RL32267 -- The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years
March 11, 2004
Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
CONTENTS
Summary
This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution,
its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background
on a variety of cases where it was utilized, or issues of its
applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually.
In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit
U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without
a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution
and its purposes continues to be a potential subject of controversy.
On June 7, 1995 the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an
amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution
that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since
the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed
U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional
authorization, Rep. Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under
the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action
in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal
court suit to enforce Presidential compliance with the terms
of the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) was passed over the
veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures
for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to
send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires
the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S.
forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a
report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, section
5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within
60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends
the time period. Section 3 requires that the "President in every
possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing" U.S.
Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
From 1975 through 2003, Presidents have submitted 111 reports
as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the
1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited section 4(a)(1) which triggers
the time limit, and in this case the military action was completed
and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict
when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President
since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of
military activities from embassy evacuations to full scale combat
military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the
2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo and the anti-terrorism
actions in Afghanistan. In some instances U.S. Armed Forces have
been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress
under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised
its authority to determine that the requirements of section 4(a)(1)
became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational
Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002,
Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against
Iraq. In several instances neither the President, Congress, nor
the courts have been willing to trigger the War Powers Resolution
mechanism.
Introduction
Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress
and the President. Among other relevant grants, Congress has
the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces
(Article I, section 8), while the President is Commander in Chief
(Article II, section 2). It is generally agreed that the Commander
in Chief role gives the President power to utilize the armed
forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there
has long been controversy over whether he is constitutionally
authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad without
a declaration of war or other congressional authorization.
Congressional concern about Presidential use of armed forces
without congressional authorization intensified after the Korean
conflict. During the Vietnam war, Congress searched for a way
to assert authority to decide when the United States should become
involved in a war or the armed forces be utilized in circumstances
that might lead to hostilities. On November 7, 1973, it passed
the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the veto of President
Nixon. The main purpose of the Resolution was to establish procedures
for both branches to share in decisions that might get the United
States involved in war. The drafters sought to circumscribe the
President's authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities
or potential hostilities without a declaration of war or other
congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to
permit him to respond to attack or other emergencies.
The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment
has been mixed, and after 30 years it remains controversial.
Some Members of Congress believe the Resolution has on some occasions
served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by Presidents,
provided a mode of communication, and given Congress a vehicle
for asserting its war powers. Others have sought to amend the
Resolution because they believe it has failed to assure a congressional
voice in committing U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad.
Others in Congress, along with executive branch officials, contend
that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign
policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution
is unconstitutional and impractical. Some have argued for its
repeal.
This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution,
actual experience in its use from its enactment in 1973 through
October 2001, and proposed amendments to it. Appendix 1 lists
instances which Presidents have reported to Congress under the
War Powers Resolution, and Appendix 2 lists representative instances
of the use of U.S. armed forces that were not reported.
Provisions of the War Powers Resolution (P.L.
93-148)
Title
Section 1 establishes the title, "The War Powers Resolution." The
law is frequently referred to as the "War Powers Act," the title
of the measure passed by the Senate. Although the latter is not
technically correct, it does serve to emphasize that the War
Powers Resolution, embodied in a joint resolution which complies
with constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law.
Purpose and Policy
Section 2 states the Resolution's purpose and policy, with Section
2(a) citing as the primary purpose to "insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued
use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations."
Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution as the basis for legislation on the war powers.
It provides that "Under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution
it is specifically provided that Congress shall have the power
to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution,
not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States...."
Section 2(c) states the policy that the powers of the President
as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. armed forces into situations
of hostilities or imminent hostilities "are exercised only pursuant
to --
(1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."
Consultation Requirement
Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President "in
every possible instance" to consult with Congress before introducing
U.S. Armed Forces into situations of hostilities and imminent
hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed
forces remain in such situations. The House report elaborated:
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition
of consultation. Rejected was the notion that
consultation should be synonymous with merely being informed. Rather,
consultation in this provision means that a decision is pending
on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the
President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances,
their approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation
to be meaningful, the President himself must participate and all
information relevant to the situation must be made available. (1)
The House version specifically called for consultation between the President
and the leadership and appropriate committees. This was changed to less
specific wording in conference, however, in order to provide more flexibility.
Reporting Requirements
Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces
U.S. armed forces abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is section
4(a)(1) because it triggers the time limit in section 5(b). Section 4(a)(1)
requires reporting within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration of
war or congressional authorization, the introduction of U.S. armed forces "into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances."
Some indication of the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities
is given in the House report on its War Powers bill:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed
conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was
considered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in
which fighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses
a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there
is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities" denotes
a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of
confrontation or for actual armed conflict. (2)
Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "into
the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement,
repair, or training of such forces." According to the House report this
was to cover
the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual
fighting but some risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities.
A report would be required any time combat military forces were sent to another
nation to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make
the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand
in 1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential
reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emergency
aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities. (3)
Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops "in
numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped
for combat already located in a foreign nation." The House report elaborated:
While the word "substantially" designates
a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-sense understanding
of the numbers involved. A 100% increase in numbers of Marine guards
at an embassy -- say from 5 to 10 -- clearly would not be an occasion
for a report. A thousand additional men sent to Europe under present
circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength
of about 300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000 would mean
an increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circumstance, President
Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when he
raised the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000. (4)
All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the
Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to
set forth:
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction
took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information
as Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing
the nation to war.
Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically,
and at least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into
hostilities or any other situation in section 4(a).
The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was
to "ensure that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be provided
with all the information it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities
with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States
Armed Forces abroad." (5)
Congressional Action
Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report
under section 4(a)(1). It provides that if a report is transmitted during
a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned
by at least 30% of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly
request the President to convene Congress in order to consider the report
and take appropriate action.
Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution.
After a report "is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to
section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier", section 5(b) requires the President
to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress
(1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the period
by law; or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
on the United States. The 60 days can be extended for 30 days by the President
if he certifies that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety
of United States Armed Forces" requires their continued use in the course
of bringing about their removal.
Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this
subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the
legislative veto. It is discussed in Part II of this report.
Priority Procedures
Section 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration
of a joint resolution or bill introduced to authorize the use of armed
forces under section 5 (b). They provide for:
(a) A referral to the House Foreign Affairs [International Relations]
or Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee to report one measure
not later than 24 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period,
unless the relevant House determines otherwise by a vote;
(b) The reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant
House and be voted on within three calendar days, unless that House determines
otherwise by vote; in the Senate the debate is to be equally divided between
proponents and opponents;
(c) A measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee
of the other House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before
the expiration of the 60 day period, the reported bill to become the pending
business of that House and be voted on within 3 calendar days unless determined
otherwise by a vote;
(d) Conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before
the expiration of the 60 day period. If they cannot agree within 48 hours,
the conferees are to report back in disagreement, and such report is to
be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of the 60 day
period.
Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolution
to withdraw forces under section 5(c). For a recent use of these procedures
see the section on the legislative veto, below.
Interpretive Provisions
Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution.
Section 8(a) states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to
be inferred from any provision of law or treaty unless it specifically
authorizes the introduction of armed forces into hostilities or potential
hostilities and states that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." This language
was derived from a Senate measure and was intended to prevent a security
treaty or military appropriations act from being used to authorize the
introduction of troops. It was also aimed against using a broad resolution
like the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (6) to justify hostilities
abroad. This resolution had stated that the United States was prepared
to take all necessary steps, including use of armed force, to assist certain
nations, and it was cited by Presidents and many Members as congressional
authorization for the Vietnam war.
Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not
required
to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with
members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters
operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to
the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United
Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such
date.
This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution
did not prevent U.S. forces from participating in certain joint military
exercises with allied or friendly organizations or countries. The conference
report stated that the "high-level" military commands meant the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, (NATO), the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)
and the United Nations command in Korea.
Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment
of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces of other
countries when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities. The conference
report on the War Powers Resolution explained that this was language modified
from a Senate provision requiring specific statutory authorization for
assigning members of the Armed Forces for such purposes. The report of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on its bill said:
The purpose of this provision is to prevent
secret, unauthorized military support activities and to prevent a repetition
of many of the most controversial and regrettable actions in Indochina.
The ever deepening ground combat involvement of the United States in
South Vietnam began with the assignment of U.S. "advisers" to accompany
South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and in Laos, secretly and without
congressional authorization, U.S. "advisers" were deeply engaged in the
war in northern Laos. (7)
Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to alter
the constitutional authority of either the Congress or the President. It
also specifies that nothing is to be construed as granting any authority
to introduce troops that would not exist in the absence of the Resolution.
The House report said that this provision was to help insure the constitutionality
of the Resolution by making it clear that nothing in it could be interpreted
as changing the powers delegated by the Constitution.
Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its
application is found invalid, the remainder of the Resolution is not to
be affected.
Constitutional Questions Raised
From its inception, the War Powers Resolution was controversial because
it operated on the national war powers, powers divided by the Constitution
in no definitive fashion between the President and Congress. Congress adopted
the resolution in response to the perception that Presidents had assumed
more authority to send forces into hostilities than the framers of the
Constitution had intended for the Commander-in-Chief. President Nixon in
his veto message challenged the constitutionality of the essence of the
War Powers Resolution, and particularly two provisions. (8) He argued that
the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to direct the withdrawal
of troops by concurrent resolution, was unconstitutional. He also argued
that the provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless
Congress passed legislation authorizing such use was unconstitutional because
it checked Presidential powers without affirmative congressional action.
Every President since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution has taken
the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief.
War Powers of President and Congress
The heart of the challenge to the constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution rests on differing interpretations by the two branches of the
respective war powers of the President and Congress. These differing interpretations,
especially the assertions of Presidential authority to send forces into
hostile situations without a declaration of war or other authorization
by Congress, were the reason for the enactment of the Resolution.
The congressional view was that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress
the power to declare war, meaning the ultimate decision whether or not
to enter a war. Most Members of Congress agreed that the President as Commander
in Chief had power to lead the U.S. forces once the decision to wage war
had been made, to defend the nation against an attack, and perhaps in some
instances to take other action such as rescuing American citizens. But,
in this view, he did not have the power to commit armed forces to war.
By the early 1970s, the congressional majority view was that the constitutional
balance of war powers had swung too far toward the President and needed
to be corrected. Opponents argued that Congress always held the power to
forbid or terminate U.S. military action by statute or refusal of appropriations,
and that without the clear will to act the War Powers Resolution would
be ineffective.
In his veto message, President Nixon said the Resolution would impose
restrictions upon the authority of the President which would be dangerous
to the safety of the Nation and "attempt to take away, by a mere legislative
act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution
for almost 200 years."
The War Powers Resolution in section 2(c) recognized the constitutional
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce forces into
hostilities or imminent hostilities as "exercised only pursuant to (1)
a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces." The executive branch has contended that
the President has much broader authority to use forces, including for such
purposes as to rescue American citizens abroad, rescue foreign nationals
where such action facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens, protect U.S.
Embassies and legations, suppress civil insurrection, implement the terms
of an armistice or cease-fire involving the United States, and carry out
the terms of security commitments contained in treaties. (9)
Legislative Veto
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,
ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in section 244(c)(2)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (10) Although the
case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the decision cast
doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not presented
to the President for signature. The Court held that to accomplish what
the House attempted to do in the Chadha case "requires action
in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription
for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment
to the President." On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court's decision striking down a provision in another law (11) that permitted
Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House) resolution. (12)
Since section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress
so directs by a concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under
the reasoning applied by the Court. (13) A concurrent
resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment
to the President for signature or veto. Some legal analysts contend, nevertheless,
that the War Powers Resolution is in a unique category which differs from
statutes containing a legislative veto over delegated authorities. (14) Perhaps more
important, some observers contend, if a majority of both Houses ever voted
to withdraw U.S. forces, the President would be unlikely to continue the
action for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance
further action. Because the War Powers Resolution contains a separability
clause in section 9, most analysts take the view that the remainder of
the joint resolution would not be affected even if section 5(c) were found
unconstitutional. (15)
Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity
of the concurrent resolution mechanism for the withdrawal of troops. On
October 20, 1983, the Senate voted to amend the War Powers Resolution by
substituting a joint resolution, which requires presentment to the President,
for the concurrent resolution in section 5(c), and providing that it would
be handled under the expedited procedures in section 7. The House and Senate
conferees agreed not to amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but to
adopt a free standing measure relating to the withdrawal of troops. The
measure, which became law, provided that any joint resolution or bill to
require the removal of U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities outside
the United States without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization
would be considered in accordance with the expedited procedures of section
601(b) of the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, (16) except
that it would be amendable and debate on a veto limited to 20 hours. (17) The priority
procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate only. Handling
of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber's discretion.
House Members attempted to use section 5(c) to obtain a withdrawal of
forces from Somalia. On October 22, 1993, Representative Benjamin Gilman
introduced H.Con.Res. 170, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution,
directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia by January
31, 1994. Using the expedited procedures called for in section 5(c), the
Foreign Affairs Committee amended the date of withdrawal to March 31, 1994,
(the date the President had already agreed to withdraw the forces), and
the House adopted H.Con.Res. 170. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported: (18)
Despite such genuine constitutionality questions,
the committee acted in accordance with the expedited procedures in section
7. The committee action was premised on a determination that neither
individual Members of Congress nor Committees of Congress should make
unilateral judgments about the constitutionality of provisions of law.
Despite the use of the phrase "directs the President", the sponsor of
the resolution and Speaker of the House Thomas Foley expressed the view
that because of the Chadha decision, the resolution would be non-binding.
The March 31, 1994, withdrawal date was later enacted as section 8151 of
P.L. 103-139, signed November 11, 1993.
Automatic Withdrawal Provision
The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial
provision of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) requires the President
to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities within 60-90 days after a report
is submitted or required to be submitted under section 4(a)(1). The triggering
of the time limit has been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents
to report, or Congress to insist upon a report, under section 4(a)(1).
Drafters of the War Powers Resolution included a time limit to provide
some teeth for Congress, in the event a President assumed a power to act
from provisions of resolutions, treaties, or the Constitution which did
not constitute an explicit authorization. The Senate report called the
time limit "the heart and core" of the bill that "represents, in an historic
sense, a restoration of the constitutional balance which has been distorted
by practice in our history and, climatically, in recent decades." (19) The House report
emphasized that the Resolution did not grant the President any new authority
or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not already
have.
Administration officials have objected that the provision would require
the withdrawal of U.S. forces simply because of congressional inaction
during an arbitrary period. Since the resolution recognizes that the President
has independent authority to use armed forces in certain circumstances,
they state, "on what basis can Congress seek to terminate such independent
authority by the mere passage of time?" (20) In addition,
they argue, the imposition of a deadline interferes with successful action,
signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a basis for
hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop
an action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field. The issue has
not been dealt with by the courts.
Major Cases and Issues Prior to the Persian Gulf War
Perceptions of the War Powers Resolution tended to be set during the Cold
War. During the 1970s the issues revolved largely around the adequacy of
consultation. The 1980s raised more serious issues of Presidential compliance
and congressional willingness to use the War Powers Resolution to restrain
Presidential action. With regard to Lebanon in 1983, Congress itself invoked
the War Powers Resolution, but in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf tanker war
Congress chose not to do so. Following is a summary of major U.S. military
actions and the issues they raised relating to the War Powers Resolution
from its enactment in 1973 to August 1990. (21)
Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation?
As the Vietnam war ended, on three occasions, in April 1975, President
Ford used U.S. forces to help evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals.
In addition, in May 1975 President Ford ordered the retaking of a U.S.
merchant vessel, the SS Mayaguez which had been seized by Cambodian
naval patrol vessels. All four actions were reported to Congress citing
the War Powers Resolution. The report on the Mayaguez recapture was the
only War Powers report to date to specifically cite section 4(a)(1), but
the question of the time limit was moot because the action was over by
the time the report was filed.
Among the problems revealed by these first four cases were differences
of opinion between the two branches on the meaning of consultation. The
Ford Administration held that it had met the consultation requirement because
the President had directed that congressional leaders be notified prior
to the actual commencement of the introduction of armed forces. The prevailing
congressional view was that consultation meant that the President seek
congressional opinion, and take it into account, prior to making a decision
to commit armed forces. (22)
Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt: Is Consultation Always
Necessary and Possible?
After an unsuccessful attempt on April 24, 1980, to rescue American hostages
being held in Iran, President Carter submitted a report to Congress to
meet the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, but he did not consult
in advance. The Administration took the position that consultation was
not required because the mission was a rescue attempt, not an act of force
or aggression against Iran. In addition, the Administration contended that
consultation was not possible or required because the mission depended
upon total surprise.
Some Members of Congress complained about the lack of consultation, especially
because legislative-executive meetings had been going on since the Iranian
crisis had begun the previous year. Just before the rescue attempt, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had sent a letter to Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance requesting formal consultations under the War Powers Resolution.
Moreover, shortly before the rescue attempt, the President outlined plans
for a rescue attempt to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd but did not
say it had begun. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church
stressed as guidelines for the future: (1) consultation required giving
Congress an opportunity to participate in the decision making process,
not just informing Congress that an operation was underway; and (2) the
judgment could not be made unilaterally but should be made by the President
and Congress. (23)
El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent
Hostilities?
One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy because it
was never reported under the War Powers Resolution was the dispatch of
U.S. military advisers to El Salvador. At the end of February 1981, the
Department of State announced the dispatch of 20 additional military advisers
to El Salvador to aid its government against guerilla warfare. There were
already 19 military advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration.
The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were organized and armed
by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14, the Administration
had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including experts in combat training.
The President did not report the situation under the War Powers Resolution.
A State Department memorandum said a report was not required because the
U.S. personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situations
of imminent hostilities. The memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances
occurred that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution
would be complied with. A justification for not reporting under section
4(a)(2) was that the military personnel being introduced were not equipped
for combat. (24) They would,
it was maintained, carry only personal sidearms which they were authorized
to use only in their own defense or the defense of other Americans.
The State Department held that section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution
was not intended to require a report when U.S. military personnel might
be involved in training foreign military personnel, if there were no imminent
involvement of U.S. personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador,
the memorandum said, U.S. military personnel "will not act as combat advisors,
and will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols,
or in any other situation where combat is likely."
On May 1, 1981, eleven Members of Congress challenged the President's
action by filing suit on grounds that he had violated the Constitution
and the War Powers Resolution by sending the advisers to El Salvador. Eventually
there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members
(13 Senators and 16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the
suit, contending that a number of legislative measures were then pending
before Congress and that Congress had ample opportunity to vote to end
military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.
On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed
the suit. She ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question
of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador were involved in a hostile or
potentially hostile situation. While there might be situations in which
a court could conclude that U.S. forces were involved in hostilities, she
ruled, the "subtleties of fact-finding in this situation should be left
to the political branches." She noted that Congress had taken no action
to show it believed the President's decision was subject to the War Powers
Resolution. (25) On
November 18, 1983, a Federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal and on
June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court declined consideration of an appeal of
that decision. (26)
As the involvement continued and casualties occurred among the U.S. military
advisers, various legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution
and El Salvador were introduced. Some proposals required a specific authorization
prior to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in
El Salvador. (27) Other proposals
declared that the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated
compliance with section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring the
President to submit a report. (28)
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported that the President had "a clear obligation under the
War Powers Resolution to consult with Congress prior to any future decision
to commit combat forces to El Salvador." (29) On July 26,
1983, the House rejected an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill
(H.R. 2969) to limit the number of active duty military advisers in El
Salvador to 55, unless the President reported any increase above that level
under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. (30) Nevertheless,
the Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.
Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training?
Military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and subsequent years raised the
question of when military exercises should be reported under the War Powers
Resolution. Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of introduction of troops
equipped for combat, but exempts deployments which relate solely to training.
