RL32336 -- FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001:
Issues and Options for Congress
April 6, 2004
Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division
CONTENTS
Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn
of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment
of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism
and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant
manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat;
collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence;
and to share intelligence internally and with other members of
the Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that
the FBI was seriously deficient in identifying, reporting on,
and defending against the foreign terrorist threat to the United
States.
The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into
an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react
to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring
and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into
a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes
the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement
of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller,
III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's
56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters
control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases.
He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise
control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements;
and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence.
Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the
reforms are too limited and have implementation problems. More
fundamentally, they argue that the gulf between law enforcement
and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI's reforms,
as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will
remain essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly
constrained in its ability to collect and exploit effectively
intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.
Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its
deficiencies, particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and
that the Director's intelligence reforms are appropriate for
what needs to be done. They argue that the FBI is unique among
federal agencies, because it supplies the critical ingredient
to a successful war against terrorism in the U.S. -- unmatched
law enforcement capabilities integrated with an improving intelligence
program.
The congressional oversight role includes deciding on whether
to accept, modify, or reject the FBI's intelligence reforms currently
underway. Congress may consider several options, ranging from
support of the FBI's current reforms, to establishing a stand-alone
domestic intelligence service entirely independent of the FBI.
Congress may also reevaluate how it conducts oversight of the
FBI. Pending legislation on FBI intelligence reform includes,
but is not limited to, S.
410, The Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act
of 2003, and S.
1520, The 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act.
Introduction (1)
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
have been labeled as a major intelligence failure, similar in
magnitude to that associated with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. (2) In
response to criticisms of its role in this failure, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms
to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement
agency focused on criminal investigations into a more mobile,
agile, flexible, intelligence-driven (3) agency
that can prevent acts of terrorism.
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were
sparked by congressional charges that the Intelligence Community
(IC), (4) including
the FBI, missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt
the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington. In
a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating
to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September
11, 2001, (5) (JIC)
criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat
domestically; collect useful intelligence; strategically analyze
intelligence, (6) and
to share intelligence internally, and with the rest of the IC.
According to the congressional inquiry, the FBI was incapable
of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously
handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on (7) and
defend against the foreign terrorist threat to the United States. (8)
Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large
measure on whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized
as its historically neglected and weak intelligence program,
particularly in the area of strategic analysis. They contend
the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate
domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and
local officials stop terrorists before they strike. If the FBI
is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they argue,
confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly
erode.
Critics contend the FBI's intelligence reforms are moving too
slowly (9) and
are too limited. (10) They
argue that the FBI's deeply rooted law enforcement culture and
its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact, (11) will
undermine efforts to transform the FBI into a proactive agency
able to develop and use intelligence to prevent terrorism (for
a more detailed discussion of the FBI's reactive "case file" approach,
see Appendix 4). While the British Security
Service (MI-5) may or may not be an appropriate organizational
model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad reasons, the
primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement
interests may be worthy of consideration. (12) In
justifying their pessimism, critics cite two previous failed
attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a
more detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).
Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive
background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the
intelligence field, (13) sufficiently
understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul
of the FBI's intelligence operation. (14)
Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that
its shortcomings are fixable, and that the Director's intelligence
reforms are appropriate, focused and will produce the needed
changes. (15) They
also argue that a successful war against terrorism demands that
law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And they
maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated
approach, because it already combines both law enforcement and
intelligence functions. (16)
A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify or reject
the FBI's intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the
FBI to be capable of meaningful reform, and the Director's reforms
to be the correct ones, could determine whether they accept or
modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether in favor of
a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent
of the FBI, as some have advocated. (17)
This report examines the FBI's intelligence program and its
reform. Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that
Congress might explore as part of its oversight responsibilities,
to develop and understanding of how well the FBI is progressing
in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the advantages
and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further
changes to the FBI's intelligence program. (18) Finally,
a number of appendices concerning contextual issues surrounding
FBI intelligence reform are provided.
FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined
by the JIC by attempting to transform itself into an agency that
can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal
acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring
and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into
a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes
the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement
of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller,
III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization's
56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters
control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases.
He has also established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence to exercise
control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence elements;
and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence. The FBI also has reallocated its resources in an
effort to establish an effective and efficient intelligence program.
The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings,
including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded
the FBI failed to
- Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable
to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity
by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating
in the United States." (19)
- Conduct all-source analysis. (20) "...
The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented,
law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection
and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence
mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information
systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support
specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis
for dissemination to other intelligence agencies." (21)
- Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence
on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. "... The FBI's 56 field
offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their
work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its
traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism
efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute
the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida." (22)
- Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent
with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was,
before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization
that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers)
viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little
use in ongoing operations." (23)
- Develop effective information technology systems.
