control

Since 9/11, U.S. and coalition action in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to halt the export of terrorism from Afghanistan has greatly increased the security of Central Asia. The development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-9/11 facilitated the cooperation of the states in OEF. Reportedly, such pre-9/11 ties included Uzbek permission for U.S. clandestine efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.” Kyrgyzstan, he relates, is a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for combat and combat support units at Manas Airport (at the U.S.-designated Ganci airbase) for U.S., French, Italian, Norwegian, Canadian, and South Korean forces. Uzbekistan provides a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad and a base for German units at Termez, and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez. It has also leased to the coalition IL-76 transport airlift for forces and equipment. Kazakhstan has provided overflight rights and expedited rail transhipment of supplies. Turkmenistan has permitted blanket overflight and refueling privileges for humanitarian flights in support of OEF. Tajikistan has permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for U.S., British, and French refueling and basing. While the Administration has rejected the idea of permanent military bases in these states, Crouch stated in June 2002 that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control.

Among recent accords, on March 12, 2002, a U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership was signed that includes a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirms that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledge to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan, and the United States offers to support setting up a PFP Training Center in Uzbekistan and to help Uzbekistan introduce NATO standards, equipment, and training. Similarly, visiting Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and President Bush issued a joint statement on September 23, 2002, pledging to deepen the strategic partnership, including cooperation in counter-terrorism, and the United States highlighted its aid for Kyrgyzstan’s border security and military capabilities. Nothing was revealed about whether Kyrgyzstan would renew the Ganci base lease. In early October 2002, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy
Prime Minister praised the economic benefits of Ganci, stressing that coalition forces already had spent up to $35 million, about 15% of Kyrgyzstan’s yearly budget.

A small but increasing amount of U.S. security assistance was provided to the region pre-9/11, and much more after 9/11 (see box and Table 2). All the states receive FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, and in FY2002 become eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis. Sizeable amounts of comprehensive threat reduction (CTR) aid have been provided to Kazakhstan to eliminate its nuclear weapons and facilities. U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia. It states that its peacetime strategy focuses on PFP, Marshall Center (the defense educational coordinator for PFP), and IMET programs to foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs” in the region. USCENTCOM Commanders visited the region regularly, setting the stage for more extensive military ties post-9/11. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited the region in December 2001 and April-May 2002. During his August 2002 visit, USCENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks stated that the U.S. military presence would continue in Afghanistan and Central Asia for some time and that military-to-military ties with regional states would increase.

Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994. Tajikistan decided to join PFP before 9/11, and signed accords on admission in February 2002. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops participated in exercises in Central Asia in 1997, 1998, and 2000. Many in Central Asia viewed these exercises as “sending a message” to Islamic extremists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering regional instability. Central Asian PFP command exercises termed “Regional Cooperation” were held in Germany in mid-2001.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries. After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the

| Cumulative Obligations FY1992-FY2001 for Central Asian Security Programs (Freedom Support Act and Other Funds) (million dollars) |
|==================================================|
| USDA-ARS Collaborative Research Program 4.63 |
| U.S. Department of Health & Human Services - BTEP 2.35 |
| DOE Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 4.28 |
| DOE Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) 32.09 |
| DOE Export Control Programs (Nuclear) 3.55 |
| DOE Arms Control Support 33.13 |
| DOS International Military Exchanges and Training (IMET) 9.82 |
| DOS NADR/Counterproliferation 2.96 |
| DOS Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 2.97 |
| DOS Warsaw Initiative (FMF) 26.75 |
| DOD Warsaw Initiative 2.21 |
| DOS Science Centers 18.24 |
| DOS Export Control and Border Security 15.38 |
| DOS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 5.59 |
| DOD-Comprehensive Threat Reduction 180.13 |
| DOD Customs Border Security and Counterproliferation 2.30 |
| DoD/FBI Counterproliferation 3.15 |
| NSF/Civilian R&D Foundation (CRDF) 6.59 |
| **Total Security Programs** 356.12* |

*See Table 2 for FY1992-FY2002 totals.
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and most silos were blown up in 1995-1996. In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes. In June 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an extension accord to destroy six remaining silos at the Leninsk testing ground in the Kyzyl-Orda region.

Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. aid has been used to eliminate active anthrax spores and other hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (See also CRS Report RL31539, Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism.)

**Trade and Investment**

The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan, although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties. However, corruption is stifling the emergence of the rule of law, as exemplified by allegations that both Nazarbayev and Niyazov have siphoned energy revenues into bank accounts they control. U.S. energy companies have committed to invest billions of dollars in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, but have experienced repeated contractual violations and other unforeseen risks. Currency convertibility problems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stymie investment, business growth, and trade.

U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June
2000, so that Jackson-Vanik trade provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no longer apply. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund, authorized by Congress to lend up to $150 million, has been bedeviled by convertibility problems and major defaults on its joint venture loans and has halted operations.

All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could yield export earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market the resources in most cases. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower.

**Energy Resources.** U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. President Bush’s May 2001 *National Energy Policy* report suggests that greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends U.S. support for building Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipelines, coaxing oil companies operating in Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy development. It avers that the building of the pipelines will enhance energy supply diversification, including for Georgia and Turkey. In late August 2002, U.S. Coordinator of Assistance to Eurasia William Taylor resurrected U.S. support (dropped during Taliban rule) for construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and possibly to India. While touted by Niyazov, energy firms have so far viewed such a route as too risky.

