Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance

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Summary

Large-scale reconstruction assistance programs are being undertaken by the United States following the war with Iraq. To fund such programs, Congress approved on April 12, 2003, a $2.48 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in the FY2003 Supplemental Appropriation. On September 7, President Bush proposed a $20.3 billion reconstruction aid package, as part of an $87 billion FY2004 supplemental request. Other donors are expected to provide aid as well; their contributions to date are estimated at $1.5 billion, and a donor conference on October 24 is expected to raise more. Security Council Resolution 1483, approved May 22, allows the United States to draw on Iraqi oil sale profits for relief and reconstruction purposes.

Former diplomat L. Paul Bremer III is the head of civilian administration in post-war Iraq. Under him, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), staffed by officials from the U.S. government and other nations, is implementing assistance programs. After an initial period of coalition-led aid activities, existing Iraqi ministries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) are expected to assume some of the burden.

U.S. policymakers are negotiating with European allies the terms of a new U.N. Security Council Resolution that may provide a larger role for the United Nations in Iraq. One U.S. objective is to gain greater international military and financial cooperation in the Iraq stability and reconstruction effort. Criticisms of Administration reconstruction efforts include accusations of inadequate security, a failure to rapidly establish an Iraqi-led government, prevention of a larger multilateral role, excessive reliance on the U.S. military, and a lack of openness regarding plans for the reconstruction process.

The report will be updated as events warrant. For discussion of the Iraq political situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance. See also CRS Report RL32090, FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations, Reconstruction Assistance, and Other Activities.
Contents

FY2004 Emergency Supplemental .............................................. 1

Funding for Assistance: Recent Developments .......................... 2
  U.S. Assistance .......................................................... 3
  Oil Resources and Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) ....................... 3
  Debts and Assets ...................................................... 5
  Other Donors .......................................................... 6

U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq ........................................... 6

Security Concerns .......................................................... 7
  U.S. Response .......................................................... 7

Reconstruction Assistance: Recent Developments ................. 8
  The Role of the United Nations ....................................... 9
  Background on Debate on U.N. Role ............................... 11
  Governance of Post-War Iraq ....................................... 13
  Reconstruction Implementation .................................. 14
  Reconstruction Contract Issues ................................. 15

Criticism of Reconstruction ............................................. 17
  Inadequate Security .................................................. 17
  Slow Establishment of Iraqi-Led Governance .................... 17
  Too Fast Establishment of Iraqi-Led Governance ............. 18
  Preventing the U.N. and International Community from Playing a Major Role ............................................. 18
  Inadequate Civilian Administration ................................ 18
  Excessive Reliance on the Military ................................ 19
  Lack of Clarity and Strategy ....................................... 19
Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance

Large-scale reconstruction assistance programs are being undertaken by the United States in Iraq. This report describes recent developments in this assistance effort. Given the rapidly-evolving situation concerning these aid programs, some of these reported developments are based on press accounts. The report will be updated as events warrant.¹

FY2004 Emergency Supplemental

On September 7, the President announced he would submit to Congress a new request for emergency spending for Iraq. The formal request was submitted on September 17. The $87 billion request includes $20.3 billion for reconstruction programs, a significant increase over previously appropriated sums.

Earlier funds have been used to support a broad range of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. The new request is intended to fund the most pressing, immediate needs in Iraq, with the aim of having a noticeable impact on the two greatest reconstruction concerns that have been raised since the occupation of Iraq began — security and infrastructure. More than $5 billion would be targeted at improving the security capabilities of the Iraqi people and government — including training and equipment for border, customs, police, and fire personnel, and to develop a new Iraqi army and a Civil Defense Corps. Enhanced efforts to reform the judicial system would also be made.

Most of the remaining supplemental reconstruction request would go toward rapid improvements in infrastructure, including electricity, oil infrastructure, water and sewerage, transportation, telecommunications, housing, roads, bridges, and hospitals and health clinics. The initiative is intended only to address the most important needs; more long-term concerns in such areas of government reform, agriculture, economic development, and education are not included in the Administration request. A relatively small amount of funds — $353 million — have been requested for programs designed to encourage the growth of the private sector and jobs training, including establishment of an American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund. Another $300 million is targeted on grassroots democracy concerns, including local governance, civil society, human rights, and refugees.

Congress began holding hearings on the measure on September 18 and continued to conduct hearings during the week of September 22. The Senate

¹ For detailed discussion of the Iraq political situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance.
Appropriations Committee reported the measure, S. 1689, on September 30. It provides the same level of funding as the request. Floor debate began in the Senate on October 1. For more details on the legislation and the debate, including the issue of providing loans in place of grants, see CRS Report RL32090, *FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations, Reconstruction Assistance, and Other Activities*.