The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical
systems...." (24)
Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program,
the FBI is changing how it processes intelligence by formally
embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a long-time practice
followed by the rest of the IC. It also is centralizing control
over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.
The Intelligence Cycle. FBI
is attempting to formalize and discipline its approach to intelligence
by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process through
which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by
national level officials, (2) priorities are communicated to
the collectors who collect this information through various human
and national technical means, (3) the analysis and evaluation
of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence
products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated
to consumers inside and outside the FBI and Department of Justice,
and (5) a feedback mechanism is created to provide collectors,
analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer
assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1,
below). To advance that effort, the Executive Assistant Director
for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine so-called
concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic
plan identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These
changes are seen as necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish
an effective intelligence program that is both internally coordinated
and integrated with its Intelligence Community counterparts.
Source: http://www.fbi.gov/,
as altered by the Congressional Research Service
The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional
capabilities at each step along the cycle. Success may turn,
in part, on the performance of the new Office of Intelligence,
which has the responsibility to "... manage and satisfy needs
for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence" within
the FBI and to ensure requirements "levied on the FBI by national,
international, state and local agencies" are met. (25)
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence
collection against terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved
strategic analysis that can identify gaps in their knowledge.
As will be addressed later in the "Issues for Congress" section,
the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities
in each element of the intelligence cycle.
Centralized Headquarters
Authority. Following September 11, Director Mueller
announced that henceforth, the FBI's top three priorities would
be counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively. (26) He
signaled his intention to improve the FBI's intelligence program
by, among other measures, consolidating and centralizing control
over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both at FBI Headquarters
and in the FBI's historically autonomous field offices. (27) He
restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI's
core competencies (28) and
organic to the FBI's investigative mission, (29) and
asserted that the organization's intelligence efforts had and
would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle
of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.
Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence
program. The FBI director has also created new intelligence-related
positions and entities at FBI Headquarters and across its 56
field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.
New Position of Executive
Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) and the Office
of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize
control, Director Mueller established a new position -- the
EAD-I. (30) The
EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's
four investigative/operational divisions -- counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each
division controlled and managed its own intelligence program.
To emphasize its new and enhanced priority, the Director also
elevated intelligence from program support to full program
status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI).
The OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide
intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career
path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared
within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. (31) The
Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing
an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring
that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. Finally,
the office oversees the FBI's participation in the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC). (32)
The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I,
is comprised of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to
develop career paths for intelligence analysts), (2) Strategic
Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives),
(3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence
Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements
procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative
Support, and (6) Executive Support. (33)
New Field Office Intelligence
Groups. The FBI has established field intelligence groups
in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence
and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination
at the local level. Each field intelligence group is responsible
for managing, executing and coordinating their local intelligence
resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities. (34) A
field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts, (35) who
conduct largely tactical analyses; special agents, who are
responsible for intelligence collection; and reports officers,
a newly created position. (36) Reports
officers are expected to play a key role by sifting raw, unevaluated
intelligence and determining to whom it should be disseminated
within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.
With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence
about the capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence
services, or those individuals or organizations operating on
behalf of foreign powers, working against the U.S., the FBI has
established six field demonstration projects led by experienced
FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence
capabilities at six individual field offices and making recommendations
to correct deficiencies. (37)
New National (and More
Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s). In July 2002,
the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF),
which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs). (38) The
NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI's newly established
Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which
is responsible for tracking terrorist threats and disseminating
information about them to the JTTFs, to the Department of Homeland
Security's Homeland Security Operations Center and, indirectly,
to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at
the FBI's 24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center
(SIOC). (39) With
respect to regional JTTFs, the Bureau has increased their number
from 66 to 84, and the number of state and local participants
has more than quadrupled -- from 534 to over 2,300, according
to the FBI.
Participation in the
New Terrorist Threat Integration Center. President Bush
in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the
establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC),
which is to issue threat assessments based on all-source intelligence
analysis. (40) The
TTIC is a joint venture comprised of a number of federal agencies
with counterterrorism responsibilities, and is directed by
a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named by the FBI.
The Center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight
of whom are FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004,
the Center anticipates employing 300 professionals, approximately
65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of 300 total staff,
56 are expected to be strategic analysts.
New Position of Executive
Assistant Director for Law Enforcement Services. As
will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized
for failing to effectively share information with numerous
consumer sets, including other members of the Intelligence
Community, and state and local law enforcement authorities.