On July 27, 1983, President Reagan announced "joint training exercises" planned
for Central America and the Caribbean. The first contingent of U.S. troops
landed in Honduras on August 8, 1983, and the series of ground and ocean
exercises continued for several years, involving thousands of ground troops
plus warships and fighter planes.
The President did not report the exercises under the War Powers Resolution.
He characterized the maneuvers as routine and said the United States had
been regularly conducting joint exercises with Latin American countries
since 1965. Some Members of Congress, on the other hand, contended that
the exercises were part of a policy to support the rebels or "contras" fighting
the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, threatening that government, and
increased the possibility of U.S. military involvement in hostilities in
Central America.
Several Members of Congress called for reporting the actions under the
War Powers Resolution, but some sought other vehicles for congressional
control. In 1982, the Boland amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act
had already prohibited use of funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua
or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua or Honduras. (31) Variations of
this amendment followed in subsequent years. After press reports in 1985
that the option of invading Nicaragua was being discussed, the Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 stated the sense of Congress that
U.S. armed forces should not be introduced into or over Nicaragua for combat. (32) In
1986, after U.S. helicopters ferried Honduran troops to the Nicaraguan
border area, Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from participating in assistance
within land areas of Honduras and Costa Rica within 120 miles of the Nicaraguan
border, or from entering Nicaragua to provide military advice or support
to paramilitary groups operating in that country. (33) Gradually
the issue died with peace agreements in the region and the electoral defeat
of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1990.
Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers Resolution?
The War Powers Resolution faced a major test when Marines sent to participate
in a Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982 became the targets of hostile
fire in August 1983. During this period President Reagan filed three reports
under the War Powers Resolution, but he did not report under section 4(a)(1)
that the forces were being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities,
thus triggering the 60-90 day time limit.
On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution determining that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983. (34) In the same
resolution, Congress authorized the continued participation of the Marines
in the Multinational Force for 18 months. The resolution was a compromise
between Congress and the President. Congress obtained the President's signature
on legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution for the first time, but
the price for this concession was a congressional authorization for the
U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months.
The events began on July 6, 1982, when President Reagan announced he would
send a small contingent of U.S. troops to a multinational force for temporary
peacekeeping in Lebanon. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Clement Zablocki wrote President Reagan that if such a force were sent,
the United States would be introducing forces into imminent hostilities
and a report under section 4(a)(1) would be required. When the forces began
to land on August 25, President Reagan reported but did not cite section
4(a)(1) and said the agreement with Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities.
After overseeing the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization
force, the Marines in the first Multinational Force left Lebanon on September
10, 1982.
The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982.
President Reagan announced that the United States, France, and Italy had
agreed to form a new multinational force to return to Lebanon for a limited
period of time to help maintain order until the lawful authorities in Lebanon
could discharge those duties. The action followed three events that took
place after the withdrawal of the first group of Marines: the assassination
of Lebanon President-elect Bashir Gemayel, the entry of Israeli forces
into West Beirut, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians by Lebanese
Christian militiamen.
On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200
Marines had begun to arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite section
4(a)(1), saying instead that the American force would not engage in combat.
As a result of incidents in which Marines were killed or wounded, there
was again controversy in Congress on whether the President's report should
have been filed under section 4(a)(1). In mid-1983 Congress passed the
Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 requiring statutory authorization
for any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S. Armed Forces
in Lebanon. It also included Section 4(b) that stated:
Nothing in this section is intended to modify,
limit, or suspend any of the standards and procedures prescribed by the
War Powers Resolution of 1983. (35)
President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time
on August 30, 1983, still not citing section 4(a)(1), after fighting broke
out between various factions in Lebanon and two Marines were killed.
The level of fighting heightened, and as the Marine casualties increased
and the action enlarged, there were more calls in Congress for invocation
of the War Powers Resolution. Several Members of Congress said the situation
had changed since the President's first report and introduced legislation
that took various approaches. Senator Charles Mathias introduced S.J.Res.
159 stating that the time limit specified in the War Powers Resolution
had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the forces to remain in Lebanon
for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the 60-day period. Representative
Thomas Downey introduced H.J.Res. 348 directing the President to report
under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Senator Robert Byrd
introduced S.J.Res. 163 finding that section 4(a)(1) of the war powers
resolution applied to the present circumstances in Lebanon. The House Appropriations
Committee approved an amendment to the continuing resolution for fiscal
year 1984 (H.J.Res. 367), sponsored by Representative Clarence Long, providing
that after 60 days, funds could not be "obligated or expended for peacekeeping
activities in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces," unless the President
had submitted a report under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.
A similar amendment was later rejected by the full body, but it reminded
the Administration of possible congressional actions.
On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on
a compromise resolution invoking section 4(a)(1) and authorizing the Marines
to remain for 18 months. The resolution became the first legislation to
be handled under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Resolution.
On September 28, the House passed H.J.Res. 364 by a vote of 270 to 161.
After three days of debate, on September 29, the Senate passed S.J.Res.
159 by a vote of 54 to 46. The House accepted the Senate bill by a vote
of 253 to 156. As passed, the resolution contained four occurrences that
would terminate the authorization before eighteen months: (1) the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President certified continued
U.S. participation was required to accomplish specified purposes; (2) the
assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities
of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation of other effective security
arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation
in the Multinational Force. (36)
Shortly afterward, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon were
killed by a suicide truck bombing, bringing new questions in Congress and
U.S. public opinion about U.S. participation. On February 7, 1984, President
Reagan announced the Marines would be redeployed and on, March 30, 1984,
reported to Congress that U.S. participation in the Multinational Force
in Lebanon had ended.
Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work?
On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress "consistent
with" the War Powers Resolution that he had ordered a landing of approximately
1900 U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel in Grenada. He said that the
action was in response to a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States which had formed a collective security force to restore order in
Grenada, where anarchic conditions had developed, and to protect the lives
of U.S. citizens.
Many Members of Congress contended that the President should have cited
section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered
the 60-90 day time limitation. On November 1, 1983, the House supported
this interpretation when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H.J Res. 402
declaring that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) had become operative
on October 25. The Senate did not act on this measure and a conference
was not held. The Senate had adopted a similar measure on October 28 by
a vote of 64 to 20, but on November 17 the provision was deleted in the
conference report on the debt limit bill to which it was attached. (37) Thus both Houses
had voted to invoke section 4(a)(1), but the legislation was not completed.
On November 17, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the Administration
had indicated that there was no need for action as the combat troops would
be out within the 60-90 day time period. Speaker Thomas O'Neill took the
position that, whether or not Congress passed specific legislation, the
War Powers Resolution had become operative on October 25. By December 15,
1983, all U.S. combat troops had been removed from Grenada.
Eleven Members of Congress filed a suit challenging the constitutionality
of President Reagan's invasion of Grenada. A district judge held that courts
should not decide such cases unless the entire Congress used the institutional
remedies available to it. (38) An appellate
court subsequently held that the issue was moot because the invasion had
been ended. (39)
Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake
in Response to International Terrorism?
The use of U.S. forces against Libya in 1986 focused attention on the
application of the War Powers Resolution to use of military force against
international terrorism.
Tensions between the United States and Libya under the leadership of Col.
Muammar Qadhafi had been mounting for several years, particularly after
terrorist incidents at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985.
On January 7, 1986, President Reagan said that the Rome and Vienna incidents
were the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi's
backing that constituted armed aggression against the United States.
The War Powers issue was first raised on March 24, 1986, when Libyan forces
fired missiles at U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra. In response,
the United States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the Libyan
missile site involved. The U.S. presence in the Gulf of Sidra, an area
claimed by Libya, was justified as an exercise to maintain freedom of the
seas, but it was widely considered a response to terrorist activities.
Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in
West Berlin occurred and an American soldier was killed. On April 14 President
Reagan announced there was irrefutable evidence that Libya had been responsible,
and U.S. Air Force planes had conducted bombing strikes on headquarters,
terrorist facilities, and military installations in Libya in response.
The President reported both cases to Congress although the report on the
bombing did not cite section 4(a)(1) and the Gulf of Sidra report did not
mention the War Powers Resolution at all. Since the actions were short
lived, there was no issue of force withdrawal, but several Members introduced
bills to amend the War Powers Resolution. One bill called for improving
consultation by establishing a special consultative group in Congress. (40) Others called
for strengthening the President's hand in combating terrorism by authorizing
the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to use all measures
he deems necessary to protect U.S. persons against terrorist threats. (41)
Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent?
The War Powers Resolution became an issue in activities in the Persian
Gulf after an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile on the USS Stark on
May 17, 1987, killing 37 U.S. sailors. The attack broached the question
of whether the Iran-Iraq war had made the Persian Gulf an area of hostilities
or imminent hostilities for U.S. forces. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. adoption
of a policy of reflagging and providing a naval escort of Kuwaiti oil tankers
through the Persian Gulf raised full force the question of whether U.S.
policy was risking involvement in war without congressional authorization.
During 1987 U.S. Naval forces operating in the Gulf increased to 11 major
warships, 6 minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats, and a battleship-led
formation was sent to the Northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to augment
an aircraft carrier battle group already there.
For several months the President did not report any of the deployments
or military incidents under the War Powers Resolution, although on May
20, 1987, after the Stark incident, Secretary of State Shultz
submitted a report similar to previous ones consistent with War Powers
provisions, but not mentioning the Resolution. No reports were submitted
after the USS Bridgeton struck a mine on July 24, 1987, or the
U.S.-chartered Texaco-Caribbean struck a mine on August 10 and
a U.S. F-14 fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian aircraft perceived
as threatening.
Later, however, after various military incidents on September 23, 1987,
and growing congressional concern, the President began submitting reports "consistent
with" the War Powers Resolution and on July 13, 1988, submitted the sixth
report relating to the Persian Gulf. (42) None of the
reports were submitted under section 4(a)(1) or acknowledged that U.S.
forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The
Reagan administration contended that the military incidents in the Persian
Gulf, or isolated incidents involving defensive reactions, did not add
up to hostilities or imminent hostilities as envisaged in the War Powers
Resolution. It held that "imminent danger" pay which was announced for
military personnel in the Persian Gulf on August 27, 1987, did not trigger
section 4 (a)(1). Standards for danger pay, namely, "subject to the threat
of physical harm or danger on the basis of civil insurrection, civil war,
terrorism, or wartime conditions," were broader than for hostilities of
the War Powers Resolution, and had been drafted to be available in situations
to which the War Powers Resolution did not apply. (43)
Some Members of Congress contended that if the President did not report
under section 4(a)(1), Congress itself should declare such a report should
have been submitted, as it had in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution.
Several resolutions to this effect were introduced, some authorizing the
forces to remain, but none were passed. (44) The decisive
votes on the subject took place in the Senate. On September 18, 1987, the
Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment to the Defense authorization bill
(S. 1174) to apply the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. The Senate
also sustained points of order against consideration of S.J.Res. 217, which
would have invoked the War Powers Resolution, on December 4, 1987, and
a similar bill the following year, S.J.Res. 305, on June 6, 1988.
The Senate opted for a different approach, which was to use legislation
to assure a congressional role in the Persian Gulf policy without invoking
the War Powers Resolution. Early in the situation, both Chambers passed
measures requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress
prior to the implementation of any agreement between the United States
and Kuwait for U.S. military protection of Kuwaiti shipping, and such a
report was submitted June 15, 1987. Later, the Senate passed a measure
that called for a comprehensive report by the President within 30 days
and provided expedited procedures for a joint resolution on the subject
after an additional 30 days. (45) The
House did not take action on the bill.
As in the case of El Salvador, some Members took the War Powers issue
to court. On August 7, 1987, Representative Lowry and 110 other Members
of Congress filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
asking the court to declare that a report was required under section 4(a)(1).
On December 18, 1987, the court dismissed the suit, holding it was a nonjusticiable
political question, and that the plaintiffs' dispute was "primarily with
fellow legislators." (46)
Compliance with the consultation requirement was also an issue. The Administration
developed its plan for reflagging and offered it to Kuwait on March 7,
1987, prior to discussing the plan with Members of Congress. A June 15,
1987, report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated on the reflagging
policy, "As soon as Kuwait indicated its acceptance of our offer, we began
consultations with Congress which are still ongoing." (47) This
was too late for congressional views to be weighed in on the initial decision,
after which it became more difficult to alter the policy. Subsequently,
however, considerable consultation developed and the President met with
various congressional leaders prior to some actions such as the retaliatory
actions in April 1988 against an Iranian oil platform involved in mine-laying.
With recurring military incidents, some Members of Congress took the position
that the War Powers Resolution was not being complied with, unless the
President reported under section 4(a)(1) or Congress itself voted to invoke
the Resolution. Other Members contended the Resolution was working by serving
as a restraint on the President, who was now submitting reports and consulting
with Congress. (48) Still other
Members suggested the Persian Gulf situation was demonstrating the need
to amend the War Powers Resolution.
As a result of the Persian Gulf situation, in the summer of 1988 both
the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which established a Special Subcommittee on War Powers, undertook extensive
assessments of the War Powers Resolution. Interest in the issue waned after
a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq began on August 20, 1988, and the United
States reduced its forces in the Persian Gulf area.
Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not
Raised?
On December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered 14,000 U.S. military forces
to Panama for combat, in addition to 13,000 already present. On December
21, he reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution but without
citing section 4(a)(1). His stated objectives were to protect the 35,000
American citizens in Panama, restore the democratic process, preserve the
integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and apprehend General Manuel Noriega,
who had been accused of massive electoral fraud in the Panamanian elections
and indicted on drug trafficking charges by two U.S. Federal courts. The
operation proceeded swiftly and General Noriega surrendered to U.S. military
authorities on January 3. President Bush said the objectives had been met,
and U.S. forces were gradually withdrawn. By February 13, all combat forces
deployed for the invasion had been withdrawn, leaving the strength just
under the 13,597 forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion.
The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision,
although he did notify them a few hours in advance of the invasion. Members
of Congress had been discussing the problem of General Noriega for some
time. Before Congress adjourned, it had called for the President to intensify
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult with other
nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power. (49) The Senate had
adopted an amendment supporting the President's use of appropriate diplomatic,
economic, and military options "to restore constitutional government to
Panama and to remove General Noriega from his illegal control of the Republic
of Panama", but had defeated an amendment authorizing the President to
use U.S. military force to secure the removal of General Noriega "notwithstanding
any other provision of law." (50)
The Panama action did not raise much discussion in Congress about the
War Powers Resolution. This was in part because Congress was out of session.
The first session of the 101st Congress had ended on November 22, 1989,
and the second session did not begin until January 23, 1990, when the operation
was essentially over and it appeared likely the additional combat forces
would be out of Panama within 60 days of their deployment. Moreover, the
President's action in Panama was very popular in American public opinion
and supported by most Members of Congress because of the actions of General
Noriega. After it was over, on February 7, 1990, the House Passed H.Con.Res.
262 which stated that the President had acted "decisively and appropriately
in ordering United States forces to intervene in Panama."
Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War World:
United Nations Actions
After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the United States began to move
away from unilateral military actions toward actions authorized or supported
by the United Nations. Under the auspices of U.N. Security Council resolutions,
U.S. forces were deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia/Bosnia,
and Haiti. This raised the new issue of whether the War Powers Resolution
applied to U.S. participation in U.N. military actions. It was not a problem
during the Cold War because the agreement among the five permanent members
required for Security Council actions seldom existed. An exception, the
Korean war, occurred before the War Powers Resolution was enacted. (51)
The more basic issue--under what circumstances congressional authorization
is required for U.S. participation in U.N. military operations--is an unfinished
debate remaining from 1945. Whether congressional authorization is required
depends on the types of U.N. action and is governed by the U.N. Participation
Act (P.L. 79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution
and war powers under the Constitution. Appropriations action by Congress
also may be determinative as a practical matter.
For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter,
Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate
special agreements with the Security Council "which shall be subject
to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution",
providing for the numbers and types of armed forces and facilities to be
made available to the Security Council. Once the agreements have been concluded,
further congressional authorization is not necessary, but no such agreements
have been concluded.
Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act, added in 1949 by P.L.
81-341, authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve in any
noncombatant capacity for certain U.N. peaceful settlement activities.
The United States has provided personnel to several U.N. peacekeeping missions,
such as observers to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
since 1948, that appear to fall within the authorization in Section 7 of
the Participation Act. Controversy has arisen when larger numbers of forces
have been deployed or when it appears the forces might be serving as combatants.
The War Powers Resolution neither excludes United Nations actions from
its provisions nor makes any special procedures for them. Section 8(a)(2)
states that authority to introduce U. S. Armed Forces into hostilities
shall not be inferred from any treaty unless it is implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction and stating that it is intended
to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the
War Powers resolution. (52) One purpose
of this provision was to ensure that both Houses of Congress be affirmatively
involved in any U.S. decision to engage in hostilities pursuant to a treaty,
since only the Senate approved a treaty. (53)
From 1990 through 1999, Congress primarily dealt with the issue on a case
by case basis, but Members also enacted some measures seeking more control
over U.S. participation in future peacekeeping actions wherever they might
occur. The Defense Appropriations Act for FY1994 stated the sense of Congress
that funds should not be expended for U.S. Armed Forces serving under U.N.
Security Council actions unless the President consults with Congress at
least 15 days prior to deployment and not later than 48 hours after such
deployment, except for humanitarian operations. (54) The Defense
Authorization Act for FY1994 required a report to Congress by April 1,
1994, including discussion of the requirement of congressional approval
for participation of U.S. Armed Forces in multinational peacekeeping missions,
proposals to conclude military agreements with the U.N. Security Council
under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, and the applicability of the War
Powers Resolution and the U.N. Participation Act. (55) In 1994 and
1995, Congress attempted to gain a greater role in U.N. and other peacekeeping
operations through authorization and appropriation legislation. A major
element of the House Republicans' Contract with America, H.R. 7, would
have placed notable constraints on Presidential authority to commit U.S.
forces to international peacekeeping operations. Senator Dole's, S. 5,
The Peace Powers Act, introduced in January 1995, would have also placed
greater legislative controls on such operations. General and specific funding
restrictions and Presidential reporting requirements were passed for peacekeeping
operations underway or in prospect. Some of these legislative enactments
led to Presidential vetoes. These representative legislative actions are
reviewed below as they apply to given cases. (56)
Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers Resolution
Relate to the United Nations and a Real War?
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under the direction of President Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, seized its oil fields, installed a new government
in Kuwait City, and moved on toward the border with Saudi Arabia. Action
to repel the invasion led to the largest war in which the United States
has been involved since the passage of the War Powers Resolution. Throughout
the effort to repel the Iraqi invasion, President Bush worked in tandem
with the United Nations, organizing and obtaining international support
and authorization for multilateral military action against Iraq.
A week after the invasion, on August 9, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that he had deployed U.S. armed forces
to the region prepared to take action with others to deter Iraqi aggression.
He did not cite section 4(a)(1) and specifically stated, "I do not believe
involvement in hostilities is imminent."
The President did not consult with congressional leaders prior to the
deployment, but both houses of Congress had adopted legislation supporting
efforts to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, particularly using economic
sanctions and multilateral efforts. On August 2, shortly before its recess,
the Senate by a vote of 97-0 adopted S.Res. 318 urging the President "to
act immediately, using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the
full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory" and
to work for collective international sanctions against Iraq including,
if economic sanctions prove inadequate, "additional multilateral actions,
under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air, sea, and
land forces as may be needed..." Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Pell stressed, however, that the measure did not authorize unilateral U.S.
military actions. Also on August 2, the House passed H.R. 5431 condemning
the Iraqi invasion and calling for an economic embargo against Iraq.
The United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq on August 7,
and the United States and United Kingdom organized an international naval
interdiction effort. (57) Later, on August
25, the U.N. Security Council authorized "such measures as may be necessary" to
halt shipping and verify cargoes that might be going to Iraq.