**Funding for Assistance: Recent Developments**

Until now, the eventual cost of meeting Iraq reconstruction needs has been uncertain. Although in July, Ambassador Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator in Iraq, had said that total reconstruction costs could fall between $50 and $100 billion, a thorough accounting of possible costs was not expected to emerge until World Bank/U.N. Development Program assessment teams had finished examining the needs of 14 sectors of the Iraqi government and economy prior to an international donors conference to be held in Madrid on October 23-24. Bank/UNDP estimates are likely to establish the targets by which the adequacy of available resources will be judged. Early press reports, although somewhat conflicting, suggest that the Bank/UNDP assessments put the cost of reconstruction at $55 billion over four years. However, it is not yet clear whether this figure includes oil and security needs, both of which compose a significant portion of the Administration’s $20.3 billion supplemental request for FY2004.²

A national budget for Iraq, formulated by Peter McPherson, the designated U.S. advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance, and covering the rest of 2003, was announced on July 7. It called for expenditures of roughly $6.1 billion in addition to providing for a Central bank currency reserve of $2.1 billion for a total requirement of $8.2 billion. New oil revenue, taxes, and profits from state owned enterprises would make up $3.9 billion of these costs. The remaining $4.3 billion deficit would be covered by recently frozen and seized assets ($2.5 billion), the Development Fund for Iraq ($1.2 billion), and already appropriated U.S. assistance ($3.0 billion). Taking into account previous expenditures ($1.2 billion), Iraq was projected to have roughly $1.1 billion remaining at the end of December 2003.³

The new Administration FY2004 request suggests that available funds for Iraq reconstruction are likely to run out by the end of 2003.⁴ In addition to new appropriations, reconstruction costs may be supplemented by other sources of funding, such as contributions from other donors, benefits of debt reduction or rescheduling, and profits from oil resources. These sources of funding are discussed below.

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U.S. Assistance

In the FY2003 emergency supplemental (P.L. 108-11), $2.48 billion was appropriated for a special Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for the purpose of aid efforts in a wide range of sectors, including water and sanitation, food, electricity, education, and rule of law. Of this amount, $743 million was allocated for relief and $1.7 billion for reconstruction. The conference report gives the President control over the Fund, and amounts may be transferred only to the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services, subject to the usual notification procedures. The FY2003 supplemental also provides $489.3 million through the Department of Defense budget for repair of oil facilities.

U.S. Funds Committed to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction as of 6/30/03

($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</th>
<th>2,475.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD - Oil Repair*</td>
<td>502.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD - Cost of CPA</td>
<td>599.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Agency Funds**</td>
<td>529.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,105.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Includes $13.2 million from Defense Cooperation Account.
**Includes USAID ($460.5 million), Department of Treasury ($2.3 million), and Department of State ($66.4 million).

Up to October 1, $1.7 billion in FY2003 funds provided to USAID and the Department of State has been obligated for relief and reconstruction, of which $1.1 billion is for reconstruction activities. Operational expenses for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), under the Department of Defense budget, were projected to reach $599 million through September 2003.5

Oil Resources and Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP)

Until the start of the war, an estimated sixty percent of Iraqis received their food supplies through the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program. Since the end of March, the U.N. has taken direct control of the program, setting priorities for and directing delivery of already contracted supplies. U.N. authority over the program was extended for six months beyond the original expiration date of June 3, 2003, by the U.N. Security Council resolution approved May 22. During this period the program will be phased out, and surplus funds will be transferred to the new Development

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Oil production has been slowed by looting and sabotage. Iraq was expected to sell $5 billion worth this year, $3.5 billion of which it was estimated could be deposited in the Development Fund. But these estimates, reportedly, may be downgraded. Current rates of production are nearing 2 million barrels/day, but Iraqis do not expect to reach the prewar level of 2.8 million barrels until spring. A 2.8 million barrels/day level might generate between $19 and $25 billion annually. At the June 24, 2003 U.N./World Bank donor meeting, it was agreed that oil revenue would be insufficient to cover Iraqi needs over the next few years. Prior to the war, some had suggested that it would take as long as five years and cost billions of dollars in investment before Iraqi oil production could meet its reconstruction needs. However, Ambassador Bremer indicated at a Senate hearing on September...

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8 Although the resolution provided for an international advisory board to monitor the sale and use of oil, resistance from the Iraqi oil community reportedly prevented the United States from putting together a board. “Oil to Come Under Iraqi Control as U.S. Fails to Form Advisory Board,” Financial Times, August 19, 2003.