In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established
the EAD for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position,
created an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. Staffed
by a former state police chief, the Office of Law Enforcement
Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures
that relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state
and local law enforcement.
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process
of making to realize its intelligence goals. With the support
of Congress, the FBI's budget has increased almost 50% since
September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6 billion in
FY2004. (41) The
recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion, including
an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related
items. (42) According
to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI
plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field
offices. (43) With
the existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its
intelligence-related staff, as well as functions which are integral
to intelligence -- such as intelligence training, language translation,
information technology, and intelligence sharing.
More Special Agent Intelligence
Collectors. The FBI has increased the number of field
agents it is devoting to its three top priorities -- counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General
Accounting Office (GAO), (44) in
FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support
Director Mueller's top the three priorities -- counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and cyber crime -- up from 25% in FY2002.
This represents an increase of approximately 1,395 agent positions,
674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing FBI
drug, white collar, and violent crime programs. (45) From
a recruitment perspective, the FBI recently established "intelligence" as
a "critical skill need" for special agent recruitment. (46)
More Intelligence Analysts. The
FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts employed as of July
2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis. (47) Prior
to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts. (48) The
FBI requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions
as part of its FY2004 funding. (49) As
mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire
900 analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field
offices. In an effort to convey that the FBI is attaching greater
importance to the role analysts play, the Office of Intelligence
has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable
role to play within the organization. (50) The
FBI, for the first time, is also attempting to establish a dedicated
career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes
of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly
the Intelligence Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations
Specialists, with the addition of a new category of employee,
Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As will
be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence
analysts, whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office,
will have promotion potential to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial).
Until now, generally, at the non-managerial level, analysts assigned
to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level,
and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level.
New recruitment standards, including the elimination of a requirement
for a bachelor's degree (51) and
a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.
Revamped Intelligence
Training. (52) The
FBI is revamping its training to reflect the role of intelligence.
The FBI has revised its new agent training, established a College
of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced
analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training
program. (53)
Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training
for new special agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week,
680 hour training program when they enter the FBI. The amount
of time agents devote to studying National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) topics (54) --
principally Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism (55) --
in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of total
training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training). (56) As
part of this updated 680 hour curriculum for new agents, the
FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training devoted solely
to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials
recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating
intelligence into all aspects of new agent training.
The new training is intended to expose new employees to the
intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, analysis, reporting
and dissemination -- and to how intelligence advances national
security goals. Agents also are taught how to use strategic and
tactical analysis effectively. (57)
All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are
required to take an introductory analytical training course when
they assume analytical responsibilities at the FBI. Historically,
the curriculum for this course -- recently renamed the Analytical
Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be "... more descriptive
and create a positive image for the training effort" (58) --
included a substantial amount of time dedicated to orienting
the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials, this
course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly
on intelligence, asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence
Community, and various analytical methodologies. According to
FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis courses --
ACES II -- are in development.
Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and
efficiency by consolidating all training in the FBI's Training
Division. Historically, the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence
Program has developed and provided its own substantive intelligence
training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail
themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses
taught by other elements of the Intelligence Community.
Improved Technology. The
FBI says it recognizes the critical importance of improving its
antiquated information technology system, (59) so
that it can more effectively share information both internally
and with the rest of the Intelligence Community, and Director
Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the FBI's
technological center-piece -- the three-stage Trilogy Project
-- continues to suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although
the FBI has installed new hardware and software, and established
local and wide area communications networks, (60) Trilogy's
third, and perhaps most important component -- the Virtual Case
File system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism
database containing 40 million documents, and generally an improved
ease of information retrieval) -- remains behind schedule and
over budget. (61)
More Intelligence Sharing
Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s domestic intelligence
scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3)
various protective "walls" were put in place to separate criminal
and intelligence investigations. As a result of these walls,
information sharing between the two sets of investigators was "sharply
limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and Justice
Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and
the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." (62) The
FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier to communication
by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to
physically work together on the same squads. As part of a new
so-called Model Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS),
all counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset
like an intelligence or espionage investigation. (63)
Improved Intelligence
Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and State and Local Officials. The
FBI also has taken steps to improve its intelligence and information
sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state and
local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant
for Law Enforcement Services, who is responsible for coordinating
law enforcement with state and local officials through a new
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has increased
dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and
localities as part of an effort to educate and raise the general
awareness of terrorism issues. And the FBI is increasing its
use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate
threat warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has
listed on its Terrorist Watch List. (64) Other
information sharing enhancements -- each addressed earlier
-- include increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing
the new position of Reports Officer.
Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI's intelligence reforms
raises several potential issues for Congress. These include
- The FBI's new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;
- Implementation challenges, including those in each area of
the Intelligence Cycle;
- Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in
Strengthening FBI Intelligence (65)
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI's new
centralized management structure will provide the organization
with the requisite formal and informal authority to ensure that
its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively and efficiently
by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect
to the FBI's law enforcement activities, field offices have had
a relatively high degree of autonomy to pursue locally determined
priorities. A related issue is whether FBI employees will embrace,
or resist, FBI Headquarters' enhanced management role and its
new emphasis on intelligence.
Supporters Contend Centralized
Management Will Help Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI's Intelligence
Program. Supporters argue that a centralized management
structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism
program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence
program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field
offices and improve headquarters-field coordination.
According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized
authority by making four principal structural changes. He has
established (1) a new position of Executive Assistant Director
for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of Intelligence
to exercise control over the FBI's historically fragmented intelligence
program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force;
and (4) established intelligence units in each field office to
collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence to FBI Headquarters.
Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the
FBI will be able to address several critical weaknesses which
the JIC Inquiry attributed to decentralized management.
First, a central management structure will enable the FBI to
more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately
assess the presence of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI
will be able to strengthen its analysis capabilities, particularly
with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to provide
a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization.
Third, FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse
and share intelligence internally, and with other IC agencies.
Finally, centralized decision-making will provide FBI Headquarters
a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field. Specifically,
it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field
agents spend less time gathering information to support criminal
prosecutions -- a legacy of the FBI's law enforcement culture
-- and more time collecting and analyzing intelligence that will
help prevent terrorist acts.
Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized
management and the FBI's new intelligence priorities, but caution
it is premature to pronounce centralized management a success.
Rather, they suggest that, "with careful planning, the commitment
of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress
should be well along in three or four years," (66) but
concede that, "we're a long way from getting there." (67)
Skeptics Agree Strong
Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making
Will Improve Program. Skeptics agree that if the FBI
is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence
program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field
offices and improve headquarters-field coordination. But they
question whether centralizing decision-making at FBI Headquarters
will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals, and they cite
two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the
impact of centralized decision making. They question whether
any structural management changes can (1) change a vested and
ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2) overcome the FBI's
lack of intelligence experience and integration with the Intelligence
Community.
Skeptics Believe FBI's Law Enforcement
Culture Will Prove Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics
assert that the FBI's entrenched law enforcement culture
will undermine its effort to establish an effective and efficient
intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI
Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that
the FBI has placed on convicting criminals -- including terrorists.
But those convictions have come after the fact, and skeptics
argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition
within its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar
intelligence methods designed to prevent terrorism. Former
Attorney General Janet Reno, for example, reportedly "leaned
toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases." (68) As
one observer said, "law enforcement and intelligence don't
fit ... law enforcement always wins." (69)
Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities
prevail over those of intelligence is because convictions that
can disrupt terrorist planning in advance of an attack often
are based on lesser charges, such as immigration violations.
FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus
more effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer
jail terms. (70) Observers
also suggest that because of the importance attached to successful
criminal prosecutions, to the extent intelligence is used, it
will be used to support criminal investigations, rather than
to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets. (71)
Skeptics are convinced that the FBI's law enforcement culture
is too entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced
by FBI Headquarters directives emphasizing the importance of
intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the Gilmore Commission,
which concluded:
... the Bureau's long-standing traditional
organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best
of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an organization
dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one
dedicated to punishing them. (72)
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized
Decision-Making Can Overcome FBI's Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics
assert that the FBI's inexperience in the intelligence area
has caused it to misunderstand the role intelligence can
play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized
decision-making can correct this deficiency.
Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to
collect intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets,
and properly analyze it. Instead, skeptics argue that notwithstanding
the FBI's current efforts to develop detailed collection requirements,
FBI agents will likely continue to "gather" evidence to support
criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly "run
faster, and jump higher," in gathering even more information
at the urging of FBI Headquarters to "improve" intelligence. (73) Missing,
however, according to critics, is the ability to implement successfully
a system in which intelligence is collected according to a strategically
determined set of collection requirements that specifically target
operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements
in turn must be informed by strategic analysis that integrates
a broader understanding of terrorist threats and known and (conceptually)
unknown gaps in the FBI's intelligence base. Critics fear that
FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their
time providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units
pursuing cases, rather than systematically and strategically
analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence gaps.
Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing
its reforms. Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will
be to transform the FBI's deeply entrenched law enforcement culture,
and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into a culture that
emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism
and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI
Director Mueller is identifying and communicating his counterterrorism
and intelligence priorities, they caution that effective reform
implementation will be the ultimate determinant of success. The
FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence
professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop
formal career development paths, including defined paths to promotion;
and continue to improve information management and technology.