Both Houses adopted measures supporting the deployment, but neither measure
was enacted. On October 1, 1990, the House passed H.J.Res. 658 supporting
the action and citing the War Powers Resolution without stating that Section
4(a)(1) had become operative. The resolution quoted the President's statement
that involvement in hostilities was not imminent. Representative Fascell
stated that H.J.Res. 658 was not to be interpreted as a Gulf of Tonkin
resolution that granted the President open-ended authority, and that it
made clear that "a congressional decision on the issue of war or peace
would have to be made through joint consultation." The Senate did not act
on H.J.Res. 658.
On October 2, 1990, the Senate by a vote of 96-3 adopted S.Con.Res. 147,
stating that "Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance
with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance
with United States constitutional and statutory processes, including the
authorization and appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi
aggression and to protect American lives and vital interest in the region." As
in the House, Senate leaders emphasized that the resolution was not to
be interpreted as an open-ended resolution similar to the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution. The resolution made no mention of the War Powers Resolution.
The House did not act on S.Con.Res. 147. Congress also supported the action
by appropriating funds for the preparatory operation, called Operation
Desert Shield, and later for war activities called Operation Desert Storm.
Some Members introduced legislation to establish a special consultation
group, but the Administration objected to a formally established group.
On October 23, 1990, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell announced that he
and Speaker Foley had designated Members of the joint bipartisan leadership
and committees of jurisdiction to make themselves available as a group
for consultation on developments in the Persian Gulf. By this time U.S.
land, naval, and air forces numbering more than 200,000 had been deployed.
After the 101st Congress had adjourned, President Bush on November 8,
1990, ordered an estimated additional 150,000 troops to the Gulf. He incurred
considerable criticism because he had not informed the consultation group
of the buildup although he had met with them on October 30. On November
16, President Bush sent a second report to Congress describing the continuing
and increasing deployment of forces to the region. He stated that his opinion
that hostilities were not imminent had not changed. The President wrote, "The
deployment will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military
option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals." By the end
of the year, approximately 350,000 U.S. forces had been deployed to the
area.
As the prospect of a war without congressional authorization increased,
on November 20, 1990, Representative Ron Dellums and 44 other Democratic
Members of Congress sought a judicial order enjoining the President from
offensive military operations in connection with Operation Desert Shield
unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress. On
November 26, 11 prominent law professors filed a brief in favor of such
a judicial action, arguing that the Constitution clearly vested Congress
with the authority to declare war and that Federal judges should not use
the political questions doctrine to avoid ruling on the issue. The American
Civil Liberties Union also filed a memorandum in favor of the plaintiffs.
On December 13, Judge Harold Greene of the Federal district court in Washington
denied the injunction, holding that the controversy was not ripe for judicial
resolution because a majority of Congress had not sought relief and the
executive branch had not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course
of action. (58) However,
throughout his opinion Judge Greene rejected the Administration's arguments
for full Presidential war powers.
On November 29, 1990, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized
member states to use "all necessary means" to implement the Council's resolutions
and restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied with the
U.N. resolutions by January 15, 1991. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait neared, President Bush indicated that if the Iraqi forces did
not withdraw from Kuwait, he was prepared to use force to implement the
U.N. Security Council resolutions. Administration officials contended that
the President did not need any additional congressional authorization for
this purpose. (59)
After the 102nd Congress convened, on January 4, 1991, House and Senate
leaders announced they would debate U.S. policy beginning January 10. A
week before the January 15 deadline, on January 8, 1991, President Bush,
in a letter to the congressional leaders, requested a congressional resolution
supporting the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678. He stated that he was "determined to do whatever is necessary
to protect America's security" and that he could "think of no better way
than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical
time." It is noteworthy that the President's request for a resolution was
a request for congressional "support" for his undertaking in the Persian
Gulf, not for "authority" to engage in the military operation. In a press
conference on January 9, 1991, President Bush reinforced this distinction
in response to questions about the use of force resolution being debated
in Congress. He was asked whether he thought he needed the resolution,
and if he lost on it would he feel bound by that decision. President Bush
in response stated: "I don't think I need it...I feel that I have the authority
to fully implement the United Nations resolutions." He added that he felt
that he had "the constitutional authority--many attorneys having so advised
me." (60)
On January 12, 1991, both houses passed the "Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution" (P.L. 102-1). (61) Section 2(a)
authorized the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the earlier Security
Council resolutions. Section 2(b) required that first the President would
have to report that the United States had used all appropriate diplomatic
and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the Security
Council resolution and that those efforts had not been successful. Section
2(c) stated that it was intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Section
3 required the President to report every 60 days on efforts to obtain compliance
of Iraq with the U.N. Security Council resolution.
In his statement made after signing H.J.Res. 77 into law, President Bush
said the following: "As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset,
my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution
does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive
branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed
Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution." He added that he was pleased that "differences on these
issues between the President and many in the Congress have not prevented
us from uniting in a common objective." (62)
On January 16, President Bush made the determination required by P.L.
102-1 that diplomatic means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait. On January 18, he reported to Congress "consistent with the
War Powers Resolution" that he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat
operations on January 16.
After the beginning of the war Members of Congress strongly supported
the President as Commander-in-Chief in his conduct of the war. On March
19, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that the military operations
had been successful, Kuwait had been liberated, and combat operations had
been suspended on February 28, 1991.
Prior to passage of P.L. 102-1, some observers questioned the effectiveness
of the War Powers Resolution on grounds that the President had begun the
action, deployed hundreds of thousands of troops without consultation of
Congress, and was moving the Nation increasingly close to war without congressional
authorization. After the passage of P.L. 102-1 and the war had begun, Chairman
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Fascell took the position that "the
War Powers Resolution is alive and well"; the President had submitted reports
to Congress, and Congress, in P.L. 102-1, had provided specific statutory
authorization for the use of force. In his view, the strength and wisdom
of the War Powers Resolution was that it established a process by which
Congress could authorize the use of force in specific settings for limited
purposes, short of a total state of war.
The question is sometimes raised why Congress did not declare war against
Iraq. Speaker Foley told the National Press Club on February 7, 1991, that "The
reason we did not declare a formal war was not because there is any difference
I think in the action that was taken and in a formal declaration of war
with respect to military operations, but because there is some question
about whether we wish to excite or enact some of the domestic consequences
of a formal declaration of war -- seizure of property, censorship, and
so forth, which the President neither sought nor desired."
Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization
Last?
After the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces were used
to deal with three continuing situations in Iraq. These activities raised
the issue of how long a congressional authorization for the use of force
lasts.
The first situation resulted from the Iraqi government's repression of
Kurdish and Shi'ite groups. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of April
5, 1991, condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population and
appealed for contributions to humanitarian relief efforts. On May 17, 1991,
President Bush reported to Congress that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish
people had necessitated a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern
Iraq for emergency relief purposes. On July 16, 1991, he reported that
U.S. forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq but that the U.S. remained
prepared to take appropriate steps as the situation required and that,
to this end, an appropriate level of forces would be maintained in the
region for "as long as required."
A second situation stemmed from the cease-fire resolution, Security Council
Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, which called for Iraq to accept the destruction
or removal of chemical and biological weapons and international control
of its nuclear materials. On September 16, 1991, President Bush reported
to Congress that Iraq continued to deny inspection teams access to weapons
facilities and that this violated the requirements of Resolution 687, and
the United States if necessary would take action to ensure Iraqi compliance
with the Council's decisions. He reported similar non-cooperation on January
14, 1992, and May 15, 1992.
On July 16, 1992, President Bush reported particular concern about the
refusal of Iraqi authorities to grant U.N. inspectors access to the Agricultural
Ministry. The President consulted congressional leaders on July 27, and
in early August the United States began a series of military exercises
to take 5,000 U.S. troops to Kuwait. On September 16, 1992, the President
reported, "We will remain prepared to use all necessary means, in accordance
with U.N. Security Council resolutions, to assist the United Nations in
removing the threat posed by Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
capability."
The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones. On August
26, 1992, the United States, Britain, and France began a "no-fly" zone,
banning Iraqi fixed wing and helicopter flights south of the 32nd parallel
and creating a limited security zone in the south, where Shi'ite groups
were concentrated. After violations of the no-fly zones and various other
actions by Iraq, on January 13, 1993, the Bush Administration announced
that aircraft from the United States and coalition partners had attacked
missile bases in southern Iraq and that the United States was deploying
a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the U.S. continuing commitment
to Kuwait's independence. On January 19, 1993, President Bush reported
to Congress that U.S. aircraft had shot down an Iraqi aircraft on December
27, 1992, and had undertaken further military actions on January 13, 17,
and 18.
President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would
adhere to the policy toward Iraq set by the Bush Administration. On January
22 and 23, April 9 and 18, June 19, and August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft
fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft
fire directed at them. On September 23, 1993, President Clinton reported
that since the August 19 action, the Iraqi installation fired upon had
not displayed hostile intentions.
In a separate incident, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported to
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S.
naval forces at his direction had launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike
on the Iraqi Intelligence Service's main command and control complex in
Baghdad and that the military action was completed upon the impact of the
missiles. He said the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned the failed
attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait
in April 1993.
The question was raised as to whether the Authorization for the Use of
Force in Iraq (P.L. 102-1) authorized military actions after the conclusion
of the war. P.L. 102-1 authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation
of previous Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. The cease-fire resolution, Security Council Resolution 687, was
adopted afterwards and therefore not included in Resolution 678.
Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not
required for U.S. military action to maintain the ceasefire agreement.
Specifically, section 1095 of P.L.102-190 stated the sense of Congress
that it supported the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of
Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. Section 1096 supported
the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, consistent
with relevant U.N. resolutions and authorities contained in P.L. 102-1.
The issue of Congressional authorization was debated again in 1998. On
March 31, 1998, the House passed a Supplemental Appropriations bill (H.R.
3579) that would have banned the use of funds appropriated in it for the
conduct of offensive operations against Iraq, unless such operations were
specifically authorized by law. This provision was dropped in the conference
with the Senate.
A more broad-gauged approach to the issue of Congressional authorization
of military force was attempted in mid-1998. On June 24, 1998, the House
passed H.R. 4103, the Defense Department Appropriations bill for FY1999,
with a provision by Rep. David Skaggs that banned the use of funds appropriated
or otherwise made available by this Act "to initiate or conduct offensive
military operations by United States Armed Forces except in accordance
with the war powers clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8),
which vests in Congress the power to declare and authorize war and to take
certain specified, related actions." The Skaggs provision was stricken
by the House-Senate conference committee on H.R. 4103.
As events developed, beginning in late 1998, and continuing into the period
prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States
conducted a large number of ad-hoc air attacks against Iraqi ground installations
and military targets in response to violations of the Northern and Southern "no-fly
zones" by the Iraqi, and threatening actions taken against U.S. and coalition
aircraft enforcing these "no-fly" sectors. Congressional authorization
to continue these activities was not sought by the President, nor were
these many incidents reported under the War Powers Resolution. The "no-fly
zones" activities were terminated following the 2003 War with Iraq.
Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require
Congressional Authorization?
In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation
to protect humanitarian assistance became increasingly controversial as
fighting and casualties increased and the objectives of the operation appeared
to be expanding.
On December 4, 1992, President Bush ordered thousands of U.S. military
forces to Somalia to protect humanitarian relief from armed gangs. Earlier,
on November 25, the President had offered U.S. forces, and on December
3, the United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 794 welcoming
the U.S. offer and authorizing the Secretary-General and members cooperating
in the U.S. offer "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible
a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." The
resolution also called on member states to provide military forces and
authorized the Secretary-General and the states concerned to arrange for
unified command and control.
On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that on December 8, U.S. armed forces entered
Somalia to secure the air field and port facility of Mogadishu and that
other elements of the U.S. armed forces were being introduced into Somalia
to achieve the objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. He said
the forces would remain only as long as necessary to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations and would then turn over
responsibility for maintaining this environment to a U.N. peacekeeping
force. The President said that it was not intended that the U.S. armed
forces become involved in hostilities, but that the forces were equipped
and ready to take such measures as might be needed to accomplish their
humanitarian mission and defend themselves. They would also have the support
of any additional U.S. forces necessary. By mid-January, U.S. forces in
Somalia numbered 25,000.
Since the President did not cite Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day time limit
was not necessarily triggered. By February, however, the U.S. force strength
was being reduced, and it was announced the United States expected to turn
over responsibility for protecting humanitarian relief shipments in Somalia
to a U.N. force that would include U.S. troops. On March 26, 1993, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 814 expanding the mandate of the U.N.
force and bringing about a transition from a U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led
force (UNOSOM II). By the middle of May, when the change to U.N. control
took place, the U.S. forces were down to approximately 4,000 troops, primarily
logistics and communications support teams, but also a rapid deployment
force of U.S. Marines stationed on Navy ships.
Violence within Somalia began to increase again. On June 5, 1993, attacks
killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, and a Somali regional leader, General
Aidid, was believed responsible. The next day the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 837 reaffirming the authority of UNOSOM II to take all
necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks. On
June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers
Resolution" that the U.S. Quick Reaction Force had executed military strikes
to assist UNOSOM II in quelling violence against it. On July 1, President
Clinton submitted another report, not mentioning the War Powers Resolution,
describing further air and ground military operations aimed at securing
General Aidid's compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had
been an obstacle to U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote
national reconstruction.
From the beginning, a major issue for Congress was whether to authorize
U.S. action in Somalia. On February 4, 1993, the Senate had passed S.J.Res.
45 that would authorize the President to use U.S. armed forces pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. S.J.Res. 45 stated it was intended
to constitute the specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of
the War Powers Resolution. On May 25, 1993, the House amended S.J.Res.
45 to authorize U.S. forces to remain for one year. S.J.Res. 45 was then
sent to the Senate for its concurrence, but the Senate did not act on the
measure.
As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N. forces,
including Americans, controversy over the operation intensified, and Congress
took action through other legislative channels. In September 1993 the House
and Senate adopted amendments to the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994
asking that the President consult with Congress on policy toward Somalia,
and report the goals, objectives, and anticipated jurisdiction of the U.S.
mission in Somalia by October 15, 1993; the amendments expressed the sense
that the President by November 15, 1993, should seek and receive congressional
authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. (63) On October 7,
the President consulted with congressional leaders from both parties for
over two hours on Somalia policy. On October 13, President Clinton sent
a 33-page report to Congress on his Somalia policy and its objectives.
Meanwhile, on October 7 President Clinton said that most U.S. forces would
be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. To ensure this, the Defense
Department Appropriations Act for FY1994, cut off funds for U.S. military
operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President obtained
further spending authority from Congress. (64) Congress approved
the use of U.S. military forces in Somalia only for the protection of American
military personnel and bases and for helping maintain the flow of relief
aid by giving the U.N. forces security and logistical support; it required
that U.S. combat forces in Somalia remain under the command and control
of U.S. commanders under the ultimate direction of the President.
Earlier, some Members suggested that the U.S. forces in Somalia were clearly
in a situation of hostilities or imminent hostilities, and that if Congress
did not authorize the troops to remain, the forces should be withdrawn
within 60 to 90 days. After a letter from House Foreign Affairs Committee
Ranking Minority Member Benjamin Gilman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Ranking Minority Member Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman
replied on July 21, 1993, that no previous Administrations had considered
that intermittent military engagements, whether constituting hostilities,
would necessitate the withdrawal of forces pursuant to Section 5(b); and
the War Powers Resolution, in their view, was intended to apply to sustained
hostilities. The State Department did not believe congressional authorization
was necessary, although congressional support would be welcome. On August
4, 1993, Representative Gilman asserted that August 4 might be remembered
as the day the War Powers Resolution died because combat broke out in Somalia
on June 5 and the President had not withdrawn U.S. forces and Congress
had "decided to look the other way." On October 22, 1993, Representative
Gilman introduced H.Con.Res. 170 directing the President pursuant to section
5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia
by January 31, 1994. The House adopted an amended version calling for withdrawal
by March 31, 1994. (65) The Senate did
not act on this non-binding measure.
However, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed
September 30, 1994) prohibited the use of funds for the continuous presence
of U.S. forces in Somalia, except for the protection of U.S. personnel,
after September 30, 1994. Subsequently, on November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security
Council decided to end the U.N. mission in Somalia by March 31, 1995. On
March 3, 1995, U.S. forces completed their assistance to United Nations
forces evacuating Somalia.
Another war powers issue was the adequacy of consultation before the dispatch
of forces. On December 4, 1992, President Bush had met with a number of
congressional leaders to brief them on the troop deployment. In his December
10 report, President Bush stressed that he had taken into account the views
expressed in H.Con.Res. 370, S.Con.Res. 132, and P.L. 102-274 on the urgent
need for action in Somalia. However, none of these resolutions explicitly
authorized U.S. military action.
Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus
Exists?
Bosnia. The issue of war
powers and U.S. participation in United Nations actions was also raised
by efforts to halt fighting in the territory of former Yugoslavia, initially
in Bosnia. Because some of the U.S. action has been taken within a NATO
framework, action in Bosnia has also raised the issue of whether action
under NATO is exempt from the requirements of the War Powers Resolution
or its standard for the exercise of war powers under the Constitution.
Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are
to be carried out by the parties "in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes," inferring some role for Congress in the event of war. Section
8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S.
forces into hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty, ratified
before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically authorizes
such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization
within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) states that
nothing in the War Powers Resolution should be construed to require further
authorization for U.S. participation in the headquarters operations of
military commands established before 1973, such as NATO headquarters operations.
On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling
on nations to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery
of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. Many in Congress had been advocating
more assistance to the victims of the conflict. On August 11, 1992, the
Senate had passed S.Res. 330 urging the President to work for a U.N. Security
Council resolution such as was adopted, but saying that no U.S. military
personnel should be introduced into hostilities without clearly defined
objectives. On the same day, the House passed H.Res. 554 urging the Security
Council to authorize measures, including the use of force, to ensure humanitarian
relief.
During 1993 the United States participated in airlifts into Sarajevo,
naval monitoring of sanctions, and aerial enforcement of a "no-fly zone." On
February 10, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that
under President Clinton, the United States would try to convince the Serbs,
Muslims, and Croats to pursue a diplomatic solution and that if an agreement
was reached, U.S. forces, including ground forces, would help enforce the
peace. On February 28, 1993, the United States began an airdrop of relief
supplies aimed at civilian populations, mainly Muslims, surrounded by fighting
in Bosnia.
On March 31, 1993, the U.N. Security Council authorized member states
to take all necessary measures to enforce the ban on military flights over
Bosnia, the "no-fly zone". NATO planes, including U.S. planes, began patrolling
over Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 12, 1993, to enforce the Security
Council ban, and the next day, President Clinton reported the U.S. participation "consistent
with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution."
Conflict continued, but the situation was complicated and opinion in Congress
and among U.N. and NATO members was divided. President Clinton consulted
with about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action
on April 27 and received a wide range of views. On May 2, the Administration
began consultation with allies to build support for additional military
action to enforce a cease-fire and Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace
agreement, but a consensus on action was not reached.
On June 10, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher announced the United
States would send 300 U.S. troops to join 700 Scandinavians in the U.N.
peacekeeping force in Macedonia. (66) The mission
was established under U.N. Security Council Resolution 795 (1992), which
sought to prevent the war in Bosnia from spilling over to neighboring countries.
President Clinton reported this action "consistent with Section 4 of the
War Powers Resolution" on July 9, 1993. He identified U.S. troops as part
of a peacekeeping force, and directed in accordance with Section 7 of the
U.N. Participation Act.
Planning for U.N. and NATO action to implement a prospective peace agreement
included the possibility that the United States might supply 25,000 out
of 50,000 NATO forces to enforce U.N. decisions. This possibility brought
proposals to require congressional approval before the dispatch of further
forces to Bosnia. On September 23, 1993, Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole said he intended to offer an amendment stating that no additional
U.S. forces should be introduced into former Yugoslavia without advance
approval from Congress. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said
on October 5 that the Clinton Administration would consult with Congress
and not commit American troops to the implementation operation for a peace
agreement without congressional support, and that the Administration would
act consistent with the War Powers Resolution. Congress sought to assure
this in Section 8146 of P.L. 103-139, the Defense Appropriation Act for
FY 1994, stating the sense of Congress that funds should not be available
for U.S. forces to participate in new missions or operations to implement
the peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.