According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Oil resources, DOE reports, are comparable to those of the North Sea, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan rank among the top countries in terms of proven and probable gas reserves. DOE reports estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and Kazakhstan in a consortium during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and Russia’s LUKoil later joined). In April 2001, the joint venture announced that Tengiz reserves were much higher than previously thought. In July 2002, another consortium led by Italy’s Agip oil firm reported findings from its test wells and research that Kazakhstan’s Kashagan offshore Caspian oil field had between 7-9 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves and up to 38 billion barrels in
probable reserves, comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are over 630,000 barrels per day (bpd), compared to 3 million bpd for Russia. (See also CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects.)

The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets. In a strategy similar to one Russia has used in other CIS and in Eastern Europe, where it restricted energy supplies until given commercial concessions, Russia’s restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium. Russian shareholders have a controlling interest, 44 percent, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), which completed construction in late 2001 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk – the region’s first new large-capacity pipeline – that initially carries 560,000 bpd, and eventually will carry 1.3 million bpd. President Bush hailed the opening of the pipeline as an example “that the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world.” He stated that the CPC project also “advances my Administration’s National Energy Policy by developing a network of multiple Caspian pipelines ... [that] help diversify U.S. energy supply and enhance our energy security.” The Administration has urged Kazakhstan to pledge to use the oil pipeline being built from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey. Kazakhstan currently transports about 100,000 bpd by rail and barge to Baku.

In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian states that had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other problems. In 1998 and every year thereafter, Turkmenistan has tried to get higher prices for its gas but has capitulated to Russia’s natural gas firm Gazprom (or its subsidiary Itera). Putin’s talks in January, 2002 with Niyazov on long-term gas supplies were unproductive because Niyazov balked at the low prices offered and at Russia’s plans for Caspian Sea border demarcation. Seeking alternative export routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran’s pipeline system. Some oil is also sent to Iran in a swap arrangement. Swiss and Chinese firms are modernizing Iran’s infrastructure to boost its ability to process Turkmen and Kazakh oil. Turkmenistan is trying to convince dubious investors to help it build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Aid Overview

The Bush Administration has provided added security and other assistance to the Central Asian states in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Some observers characterize this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an incentive for continued cooperation. The Administration has argued that the safer environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources.
For much of the 1990s and until 9/11, U.S. assistance to Central Asian states was dwarfed by that to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia (most such aid was funded from the FREEDOM Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and agency budgets). The amount of aid provided to Central Asia usually but not always tracked with the “roller coaster” of declining (FY1994-FY1997), increasing (FY1998-FY1999), and declining (FY2000-FY2001) aid provided to the rest of the Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. In FY1998, the previous Administration called for added civil society assistance, particularly for the Central Asian countries and Russia. Although congressional earmarks fenced off much of the FREEDOM Support Act aid, Central Asia benefitted from other program and agency spending. Increased appropriations in FY1999 for Eurasia also benefitted Central Asia. In FY2000, despite declining FREEDOM Support Act assistance, support for Central Asia increased to $222.57 million (including other program and Agency funding). In FY2001, foreign assistance obligated to Central Asia amounted to $248.02 million (FREEDOM Support Act and other Agency funding). Estimated spending for FY2002, during OEF, was greatly boosted, but requested aid for FY2003 is less. See Table 1.

The Central Asian states have been regarded as front line states during OEF, receiving $147.883 million in added security and humanitarian aid in the emergency terrorism response supplemental appropriation for FY2002 (P.L.107-38) to supplement other appropriated aid for FY2002. The Administration’s third emergency supplemental request for FY2002 (P.L.107-206; H.Rept.107-593) calls for $3.5 million for Kazakhstan, $4 million for Turkmenistan, $42 million for Kyrgyzstan, $40 million for Tajikistan, and $45.5 million for Uzbekistan, with the larger aid amounts for the latter three states dedicated mainly to democratic and economic reforms. Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it (is the aid subject to corruption or is the aid conditioned on reforms), what it should be used for, and who should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.)

Table 1. FY2001 Obligations, the FY2002 Estimate, and the FY2003 Foreign Assistance Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Asian Country</th>
<th>FY2001 Obligations</th>
<th>FY2002 Estimate Including the Emergency Terrorism Supplementals (in parentheses)</th>
<th>FY2003 Request*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>84.9 (28.0+3.5)</td>
<td>51.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>36.73</td>
<td>91.9 (2.0+42.0)</td>
<td>43.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>67.38</td>
<td>138.1 (27.383+40.0)</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>13.69</td>
<td>20.9 (7.0+4.0)</td>
<td>9.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>54.72</td>
<td>218.5 (83.5+45.5)</td>
<td>43.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>248.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>554.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.901</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: USAID and State Department. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency budgets.
*FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds (does not include Defense or Energy Department funding).
Table 2. U.S. Government FY1992-FY2002 Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia, by Category  
(FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets)  
(millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Kaz</th>
<th>Kgz</th>
<th>Tjk</th>
<th>Tkm</th>
<th>Uzb</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Prog.</td>
<td>108.85</td>
<td>71.04</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>71.21</td>
<td>301.11</td>
<td>11.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Reform</td>
<td>241.66</td>
<td>151.77</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>69.54</td>
<td>503.92</td>
<td>18.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Prog.</td>
<td>324.39</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>21.86</td>
<td>19.54</td>
<td>119.21</td>
<td>539.9</td>
<td>20.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Prog.</td>
<td>74.36</td>
<td>279.23</td>
<td>363.94</td>
<td>113.17</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>944.7</td>
<td>35.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral/other</td>
<td>131.04</td>
<td>54.25</td>
<td>31.06</td>
<td>38.97</td>
<td>108.27</td>
<td>363.59</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>880.3</td>
<td>611.19</td>
<td>458.69</td>
<td>220.81</td>
<td>482.23</td>
<td>2,653.22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Coordinator’s Office, State Department, and CRS calculations. The included FY2002 data are estimates. The third supplemental’s democracy/economy program funding of $76 million is not further broken down so is not included.