22 that he expected Iraq to produce sufficient oil in 2005 to take care of its basic needs and provide additional funds for capital investment.11

Debts and Assets

The United States has sought to obtain support from creditors for Iraq debt relief. Debt estimates vary widely; recently some in the Administration have put it at as much as $200 billion.12 The Paris Club organization of creditor nations has estimated Iraqi debt to its members at $21 billion and as much as $21 billion more in interest. Of this amount, the United States is owed $2.2 billion. The London Club of commercial creditors, multilateral banks, and the Gulf States are owed substantial additional sums.13

Creditors have agreed to suspend repayment of debt until the end of 2004. But the United States argues that any new Iraqi government should not be burdened with debts associated with the policies of its previous ruler.14 Some large holders of Iraqi debt, such as Russia, are more inclined to reschedule debt than to forgive it.

On March 20, President Bush issued an executive order confiscating non-diplomatic Iraqi assets held in the United States. Of the total assets seized, an estimated $1.74 billion worth were available for reconstruction purposes, including salaries for civil servants. Another $795 million in assets located by the United States in Iraq were also used for these purposes. These funds have, reportedly, been exhausted.15 In addition, foreign governments are reported to hold an estimated $2.9 billion in seized or frozen assets.16 On August 29, Japan transferred $98 million in frozen assets to the Development Fund for Iraq.

10 (...continued)
16 90 Day Update Report to Congress Pursuant to Sec. 1506 of Emergency Wartime Supplemental.
Other Donors

Since March, U.N. appeals for postwar humanitarian relief to Iraq totaling $2.2 billion have been met with nearly $2 billion in pledges and contributions as of the end of September.17

U.S. officials have sought to encourage international donor contributions, and some form of support has been offered by about 61 countries. International contributions pledged or received by September have amounted to $1.5 billion, according to Ambassador Bremer.18 Among others, the U.K. has pledged roughly $382 million in assistance; Japan $212 million. Early on, the European Union (EU) agreed to provide 100 million euros for humanitarian relief agencies, but did not announce plans with respect to reconstruction and long-term aid until recently. The EU is now expected to pledge $232 million at the Madrid donor conference. Japan is expected to pledge $1 billion. However, donors are said to be reluctant to contribute to reconstruction because they have no say in where the funds are to be allocated.19 The EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten has supported establishment of a trust fund for Iraq to be administered by the World Bank that would encourage contributions by other donors by keeping them outside the control of the United States. Language establishing such a fund was reportedly being discussed in conjunction with a broader Security Council resolution seeking to obtain greater international cooperation.

U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq

To prepare for the use of aid, a post-war planning office — the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) — was established on January 20, 2003, by a presidential directive. On June 1, it was subsumed into the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).20 While immediate overall responsibility for the war and management of U.S. military activity in post-war Iraq belongs to the Commander of U.S. Central Command, the CPA is responsible for administration of Iraq and

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18 Down from $2.5 billion reported in the July 14, 2003, *90 Day Update Report to Congress Pursuant to Sec. 1506 of Emergency Wartime Supplemental*. This figure may also include part of the U.N. appeal donations. Testimony of Paul Bremer to House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 24, 2003.


20 The former head of ORHA, Retired Army Lt. General Jay M. Garner left Iraq on June 1, 2003.
implementing assistance efforts there.\textsuperscript{21} The Authority is headed by L. Paul Bremer III, appointed by the President on May 6. He reports to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The CPA is staffed by officials from agencies throughout the U.S. government as well as personnel from other coalition member nations.\textsuperscript{22} It has eleven directorates — oil policy, governance, operations and infrastructure, management and budget, economic development, private sector development, civil affairs, interior affairs, USAID, security affairs, and press and public affairs. A Council for International Cooperation provides liaison with NGOs, donor countries, and U.N. agencies and directs humanitarian affairs. In July, the CPA opened a support office in Washington, the Office of the CPA Representative, headed by Reuben Jeffrey III.

\textbf{Security Concerns}

The successful conduct of much relief and reconstruction work is contingent on an environment of order and stability. As the battle phase of the war ended, however, Iraq was besieged by looting and lawlessness. Six months into the U.S. occupation violence persists against both U.S. forces and Iraqis cooperating with the occupation. The August 19 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad and the August 29 bombing of the Najaf mosque and assassination of the moderate Shiite cleric Al-Hakim drew media and international attention to the failure of U.S. forces and the CPA to cope with the problem. One likely impact of the continued instability has been an increase in reconstruction costs and delay in implementation.\textsuperscript{23} For example, sabotaged oil pipelines must be repaired, and many aid implementors have been temporarily withdrawn from the country.\textsuperscript{24} Further, as institutions of commerce and security have yet to be fully reestablished, the trust of the Iraqi people in U.S. leadership to bring about a democratic transformation in Iraq has been undermined, opening the door to political discontent and opposition.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{U.S. Response}

As security concerns have continued to dominate the attention of policymakers, greater efforts have been made to encourage other countries to provide peacekeeping forces. However, participation of other countries has been hindered by previous opposition to the war and lack of a U.N. mandate. U.S. diplomats are currently seeking to encourage international help through a U.N. Security Council resolution. But many analysts think it unlikely that the United States will get the military support

\textsuperscript{21} For more information about the CPA, see [http://www.cpa-iraq.org].