This provision was sponsored by the Senate by leaders Mitchell and Dole.
At the NATO summit conference in Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders,
including President Clinton, repeated an August threat to undertake air
strikes on Serb positions to save Sarajevo and to consider other steps
to end the conflict in Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution that the United States
had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach
a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were
available for participation in the authorized NATO missions. On March 1,
1994, he reported that on the previous day U.S. planes patrolling the "no-fly
zone" under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian
Galeb planes. On April 12, 1994, the President reported that on April 10
and 11, following shelling of Gorazde, one of the "safe areas," and a decision
by U.N. and NATO leaders, U.S. planes bombed Bosnian Serbian nationalist
positions around Gorazde. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton similarly
reported that on August 5, U.S. planes under NATO had strafed a Bosnian
Serb gun position in an exclusion zone. On September 22, 1994, two British
and one U.S. aircraft bombed a Serbian tank in retaliation for Serb attacks
on U.N. peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on November 21 more than 30 planes
from the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands bombed the
runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia.
As the conflict in Bosnia continued, leaders in Congress called for greater
congressional involvement in decisions. Senator Dole introduced S. 2042,
calling for the United States to end unilaterally its arms embargo, conducted
in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution, against Bosnia and
Herzegovina. On May 10, 1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell introduced
an amendment to authorize and approve the President's decision to carry
out NATO decisions to support and protect UNPROFOR forces around designated
safe areas; to use airpower in the Sarajevo region; and to authorize air
strikes against Serb weapons around certain safe areas if these areas were
attacked. The Mitchell amendment favored lifting the arms embargo but not
unilaterally; it also stated no U.S. ground combat troops should be deployed
in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress. The Senate adopted
both the Dole proposal, as an amendment, and the Mitchell amendment on
May 12, 1994, by votes of 50-49. The less stringent Mitchell amendment
passed on a straight party line vote. Yet thirteen Democrats voted for
the Dole amendment, indicating a sentiment in both parties to assist the
Bosnians in defending themselves. The Senate then adopted S. 2042 as amended.
The House did not act on the measure.
The Defense Authorization Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-337, signed October
5, 1994) provided, in Section 1404, the sense of the Congress that if the
Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Contact Group proposal by October 15,
1994, the President should introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution
to end the arms embargo by December 1, 1994; if the Security Council had
not acted by November 15, 1994, no funds could be used to enforce the embargo
other than those required of all U.N. members under Security Council Resolution
713. That sequence of events occurred and the United States stopped enforcing
the embargo. In addition, Section 8100 of the Defense Appropriations Act,
FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), stated the sense of the
Congress that funds made available by this law should not be available
for the purposes of deploying U.S. armed forces to participate in implementation
of a peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.
On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers
Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft
continued to contribute to NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace
over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for
close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers
were still deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part
of the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue
to support U.N. refugee and embargo operations in this region.
On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent with the
War Powers Resolution," that "U.S. combat and support aircraft" had been
used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening
the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde." He noted
that during the first day of operations, "some 300 sorties were flown against
23 targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Mostar."
On September 7, 1995 the House passed an amendment to the FY1996 Department
of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2126), offered by Representative Mark
Neumann (R-WI.) that prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds
provided by the bill for any operations beyond those already undertaken.
However, in conference the provision was softened to a sense-of-the-Congress
provision that said that President must consult with Congress before deploying
U.S. forces to Bosnia. The conference report was rejected by the House
over issues unrelated to Bosnia on September 29, 1995 by a vote of 151-267.
The substitute conference report on H.R. 2126, which was subsequently passed
and signed into law, did not include language on Bosnia, in part due to
the President's earlier objections to any provision in the bill that might
impinge on his powers as Commander-in-Chief. On September 29, the Senate
passed by a vote of 94-2 a sense-of-the-Senate amendment to H.R. 2076,
the FY1996 State, Commerce, Justice Appropriations bill, sponsored by Senator
Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) that said no funds in the bill should be used for the
deployment of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless Congress
approves the deployment in advance or to evacuate endangered U.N. peacekeepers.
The conference report on H.R. 2076, agreed to by the House and the Senate,
included the "sense of the Senate" language of the Gregg amendment.
In response to mounting criticism of the Administration's approach to
Bosnian policy, on October 17-18, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher,
Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili
testified before House and Senate Committees on Bosnia policy and the prospect
of President Clinton deploying approximately 20,000 American ground forces
as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation. During testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on October 17, Secretary Christopher stated
that the President would not be bound by a resolution of the Congress prohibiting
sending of U.S. forces into Bosnia without the express prior approval of
Congress. Nevertheless, on October 19, 1995, President Clinton in a letter
to Senator Robert C. Byrd stated that "[w]hile maintaining the constitutional
authorities of the Presidency, I would welcome, encourage and, at the appropriate
time, request an expression of support by the Congress" for the commitment
of U.S. troops to a NATO implementation force in Bosnia, after a peace
agreement is reached.
Subsequently, on October 30, 1995, the House, by a vote of 315-103, passed
H.Res. 247, expressing the sense of the House that "no United States Armed
forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress
has approved such a deployment." On November 13, President Clinton's 9-page
letter to Speaker Gingrich stated he would send a request "for a congressional
expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation
Force in Bosnia ... before American forces are deployed in Bosnia." The
President said there would be a "timely opportunity for Congress to consider
and act upon" his request for support. He added that despite his desire
for congressional support, he "must reserve" his "constitutional prerogatives
in this area." On November 17, 1995, the House passed (243-171) H.R. 2606,
which would "prohibit the use of funds appropriated or otherwise available" to
the Defense Department from "being used for the deployment on the ground
of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
part of any peacekeeping operation or as part of any implementation force,
unless funds for such deployment are specifically appropriated" by law.
On December 4, 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry announced the deployment
of about 1,400 U.S. military personnel (700 to Bosnia/700 to Croatia) as
part of the advance elements of the roughly 60,000 person NATO Implementation
Force in Bosnia, scheduled to deploy in force once the Dayton Peace Agreement
is signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Secretary Perry noted that once
the NATO I-Force was fully deployed, about 20,000 U.S. military personnel
would be in Bosnia, and about 5,000 in Croatia.
On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified the Congress, "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered the deployment of
approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the groundwork for the
prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR)," which
would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing.
The President also noted that he had authorized deployment of roughly 3,000
other U.S. military personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia to establish
infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR.
In response to these developments, Congress addressed the question of
U.S. ground troop deployments in Bosnia. Lawmakers sought to take action
before the final Bosnian peace agreement was signed in Paris on December
14, 1995, following which the bulk of American military forces would be
deployed to Bosnia. On December 13, 1995, the House considered H.R. 2770,
sponsored by Representative Dornan, which would have prohibited the use
of Federal funds for the deployment "on the ground" of U.S. Armed Forces
in Bosnia-Herzegovina "as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part
of any implementation force." H.R. 2770 was defeated in the House by a
vote of 210-218. On December 13, the House considered two other measures.
It approved H.Res. 302, offered by Representative Buyer, by a vote of 287-141.
H.Res. 302, a non-binding measure, reiterated "serious concerns and opposition" to
the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, while expressing confidence, "pride
and admiration" for U.S. soldiers deployed there. It called on the President
and Defense Secretary to rely on the judgement of the U.S. ground commander
in Bosnia and stated that he should be provided with sufficient resources
to ensure the safety and well-being of U.S. troops. H.Res. 302, further
stated that the U.S. government should "in all respects" be "impartial
and evenhanded" with all parties to the Bosnian conflict "as necessary
to ensure the safety and protection" of American forces in the region.
Subsequently, the House defeated H.Res 306, proposed by Representative
Hamilton, by a vote of 190-237. H.Res 306 stated that the House "unequivocally
supports the men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are carrying
out their mission in support of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with professional
excellence, dedicated patriotism and exemplary bravery."
On December 13, the Senate also considered three measures related to Bosnia
and U.S. troop deployments. The Senate defeated H.R. 2606 by a vote of
22-77. This bill would have prohibited funds to be obligated or expended
for U.S. participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia unless such funds were
specifically appropriated for that purpose. The Senate also defeated S.Con.Res.
35, a non-binding resolution of Senators Hutchison and Inhofe. This resolution
stated that "Congress opposes President Clinton's decision to deploy" U.S.
troops to Bosnia, but noted that "Congress strongly supports" the U.S.
troops sent by the President to Bosnia.
The Senate did pass S.J.Res. 44, sponsored by Senators Dole and McCain,
by a vote of 69-30. This resolution stated that Congress "unequivocally
supports the men and women of our Armed Forces" who were to be deployed
to Bosnia. S.J.Res. 44 stated that "notwithstanding reservations expressed
about President Clinton's decision" to deploy U.S. forces, "the President
may only fulfill his commitment" to deploy them to Bosnia "for approximately
one year" if he made a determination to Congress that the mission of the
NATO peace implementation force (IFOR) will be limited to implementing
the military annex to the Bosnian peace agreement and to protecting itself.
The Presidential determination must also state that the United States will "lead
an immediate international effort," separate from IFOR, "to provide equipment,
arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest possible
quality" to the Muslim-Croat Federation so that it may provide for its
own defense. The President could use "existing military drawdown authorities
and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary." S.J.Res.
44 also required President Clinton to submit to Congress a detailed report
on the armament effort within 30 days, and required regular Presidential
reports to Congress on the implementation of both the military and non-military
aspects of the peace accords.
The House and Senate did not appoint and direct conferees to meet to reconcile
the conflicting elements of the Bosnia related measures each had passed
on December 13, 1995. A number of Members and Senators had wished to express
their views on the troop deployment before the Dayton Accords were formally
signed in Paris. That action had occurred, and the leadership of both parties
apparently believed nothing further would be achieved by a conference on
the measures passed. As result, no final consensus on a single specific
measure was reached on the issue by the two chambers.
The President meanwhile continued with the Bosnian deployment. On December
21, 1995, President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War
Powers Resolution," that he had ordered the deployment of approximately
20,000 U.S. military personnel to participate in the NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000
U.S. military personnel would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states,
primarily in Croatia. In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would
be deployed to Hungary, Italy, Croatia, and other regional states in support
of IFOR's mission. The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant
to" his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the
United States and as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." (67) Subsequently,
President Clinton in December 1996, agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground
troops to participate in a NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). On March 18, 1998, the House defeated by a
vote of 193-225, H.Con.Res. 227, a resolution of Rep. Tom Campbell, directing
the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to
remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.(H.Rept.
105-442). (68)
Kosovo. The issue of Presidential
authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional authorization,
under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of renewed
controversy in late March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military
forces to participate in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo. This
action was the focus of a major policy debate over the purpose and scope
of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. The President's action to commit
forces to the NATO Kosovo operation also led to a suit in Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia by Members of Congress seeking a judicial
finding that the President was violating the War Powers Resolution and
the Constitution by using military forces in Yugoslavia in the absence
of authorization from the Congress.
The Kosovo controversy began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President
Clinton notified the Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution",
that on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and in coalition
with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response
to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against
the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Prior to the President's action,
the Senate, on March 23, 1999, had passed, by a vote of 58-41, S.Con.Res.
21, a non-binding resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that
the President was authorized to conduct "military air operations and missile
strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."
Subsequently, the House voted on a number of measures relating to U.S.
participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo. On April 28, 1999, the House
of Representatives passed H.R. 1569, by a vote of 249-180. This bill would
prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Defense Department from being
used for the deployment of "ground elements" of the U.S. Armed Forces in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically
authorized by law. On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res. 82, by
a vote of 139-290. This resolution would have directed the President, pursuant
to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces
from their positions in connection with the present operations against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 28, 1999, the House also defeated
H.J.Res. 44, by a vote of 2-427. This joint resolution would have declared
a state of war between the United States and the "Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia." The House on that same day also defeated, on a
213-213 tie vote, S.Con.Res. 21, the Senate resolution passed on March
23, 1999, that supported military air operations and missile strikes against
Yugoslavia. On April 30, 1999, Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other
members of the House filed suit in Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to obtain authorization
from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action
against Yugoslavia. (69)
The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res. 20, a
joint resolution, sponsored by Senator John McCain, that would authorize
the President "to use all necessary force and other means, in concert with
United States allies, to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)." (70) The House, meanwhile,
on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-301, defeated an amendment by Representative
Ernest Istook to H.R. 1664, the FY1999 defense supplemental appropriations
bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of funds in the bill to
implement any plan to use U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia, except
in time of war. Congress, meanwhile, on May 20, 1999 cleared for the President's
signature, H.R. 1141, an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for
FY1999, that provided billions in funding for the existing U.S. Kosovo
operation.
The Senate tabled two other amendments that would have restricted military
operations by President Clinton in Kosovo. On May 24, 1999, it tabled,
by a vote of 52-48, an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter to state
that no funds available to the Defense Department may be obligated or expended
for the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia unless authorized
by a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of military
force. The Specter amendment did not apply to certain actions, such as
rescuing U.S. military personnel or citizens. (71) On May 26, 1999
the Senate tabled an amendment, by a vote of 77-21, offered by Senator
Bob Smith to prohibit, effective October 1, 1999, the use of funds for
military operations in Yugoslavia unless Congress enacted specific authorization
in law for the conduct of these operations. (72)
On May 25, 1999, the 60th day had passed since the President notified
Congress of his actions regarding U.S. participation in military operations
in Kosovo. Representative Campbell, and those who joined his suit, noted
to the Federal Court that this was a clear violation of the language of
the War Powers Resolution stipulating a withdrawal of U.S. forces from
the area of hostilities after 60 days in the absence of congressional authorization
to continue, or a Presidential request to Congress for an extra 30 day
period to safely withdraw. The President did not seek such a 30 day extension,
noting instead his view that the War Powers Resolution is constitutionally
defective.
On June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge Paul L. Friedman dismissed the
suit of Rep. Campbell and others that sought to have the court rule that
President Clinton was in violation of the War Powers Resolution and the
Constitution by conducting military activities in Yugoslavia without having
received prior authorization from Congress. The judge ruled that Representative
Campbell and the other Congressional plaintiffs lacked legal standing to
bring the suit. (73) On
June 24, 1999, Representative Campbell appealed the ruling to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court subsequently
agreed to hear the case on an expedited basis before Judges Silberman,
Randolph, and Tatel. On February 18, 2000, the appeals court affirmed the
opinion of the District Court that Representative Campbell and his co-plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue the President. (74) On May 18, 2000,
Representative Campbell and 30 other Members of Congress appealed this
decision to the United States Supreme Court. On October 2, 2000, the United
States Supreme Court, without comment, refused to hear the appeal of Representative
Campbell, thereby letting stand the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals. (75)
While Representative Campbell's litigation was continuing, Yugoslavia,
on June 10, 1999, agreed to NATO conditions for a cease-fire and withdrawal
of Yugoslav military and paramilitary personnel from Kosovo, and the creation
of a peacekeeping force (KFOR) which had the sanction of the United Nations.
Further, on June 10, 1999, the House of Representatives defeated, by a
vote of 328-97, an amendment to H.R. 1401, the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2000-FY2001, that would have prohibited the use of any Defense
Department funding in FY2000 for "military operations in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia." On that same day, the House approved, by a vote of 270-155,
an amendment that deleted, from the House reported version of H.R. 1401,
language that would have prohibited any funding for "combat or peacekeeping
operations" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
On June 12, 1999, President Clinton announced and reported to Congress "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that he had directed the deployment of
about "7,000 U.S. military personnel as the U.S. contribution to the approximately
50,000-member, NATO-led security force (KFOR)" currently being assembled
in Kosovo. He also noted that about "1,500 U.S. military personnel, under
separate U.S. command and control, will deploy to other countries in the
region, as our national support element, in support of KFOR." Thus, by
the summer of 1999, the President had been able to proceed with his policy
of intervention in the Kosovo crisis under the aegis of NATO, the Congress
had not achieved any position of consensus on what actions were appropriate
in Yugoslavia, and a U.S. District Court had dismissed a congressional
lawsuit (a position subsequently affirmed the following year by the Appeals
Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court) attempting to stop Presidential military
action in Yugoslavia in the absence of prior congressional authorization
under the War Powers Resolution. (76)
Haiti: Can the President Order Enforcement of a U.N.
Embargo?
On July 3, 1993, Haitian military leader Raoul Cedras and deposed President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed an agreement providing for the restoration
of President Aristide on October 30. The United Nations and Organization
of American States took responsibility for verifying compliance. In conjunction
with the agreement, President Clinton offered to send 350 troops and military
engineers to Haiti to help retrain the Haitian armed forces and work on
construction projects. A first group of American and Canadian troops arrived
on October 6. When additional U.S. forces arrived on October 11, a group
of armed civilians appeared intent upon resisting their landing, and on
October 12 defense officials ordered the ship carrying them, the U.S.S.
Harlan County, to leave Haitian waters.
Because the Haitian authorities were not complying with the agreement,
on October 13 the U.N. Security Council voted to restore sanctions against
Haiti. On October 20, President Clinton reported "consistent with the War
Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had begun to enforce the U.N. embargo.
Some Members of Congress complained that Congress had not been consulted
on or authorized the action. On October 18, Senator Dole said he would
offer an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill (H.R. 3116) which
would require congressional authorization for all deployments into Haitian
waters and airspace unless the President made specified certifications.
Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated on the terms
of the amendment. As enacted, section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 stated the sense
of Congress that funds should not be obligated or expended for U.S. military
operations in Haiti unless the operations were (1) authorized in advance
by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate U.S. citizens, (3) vital
to the national security of the United States and there was not sufficient
time to receive congressional authorization, or (4) the President reported
in advance that the intended deployment met certain criteria.
Enforcement of the embargo intensified. On April 20, 1994, President Clinton
further reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S.
naval forces had continued enforcement in the waters around Haiti and that
712 vessels had been boarded. On May 6, 1994, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 917 calling for measures to tighten the embargo. On
June 10, 1994, President Clinton announced steps being taken to intensify
the pressure on Haiti's military leaders that included assisting the Dominican
Republic to seal its border with Haiti, using U.S. naval patrol boats to
detain ships suspected of violating the sanctions, a ban on commercial
air traffic, and sanctions on financial transactions.
As conditions in Haiti worsened, President Clinton stated he would not
rule out the use of force, and gradually this option appeared more certain.
Many Members continued to contend congressional authorization was necessary
for any invasion of Haiti. On May 24, 1994, the House adopted the Goss
amendment to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 4301) by a vote of 223-201.
The amendment expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should
not undertake any military action against the mainland of Haiti unless
the President first certified to Congress that clear and present danger
to U.S. citizens or interests required such action. Subsequently, on June
9 the House voted on the Goss amendment again. This time the House reversed
itself and rejected the amendment by a vote of 195-226. On June 27, a point
of order was sustained against an amendment to the State Department appropriations
bill that sought to prohibit use of funds for any U.N. peacekeeping operation
related to Haiti. On June 29, 1994, the Senate in action on H.R. 4226 repassed
a provision identical to Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 but rejected a measure
making advance congressional authorization a binding requirement. On August
5 it tabled (rejected) by a vote of 31 to 63 an amendment to H.R. 4606
by Senator Specter prohibiting the President from using U.S. armed forces
to depose the military leadership unless authorized in advance by Congress,
necessary to protect U.S. citizens, or vital to U.S. interests.
President Clinton sought and obtained U.N. Security Council authorization
for an invasion. On July 31, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational
force to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti
of the military leadership ... on the understanding that the cost of implementing
this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States" (Resolution
940, 1994).
On August 3, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Department of Veterans
Affairs appropriation, H.R. 4624, by a vote of 100-0 expressing its sense
that the Security Council Resolution did not constitute authorization for
the deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti under the Constitution or the War
Powers Resolution. The amendment, however, was rejected in conference.