These changes, they say, should be implemented in a timely fashion,
as over two and a half years have passed since the attacks of
September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve intelligence
sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal,
state and local agencies.
Technology. Inadequate
information technology, in part, contributed to the FBI being
unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components
prior to September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry. (74) GAO
and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports
conclude that the FBI still lacks an enterprise architecture,
a critical and necessary component, they argue, to successful
IT modernization. (75) In
addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan, according
to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology
leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent
GAO report found the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers
in the last 2003-2004, and the current CIO is temporarily detailed
to the FBI from the Department of Justice. (76)
One important manifestation of the FBI's historical problems
with information management is the deleterious effects it has
had on analysis. For numerous information technology reasons,
it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at Headquarters,
whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from
open sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other
entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to retrieve in a
timely manner intelligence which should be readily available
to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate
information management and technology tools and, to a lesser
extent, the lack of uniform implementation of policies relating
to information technology usage.
Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information
technology tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One
FBI official responsible for intelligence analysis stated before
the Joint Inquiry that "... Information was sometimes not made
available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned
about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative
results or restricted access to specific cases. This, of course,
risks leaving the analysts not knowing what they did not know." (77)
As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes
the important role technology must play in his reforms, and that
despite setbacks to the Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director
is making important progress. (78) However,
the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology
update, the deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File
system, did not meet its December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according
to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, as
of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General's assessment
that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement
of $458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project. (79) This
would bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.
FBI Field Leadership. An
important issue is whether the FBI's field leadership is able
and willing to support Director Mueller's reforms. Critics argue
that the lack of national security experience among the existing
cadre of Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI's field offices
represents a significant impediment to change. According to one
former senior FBI official, "... over 90 percent of the SACs
have very little national security experience ...." (80) He
suggested that lack of understanding and experience would result
in continued field emphasis on law enforcement rather than an
intelligence approach to terrorism cases.
Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably
clear that his priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention.
Some SACs who have been uncomfortable with the new priorities
have chosen to retire. But critics also contend that it will
require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field
leadership more attuned to the importance of intelligence is
in place.
Lack of Specific Implementation
Plans and Performance Metrics. Another issue is whether
the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has established
appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert
that although the FBI developed various concepts of operations
to improve its intelligence program, in many cases it lacks
specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The Department
of Justice Inspector General has recommended that "an implementation
plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing
each step and identifying the responsible FBI official" (81) be
drafted for each concept of operations.
Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific
implementation plans and is developing them. They cite as an
example the implementation plan for intelligence collection management,
almost half of which they estimate is in place. (82)
Funding and Personnel
Resources to Support Intelligence Reform. Prior to September
11, FBI analytic resources -- particularly in strategic analysis
-- were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic
analyst exclusively to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11. (83) Of
its approximately 1,200 intelligence analysts, 66% were unqualified,
according to the FBI's own assessment. (84) The
FBI also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects
spoken by radicals linked to Al-Qaeda. (85)
Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being
allocated to reflect the FBI's new intelligence priorities. "Dollars
and people are now flowing to the FBI's most critical needs ...
This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI's requested resources
for FY2004," (86) according
to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who said intelligence
analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has improved
substantially. (87) As
mentioned above, the Department of Justice is requesting at least
$76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related
programs for FY2005.
Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a "dramatic
increase" in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and
in the field -- from 159 in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and
that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts is supporting
TTIC . (88) Moreover,
as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900 intelligence
analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential
Threat Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses
and a comprehensive national terrorist threat assessment that
have been completed. (89) But
even supporters caution that institutional change now underway
at the FBI "does not occur overnight and involves major cultural
change." (90) They
estimate that with careful planning, the commitment of adequate
resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI's "transformation" will
be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer
to fully accomplish its goals. (91)
GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: "The
FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development
of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan,
as well as its realignment of staff to better address the new
priorities." Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO
concluded "...an overall transformation plan is more valuable..." than "cross
walks" between various strategic plans. (92) GAO
also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and 29 of the 34 FBI
analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of intelligence
analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities. (93) As
a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct
their own intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent
before September 11, if not after, the FBI did not establish
priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until 2003. (94) According
to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of
126 new analytic hires in 2003 -- having hired 115 or 91%. (95)
The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to
GAO, the FBI lacks a strategic human capital plan, making it
difficult to determine whether the FBI is striking an effective
balance in its analytic core. (96) It
also is difficult to assess whether the FBI is providing sufficient
institutional support, the appropriate tools, and incentive system
for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of
its priority national security missions-counterterrorism and
counterintelligence.
Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue -- and
supporters concede -- that this is not the first time the FBI
has singled out intelligence for additional resources. The FBI
did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources
to revert to the FBI's traditional priorities -- violent and
organized crime, drug trafficking, and infrastructure protection.
Additional intelligence analysts also were hired, but they were
viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking
in needed information technology tools. They also were easily
diverted to support the FBI's traditional anti-crime operations, (97) even
though efforts were made during the intervening years to protect
resources intended to support the agency's national security
efforts, including intelligence. (98)
Changes in The Intelligence
Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its intelligence
cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the
intelligence cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation
in any one element of the cycle detracts from the overall system's
effectiveness.
Will the Changes in the Collection
Requirements Produce Desired Results? The FBI's
new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal intelligence
requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated
IC national requirements system. Supporters of establishing
this mechanism maintain that the FBI has outlined a rational
process for managing collection requirements. According to
FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational
programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection
requirements. These requirements will be disseminated to
FBI field offices through a classified FBI Intranet.
Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic
lack of experience with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements
process. The FBI, they argue, traditionally has viewed domestic
collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority "collateral" function,
unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of
any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be
ad hoc.
Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble
surmounting. First, given that traditional intelligence tasking
from the Intelligence Community to the FBI has generally been
vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike
a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions
that are either too nebulous or too specific. Questions that
are overly vague can go unanswered for lack of direction. On
the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific
risk reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most
analysts would agree the intelligence discipline is more art
than science. In the final analysis, while appropriately drafted
intelligence collection requirements are an essential element
in the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced
intelligence professionals who are capable of successfully collecting
intelligence in response to the requirements. Second, they say,
the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources to managing
a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters
and field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests
for intelligence collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have
to significantly upgrade its cadre of strategic analysts, who
will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps. Fourth,
they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process
with incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors
so that requirements are fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the
intelligence requirements process depends largely on the accumulated
successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete or ineffective
implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from
the overall system's effectiveness.
Are Changes in Collection Techniques
Adequate? Both supporters and skeptics of the adequacy
of FBI's reforms agree that collecting intelligence by penetrating
terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing
terrorist acts. Supporters argue that the FBI has a long
and successful history of such penetrations when it comes
to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable
of replicating its success against terrorist cells. They
assert that the FBI has had almost a century of experience
recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers,
and that it long ago mastered collection techniques such
as electronic surveillance and witness interviews. They also
argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat
of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human
source assets. (99) They
also cite as evidence of the FBI's commitment to improving
its human intelligence collection the organization's recent
deployment of six teams to "...examine ways to expand the
FBI's human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight." (100)
Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime
penetrations differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting.
As one former senior level intelligence official put it, "It's
one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit
an al Qaeda operative." (101) This
official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may have
different motivations and support networks than organized crime
groups. (102) Moreover,
terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises
to accept as members or agents individuals who they have not
known for years and are not members of the same ethnocentric
groups, or whose bona fides are not directly supported by existing
members of the group.
As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI
is good at gathering information, it has little experience collecting
intelligence based on a policy driven, strategically determined
set of collection requirements. (103) As
one observer commented:
While the FBI correctly highlights
its unmatched ability to gather evidence and with it information,
there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which distinguishes
intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function
found in law enforcement. "Gathering" which is not driven [and]
informed by specific, focused, National Security needs is not
the same as "intelligence collection"... which means intelligence
activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a policy
driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements. (104)
Critics assert that the FBI's criminal case approach to terrorism
produces a vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection.
The FBI, they say, continues to collect and disseminate interesting
items from a river of intelligence when, instead, it should focus
collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest
potential threat. (105) But
critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI
has adopted such an approach. "They are jumping higher, faster," but
not collecting the intelligence they need, according to one critic. (106) As
a result, critics maintain, the process turns on serendipity
rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven requirements
process. Another observer put it this way:
Using the metaphor "finding the
needle in the haystack," since September 11 government agencies
have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding
needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more
focused, rigorous and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection
and analysis not collect mountains of information on innocent
civilians.
(107)
Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit
the type of individual needed to effectively collect and analyze
intelligence. The FBI's historic emphasis on law enforcement
has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as many facts as
legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because
a successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI
draws largely from the top talent in state and local law enforcement
agencies, and the military; in short, some say, those individuals
who focus on discrete facts rather than on the connections between
them. (108)
Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human
intelligence is the implementation of a formal asset vetting
program to assess the validity and credibility of human sources,
according to informed observers, who note that only three to
four percent of the FBI's human assets are vetted. (109) They
point out the failure to effectively vet its human assets has
contributed to serious problems in the FBI's criminal and national
foreign intelligence programs. (110)
Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its
national intelligence collections requirements concept of operations,
and so it may be premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend,
however, that it remains unclear what specific performance metrics
the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness of its collection.