\textsuperscript{22} As of early June 2003, there were 617 U.S. citizens and 471 coalition members in the CPA.


it seeks. Reversing its previous position, India, for example, has announced it would not send troops regardless of the outcome of a resolution. 26 There are no official figures; however, credible estimates at this time put the number of U.S. troops at between 129,000 and 145,000, British troops at roughly 12,000, and troops from 29 other countries at between 11,000 and 22,000. 27

About 37,000 Iraqi police, half the goal, have returned to work. About 28,000 police trainees are expected to be sent to Hungary for accelerated training. 28 Within one year, a reconstituted Iraqi army of 40,000 — half soldiers and half supply and administrative personnel — is expected to be ready. 29 The first 3,000 troops will have completed a nine-week training course by January. The CPA also proposes that more than 4,500 more border/customs police be recruited and trained; that 20,000 facility protection guards be deployed; and a roughly 10,000 strong Civil Defense Corps to support the coalition forces be established. 30

In early September, the Interior Ministry proposed a new 5,000 man Civil Defense Battalion aimed at combating the security threat from militants. 31 This move has not yet been approved by CPA Administrator Bremer. Some Iraqi leaders have recently proposed the withdrawal of U.S. forces to their bases and the turnover of military duties to existing Kurdish and Shiite militias that, up to now, the U.S. military has tried to disarm or restrict. 32

Reconstruction Assistance: Recent Developments

Among the key policy objectives laid out by the Bush Administration in conjunction with the war in Iraq was the economic and political reconstruction of the country. Discussion and debate within the United States government and the

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30 Coalition Provisional Authority Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq, September 2003.


diplomatic community have been ongoing regarding responsibilities for reconstruction programs and the effectiveness of aid implementation. Serious criticisms have mounted over the past six months regarding all aspects of the reconstruction effort.

**The Role of the United Nations**

The August 19 bombing of the U.N. mission in Baghdad highlighted the failure of U.S. forces and the CPA to establish security in Iraq and appears to have forced a reassessment of U.S. policy with regard to the post-war role of the U.N.. Following the bombing, two previously announced U.S. objectives — obtaining greater international military support for peacekeeping and donor financial contributions for reconstruction purposes — became significantly more important to U.S. policymakers. In this view, security could best be established if there were a greater military presence and a more visible, high-impact reconstruction effort. To avoid having to bear the financial and military burdens alone, the United States would have to seek greater international support. As a stronger U.N. role might facilitate U.S. goals in each case, U.S. Administration officials and legislators have debated a shift in policy from a continuing post-war position opposing a U.N. role to a moderation or outright reversal of this position. (See Background section below for events and views prior to August 19.)

Many countries, especially those that opposed the war, appear to believe it may legitimize the U.S. occupation if they provide substantial military or reconstruction assistance. A number of countries have indicated that they would not be able to participate in a peacekeeping force unless the U.N. provided some “political cover” through a resolution creating a multilateral force. Security concerns as well as absence of a strong U.N. role in governing Iraq have also been suggested as a possible obstacle to large donor contributions toward the reconstruction of Iraq.

On September 2, the President agreed to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution that might encourage international financial and military support by providing the U.N. with a larger role. Since then, negotiations with other countries on the Council regarding Iraq’s reconstruction have focused on two key questions — the extent of a U.N. role and the timing of full Iraqi sovereignty. When the leaders of France, Germany, and Britain met on September 20 to discuss Iraq, among other issues, they all agreed that the U.N. should play a major role and that sovereignty should be transferred to an Iraqi civilian government as soon as possible. However, they did not agree, in Chirac’s words, on “the practicalities and the timetable” for this

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transfer of power. The position of France and Germany is that full authority over Iraq should be transferred from the occupation coalition to the United Nations. In addition, France has been promoting the view that the transition to full Iraqi sovereignty should occur more rapidly than envisioned by U.S. leaders. The French have been arguing recently that steps toward handing over power to the Governing Council should begin within a few months. On September 21, President Chirac presented a plan in which symbolic sovereignty would be transferred immediately to the Governing Council, followed by a gradual six- to nine-month process of transferring real power from the CPA to the Iraqis.