President Clinton said the same day that he would welcome the support of
Congress but did not agree that he was constitutionally mandated to obtain
it. Some Members introduced resolutions, such as H.Con.Res. 276, calling
for congressional authorization prior to the invasion.
On September 15, 1994, in an address to the Nation, President Clinton
said he had called up the military reserve and ordered two aircraft carriers
into the region. His message to the military dictators was to leave now
or the United States would force them from power. The first phase of military
action would remove the dictators from power and restore Haiti's democratically
elected government. The second phase would involve a much smaller force
joining with forces from other U.N. members which would leave Haiti after
1995 elections were held and a new government installed.
While the Defense Department continued to prepare for an invasion within
days, on September 16 President Clinton sent to Haiti a negotiating team
of former President Jimmy Carter, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn. Again
addressing the Nation on September 18, President Clinton announced that
the military leaders had agreed to step down by October 15, and agreed
to the immediate introduction of troops, beginning September 19, from the
15,000 member international coalition. He said the agreement was only possible
because of the credible and imminent threat of multinational force. He
emphasized the mission still had risks and there remained possibilities
of violence directed at U.S. troops, but the agreement minimized those
risks. He also said that under U.N. Security Council resolution 940, a
25-nation international coalition would soon go to Haiti to begin the task
of restoring democratic government. Also on September 18, President Clinton
reported to Congress on the objectives in accordance with the sense expressed
in Section 8147 (c) of P.L. 103-139, the FY1994 Defense Appropriations
Act.
U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 1994. On September 21, President
Clinton reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment
of 1,500 troops, to be increased by several thousand. (At the peak in September
there were about 21,000 U.S. forces in Haiti.) He said the U.S. presence
would not be open-ended but would be replaced after a period of months
by a U.N. peacekeeping force, although some U.S. forces would participate
in and be present for the duration of the U.N. mission. The forces were
involved in the first hostilities on September 24 when U.S. Marines killed
ten armed Haitian resisters in a fire-fight.
On September 19, the House agreed to H.Con.Res. 290 commending the President
and the special delegation to Haiti, and supporting the prompt and orderly
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti as soon as possible; on September
19, the Senate agreed to a similar measure, S.Res. 259. On October 3, 1994,
the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 416 authorizing the
forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint
resolution to withdraw the forces. In House debate on October 6 the House
voted against the original contents and for the Dellums substitute. As
passed, H.J.Res. 416 stated the sense that the President should have sought
congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces to Haiti, supporting
a prompt and orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and requiring a monthly
report on Haiti as well as other reports. This same language was also adopted
by the Senate on October 6 as S.J.Res. 229, and on October 7 the House
passed S.J.Res. 229. President Clinton signed S.J.Res. 229 on October 25,
1994 (P.L. 103-423).
After U.S. forces began to disarm Haitian military and paramilitary forces
and President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994, the United States
began to withdraw some forces. On March 31, 1995, U.N. peacekeeping forces
assumed responsibility for missions previously conducted by U.S. military
forces in Haiti. By September 21, 1995, President Clinton reported the
United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in
the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and 260 U.S. military personnel assigned
to the U.S. Support Group Haiti. On February 29, 1996, the U.S. Commander
of the UNMIH was replaced and U.S. forces ceased to conduct security operations
in Haiti, except for self defense. The majority of the 1,907 U.S. military
personnel in Haiti were withdrawn by mid-March 1996, and the remainder,
who stayed to arrange the dismantlement and repatriation of equipment,
were withdrawn in mid-April 1996. After that, a U.S. support unit of 300
to 500 troops, made up primarily of engineers, remained in Haiti carrying
out public works such as building bridges, repairing schools, and digging
wells. In December 1997, President Clinton ordered the Dept. of Defense
to maintain hundreds of U.S. troops in Haiti indefinitely. In September
1999, however, the 106th Congress passed the FY2000 DOD authorization bill
(P.L. 106-65) that prohibited DOD funding to maintain a continuous U.S.
military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000. The troops were withdrawn
by the end of January 2000. According to the conference report accompanying
the FY2000 DOD authorization bill (H.Rept. 106-301), the President is not
prohibited from engaging in periodic theater engagement activities in Haiti. (77)
Terrorist Attacks against the United States (World
Trade Center and the Pentagon) 2001: How Does the War Powers Resolution
Apply?
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners,
crashing two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City,
and another into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth
plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, after passengers
struggled with the highjackers for control of the aircraft. The death toll
from these incidents was more than three thousand, making the attacks the
most devastating of their kind in United States history. President George
W. Bush characterized these attacks as more than acts of terror. "They were
acts of war," he said. He added that "freedom and democracy are under attack," and
he asserted that the United States would use "all of our resources to conquer
this enemy." (78)
In the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, the President
consulted with the leaders of Congress on appropriate steps to take to
deal with the situation confronting the United States. One of the things
that emerged from discussions with the White House and congressional leaders
was the concept of a joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the President
to take military steps to deal with the parties responsible for the attacks
on the United States. Between September 13 and 14, draft language of such
a resolution was discussed and negotiated by the President's representatives
and the House and Senate leadership of both parties. Other members of both
Houses suggested language for consideration. On Friday, September 14, 2001,
the text of a joint resolution was introduced. It was first considered
and passed by the Senate in the morning of September 14, as Senate Joint
Resolution 23, by a vote of 98-0. The House of Representatives passed it
later that evening, by a vote of 420-1, after tabling an identical resolution,
H.J.Res. 64, and rejecting a motion to recommit by Rep. John Tierney that
would have had the effect, if passed and enacted, of requiring a report
from the President on his actions under the resolution every 60 days. (79)
Senate Joint Resolution 23, titled the "Authorization for Use of Military
Force," passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, was signed into law on
September 18, 2001. (80) The joint resolution
authorizes the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
The joint resolution further states that Congress declares that this resolution
is intended to "constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Finally, the joint
resolution also states that "[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any
requirement of the War Powers Resolution."
A notable feature of S.J.Res. 23 is that unlike all other major legislation
authorizing the use of military force by the President, this joint resolution
authorizes military force against "organizations and persons" linked to
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Past authorizations
of the use of force have permitted action against unnamed nations in specific
regions of the world or against named individual nations. This authorization
of military action against "organizations or persons" is unprecedented
in American history, with the scope of its reach yet to be determined.
The authorization of use of force against unnamed nations is more consistent
with some previous instances where authority was given to act against unnamed
states as appropriate when they became aggressors or took military action
against the United States or its citizens.
President George W. Bush in signing S.J.Res. on September 18, 2001, noted
the Congress had acted "wisely, decisively, and in the finest traditions
of our country." He thanked the "leadership of both Houses for their role
in expeditiously passing this historic joint resolution." He noted that
he had had the "benefit of meaningful consultations with members of the
Congress" since the September 11 attacks and that he would "continue to
consult closely with them as our Nation responds to this threat to our
peace and security." President Bush also asserted that S.J.Res. 23 "recognized
the authority of the President under the Constitution to take action to
deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States." He also
stated: "In signing this resolution, I maintain the longstanding position
of the executive branch regarding the President's constitutional authority
to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding
the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution." (81)
Prior to its enactment, there was concern among some in Congress that
the President might not adhere to the reporting requirements of the War
Powers Resolution when he exercised the authority provided in S.J.Res.
23. There appeared to be general agreement that the President had committed
himself to consult with the Congress on matters related to his military
actions against terrorists and those associated with the attacks on the
United States on September 11. On September 24, 2001, President Bush reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint
Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped
and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central
and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted that as part
of efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary
to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world...." He
stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," nor
the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States."
Subsequently, on October 9, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to
Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint
Resolution 23" that on October 7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces "began combat
action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban supporters." The
President stated that he had directed this military action in response
to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. "territory, our citizens, and
our way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against
the United States and our friends and allies." This military action was "part
of our campaign against terrorism" and was "designed to disrupt the use
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations."
Thus, in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against United
States territory and citizens, the President and the Congress, after consultations,
agreed to a course of legislative action that did not invoke the War Powers
Resolution itself, but substituted a specific authorization measure, S.J.Res.
23. Pursuit of such an action is contemplated by the language of the War
Powers Resolution itself. As of the end of October 2001, President Bush
had chosen to state in his reports to Congress that the military actions
he had taken relating to the terrorists attacks were "consistent with" both
the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23. His actions follow
the practice of his White House predecessors in not formally citing the
language of the War Powers Resolution in section 4(a)(1) that would trigger
a military forces withdrawal timetable. Congress for its part in S. J.
Res. 23 stated that this legislation constituted "specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also
noted that "nothing" in S.J.Res. 23 "supercedes any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution." The President and the Congress, in sum, maintained
their respective positions on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution
and the responsibilities of the President under it, while finding a legislative
vehicle around which both branches could unite to support the President's
response to the terrorist attacks on the United States.
Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002: A Classic
Application of the War Powers Resolution?
In the summer of 2002, the Bush Administration made public its views regarding
what it deemed a significant threat to U.S. interests and security posed
by the prospect that Iraq had or was acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Senior members of the Bush Administration cited a number of violations
of U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq regarding the obligation imposed
at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to end its chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons programs. On September 4, 2002, President Bush met with
leaders from both Houses and parties at the White House. At that meeting
the President stated that he would seek Congressional support, in the near
future, for action deemed necessary to deal with the threat posed to the
United States by the regime of Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The President also
indicated that he would speak to the United Nations shortly and set out
his concerns about Iraq.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly
and set out the history of Iraqi misdeeds over the last two decades and
the numerous times that Iraq had not fulfilled its commitments to comply
with various U.N. Security Council resolutions, including disarmament,
since the Gulf War of 1991. He stated that the United States would work
with the U.N. Security Council to deal with Iraq's challenge. However,
he emphasized that if Iraq refused to fulfill its obligations to comply
with U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United States would see that
those resolutions were enforced. (82)
Subsequently, on September 19, 2002, the White House sent a "draft" joint
resolution to House Speaker Dennis Hastert, House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle and Senate Minority Leader
Trent Lott. This draft would have authorized the President to use military
force not only against Iraq but "to restore international peace and security
in the region." Subsequently introduced as S.J.Res. 45 on September 26,
it served as the basis for an extensive debate over the desirability, necessity,
and scope of a new Congressional authorization for the use of force. The
Senate used this bill as the focus for a debate which began, after cloture
was invoked, on October 3. The Senate debate continued from October 4 until
October 11, 2002, and involved consideration of numerous amendments to
the measure. In the end the Senate adopted H.J.Res. 114 in lieu of S.J.Res.
45.
The draft measure was not formally introduced in the House. Instead, the
vehicle for House consideration of the issue was H.J.Res. 114. Cosponsored
by Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Gephardt and introduced on October
2, 2002, H.J.Res. 114 embodied modifications to the White House draft that
were agreeable to the White House, most House and Senate Republicans, and
the House Democratic leader. The House International Relations Committee
reported out a slightly amended version of the joint resolution on October
7, 2002 (H. Report 107-721). The House adopted the rule governing debate
on the joint resolution (H.Res. 474) on October 8, 2002; and debated the
measure until October 10, when it passed H.J.Res. 114 by a vote of 296-133.
Subsequently, the Senate passed the House version of H.J. Res 144 on October
11 by a vote of 77-23, and President Bush signed the "Authorization for
Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002" into law on October
16, 2002. (83)
In signing H.J.Res. 114 into law, President Bush noted that by passing
this legislation the Congress had demonstrated that "the United States
speaks with one voice on the threat to international peace and security
posed by Iraq." He added that the legislation carried an important message
that "Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of
weapons of mass destruction, and ...its support for terrorists, or will
be compelled to do so." While the President noted he had sought a "resolution
of support" from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated receiving
that support, he also stated that:
...my request for it did not, and my signing
this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing
positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional
authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or
other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution.
The President went on to state that on the "important question of the
threat posed by Iraq", his views and goals and those of the Congress were
the same. He further observed that he had extensive consultations with
the Congress in the past months, and that he looked forward to "continuing
close consultation in the months ahead." He stated his intent to submit
written reports to Congress every 60 days on matters "relevant to this
resolution." (84)
The central element of P.L. 107-243 is the authorization for the President
to use the armed forces of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate
in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
As predicates for the use of force, the statute requires the President
to communicate to Congress his determination that the use of diplomatic
and other peaceful means will not "adequately protect the United States
... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions" and that the use of force is "consistent" with the
battle against terrorism. Like P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-40, the statute
declares that it is "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." It also
requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress "on matters
relevant to this joint resolution." Finally, the statute expresses Congress' "support" for
the efforts of the President to obtain "prompt and decisive action by the
Security Council" to enforce Iraq's compliance with all relevant Security
Council resolutions.
Public Law 107-243 clearly confers broad authority on the President to
use force. In contrast to P.L. 102-1, the authority granted is not limited
to the implementation of previously adopted Security Council resolutions
concerning Iraq but includes "all relevant ... resolutions." Thus, it appears
to incorporate resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security
Council in the future as well as those already adopted. The authority also
appears to extend beyond compelling Iraq's disarmament to implementing
the full range of concerns expressed in those resolutions. Unlike P.L.
107-40, the President's exercise of the authority granted is not dependent
upon a finding that Iraq was associated in some direct way with the September
11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. Moreover, the authority conferred can be
used for the broad purpose of defending "the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Nevertheless, P.L.
107-243 is narrower than P.L. 107-40 in that it limits the authorization
for the use of force to Iraq. It also requires as a predicate for the use
of force that the President determine that peaceful means cannot suffice
and that the use of force against Iraq is consistent with the battle against
terrorism. It further limits the force used to that which the President
determines is "necessary and appropriate." Finally, as with P.L. 107-40,
the statutory authorization for use of force granted to the President in
P.L. 107-243 is not dependent for its exercise upon prior authorization
by the U.N. Security Council. In the form that P.L. 107-243 is drafted,
and given the context in which it was debated, one could argue that it
is a classic example of an authorization vehicle contemplated by the original
War Powers Resolution.
Proposed Amendments
After 30 years of experience with it in practice, controversy continues
over the War Powers Resolution's effectiveness and appropriateness as a
system for maintaining a congressional role in the use of armed forces
in conflict. One view is that the War Powers Resolution is basically sound
and does not need amendment. (85) Those who hold
this opinion believe it has brought about better communication between
the two branches in times of crisis, and has given Congress a vehicle by
which it can act when a majority of Members wish to do so. The Resolution
served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by the President in some
cases because of awareness that certain actions might invoke its provisions.
For example, the threat of invoking the War Powers Resolution may have
been helpful in getting U.S. forces out of Grenada, in keeping the number
of military advisers in El Salvador limited to 55, and in prodding Congress
to take a stand on authorizing the war against Iraq.
A contrary view is that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate
instrument that restricts the President's effectiveness in foreign policy
and should be repealed. (86) Those with this
perspective believe that the basic premise of the War Powers Resolution
is wrong because in it, Congress attempts excessive control of the deployment
of U.S. military forces, encroaching on the responsibility of the President. (87) Supporters
of repeal contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct
of foreign policy and that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution
is unconstitutional and impractical. Some holding this view contend that
Congress has always had the power, through appropriations and general lawmaking,
to inquire into, support, limit, or prohibit specific uses of U.S. Armed
Forces if there is majority support. The War Powers Resolution does not
fundamentally change this equation, it is argued, but it complicates action,
misleads military opponents, and diverts attention from key policy questions.
A third view is that the War Powers Resolution has not been adequate to
accomplish its objectives and needs to be strengthened or reshaped. (88) Proponents
of this view assert that Presidents have continued to introduce U.S. armed
forces into hostilities without consulting Congress and without congressional
authorization. Presidents have cited section 4(a)(1) on only one occasion
-- Mayaguez -- and by the time the action was reported, it was virtually
over.
Holders of this third view have proposed various types of amendments to
the War Powers Resolution. These include returning to the version originally
passed by the Senate, establishing a congressional consultation group,
adding a cutoff of funds, and providing for judicial review. A general
discussion of these categories of possible changes follows.
Return to Senate Version: Enumerating Exceptions for
Emergency Use
In 1977, Senator Thomas Eagleton proposed that the War Powers Resolution
return to the original language of the version passed by the Senate, and
this proposal has been made several times since. This would require prior
congressional authorization for the introduction of forces into conflict
abroad without a declaration of war except to respond to or forestall an
armed attack against the United States or its forces or to protect U.S.
citizens while evacuating them. The amendment would eliminate the construction
that the President has 60 to 90 days in which he can militarily act without
authorization. Opponents fear the exceptions to forestall attacks or rescue
American citizens abroad would serve as a blanket authorization and might
be abused, yet might not allow the needed speed of action and provide adequate
flexibility in other circumstances.
Shorten or Eliminate Time Limitation
Another proposal is to shorten the time period that the President could
maintain forces in hostile situations abroad without congressional authorization
from 60 to 30 days, or eliminate it altogether. Some proponents of this
amendment contend the current War Powers Resolution gives the President
60 to 90 days to do as he chooses and that this provides too much opportunity
for mischief or irreversible action. The original Senate version provided
that the use of armed forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities in
any of the emergency situations could not be sustained beyond 30 days without
specific congressional authorization, extendable by the President upon
certification of necessity for safe disengagement. Opponents of this and
related measures argue that they induce military opponents to adopt strategies
to win given conflicts in Congress that they could not win in the field
over time.
Replace Automatic Withdrawal Requirement
The War Powers Resolution has an automatic requirement for withdrawal
of troops 60 days after the President submits a section 4(a)(1) report.
Some Members of Congress favor replacing this provision with expedited
procedures for a joint resolution to authorize the action or require disengagement.
One of the main executive branch objections to the War Powers Resolution
has been that the withdrawal requirement could be triggered by congressional
inaction, and that adversaries can simply wait out the 60 days. By providing
for withdrawal by joint resolution, this amendment would also deal with
the provision for withdrawal by concurrent resolution, under a cloud because
of the Chadha decision. On the other hand, a joint resolution
requiring disengagement could be vetoed by the President and thus would
require a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses for enactment.
Cutoff of Funds
Some proposals call for prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of funds
for any use of U.S. armed forces in violation of the War Powers Resolution
or laws passed under it except for the purpose of removing troops. (89) Congress
could enforce this provision by refusing to appropriate further funds to
continue the military action. This has always been the case, some contend,
and would not work because Congress would remain reluctant to withhold
financial support for U.S. Armed Forces once they were abroad.
Elimination of Action by Concurrent Resolution
Many proposed amendments eliminate section 5(c) providing that U.S. forces
engaged in hostilities abroad without congressional authorization are to
be removed if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution, and section
7 providing priority procedures for a concurrent resolution. Those who
hold this view contend the concurrent resolution section is invalid because
of the Chadha decision.
Expedited Procedures
Several proposals call for new and more detailed priority procedures for
joint resolutions introduced under the War Powers Resolution. These would
apply to joint resolutions either authorizing a military action or calling
for the withdrawal of forces, and to congressional action to sustain or
override a Presidential veto of the joint resolution. (90)
Consultation Group
Several proposed amendments have focused on improving consultation under
the War Powers Resolution, particularly by establishing a specific consultation
group in Congress for this purpose. Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell
have proposed the President regularly consult with an initial group of
6 Members--the majority and minority leaders of both Chambers plus the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate. Upon a request
from a majority of this core group, the President is to consult with a
permanent consultative group of 18 Members consisting of the leadership
and the ranking and minority members of the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Armed Services, and Intelligence. The permanent consultative group would
also be able to determine that the President should have reported an introduction
of forces and to introduce a joint resolution of authorization or withdrawal
that would receive expedited procedures. (91)
Other Members have favored a consultation group, but consider that amendment
of the War Powers Resolution is not required for Congress to designate
such a group. (92) On October 28,
1993, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Lee Hamilton introduced H.R. 3405
to establish a Standing Consultative Group. Its purpose would be to facilitate
improved interaction between the executive branch and Congress on the use
of U.S. military forces abroad, including under the War Powers Resolution
or United Nations auspices. Members of the Consultative Group would be
appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate,
after consultation with the minority leaders. The Group would include majority
and minority representatives of the leadership and the committees on foreign
policy, armed services, intelligence, and appropriations.