They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war
on terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions
of suspected terrorists. (111) They
further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human
sources recruited who have provided information essential to
counterterrorism or counterintelligence as a performance metric. (112)
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some
observers contend that the FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing
its analytical program since September 11, and, indeed, over
the past two decades. During this period, they assert that the
FBI's analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved
from a disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into
a group of professionals which understands the role analysis
plays in advancing national security investigations and operations.
The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses
advanced degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional
and geographic areas. Over the last two decades, they also cite
the FBI's progress in internally promoting analysts to analytic
management positions.
Supporters of Director Mueller's reforms also point to the new
Office of Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing
a number of initiatives focused on improving the quality of analysis.
They include a new promotion plan that will provide analysts
GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14);
new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue
working in their areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional,
geographic or management positions; improved mid-career training;
and improved and more standardized recruitment practices. They
assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a chronic
problem. (113)
Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that
analysis remains a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism.
The Congressional Joint Inquiry on September 11 urged the FBI,
among other steps, to
... significantly improve strategic
analytical capabilities by assuring qualification, training,
and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access
to necessary information and resources. (114)
Although they applaud the FBI's new focus on analysis, critics
question its effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For
example, they cite the continuing paucity of analysts in the
FBI's senior national security ranks, even more than two years
after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the
FBI's continuing failure to treat analysis as a priority and
more fundamentally to understand how to leverage analysis in
the war on terror. (115) They
also point to the FBI's own internal study that found 66 percent
of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the FBI's
changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem. (116)
Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that
implementation is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive
service promotion which they advocate. (117) According
to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence analysts
at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned
that the FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence
analysts possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree, and substituted
instead a less rigorous requirement, in their view, of one year
of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement employment.
They insist that a bachelor's degree provides more formal and
necessary academic training in research methodologies, written
and oral communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according
to some critics, the collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary
analysts into one intelligence analyst position encourages a "one
size fits all" approach to analysis that may undermine a need
for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise. (118)
Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it
is trying to strengthen strategic analysis, it is failing to
commit adequate resources. The new Office of Intelligence has
a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according
to some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit,
and those who have are being forced to balance management and
executive briefing responsibilities with actually conducting
strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the
fact that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located
in each of the FBI's operational divisions are now "matrixed" to
the Office of Intelligence. That is, they report both to their
own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they
potentially confront competing priorities -- analysis largely
composed of briefing materials to support FBI executives, and
tactical analyses to support ongoing cases. (119)
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence
Sharing Adequate? The FBI continues to be criticized
for not sharing information -- a failure that variously has
been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture,
an absence of information sharing strategy, technological
problems, and legal and policy constraints. Some of the legal
and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA PATRIOT
Act. (120) And
more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and intelligence
investigators to work side by side. (121)
FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th
attacks for sharing threat information, building information
bridges to the intelligence agencies and state and local law
enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement components,
and opening itself up to external reviewers. (122) But
even supporters believe that maintaining this commendable record
will be a continuing management challenge, one which will require
constant reinforcement. (123) They
emphasize that the traditional values of FBI agents as independent
and determined must give way to include values of information
sharing and cooperation. (124)
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters
argue that perhaps the most significant change -- a sea change,
according to some -- is a recent decision to tear down the organizational
wall that has separated criminal and intelligence investigations
since the spying scandals of the 1960s. (125) As
a result, criminal and intelligence investigators will now physically
work as part of the same squads on terrorism investigations.
All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset like
intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators
to more easily use secret warrants and other methods that are
overseen by the surveillance court and are unavailable in traditional
criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result of the
USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and
criminal information to be more easily shared within the FBI. (126)
Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first
place. They assert that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals,
Congress weakened the FBI's domestic intelligence capabilities
by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was a
dangerous lack of intelligence sharing. (127) According
to the FBI, the recent change has resulted in the disruption
of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the uncovering
of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States. (128)
Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence
sharing between FBI's criminal and intelligence components, the
question remains whether the information will be shared with
other agencies and state and local law officials. Some critics
do not dispute that Director Mueller's decision will enhance
intelligence sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather,
they are concerned that more innocent people will become the
targets of clandestine surveillance. (129)
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and
With Other Agencies, Is Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates
assert intelligence sharing, both internally and with other
agencies is improving for other reasons -- the FBI is better
training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing
processes. In addition, they point to the FBI's new concept
of operations for intelligence dissemination that collapses
a number of current and different production processes into
a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI. (130) Supporters
also point favorably to Director Mueller's decision to establish
the position of "Reports Officers," whose responsibility will
be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI collection and
analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible.