The United States position, as suggested in the President’s September 23 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, has been that the present timetable of U.S. control during a process of drafting a constitution and eventual elections should continue, and that the U.N. could play a major, but unspecified, role in supervising the constitution and election efforts. This position has been viewed by many as unlikely to satisfy critics and unlikely to lead to increased donor contributions. The European Commission is reportedly expected to pledge only $232 million at the forthcoming donor conference. German Chancellor Schroder, however, has agreed with President Bush to put aside differences on the war and work cooperatively in the future. Germany has offered to assist with police training. Russia’s President Putin has indicated a willingness to assist as well, although he has indicated strong support for an active U.N. role.

The existing U.N. role was further diminished on September 25 as Secretary Annan ordered another reduction in international U.N. staff in Baghdad in response to a second bomb attack on September 22. Annan has since suggested that the U.N. might resume its political role if security is improved and if a provisional Iraqi government is soon established.

The United States introduced its draft U.N. resolution on October 2. It reportedly offers to strengthen the U.N. role, asking it to continue humanitarian relief efforts, help draft a constitution, organize elections, train civil servants and police,

and help with judicial and penal reform. It reportedly supports the “progressive” transfer of administrative power to Iraqi leadership, while maintaining authority with the U.S. Administrator. The proposal has reportedly received a “tepid” response from diplomats.44

**Background on Debate on U.N. Role.** The current debate on the role of the United Nations in post-war Iraq is a continuation of a discussion begun in March 2003 both within the U.S. Government and internationally. As the war ended, the U.S. position was that the U.N. may play a major role in humanitarian and other assistance, but should have no political authority. Secretary Powell suggested that the United States and its allies must play the “leading role” in post-war administration because it was they who took on the mission to establish democracy in Iraq. Some observers also argued that unilateral U.S. rule might make reconstruction “quicker and more efficient.” Administration officials, however, disagreed over the role of the U.N. Many in the State Department reportedly argued that a U.N.-run post-war Iraq would attract more financial support from the international community while being more acceptable to the Iraqis.45

A number of European leaders, including those of France and Germany, argued that administration of Iraq should be turned over as soon as possible to the United Nations.46 They argued that prolonged U.S. military control will be opposed by Iraqis and antagonize the Arab world. They supported a role for the U.N. such as it has had in Kosovo. They appeared reluctant to offer reconstruction assistance unless the U.N. was provided a lead role, and there was speculation that they would use the U.S. desire for a U.N. resolution ending sanctions as leverage to win support for a greater U.N. role in reconstruction.47

The European position on the U.N. role was significantly strengthened by the persistent advocacy of British Prime Minister Blair. The issue, raised at the Belfast Summit on April 7-8 as it had been in previous talks between the Prime Minister and President Bush, resulted in a pledge that the U.N. would play a “vital role” in reconstruction. The President described the U.N. role as providing aid, channeling

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international donor contributions, and suggesting people to serve on the IIA. The U.N. resolution submitted by the United States to the Security Council on May 9 appeared to match the President’s description, giving the U.N. a purely advisory role on assistance. The United States and Britain in the draft resolution supported the appointment of a U.N. Special Commissioner who would act as liaison between the U.N. and ORHA.

In part because Germany and France were much less inclined to appear as obstacles to U.S. intentions, the U.S. position was not strongly challenged. Subsequent negotiations only slightly strengthened the U.N. role. The final resolution gave the United States the nearly complete control it sought over the administration of Iraq’s reconstruction.

On May 22, 2003, the U.N. Security Council approved (14-0) resolution 1483 ending sanctions on Iraq. It recognized the United States and United Kingdom as the occupying powers until an internationally recognized government is in place. It extended the Oil-for-Food program for six months, and transferred $1 billion to establish a new Development Fund for Iraq. The Fund, the depository of future profits from the sale of oil, would finance reconstruction programs. It would be controlled by the coalition, but be monitored by an international advisory board and audited by independent accountants.

On May 23, Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian diplomat, was named U.N. Special Representative, and assumed a central role in coordinating U.N. humanitarian and reconstruction activities. He was credited with making the U.N. a more active player in the unfolding Iraqi political process than his formal role would suggest. On July 14, the U.N. announced it would soon send a team of experts to help prepare for elections expected to be held next year. Further, on July 18, in an assessment of the Iraqi situation, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the coalition partners to quickly restore power to the Iraqis and produce a clear timetable leading to self-rule. On August 14, the Security Council approved Resolution 1500 which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). It also approved the U.S.-appointed Governing Council as a step in the direction of an internationally recognized sovereign government for Iraq. On August 19, a bomb destroyed U.N. headquarters, killing Vieira de Mello and leading to the withdrawal from Iraq of more than two-thirds of the 300-member international U.N. staff.