Another proposal would attempt to improve consultation by broadening the
instances in which the President is required to consult. This proposal
would cover all situations in which a President is required to report,
rather than only circumstances that invoke the time limitation, as is now
the case. (93)
Judicial Review
Proposals have been made that any Member of Congress may bring an action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for judgment
and injunctive relief on the grounds that the President or the U.S. Armed
Forces have not complied with any provision of the War Powers Resolution.
The intent of this legislation is to give standing to Members to assert
the interest of the House or Senate, but whether it would impel courts
to exercise jurisdiction is uncertain. Most recent Federal court decisions
have rejected War Powers lawsuits by Congressional litigants on the grounds
they lacked standing to sue. Proposals have also called for the court not
to decline to make a determination on the merits, on the grounds that the
issue of compliance is a political question or otherwise nonjusticiable;
to accord expedited consideration to the matter; and to prescribe judicial
remedies including that the President submit a report or remove Armed Forces
from a situation. (94)
Change of Name
Other proposals would construct a Hostilities Act or Use of Force Act
and repeal the War Powers Resolution. (95) A possible objection
to invoking the War Powers Resolution is reluctance to escalate international
tension by implying that a situation is war. Some would see this as a step
in the wrong direction; in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, some contend,
it was self-deceptive and ultimately impractical not to recognize hostilities
of that magnitude as war and bring to bear the Constitutional provision
giving Congress the power to declare war.
United Nations Actions
With the increase in United Nations actions since the end of the Cold
War, the question has been raised whether the War Powers Resolution should
be amended to facilitate or restrain the President from supplying forces
for U.N. actions without congressional approval. Alternatively, the United
Nations Participation Act might be amended, or new legislation enacted,
to specify how the War Powers Resolution is to be applied, and whether
the approval of Congress would be required only for an initial framework
agreement on providing forces to the United Nations, or whether Congress
would be required to approve an agreement to supply forces in specified
situations, particularly for U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Appendix 1. Instances Reported under the War Powers
Resolution
This appendix lists reports Presidents have made to Congress as the result
of the War Powers Resolution. Each entry contains the President's reference
to the War Powers Resolution. (96) The reports
generally cite the President's authority to conduct foreign relations and
as Commander in Chief; each entry indicates any additional legislative
authority a President cites for his action.
(1) Danang, Vietnam. On April 4, 1975, President Ford
reported the use of naval vessels, helicopters, and Marines to transport
refugees from Danang and other seaports to safer areas in Vietnam. His
report mentioned section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution and authorization
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for humanitarian assistance to refugees
suffering from the hostilities in South Vietnam. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
to the Department of State, testified later that the President "advised
the members of the Senate and House leadership that a severe emergency
existed in the coastal communities of South Vietnam and that he was directing
American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation
of refugees from coastal seaports." (97)
(2) Cambodia. On April 12, 1975, President Ford reported
the use of ground combat Marines, helicopters, and supporting tactical
air elements to assist with the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cambodia.
The report took note of both section 4 and section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers
Resolution. On April 3, 1975, the day the President authorized the Ambassador
to evacuate the American staff, he directed that the leaders of the Senate
and House be advised of the general plan of evacuation. On April 11, the
day he ordered the final evacuation, President Ford again directed that
congressional leaders be notified.
(3) Vietnam. On April 30, 1975, President Ford reported
the use of helicopters, Marines, and fighter aircraft to aid in the evacuation
of U.S. citizens and others from South Vietnam. The report took note of
section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. On April 10, the President had
asked Congress to clarify its limitation on the use of forces in Vietnam
to insure evacuation of U.S. citizens and to cover some Vietnamese nationals,
but legislation to this effect was not completed. On April 28, the President
directed that congressional leaders be notified that the final phase of
the evacuation of Saigon would be carried out by military forces within
the next few hours. (98)
(4) Mayaguez. On May 15, 1975, President Ford reported
that he had ordered U.S. military forces to rescue the crew of and retake
the ship Mayaguez that had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats
on May 12, that the ship had been retaken, and that the withdrawal of the
forces had been undertaken. The report took note of section 4(a)(1) of
the War Powers Resolution. On May 13, Administration aides contacted ten
Members from the House and 11 Senators regarding the military measures
directed by the President. (99)
(5) Iran. On April 26, 1980, President Carter reported
the use of six aircraft and eight helicopters in an unsuccessful attempt
of April 24 to rescue the American hostages in Iran. The report was submitted "consistent
with the reporting provision" of the War Powers Resolution. President Carter
said the United States was acting in accordance with its right under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter to protect and rescue its citizens where
the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or
unwilling to protect them. The Administration did not inform congressional
leaders of the plan on grounds that consultation could endanger the success
of the mission.
(6) Sinai. The United States, Egypt, and Israel signed
an executive agreement on August 3, 1981, outlining U.S. participation
in a Multinational Force and Observers unit to function as a peacekeeping
force in the Sinai after Israel withdrew its forces. In anticipation of
this accord, on July 21, 1981, President Reagan requested congressional
authorization for U.S. participation. Congress authorized President Reagan
to deploy military personnel to the Sinai in the Multinational Force and
Observers Participation Resolution, P.L. 97-132, signed December 29, 1981.
On March 19, 1982, President Reagan reported the deployment of military
personnel and equipment to the Multinational Force and Observers in the
Sinai. The President said the report was provided "consistent with section
4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution" and cited the Multinational Force
and Observers Participation Resolution.
(7) Lebanon. On August 24, 1982, President Reagan reported
the dispatch of 800 Marines to serve in the multinational force to assist
in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation force from Lebanon.
The report was provided "consistent with" but did not cite any specific
provision of the War Powers Resolution. President Reagan had begun discussions
with congressional leaders on July 6, 1982 after the plan had been publicly
announced, and after leaks in the Israeli press indicated that he had approved
the plan on July 2. (100)
(8) Lebanon. On September 29, 1982, President Reagan
reported the deployment of 1,200 Marines to serve in a temporary multinational
force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty.
He said the report was being submitted "consistent with the War Powers
Resolution." On this second Multinational Force in Lebanon there was a
considerable amount of negotiation between the executive branch and Congress,
but most of it occurred after the decision to participate had been made
and the Marines were in Lebanon. (101)
(9) Chad. On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported
the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15
fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to Sudan to assist
Chad and other friendly governments helping Chad against Libyan and rebel
forces. He said the report was being submitted consistent with Section
4 of the War Powers Resolution. On August 23, 1983, a State Department
spokesman announced that the planes were being withdrawn.
(10) Lebanon. On August 30, 1983, after the Marines participating
in the Multinational Force in Lebanon were fired upon and two were killed,
President Reagan submitted a report "consistent with section 4 of the War
Powers Resolution." In P.L.98-119, the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution,
signed October 12, 1983, Congress determined section 4(a) had become operative
on August 29, 1983, and authorized the forces to remain for 18 months.
(11) Grenada. On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported
that U.S. Army and Marine personnel had begun landing in Grenada to join
collective security forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
in assisting in the restoration of law and order in Grenada and to facilitate
the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. He submitted the report "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution." President Reagan met with several congressional
leaders at 8 p.m. on October 24. (102) This was after
the directive ordering the landing had been signed at 6 p.m., but before
the actual invasion that began at 5:30 a.m., October 25.
(12) Libya. On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported
(without any mention of the War Powers Resolution) that, on March 24 and
25, U.S. forces conducting freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf
of Sidra had been attacked by Libyan missiles. In response, the United
States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the missile site.
(13) Libya. On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported, "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution", that on April 14 U.S. air and naval forces
had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations
in Libya. President Reagan had invited approximately a dozen congressional
leaders to the White House at about 4 p.m. on April 14 and discussed the
situation until 6 p.m. He indicated that he had ordered the bombing raid
and that the aircraft from the United Kingdom were on their way to Libya
and would reach their targets about 7 p.m.
(14) Persian Gulf (103). On September
23, 1987, President Reagan reported that, on September 21, two U.S. helicopters
had fired on an Iranian landing craft observed laying mines in the Gulf.
The President said that while mindful of legislative-executive differences
on the interpretation and constitutionality of certain provisions of the
War Powers Resolution, he was reporting in a spirit of mutual cooperation.
(15) Persian Gulf. On October 10, 1987, President Reagan
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that, on October 8,
three U.S. helicopters were fired upon by small Iranian naval vessels and
the helicopters returned fire and sank one of the vessels.
(16) Persian Gulf. On October 20, 1987, President Reagan
reported an attack by an Iranian Silkworm missile against the U.S.-flag
tanker Sea Isle City on October 15 and U.S. destruction, on October 19,
of the Iranian Rashadat armed platform used to support attacks and mine-laying
operations. The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."
(17) Persian Gulf. On April 19, 1988, President Reagan
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that in response to
the U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine on April 14, U.S. Armed Forces
attacked and "neutralized" two Iranian oil platforms on April 18 and, after
further Iranian attacks, damaged or sank Iranian vessels. The President
called the actions "necessary and proportionate." Prior to this action,
the President met with congressional leaders.
(18) Persian Gulf. On July 4, 1988, President Reagan
reported that on July 3 the USS Vincennes and USS Elmer Montgomery fired
upon approaching Iranian small craft, sinking two. Firing in self-defense
at what it believed to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft, the Vincennes
had shot down an Iranian civilian airliner. The President expressed deep
regret. The report was submitted "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."
(19) Persian Gulf. On July 14, 1988, President Reagan
reported that, on July 12, two U.S. helicopters, responding to a distress
call from a Japanese-owned Panamanian tanker, were fired at by two small
Iranian boats and returned the fire. The report was submitted "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution."
(20) Philippines. On December 2, 1989, President George
H. W. Bush submitted a report to congressional leaders "consistent with" the
War Powers Resolution, describing assistance of combat air patrols to help
the Aquino government in the Philippines restore order and to protect American
lives. After the planes had taken off from Clark Air Base to provide air
cover, Vice President Quayle and other officials informed congressional
leaders. On December 7, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante
Fascell wrote President Bush expressing his concern for the lack of advance
consultation. In reply, on February 10, 1990, National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft wrote Chairman Fascell that the President was "committed
to consultations with Congress prior to deployments of U.S. Forces into
actual or imminent hostilities in all instances where such consultations
are possible. In this instance, the nature of the rapidly evolving situation
required an extremely rapid decision very late at night and consultation
was simply not an option."
(21) Panama. On December 21, 1989, President George H.
W. Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had
ordered U.S. military forces to Panama to protect the lives of American
citizens and bring General Noriega to justice. By February 13, 1990, all
the invasion forces had been withdrawn. President Bush informed several
congressional leaders of the approaching invasion of Panama at 6 p.m. on
December 19, 1989. This was after the decision to take action was made,
but before the operation actually began at 1:00 a.m., December 20.
(22) Liberia. On August 6, 1990, President George H.
W. Bush reported to Congress that following discussions with congressional
leaders, a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional
security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and helicopter teams had evacuated
U.S. citizens from Liberia. The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution
or cite any authority.
(23) Iraq. On August 9, 1990, President George H. W.
Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had ordered the forward deployment of substantial elements of the U.S.
Armed Forces into the Persian Gulf region to help defend Saudi Arabia after
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The Bush Administration notified congressional
leaders that it was deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia on August 7,
the date of the deployment. After the forces had been deployed, President
Bush held several meetings with congressional leaders and members of relevant
committees, and committees held hearings to discuss the situation.
(24) Iraq. On November 16, 1990, President George H.
W. Bush reported, without mention of the War Powers Resolution but referring
to the August 9 letter, the continued buildup to ensure "an adequate offensive
military option." Just prior to adjournment, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell
and Speaker Foley designated Members to form a consultation group, and
the President held meetings with the group on some occasions, but he did
not consult the members in advance on the major buildup of forces in the
Persian Gulf area announced November 8.
(25) Iraq. On January 18, 1991, President George H. W.
Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had directed U.S. Armed Forces to commence combat operations on January
16 against Iraqi forces and military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. On January
12, Congress had passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against
Iraq Resolution (P.L. 102-1), which stated it was the specific statutory
authorization required by the War Powers Resolution. P.L. 102-1 required
the President to submit a report to the Congress at least once every 60
days on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N.
Security Council resolution, and Presidents submitted subsequent reports
on military actions in Iraq "consistent with" P.L. 102-1. An exception
is report submitted June 28, 1993, described below.
(26) Somalia. On December 10, 1992, President George
H. W. Bush reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S.
armed forces had entered Somalia on December 8 in response to a humanitarian
crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation
constituted a threat to international peace. He included as authority applicable
treaties and laws, and said he had also taken into account views expressed
in H.Con.Res. 370, S.Con.Res. 132, and the Horn of Africa Recovery and
Food Security Act, P.L. 102-274. On December 4, the day the President ordered
the forces deployed, he briefed a number of congressional leaders on the
action.
(27) Bosnia. On April 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent
with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. forces were participating
in a NATO air action to enforce a U.N. ban on all unauthorized military
flights over Bosnia-Hercegovina, pursuant to his authority as Commander
in Chief. Later, on April 27, President Clinton consulted with about two
dozen congressional leaders on potential further action.
(28) Somalia. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported
that in response to attacks against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional
leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military
action to quell the violence. He said the report was "consistent with the
War Powers Resolution, in light of the passage of 6 months since President
Bush's initial report...." He said the action was in accordance with applicable
treaties and laws, and said the deployment was consistent with S.J.Res.
45 as adopted by the Senate and amended by the House. (The Senate did not
act on the House amendment, so Congress did not take final action on S.J.Res.
45.)
(29) Iraq. On June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that on June 26 U.S. naval forces had launched
missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters in Baghdad
in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President
Bush in Kuwait in April 1993.
(30) Macedonia (104). On July 9,
1993, President Clinton reported "consistent with Section 4 of the War
Powers Resolution" the deployment of approximately 350 U.S. armed forces
to Macedonia to participate in the U.N. Protection Force to help maintain
stability in the area of former Yugoslavia. He said the deployment was
directed in accordance with Section 7 of the United Nations Participation
Act.
(31) Bosnia. On October 13, 1993, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces continued to
support enforcement of the U.N. no-fly zone in Bosnia, noting that more
that 50 U.S. aircraft were now available for NATO efforts in this regard.
(32) Haiti. On October 20, 1993, President Clinton submitted
a report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. ships had
begun to enforce a U.N. embargo against Haiti.
(33) Macedonia. On January 8, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that approximately
300 members of a reinforced company team (RCT) of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry
Division (Mechanized) had assumed a peacekeeping role in Macedonia as part
of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on January 6, 1994.
(34) Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the United States
had expanded its participation in United Nations and NATO efforts to reach
a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft were
available for participation in the authorized NATO missions.
(35) Bosnia. On March 1, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent
with" the War Powers Resolution that on February 28 U.S. planes patrolling
the "no-fly zone" in former Yugoslavia under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) shot down 4 Serbian Galeb planes.
(36) Bosnia. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent
with" the War Powers Resolution that on April 10 and 11, U.S. warplanes
under NATO command had fired against Bosnian Serb forces shelling the "safe" city
of Gorazde.
(37) Rwanda. On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent
with" the War Powers Resolution that combat-equipped U.S. military forces
had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant evacuation
operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda,
where widespread fighting had broken out.
(38) Macedonia. On April 19, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. contingent
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had been augmented by a reinforced
company of 200 personnel.
(39) Haiti. On April 20, 1994, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. naval forces had continued enforcement
in the waters around Haiti and that 712 vessels had been boarded.
(40) Bosnia. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton reported
the use on August 5 of U.S. aircraft under NATO to attack Bosnian Serb
heavy weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone upon request
of the U.N. Protection Forces. He did not cite the War Powers Resolution
but referred to the April 12 report that cited the War Powers Resolution.
(41) Haiti. On September 21, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the deployment of
1,500 troops to Haiti to restore democracy in Haiti. The troop level was
subsequently increased to 20,000.
(42) Bosnia. On November 22, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" the use of U.S. combat
aircraft on November 21, 1994 under NATO to attack bases used by Serbs
to attack the town of Bihac in Bosnia.
(43) Macedonia. On December 22, 1994, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. Army
contingent in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued its peacekeeping
mission and that the current contingent would soon be replaced by about
500 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored
Division from Kirchgons, Germany.
(44) Somalia. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped
U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to
assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).
(45) Haiti. On March 21, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. military forces in Haiti as part
of a U.N. Multinational Force had been reduced to just under 5,300 personnel.
He noted that as of March 31, 1995, approximately 2,500 U.S. personnel
would remain in Haiti as part of the U.N. Mission in Haiti UNMIH).
(46) Bosnia. On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft
and other aircraft continued to contribute to NATO's enforcement of the
no-fly zone in airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted,
are also available for close air support of U.N. forces in Croatia. Roughly
500 U.S. soldiers continue to be deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and embargo operations in
this region.
(47) Bosnia. On September 1, 1995, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that "U.S. combat
and support aircraft" had been used beginning on August 29, 1995, in a
series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla,
and Gorazde." He noted that during the first day of operations, "some 300
sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Goradzde and Mostar."
(48) Haiti. On September 21, 1995, President Clinton
reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that currently the
United States has 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in
the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In addition, 260 U.S. military personnel
are assigned to the U.S. Support Group Haiti.
(49) Bosnia. On December 6, 1995, President Clinton notified
Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had "ordered
the deployment of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel to Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO 'enabling force' to lay the
groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR)," which would be used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement
after its signing. The President also noted that he had authorized deployment
of roughly 3,000 other U.S. military personnel to Hungary, Italy, and Croatia
to establish infrastructure for the enabling force and the IFOR.
(50) Bosnia. On December 21, 1995, President Clinton
notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he had
ordered the deployment of approximately 20,000 U.S. military personnel
to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and approximately 5,000 U.S. military personnel
would be deployed in other former Yugoslav states, primarily in Croatia.
In addition, about 7,000 U.S. support forces would be deployed to Hungary,
Italy and Croatia and other regional states in support of IFOR's mission.
The President ordered participation of U.S. forces "pursuant to" his "constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as
Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive."
(51) Haiti. On March 21, 1996, President Clinton notified
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that beginning in
January 1996 there had been a "phased reduction" in the number of United
States personnel assigned to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).
As of March 21, 309 U.S. personnel remained a part of UNMIH. These U.S.
forces were "equipped for combat."
(52) Liberia. On April 11, 1996, President Clinton notified
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that on April 9, 1996
due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat
to American citizens" in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to
evacuate from that country "private U.S. citizens and certain third-country
nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound...."
(53) Liberia. On May 20, 1996, President Clinton notified
Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of the continued
deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American
citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated "attacks
on the American Embassy complex" in Liberia. The President noted that the
deployment of U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any
need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain
an evacuation capability in the country.
(54) Central African Republic. On May 23, 1996, President
Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" of
the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic,
to conduct the evacuation from that country of "private U.S. citizens and
certain U.S. Government employees," and to provide "enhanced security" for
the American Embassy in Bangui.
(55) Bosnia. On June 21, 1996, President Clinton notified
Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that United States
forces totaling about 17,000 remain deployed in Bosnia "under NATO operational
command and control" as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). In
addition, about 5,500 U.S. military personnel are deployed in Hungary,
Italy and Croatia, and other regional states to provide "logistical and
other support to IFOR." The President noted that it was the intention that
IFOR would complete the withdrawal of all troops in the weeks after December
20, 1996, on a schedule "set by NATO commanders consistent with the safety
of troops and the logistical requirements for an orderly withdrawal." He
also noted that a U.S. Army contingent (of about 500 U.S. soldiers) remains
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the United Nations
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(56) Rwanda and Zaire. On December 2, 1996, President
Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
in support of the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding
refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had
authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes
to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations,
although fighting still was occurring in the area, and U.S. aircraft had
been subject to fire when on flight duty.