Supporters who believe that sharing with state and local authorities
has improved point out that since September 11, the number
of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the principal link
between the Intelligence Community and state and local law
enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84
in 2003. The number of state and local participants has more
than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300, according to the FBI.
Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly
emphasizing technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than
vertical, flow of information to produce better results. Director
Mueller asserts that, "Our move to change the technology in the
next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way
we do business -- eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups,
giving the agents the tools they need to be interactive, pass
among themselves the best ways of doing things and we will free
up the FBI in a substantial number of ways." (131)
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling
Signs on Sharing. The FBI concedes that although it "...
has always been a great collector of information," its "sharing
of information was primarily case oriented rather than part
of an enterprise wide activity." (132) Critics
point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate
continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the
Federal government is far from perfecting a system of sharing
national security intelligence and other information. Moreover,
the flow of information remains largely one way -- from the
local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according
to the Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government
likes to receive information but is reluctant to share it completely.
One local law enforcement official said the FBI's intelligence
sharing practices remain essentially unchanged since September
11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume
of threat information, but little of real value that would
help state and local officials prevent terrorist attacks. (133) Another
state office said, "We don't get anything (of value) from the
FBI." (134)
Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding,
willingness to share intelligence, both within the FBI and with
other Intelligence Community agencies, remains a continuing problem.
According to a recent report issued by the Markle Foundation,
there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in
the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant
agencies, including the FBI. The report states that sharing remains
haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad hoc network of
personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result
of a carefully considered network architecture that optimizes
the abilities of all of the players, according to the report. (135)
The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism
information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric,
and bound by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations
and law regarding domestic and foreign intelligence. (136) In
order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more effectively,
Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter
to the existing "hub and spoke" information sharing model the
FBI is building. Advocates envision a decentralized "peer-to-peer" network
in which the various federal, state, local and private sector
entities systematically collecting information relevant to counterterrorism,
and according to established guidelines protecting civil liberties
and privacy, share that information directly with one another. (137)
The Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General, recently
reported that despite progress in terrorism information sharing,
the FBI faces considerable impediments in establishing an effective
information and intelligence sharing program, including changes
to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical weaknesses,
agency origination control procedures, (138) and
lack of "... established policies and procedures that delineate
the appropriate processes to be used to share information and
intelligence, either internally or externally." (139)
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain
Dissatisfied With Level of Sharing. Some state and local
law enforcement officials continue to criticize what they characterize
as FBI's continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while
expecting state and local law officials to share their information
with them. Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement
officials concede that there has been some improvement in the
sharing relationship since September 11. And there also is
a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement
officials that "... there may be a mis-perception that the
FBI has more detailed accurate or confirmed information than
it actually has." (140)
While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist
the exchange of information remains largely one-way. (141) And
although that hasn't prevented them from participating in their
local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did not
consider him an intelligence consumer. (142) According
to another, the FBI has shared information through the JTTF but
made clear it was doing so because "...he has a right to know,
but not a need to know," and that the FBI told him not to share
the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state
government, including the governor, who, he said, possesses a
Top Secret clearance. (143)
Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that
although JTTFs are intended to be joint enterprises, combining
federal, state and local law enforcement resources, they characterize
the relationship as more of one of "co-habitation" where the
FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are
viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater
knowledge of a particular case. (144)
With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias
so often mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to
having a more preventative bias, state and local law enforcement
officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by FBI leadership
that the "intelligence is in the case," the FBI agent on the
street still starts with a case and has a bias in the direction
of law enforcement. Moreover, one senior state law enforcement
official stated that FBI leadership is "... still being led by
individuals who have a criminal law mindset." (145)
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing
Procedures. Some state and local law enforcement officials
are sufficiently displeased with the current sharing relationship
that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland Security
establish regional intelligence centers through which classified
raw and finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be
disseminated. (146) The
centers would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel
drawn principally from State Police and State DHS Offices and
would serve as "... regional repository and clearinghouse for
terrorist related information gathered at the federal level,
consisting of trends, indicators, and warnings." (147) Through
a pending arrangement with the DHS, Directorate of Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the goal would
be to "... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend
analysis of terrorism intelligence," (148) at
the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal. (149)
Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established
intelligence oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst
for the creation of these committees was public revelations resulting
from press coverage and congressional investigations that the
Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts
against foreign leaders, and collected information concerning
the political activities of some U.S. citizens during the late
1960s and early 1970s. (150) Intelligence
Committee Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership
of each chamber of Congress, and serve terms of eight years on
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and six years on
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Terms limited
were established so that a greater number of Members could become
knowledgeable on intelligence