51 For the full text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/iraq-blue-res-052103en.pdf].
53 For the full text, see [http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/467/78/PDF/N0346778.pdf?OpenElement].
Governance of Post-War Iraq

How Iraq is administered in the post-war period will strongly affect the outcome of U.S. assistance objectives and programs. Under the May 22 Security Council resolution, the United States and United Kingdom are recognized as “occupying powers,” responsible for administration until a permanent, internationally recognized government is in place. Although U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed the desire to return the governance of Iraq to its people as soon as possible, there have been predictions, but no official deadlines, for completion of all U.S. objectives. On May 9, Secretary Rumsfeld said that U.S. administration might take longer than a year. Some, including a delegation of Senators returning from Iraq in July, had suggested that the nation-building effort may take years.

As noted above, the United States had appeared to resist recent calls from France and Germany for a rapid transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government. CPA Administrator Bremer currently envisions a seven-step process leading to transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people. The first three steps have already taken place: creation of the 25-member Governing Council which took place on July 13; naming by the Council of a committee to propose a plan for writing a constitution (August 12); and appointment of 25 ministers to run the government (September 3). The final four steps are drafting a constitution; ratifying the constitution by the Iraqi people; electing a government; and transferring power from the coalition authority to the new government. On September 25, Secretary Powell set a deadline of six months for Iraqis to write a new constitution. Some Governing Council members, however, believe this is too short a time, because the committee to determine how the constitution is written has been unable to agree on a recommendation and has missed a September 30 deadline for reaching a decision.

Throughout the summer, the CPA-handpicked Council, fractured along ethnic and religious lines, had been encouraged by the CPA to move forward with its appointments of the cabinet and preparatory committee for the constitution. Although decisions of the Council and the cabinet must ultimately be approved by Bremer, the Council has increasingly taken steps independent of the CPA, including approving a law on de-Baathification and announcing it publicly before the CPA could respond. Several individual members of the Council have pressed the CPA to turn over sovereign power to the Council, thereby making more difficult the U.S.

position in the ongoing discussion regarding a new U.N. resolution.\textsuperscript{59} For discussion of the internal politics of Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, \textit{Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance}.

**Reconstruction Implementation**

Since his appointment in early May, civilian administrator Bremer has taken steps to demonstrate U.S. control and its intention to “remake” Iraq. Among these were the appointment of the Governing Council noted above. Although an Iraqi cabinet is now in place to run the government, one or more U.S. advisers are attached to each of the 25 Iraqi ministries to provide technical expertise.\textsuperscript{60}

On July 7, 2003, Bremer announced a $6.1 billion budget for Iraq through the rest of 2003. This amount is derived from future Iraqi oil sales, frozen and seized assets, and U.S. assistance. The budget includes funds for what Mr. Bremer described as “key priorities”: the improvement of security and justice ($233 million, 4% of the total), electricity ($294 million, 5%), construction ($257 million, 4%), health ($211 million, 3.5%), water and sewerage treatment ($73 million, 1%), and telecommunications ($150 million, 2.5%).\textsuperscript{61}

Actual reconstruction project work on the ground is well underway, but there is no report card measuring the degree to which U.S. reconstruction objectives are being met nationwide. Anecdotal accounts, from the media and USAID, provide a mixed picture. The dredging operation at the port of Umm Qasr, necessary to allow import of relief and reconstruction materiel and to enable oil exports to flow, has been completed. Neighborhood councils, intended to determine priorities and implement small projects, have been established in 88 Baghdad locations and are being set up in 14 other places throughout the country. USAID grants are being provided to meet identified community needs. Sixteen of the 25 ministries have been rehabilitated and reequipped. School materials are being provided, schools inventoried, and some schools beginning to be renovated. All schools will open in October. A broad range of economic policy reform efforts are being launched. These and many other reconstruction activities are countered by reports in the press of slow and ineffective implementation.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} At least one member has publicly supported the U.S. position, however. “Warning on Swift Self-Rule Timetable,” \textit{Financial Times}, September 22, 2003.

\textsuperscript{60} For example, Walter Slocombe (former DOD official) advises the Defense Ministry; Peter McPherson (former USAID Administrator) and David Nummy (Treasury), the Finance Ministry; Robert Reilly (formerly with VOA), the Information Ministry, and Robert McKee, the Oil Ministry.


While most reconstruction activities provide needed infrastructure and services, some far-reaching economic and political policy reforms are likely to stir controversy in Iraq, especially as they are viewed as imposed by an occupying administration. In a move to establish an open and free market economy, on September 21, the new Iraqi finance minister announced new laws signed by Ambassador Bremer abolishing all curbs on foreign direct investment except in natural resources. Like donor assistance and oil income, foreign investment would be a way to obtain revenue to meet development needs and stimulate the economy. However, security concerns are likely to prevent significant investment at this stage, no matter how appealing the terms offered. Further, nationalist sentiment in Iraq as in other Arab countries has in the past severely restricted foreign ownership, and investors would have to wonder whether a future Iraqi government might restore restrictions. Already several members of the Governing Council have criticized the reforms as announced by the Finance Minister, while being careful not to attack the CPA itself. According to the Financial Times, the reforms are “near universally unpopular,” Iraqi businessmen and unions fearing they would be unable to compete.  