(57) Bosnia. On December 20, 1996, President Clinton
notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he
had authorized U.S. participation in an IFOR follow-on force in Bosnia,
known as SFOR (Stabilization Force), under NATO command. The President
said the U.S. forces contribution to SFOR was to be "about 8,500" personnel
whose primary mission was to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities
or new threats to peace in Bosnia. SFOR's duration was Bosnia is expected
to be 18 months, with progressive reductions and eventual withdrawal.
(58) Albania. On March 15, 1997, President Clinton notified
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on March 13,
1997, he had utilized U.S. military forces to evacuate certain U.S. Government
employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania, and to enhance
security for the U.S. embassy in that city.
(59) Congo and Gabon. On March 27, 1997, President Clinton
notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on
March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had
been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American
private citizens, government employees and selected third country nationals
in Zaire, and be available for any necessary evacuation operation.
(60) Sierra Leone. On May 30, 1997, President Clinton
notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on
May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown,
Sierra Leone to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S.
Government employees and private U.S. citizens.
(61) Bosnia. On June 20, 1997, President Clinton notified
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. Armed Forces
continued to support peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and other states
in the region in support of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). He
reported that most U.S. military personnel then involved in SFOR were in
Bosnia, near Tuzla, and about 2,800 U.S. troops were deployed in Hungary,
Croatia, Italy, and other regional states to provide logistics and other
support to SFOR. A U.S. Army contingent of about 500 also remained deployed
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventative
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(62) Cambodia. On July 11, 1997, President Clinton notified
Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in an effort
to ensure the security of American citizens in Cambodia during a period
of domestic conflict there, he had deployed a Task Force of about 550 U.S.
military personnel to Utapao Air Base in Thailand. These personnel were
to be available for possible emergency evacuation operations in Cambodia.
(63) Bosnia. On December 19, 1997, President Clinton
notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he
intended "in principle" to have the United States participate in a security
presence in Bosnia when the NATO SFOR contingent withdrew in the summer
of 1998.
(64) Guinea-Bissau. On June 12, 1998 President Clinton
reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that,
on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering
the U.S. Embassy and U.S. government employees and citizens in that country,
he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to
Dakar, Senegal, to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country
nationals, from the city of Bissau.
(65) Bosnia. On June 19, 1998, President Clinton reported
to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" regarding activities
in the last six months of combat-equipped U.S. forces in support of NATO's
SFOR in Bosnia and surrounding areas of former Yugoslavia.
(66) Kenya and Tanzania. On August 10, 1998, President
Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military
personnel to Nairobi, Kenya to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance
related to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He
also reported that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to enhance the security of the U.S. embassies
and citizens there.
(67) Albania. On August 18, 1998, President Clinton reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had,
on August 16, 1998, deployed 200 U.S. Marines and 10 Navy SEALS to the
U.S. Embassy compound in Tirana, Albania to enhance security against reported
threats against U.S. personnel.
(68) Afghanistan and Sudan. On August 21, 1998, by letter,
President Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations
in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization.
The President did so based on what he termed convincing information that
the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August
7, 1998, of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
(69) Liberia. On September 29, 1998, by letter, President
Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force to Liberia to
augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide
for a rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and
government personnel from the country.
(70) Bosnia. On January 19, 1999, by letter, President
Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
pursuant to his authority as Commander-in-Chief he was continuing to authorize
the use of combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and other states
in the region to participate in and support the NATO-led Stabilization
Force (SFOR). He noted that U.S. SFOR military personnel totaled about
6,900, with about 2,300 U.S. military personnel deployed to Hungary, Croatia,
Italy and other regional states. Also some 350 U.S. military personnel
remain deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as
part of the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
(71) Kenya. On February 25, 1999, President Clinton submitted
a supplemental report to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" describing
the continuing deployment of U.S. military personnel in Kenya to provide
continuing security for U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi in
the aftermath of the terrorist bombing there.
(72) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On March 26, 1999, President
Clinton notified Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
on March 24, 1999, U.S. military forces, at his direction and acting jointly
with NATO allies, had commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response
to the Yugoslav government's campaign of violence and repression against
the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.
(73) Yugoslavia/Albania. On April 7, 1999, President
Clinton notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
he had ordered additional U.S. military forces to Albania, including rotary
wing aircraft, artillery, and tactical missiles systems to enhance NATO's
ability to conduct effective air operations in Yugoslavia. About 2,500
soldiers and aviators are to be deployed as part of this task force.
(74) Yugoslavia/Albania. On May 25, 1999, President Clinton
reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
he had directed "deployment of additional aircraft and forces to support
NATO's ongoing efforts [against Yugoslavia], including several thousand
additional U.S. Armed Forces personnel to Albania in support of the deep
strike force located there." He also directed that additional U.S. forces
be deployed to the region to assist in "humanitarian operations."
(75) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On June 12, 1999, President Clinton
reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
he had directed the deployment of about "7,000 U.S. military personnel
as the U.S. contribution to the approximately 50,000-member, NATO-led security
force (KFOR)" currently being assembled in Kosovo. He also noted that about "1,500
U.S. military personnel, under separate U.S. command and control, will
deploy to other countries in the region, as our national support element,
in support of KFOR."
(76) Bosnia. On July 19, 1999, President Clinton reported
to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that about 6,200
U.S. military personnel were continuing to participate in the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and that another 2,200 personnel
were supporting SFOR operations from Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. He also
noted that U.S. military personnel remain in the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia to support the international security presence in Kososo (KFOR).
(77) East Timor. On October 8, 1999, President Clinton
reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he
had directed the deployment of a limited number of U.S. military forces
to East Timor to support the U.N. multinational force (INTERFET) aimed
at restoring peace to East Timor. U.S. support had been limited initially
to "communications, logistics, planning assistance and transportation." The
President further noted that he had authorized deployment of the amphibious
ship USS BELLEAU WOOD, together with its helicopters and her complement
of personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable) (MEU SOC)) to the East Timor region, to provide helicopter airlift
and search and rescue support to the multinational operation. U.S. participation
was anticipated to continue until the transition to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation was complete.
(78) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On December 15, 1999, President
Clinton reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that
U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to serve as part of the
NATO-led security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that the American contribution
to KFOR in Kosovo was "approximately 8,500 U.S. military personnel." U.S.
forces were deployed in a sector centered around "Urosevac in the eastern
portion of Kosovo." For U.S. KFOR forces, "maintaining public security
is a key task." Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries
in the region to serve in administrative and logistics support roles for
U.S. forces in KFOR. Of these forces, about 1,500 U.S. military personnel
are in Macedonia and Greece, and occasionally in Albania.
(79) Bosnia. On January 25, 2000, President Clinton reported
to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the U.S. continued
to provide combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina
and other states in the region as part of the NATO led Stabilization Force
(SFOR). The President noted that the U.S. force contribution was being
reduced from "approximately 6,200 to 4,600 personnel," with the U.S. forces
assigned to Multinational Division, North, centered around the city of
Tuzla. He added that approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel were deployed
to Hungary, Croatia, and Italy to provide "logistical and other support
to SFOR," and that U.S. forces continue to support SFOR in "efforts to
apprehend persons indicted for war crimes."
(80) East Timor. On February 25, 2000, President Clinton
reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that he
had authorized the participation of a small number of U.S. military personnel
in support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), with a mandate to maintain law and order throughout East Timor,
facilitate establishment of an effective administration there, deliver
humanitarian assistance, and support the building of self-government. The
President reported that the U.S. contingent was small: three military observers,
and one judge advocate. To facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities
in East Timor, the President also authorized the deployment of a support
group (USGET), consisting of 30 U.S. personnel. U.S. personnel would be
temporarily deployed to East Timor, on a rotational basis, and through
periodic ship visits, during which U.S. forces would conduct "humanitarian
and assistance activities throughout East Timor." Rotational activities
should continue through the summer of 2000.
(81) Sierra Leone. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, "consistent
with the War Powers Resolution" reported to Congress that he had ordered
a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support
evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a
U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver "ammunition, and other supplies and equipment" to
Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.
(82) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On June 16, 2000, President Clinton
reported to
Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the U.S. was
continuing to provide military personnel to the NATO-led KFOR security
force in Kosovo. U.S. forces were numbered at 7,500, but were scheduled
to be reduced to 6,000 when ongoing troop rotations were completed. U.S.
forces in Kosovo are assigned to a sector centered near Gnjilane in eastern
Kosovo. Other U.S. military personnel are deployed to other countries to
serve in administrative and logistics support roles, with approximately
1,000 U.S. personnel in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece.
(83) Bosnia. On July 25, 2000, President Clinton reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that combat-equipped
U.S. military personnel continued to participate in the NATO-led Stabilization
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, being deployed to Bosnia, and other
states in the region in support of peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia.
U.S. military personnel levels have been reduced from 6,200 to 4,600. Apart
from the forces in Bosnia, approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel continue
to be deployed in support roles in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy.
(84) East Timor. On August 25, 2000, President Clinton
reported to Congress,"consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the United States was currently contributing three military observers to
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) that
is charged by the UN with restoring and maintaining peace and security
there. He also noted that the U.S. was maintaining a military presence
in East Timor separate from UNTAET, comprised of about 30 U.S. personnel
who facilitate and coordinate U.S. military activities in East Timor and
rotational operations of U.S. forces there. U.S. forces currently conduct
humanitarian and civic assistance activities for East Timor's citizens.
U.S. rotational presence operations in East Timor are presently expected,
the President said, to continue through December 2000.
(85) Yemen. On October 14, 2000, President Clinton reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on October
12, 2000, in the wake of an attack on the USS COLE in the port of Aden,
Yemen, he had authorized deployment of about 45 military personnel from
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command to Aden to provide "medical, security,
and disaster response assistance." The President further reported that
on October 13, 2000 about 50 U.S. military security personnel arrived in
Aden, and that additional "security elements" may be deployed to the area,
to enhance the ability of the U.S. to ensure the security of the USS COLE
and the personnel responding to the incident. In addition, two U.S. Navy
surface combatant vessels are operating in or near Yemeni territorial waters
to provide communications and other support, as required.
(86) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On December 18, 2000, President
Clinton reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,600 U.S. military
personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led
international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military
personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with
an occasional presence in Albania and Greece. U.S. forces are assigned
to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo.
The President noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is
maintaining a safe and secure environment through conducting "security
patrols in urban areas and in the countryside throughout their sector."
(87) Bosnia. On January 25, 2001, President George W.
Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution,"that
about 4,400 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR).Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 650
others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical
and other support.
(88) East Timor. On March 2, 2001, President George W.
Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping
effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and
order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance,
and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The
U.S. currently has three military observers attached to the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also
has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET),
of approximately 12 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates
and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor.
(89) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 18, 2001, President George
W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the United States was continuing to provide approximately 6,000 U.S. military
personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led
international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military
personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with
an occasional presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are
assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President
Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining
a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban
areas and in the countryside through their sector.
(90) Bosnia. On July 24, 2001, President George W. Bush
reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," about
3,800 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization
Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500 others were
based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical and other support.
(91) East Timor. On August 31, 2001, President George
W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping
effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and
order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance,
and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The
U.S. currently has three military observers attached to the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also
has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET),
of approximately 20 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment, which "facilitates
and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor, as well as a rotational
presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments to East Timor. The
President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence through December
2001, while options for a U.S. presence in 2002 are being reviewed, with
the President's objective being redeployment of USGET personnel, as circumstances
permit.
(92) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 24, 2001,
President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War
Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered
the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to
a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of
operations." The President noted in efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he
might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other
areas of the world...." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope
and duration of these deployments," nor the "actions necessary to counter
the terrorist threat to the United States."
(93) Afghanistan. On October 9, 2001, President George
W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate
Joint Resolution 23" that on October 7, 2001, U.S. Armed Forces "began
combat action in Afghanistan against Al Qaida terrorists and their Taliban
supporters." The President stated that he had directed this military action
in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. "territory, our citizens,
and our way of life, and to the continuing threat of terrorist acts against
the United States and our friends and allies." This military action was "part
of our campaign against terrorism" and was "designed to disrupt the use
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations."
(94) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 19, 2001, President
George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the United States was continuing to provide approximately 5,500 U.S. military
personnel in support of peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led
international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). An additional 500 U.S. military
personnel are deployed as the National Support Element in Macedonia, with
an occasional presence in Greece and Albania. U.S. forces in Kosovo are
assigned to a sector centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion. President
Bush noted that the mission for these U.S. military forces is maintaining
a safe and secure environment through conducting security patrols in urban
areas and in the countryside through their sector.
(95) Bosnia. On January 21, 2002, President
George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
about 3,100 combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces continued to be deployed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR).Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 500
others were based in Hungary, Croatia, and Italy, providing logistical
and other support.
(96) East Timor. On February 28, 2002, President George
W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
U. S. armed forces were continuing to support the United Nations peacekeeping
effort in East Timor aimed at providing security and maintaining law and
order in East Timor, coordinating delivery of humanitarian assistance,
and helping establish the basis for self-government in East Timor. The
U.S. currently has three military observers attached to the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The United States also
has a separate military presence, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET),
comprised of approximately 10 U.S. personnel, including a security detachment,
which "facilitates and coordinates" U.S. military activities in East Timor,
as well as a rotational presence of U.S. forces through temporary deployments
to East Timor. The President stated that U.S. forces would continue a presence
through 2002. The President noted his objective was to gradually reduce
the "rotational presence operations," and to redeploy USGET personnel,
as circumstances permitted.
(97) Anti-terrorist operations. On March 20, 2002, President
George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution,"on
U.S. efforts in the "global war on Terrorism." He noted that the "heart
of the al-Qaeda training capability" had been "seriously degraded," and
that the remainder of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters were being "actively
pursued and engaged by the U.S., coalition and Afghan forces." The United
States was also conducting "maritime interception operations...to locate
and detain suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban leadership fleeing Afghanistan
by sea." At the Philippine Government's invitation, the President had ordered
deployed "combat-equipped and combat support forces to train with, advise,
and assist" the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "existing
counterterrorist capabilities." The strength of U.S. military forces working
with the Philippines was projected to be 600 personnel. The President noted
that he was "assessing options" for assisting other nations, including
Georgia and Yemen, in enhancing their "counterterrorism capabilities, including
training and equipping their armed forces." He stated that U.S. combat-equipped
and combat support forces would be necessary for these efforts, if undertaken.
(98) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 17, 2002, President George
W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the
NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted that the
current U.S. contribution was about 5,100 military personnel, with an additional
468 personnel in Macedonia; and an occasional presence in Albania and Greece.
(99) Bosnia. On July 22, 2002, President George W. Bush
reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
the U.S. military was continuing to support peacekeeping efforts of the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other
regional states. He noted that the current U.S. contribution was "approximately
2,400 personnel." Most U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are assigned
to the Multinational Division, North headquartered in Tuzla. An additional
60 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Hungary and Croatia to provide
logistical and other support.
(100) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 20, 2002,
President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" have been deployed to
the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the
Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." He
added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations
in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming, or
financing of "international terrorists." He also noted that U.S. combat
personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist
capabilities" of their armed forces.
(101) Cote d'Ivoire. On September 26, 2002, President
Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
in response to a rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire that he had on September 25,
2002 sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation
of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake;
and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.
(102) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 15, 2002, the President
reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the
U.S. was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel as part
of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). Currently
the U.S. has approximately 4,350 U.S. military personnel in Kosovo, with
an additional 266 military personnel in Macedonia. The U.S. also has an
occasional presence in Albania and Greece, associated with the KFOR mission.
(103) Bosnia. On January 21, 2003, President George W.
Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
about 1,800 U.S. Armed Forces personnel continued to be deployed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and other regional states as part of the NATO-led Stabilization
Force (SFOR). Most were based at Tuzla in Bosnia. About 80 others were
based in Hungary and Croatia, providing logistical and other support.
(104) Anti-terrorist operations. On March 20, 2003, President
Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as
well as P.L. 107-40, and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander-in-Chief,
that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in
the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S.
actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror
operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; "maritime
interception operations on the high seas" in areas of responsibility of
the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other
activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen
in counter-terrorism operations.
(105) War against Iraq. On March 21, 2003, President
Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as
well as P.L. 102-1 and P.L. 107-243, and "pursuant to" his authority as
Commander-in-Chief, that he had "directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating
with other coalition forces, to commence operations on March 19, 2003,
against Iraq." He further stated that it was not possible to know at present
the duration of active combat operations or the scope necessary to accomplish
the goals of the operation -- "to disarm Iraq in pursuit of peace, stability,
and security both in the Gulf region and in the United States."
(106) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On May 14, 2003, President Bush
reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
combat-equipped U.S. military personnel continued to be deployed as part
of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR). He noted
that about 2,250 U.S. military personnel were deployed in Kosovo, and additional
military personnel operated, on occasion, from Macedonia, Albania, and
Greece in support of KFOR operations.
(107) Liberia. On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on June
8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia,
Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible
evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that
he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure
the U.S. embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation
of American citizens if required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S.
embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar,
Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.
(108) Bosnia. On July 22, 2003, President Bush reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that the United
States continued to provide about 1,800 combat-equipped military personnel
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR)
and its peacekeeping efforts in this country.
(109) Liberia. On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported
to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response
to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350
U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters
in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore order and
provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.
(110) Anti-terrorist operations. On September 19, 2003,
President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that
U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" continue to be deployed
at a number of locations around the world as part of U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts. American forces support anti-terrorism efforts in the Philippines,
and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central,
European and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to "prevent the movement,
arming, or financing of international terrorists." He also noted that "U.S.
combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti
to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."
(111) Yugoslavia/Kosovo. On November 14, 2003, the President
reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" that the
United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel
as part of the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR).
Currently the United States has approximately 2,100 U.S. military personnel
in Kosovo, with additional American military personnel operating out of
Macedonia, Albania, and Greece, in support of KFOR operations.
Appendix 2. Instances Not Formally Reported to the
Congress Under the War Powers Resolution
In some instances where U.S. Armed Forces have been deployed in potentially
hostile situations abroad, Presidents did not submit reports to Congress
under the War Powers Resolution and the question of whether a report was
required could be raised. Representative examples of these instances since
1973 include: (105)
- evacuation of civilians from Cyprus in 1974
- evacuation of civilians from Lebanon in 1976
- Korean DMZ tree-cutting incident of 1976
- transport of European troops to Zaire in 1978
- dispatch of additional military advisers to El Salvador in 1981
- shooting down of two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra on August 19,
1981, after one had fired a heat-seeking missile
- the use of training forces in Honduras after 1983
- dispatch of AWACS to Egypt after a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan
March 18, 1983
- shooting down of two Iranian fighter planes over Persian Gulf on June
5, 1984, by Saudi Arabian jet fighter planes aided by intelligence from
a U.S. AWACS
- interception by U.S. Navy pilots on October 10, 1985, of an Egyptian
airliner carrying hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro
- use of U.S. Army personnel and aircraft in Bolivia for anti-drug assistance
on July 14, 1986
- buildup of fleet in Persian Gulf area in 1987
- force augmentations in Panama in 1988 and 1989
- shooting down 2 Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea on January
4, 1989
- dispatch of military advisers and Special Forces teams to Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru, in the Andean initiative, announced September 5, 1989,
to help those nations combat illicit drug traffickers
- transport of Belgian troops and equipment into Zaire September 25-27,
1991
- evacuation of non-essential U.S. government workers and families from
Sierra Leone, May 3, 1992
- a bombing campaign against Iraq, termed Operation Desert Fox, aimed
at destroying Iraqi industrial facilities deemed capable of producing
weapons of mass destruction, as well as other Iraqi military and security
targets, December 16-23, 1998.