Reconstruction Contract Issues. Reconstruction of Iraq is expected to cost billions of dollars and utilize the services of dozens of U.S. and international companies and NGOs. As a result, government agencies implementing these programs have been besieged by expressions of interest from potential contractors. Continuing security and other concerns in the unpredictable Iraqi environment may pose problems for firms interested in reconstruction work.

The main contracting agencies for relief and reconstruction activities are the Army Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for oil well repair and maintenance; the Department of State, which is handling police training; and the Agency for International Development (USAID), which is managing the widest range of economic, social, and political development programs. To date, USAID has awarded contracts in seaport and airport administration, capital construction, theater logistical support, public health, primary and secondary education, personnel support, and local governance. It has also requested submission of proposals for an agriculture


64 For information on contract solicitations and business opportunities in Iraq, see the following websites: [http://www.export.gov/iraq/], the Department of Commerce (DOC) Iraq Reconstruction Task Force; [http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/activities.html], USAID’s Iraq Reconstruction effort; and [http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/iraq.htm], website of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Army branch most directly involved in reconstruction activities on the ground in Iraq to date; and [http://www.policemission.com], the site for recruiting of police trainers under the State Department-managed, DynCorp-implemented project. Companies interested in sub-contracting under any of the USAID projects should contact the winner of the award. For example, construction-related companies can register at [http://www.bechtel.com].

65 Stevedoring Services of America was selected for seaport administration; International (continued...)
development project, a higher education program, and a second phase of infrastructure reconstruction.

An Administration decision applied to the early reconstruction contracts to waive the normal competitive bidding requirements and request bids from specific companies which were seen to have preexisting qualifications received considerable attention by the business community. The closed bidding and lack of transparency disturbed a number of legislators, and some Members of Congress asked the GAO to determine whether contracting agencies are following appropriate procedures. U.S. officials explained that only a few select firms possess the particular skills that would qualify them for the job specifications for Iraq reconstruction, and that time and security clearances were also critical factors. Foreign entities, potentially excluded by “buy America” provisions of law, and other U.S. firms, they noted, could participate as sub-contractors to the selected American firms. Sub-contractors are likely to compose half or more of the total cost of each contract. Ambassador Bremer has said that all future contracts will be competitively solicited. The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of S. 1689 requires that all reconstruction contracts employ open competition. The President can waive this provision in case of unforeseen or emergency circumstances.

In particular, it was the sole source contract for oil well repair provided to Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, whose former chief executive is Vice-President Cheney, that was and continues to be the focus of some media attention, raising concerns of favoritism and reinforcing suspicions that the war was fought for oil. The repair work, conducted by KBR for the Army Corps of Engineers, was valued at $948 million as of early September. With the war over, the Corps announced that remaining oil repair work would be competitively bid. However, KBR continues to carry out work orders pending a delayed decision on two new contracts worth up to $500 million each. Favoritism concerns have persisted as press reports appear regarding well-connected lobbyists seeking to profit from the reconstruction effort.

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Resources Group for personnel support; Creative Associates for primary and secondary education; Research Triangle for local governance; Bechtel for capital construction; the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program for theater logistical support; ABT Associates for public health; and SkyLink Air for airport administration. Grants were also provided to UNICEF for water and sanitation services, and to WHO for health system strengthening.


Criticism of Reconstruction

There has been a chorus of criticism — from American soldiers, coalition partners, analysts, NGOs, U.S. policymakers, and the media — regarding the way in which the reconstruction effort is being carried out. In early July, the Administration itself requested that a team of specialists examine Iraq reconstruction with a critical eye. The resulting report warned that the “window for cooperation may close rapidly” if progress is not made on security, delivery of basic services, and providing opportunity for political involvement. U.S. officials indicated they would take the report’s recommendations seriously. 70 Subsequent incidents demonstrating the continued failure of security, such as the August U.N. headquarters bombing, and slow pace of reconstruction appear to have led the Administration to request its $20.3 billion supplemental in order to address pressing security and infrastructure concerns and accelerate the political process. However, some Administration officials, Vice-President Cheney most notably, insist that there is no reason to “think that the strategy is flawed or needs to be changed.” 71

Disparate critical views can be categorized and summarized as follows:

**Inadequate Security.** Lack of security and order continues to threaten reconstruction efforts, including supply of electrical power, oil resources, and movement of assistance personnel. As a result, many Iraqis are angry and alienated by the occupation. Critics point to a lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. military to anticipate security needs and provide support to reconstruction implementors and call for an increase in force deployment, including international help. Some also criticize the early decision of the CPA administrator to disband the Iraqi military as contributing to the initial disorder. 72

**Slow Establishment of Iraqi-Led Governance.** Perhaps as important to many critics as the lack of order has been the slow pace of forming an Iraqi authority which could provide Iraqis with a sense of ownership in the reconstruction and democratic processes. Until September, foreign aid workers had no counterpart in the Iraqi ministries able to make decisions that might advance reconstruction. Appointed, instead of elected or chosen by an Afghan-like national assembly, the Governing Council will have to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and the international community to be fully effective — members are already disputing CPA decisions and some are seeking recognition by the U.N. Until the Council is

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embraced by Iraqis, however, serious policy decisions likely to be made by it and the CPA, such as on liberalization of the economy and privatization of state-owned enterprises, may have little long-term legitimacy and support.\textsuperscript{73}

**Too Fast Establishment of Iraqi-Led Governance.** Conversely, some analysts argue that the pace of self-governance may now be too hurried, driven by the timetable of the U.S. presidential election or the need to appease Europeans to obtain financial support rather than Iraqi needs. They argue that time must be allowed for democratic institution building.\textsuperscript{74} U.N. officials have reportedly questioned the need for a deadline on approving a constitution, noting that a legitimate process might take longer.\textsuperscript{75}

**Preventing the U.N. and International Community from Playing a Major Role.** As noted earlier, the Administration has sought to keep control of post-war reconstruction in U.S. hands, rather than internationalizing it as had been done in Kosovo and Bosnia. Critics assert that were the U.N. in a position of greater responsibility, it would deflect Iraqi criticism of the United States, legitimize occupation policies, and encourage financial and peacekeeping participation by bilateral donors. Some Members of Congress have criticized the current *modus operandi* because of the financial cost and strain put on the U.S. military. Senator Hagel has urged, “We need to internationalize this as quickly as we can.” Donors, reportedly, are unresponsive to U.S. pleas for either military or financial assistance, partly because they are not being offered a “seat at the table” in determining the future of Iraq.\textsuperscript{76}

**Inadequate Civilian Administration.** Though a part of the Department of Defense, the civilian reconstruction effort led by ORHA, some assert, was never given sufficiently high priority by the Department’s leaders to receive the security and technical support it needed to be effective. Its successor, the CPA, has also been described as understaffed, lacking experience and knowledge of the country, and too isolated from the Iraqi people (with headquarters in a former palace and requiring a military bodyguard when they venture outside).\textsuperscript{77} A British official has been quoted


\textsuperscript{77} “Iraq Leaders Seek Greater Role Now in Running Nation,” New York Times, September (continued...)
as saying of the CPA, “this is the single most chaotic organization I have ever worked for.” Some suggest that post-war planning, although begun as long ago as November 2002, was inept. In its defense, Administration officials argue that they were planning for a humanitarian crisis that never came, and had not expected the problems with reconstruction that they did encounter.

**Excessive Reliance on the Military.** Although reconstruction is inherently a civilian effort, in its early stages, it has been implemented largely by military personnel. Prior to the war, it was anticipated that the military would fill humanitarian needs as the war was winding down — a role the military has played to some degree in other crises. In part because the reconstruction phase of assistance arrived earlier than expected, military civil affairs teams are reportedly making decisions at the grassroots level regarding election of local councils, selection of community leaders, prioritization of needs, and other reconstruction activities. Some assert that these are roles for which they have not been prepared and which emphasize to the Iraqi people the “occupation” character of the U.S. presence. Some critics suggest that a corps of civilian reconstruction specialists should have been deployed around the country. Along these lines, the July 17 Assessment Mission report recommended that 18 provincial CPA offices should be established in Iraq, with 20-30 staff in each.

**Lack of Clarity and Strategy.** The Administration has been criticized for a lack of openness and clarity regarding its plans for the reconstruction process, with a consequent negative affect on the stability and trust of the Iraqi people in the work of the Coalition Provisional Authority and faltering support for its Iraq policy among the American people. Some attribute problems in reconstruction to “secretive

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decision-making by the Defense Department civilians who led the planning. Others note a lack of coordination between U.S. government agencies responsible for reconstruction. Indecision and changes of mind regarding reconstruction policy have been common. There has been no clear plan for a long-term process leading to final Iraqi government control. On the domestic front, Members of Congress have complained about the failure of the Administration to provide a clear accounting of anticipated costs and plans for the future of Iraq.

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