Appendix 3. Text of the War Powers Resolution
War Powers Resolution (106)
Public Law 93-148 [H.J.Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, passed over President's
veto November 7, 1973
JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".
purpose and policy
Sec. 2. (107) (a) It is
the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers
of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary
and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also
all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
consultation
Sec. 3. (108) The President
in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and
after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress
until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or
have been removed from such situations.
reporting
Sec. 4. (109) (a) In the
absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed
Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace of waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report,
in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction
took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress
may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with
respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States
Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities
or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the
President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in
such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the
status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration
of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the
Congress less often than once every six months.
congressional action
Sec. 5. (110)
(a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro
tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted
shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (111) of the House
of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress
has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three
calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned
by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall
jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may
consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required
to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the
President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect
to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless
the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization
for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such
sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an
armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended
for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines
and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued
use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal
of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed
Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States,
its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific
statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
congressional priority procedures for joint resolution or
bill
Sec. 6. (112) (a) Any joint
resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in
such section, shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint
resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in
such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and
nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending
business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for
debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents),
and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such
House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred
to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be
reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration
of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution
or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question
and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress
with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees
shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make
and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than
four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified
in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within
48 hours, they shall report back to their respective House in disagreement.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference
reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the
expiration of such sixty-day period.
congressional priority procedures for concurrent resolution
Sec. 7. (113) (a) Any concurrent
resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent
resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations
within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine
by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business
of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate
shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and
shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred
to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be
reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within
fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of
such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such
House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress
with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees
shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make
and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six
calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference
reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees
are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective
Houses in disagreement.
interpretation of joint resolution
Sec. 8. (114) (a) Authority
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date
of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained
in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty
is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations
and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any
further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States
Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of
one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level
military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment
of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or
any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United
States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces
to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the
regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government
when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat
that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress
or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with
respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence
of this joint resolution.
separability clause
Sec. 9. (115) If any provision
of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstances
is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application
of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby.
effective date
Sec. 10. (116) This joint
resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.
Footnotes
1. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 6.
2. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 7.
3. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 7.
4. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 8.
5. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 93-547, p. 8.
6. (back)P.L.
88-408, approved August 10, 1964; repealed in 1971 by P.L. 91-672.
7. (back)U.S.
Congress. S.Rept. 93-220, p. 24.
8. (back)United
States. President (Nixon). Message vetoing House Joint Resolution 542,
A Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President.
October 24, 1973. H.Doc. 93-171.
9. (back)U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test
of Compliance relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh,
the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7 and
June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1975. p. 69.
10. (back)462
U.S. 919 (1983).
11. (back)Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.
12. (back)Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
13. (back)Celada,
Raymond. J. Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision on the Two-House Disapproval
Mechanism to Terminate U.S. Involvement in Hostilities Pursuant to Unilateral
Presidential Action. CRS Report, August 24, 1983.
14. (back)Gressman,
Prof. Eugene. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The
U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto. Hearings,
July 19, 20, and 21, 1983. 98th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, U.S. GPO,
1983, p. 155-157. Buchanan, G. Sidney. In Defense of the War Powers Resolution:
Chadha Does Not Apply. Houston Law Review, Vol. 22, p. 1155; Ely, John
Hart. Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked. Columbia Law
Review, Vol. 88, p. 1379 (see p. 1395-1398).
15. (back)U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Concerning the Legislative Veto, Hearings, p. 52.
16. (back)P.L.
94-329, signed June 30, 1976.
17. (back)Senate
amendment to S. 1324. Section 1013, State Department Authorization Act
for FY 1984, P.L. 98-164, approved November 22, 1983. Codified at 50 U.S.C.
, sect.1546a (1994).
18. (back)H.Rept.
103-329, November 5, 1993, p. 2. See below for further discussion of the
Somalia case.
19. (back)The
Senate bill had a time limit of 30 days. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee
on Foreign Relations. War Powers. Report to accompany S. 440. S.Rept. 93-220,
93d Congress, 1st Session. p. 28.
20. (back)Sofaer,
Abraham D. Prepared statement in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign
Relations. The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at
a Constitutional Impasse. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on War
Powers. July 13-September 29, 1988. S.Hrng. 100-1012. p. 1059.
21. (back)Appendix
1 lists in chronological order all reports to Congress related to the War
Powers Resolution from the first in 1975 through 2003. Appendix 2 lists
representative instances of the deployment to or use of armed forces in
potentially hostile situations which were not reported under the Resolution.
Appendix 3 gives the complete text of the War Powers Resolution.
22. (back)U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test
of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh,
the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7 and
June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. P. 3.
23. (back)U.S.
Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The situation in Iran.
Hearing, 96th Congress, 2nd session. May 8, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1980. P. iii.
24. (back)Congressional
Record, March 5, 1981, V. 127, p. 3743.
25. (back)Crockett
v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
26. (back)720
F. 2d 1355 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
27. (back)On
March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolution
Amendment of 1982 (S. 2179) specifically providing that U.S. armed forces
shall not be introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) the Congress
has declared war or specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduction
was necessary to meet a clear and present danger of attack on the United
States or to provide immediate evacuation of U.S. citizens. Similar bills
were introduced in the House, e.g. H.R. 1619 and H.R. 1777 in the 98th
Congress.
28. (back)H.Con.Res.
87, 97th Congress.
29. (back)Report
on S.J.Res. 158, Sec. III, S.Rept. 97-470, June 9, 1982.
30. (back)Congressional
Record, House, July 26, 1983, pp. 20924-20925.
31. (back)The
initial statutory restriction was contained in the Continuing Appropriations
Resolution for 1983, P.L. 97-377. This was followed by a $24 million ceiling
on intelligence agency support in fiscal year 1984.
32. (back)Sec.
1451 of P.L.99-145, approved Nov. 8, 1985. A similar provision was contained
in the defense authorization for 1988-1989, sec.1405 of P.L.100-180, approved
Dec. 4, 1987.
33. (back)Continuing
Appropriations Resolution, P. L. 99-591, approved Oct. 30, 1986. Continued
in P.L. 100-202, approved Dec. 22, 1987.
34. (back)P.L.
98-119, approved Oct. 12, 1983.
35. (back)P.L.
98-43, approved June 27, 1983.
36. (back)P.L.
98-119, signed October 12, 1983.
37. (back)U.S.
Congress. H.Rept. 98-566 on H.J.Res. 308; Senate amendment numbered 3.
Congressional Record November 17, 1983, p. H10189.
38. (back)Conyers
v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1984).
39. (back)Conyers
v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
40. (back)S.J.Res.
340, introduced May 8, 1986. The bill was not acted upon, but the proposal
was later incorporated in other proposed amendments. See below, section
on amendments.
41. (back)S.
2335 and H.R. 4611, Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, introduced April 17, 1986.
Not acted upon.
42. (back)For
the reports, see list above under section on reporting requirements.
43. (back)Questions
submitted to Department of State and responses thereto, March 30, 1988,
in War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports,
p. 97-99.
44. (back)Bills
to this effect in the House included H.J.Res. 387, introduced October 22,
1987, which also authorized the continued presence of U.S. forces in the
Gulf.
45. (back)Byrd-Warner
amendment to S.J.Res. 194, adopted by Senate Oct. 21, 1987.
46. (back)Lowry
v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). See also Ackerman, David M.
War Powers Litigation Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution.
CRS Report RL30352(pdf).
47. (back)Weinberger,
Caspar W. Secretary of Defense. A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements
in the Persian Gulf. June 15, 1987, p.14.
48. (back)When
asked about abiding by the War Powers Resolution, President Reagan said "we
are complying with a part of that act, although we do not call it that.
But we have been consulting the Congress, reporting to them and telling
them what we're doing, and in advance..." Press conference of October 22,1987. The
New York Times, October 23, 1987, p. A8.
49. (back)P.L.
101-162, signed November 21, 1989.
50. (back)Amendments
to National Drug Control Strategy bill, S. 1711, October 5, 1989.
51. (back)In
that case, the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Council temporarily,
and the Security Council requested members to supply the Republic of Korea
with sufficient military assistance to repel the invasion of North Korea.
President Truman ordered U.S. air, naval, and ground forces to Korea to
repel the attack without authorization from Congress. Senator Robert Taft
complained on January 5, 1951, "The President simply usurped authority
in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea
to carry out the resolution of the United Nations in an undeclared war."
52. (back)Such
a statement was made in the Authorization for Use of Military Force against
Iraq Resolution, P.L. 102-1, signed January 14, 1991, and in S.J.Res. 45,
authorizing the use of force in Somalia for one year, as passed by the
Senate on February 4, 1993, and amended by the House on May 25, 1993; a
conference was not held.
53. (back)U.S.
Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. War Powers; report to
accompany S. 440. June 14, 1973. S.Rept. 93-220.
54. (back)Sec.8153,
Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY1994, H.R. 3116, P.L. 103-139,
signed November 11, 1993.
55. (back)Sec.
1502 (11), Defense Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-160, signed November
30, 1993.
56. (back)For
background see Multinational Peacekeeping Operations: Proposals to Enhance
Congressional Oversight, Archived CRS Issue Brief IB95006.
57. (back)On
August 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt sent a formal
letter to Congress (not mentioning the War Powers Resolution) stating, "It
is not our intention or expectation that the use of force will be required
to carry out these operations. However, if other means of enforcement fail,
necessary and proportionate force will be employed to deny passage to ships
that are in violation of these sanctions."
58. (back)Dellums
v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
59. (back)Statement
by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee
on Armed Services. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options
and Implications. Sept. 11-December 3, 1990, S.Hrg. 101-1071, pp. 701-2.
60. (back)Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2,
pp.17-18; pp. 24-25.
61. (back)The
House passed H.J.Res. 77 by a vote of 250 to 183. The Senate passed S.J.Res.
2 and then considered H.J.Res. 77 as passed. The Senate vote was 52 to
47. The bill became P.L. 102-1, signed January 14, 1991. On January 12,
to emphasize the congressional power to declare war, the House also adopted
by a vote of 302 to 131 H.Con.Res. 32 expressing the sense that Congress
must approve any offensive military actions against Iraq; the Senate did
not act on the measure.
62. (back)Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 21, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 3,
pp.48-49. Subsequently, on June 20,1992, during remarks to the Texas State
Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas, President Bush said: "Some people
say, why can't you bring the same kind of purpose and success to the domestic
scene as you did in Desert Shield and Desert Storm? And the answer is:
I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United States
Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. That's the reason." Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. June 29, 1992. Vol. 28, No. 26,
pp.1120-1121.
63. (back)Section
1512, P.L. 103-160, signed November 30, 1993.
64. (back)Sec.
8151 of P.L. 103-139, signed November 11, 1993.
65. (back)For
additional discussion of H.Con.Res. 170, see section on Legislative Veto,
above.
66. (back)The
name of this area is in dispute. The provisional name, which is used for
its designation as a member of the United Nations, is "The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia." This report uses the term "Macedonia" without prejudice.
67. (back)For
additional background see Bosnia-Former Yugoslavia: Ongoing Conflict and
U.S. Policy, Archived CRS Issue Brief IB91089.
68. (back)For
additional background see Archived CRS Issue Brief IB91089 Bosnia-Former
Yugoslavia: Ongoing Conflict and U.S. Policy and CRS Issue Brief IB93056
Bosnia, U.S. Military Operations.
69. (back) Campbell
v. Clinton. Civil Action No. 99-1072.
70. (back)The
McCain joint resolution (S.J.Res. 20) authorizing Presidential action in
Yugoslavia was forced to the Senate floor by the Senator's use of the expedited
procedures set out in section 6 of the War Powers Resolution for consideration
of such resolutions. See debate and discussion in U.S. Congressional Record,
Senate, May 3, 1999, pp. S4514-S4572; and May 4, 1999, pp. S4611-S4616
[daily edition].
71. (back)U.S.
Congressional Record, Senate, May 24, 1999, pp. S5809-S5840 [daily edition].
72. (back)U.S.
Congressional Record, Senate, May 26, 1999, pp. S6034-S6040 [daily edition].
73. (back)Seethe
June 8, 1999 decision of Judge Friedman of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia at 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (1999).
74. (back)Campbell
v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
75. (back)Campbell
v. Clinton, cert. denied, 531 U.S.815 Oct. 2, 2000).
76. (back)For
detailed discussion of major issues see Kosovo and U.S. Policy, CRS Issue
Brief IB98041, Kosovo-U.S. and Allied Military Operations, CRS Issue Brief
IB10027, and CRS Report for Congress RL30352. War Powers Litigation Since
the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution.
77. (back)For
further information on Haiti, see Haiti: Issues for Congress, CRS Issue
Brief IB96019.
78. (back)Presidential
statement of September 12, 2001. Office of the White House Press Secretary.
See White House website at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
79. (back)For
background on discussions regarding the resolution see: Washington Post,
September 13, 2001, p.A3; CQ Daily Monitor, September 13, 2001, p.2, 6;
CQ Daily Monitor, September 14, 2001, p.2; Washington Post, September 14,
2001, p. A30; The New York Times, September 14, 2001, p.A19; Roll Call,
September 20, 2001, p.17. The debate on S. J. Res. 23 is found in U.S.
Congress. Congressional Record, 107th Congress, 1st session, pp.S9416-S9421
(Senate); H5638-H5683 [daily edition].
80. (back)P.L.
107-40 (September 18, 2001); 115 Stat. 224.
81. (back)Statement
of the President on September 18, 2001. President Signs Authorization for
Use of Military Force bill. Office of the White House Press Secretary.
September 18, 2001. See White House website at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
82. (back)See
the White House website for comments by the President to the Congressional
leaders and to the U.N. under news (Sept.) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/
83. (back)P.L.
107-243; 116 Stat. 1498. For a detailed side-by-side comparison of the
House and Senate versions of the authorization of force against Iraq legislation
and proposed amendments see CRS Report RL 31596, Authorization
of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against Iraq: Side-by-Side Comparison of Selected
Legislative Proposals.
84. (back)For
text of President Bush's signing statement for H.J.Res. 114 see the State
Department's Washington File entry at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/02101606.htm
85. (back)Fascell,
Representative Dante B. Testimony. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Foreign Relations. The War Powers after 200 years: Congress and the President
at Constitutional Impasse. Hearings, July 13 - September 29, 1988. P. 11.
86. (back)Examples
of bills to repeal the War Powers Resolution include S. 2030 introduced
by Senator Barry Goldwater on October 31, 1983, H.R. 2525, introduced by
Representative Robert Dornan on May 27, 1987 and S. 5, introduced by Senator
Robert Dole on January 4, 1995. See also the most recent major legislative
floor debate on repeal of the War Powers Resolution, held on June 7, 1995.
This debate centered on an amendment to H.R. 1561, offered by Representative
Henry Hyde, which would have repealed most of the key elements of the War
Powers Resolution. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 217-201. Congressional
Record, June 7, 1995, pp. H5655-H5674[daily edition].
87. (back)Congressional
Record, July 12, 1983, p. S9670.
88. (back)A
broad-gauged proposal reflective of this view is S. 564, Use of Force Act,
introduced by Senator Biden on March 15, 1995.
89. (back)S.J.Res.
323, introduced by Senators Byrd, Warner, and Nunn, May 19, 1988. On September
29, 1983, Senators Cranston, Eagleton, and Stennis introduced an amendment
to this effect that had been proposed in the Senate Foreign Relations in
July 1977 and known as Committee Print No. 2, July 1, 1977. In U.S. Congress.
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. War Powers. Hearings, July 13,14
and 15, 1977. Wash., GPO, 1977. P.338. For a review of the use of funding
cutoffs by Congress since 1970 see: Grimmett, Richard F. Congressional
Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas
Deployments. CRS Report RS20775. January
10, 2001, 6p.
90. (back)See
Krotoski, Mark L. Essential Elements of Reform of the War Powers Resolution.
Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 28, Summer 1989, p. 609-750.
91. (back)S.J.Res.
323, introduced May 19, 1988.
92. (back)Fascell,
Representative Dante. Testimony before Foreign Relations Committee, July
13, 1988.
93. (back)Strengthening
Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs Committee
Print, October 1983, p. 67.
94. (back)H.J.Res.
95, War Powers Amendments of 1995, introduced by Representative DeFazio,
June 16, 1995.
95. (back)H.R.
3912, Introduced by Representative Lungren, Feb. 4, 1988. Biden, Joseph
R. Jr. and John B. Ritch. The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: a "Joint
Decision" Solution. Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 77:367.
96. (back)Two
of the reports did not mention the War Powers Resolution but met the basic
requirement of reporting specified deployments or uses of forces. For the
text of the reports until April 12, 1994, and other key documents and correspondence
see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights. The
War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Reports, Correspondence. Committee
Print., 103rd Congress, second session, May 1994. 267 p.
97. (back)U.S.
Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A test
of compliance relative to the Danang sealift, the evacuation of Phnom Penh,
the evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez incident. Hearings, May 7 and
June 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1975. P. 3.
98. (back)Ibid.,
p. 6.
99. (back)Ibid.,
p. 78.
100. (back)Oberdorfer,
Don and John M. Goshko. Peace-keeping Force. Washington Post, July 7, 1982,
p. 1.
101. (back)Gwetzman,
Bernard. U.S. To Send Back Marines to Beirut. New York Times, Sept. 21,
1982, p. 1.
102. (back)U.S.
Declares Goal in to Protect Americans and Restore Order. Washington Post,
Oct. 26, 1983. P. A7.
103. (back)Earlier,
on September 21, 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz submitted a
report concerning the Iraqi aircraft missile attack on the U.S.S. Stark
in the Persian Gulf similar to reports in this list submitted by Presidents.
The report did not mention the War Powers Resolution but said the U.S.
presence had been maintained in the Gulf pursuant to the authority of the
President as Commander-in-Chief.
104. (back)See
footnote 66 above discussing Macedonia.
105. (back)The
list does not include military assistance or training operations generally
considered routine, forces dispatched for humanitarian reasons such as
disaster relief, or covert actions. War powers questions have not been
raised about U.S. armed forces dispatched for humanitarian aid in peaceful
situations, such as 8,000 marines and sailors sent to Bangladesh on May
12, 1991, to provide disaster relief after a cyclone. The War Powers Resolution
applies only to the introduction of forces into situations of hostilities
or imminent hostilities and to forces equipped for combat.
106. (back)As
presented in Legislation on Foreign Relations, volume II, Joint
Committee Print of the House Committee on International Relations and Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
107. (back)50
U.S.C. 1541.
See also the authorization for participation in a multinational force
in Lebanon, 1983 (Public Law 98-119; 97 Stat. 805).
See also the sense of Congress regarding the possible introduction of
U.S. Armed Forces into El Salvador, 1984 (Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1904,
1942).
See also the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Central America for
combat, 1984 (sec. 310 of Public Law 98-525; 98 Stat. 2516).
See also the authorization for use of U.S. military force against Iraq,
1991 (Public Law 102-1; 105 Stat. 3).
See also Congressional findings and conditional authorization for use
of U.S. military force in Somalia, 1993 (sec. 8151 of Public Law 103-139;
107 Stat. 1475), and the sense of the Congress and a statement of Congressional
policy on U.S. armed forces in Somalia, 1993 (sec. 1512 of Public Law 103-160;
107 Stat. 1840).
See also the Joint Resolution regarding U.S. policy toward Haiti, 1994
(Public Law 103-423; 108 Stat. 4358).
See also the limitation on deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti during
Fiscal Year 2000 and congressional notification of deployments, 1999 (sec.
1232 of Public Law 106-65, 113 Stat. 788).
See also the authorization for use of military force in the global war
against terrorism, 2001 (Public Law 107-40; 115 Stat. 224).
See also the authorization for use of military force against Iraq, 2002
(Public Law 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498).
108. (back)50
U.S.C. 1542.
109. (back)50
U.S.C. 1543.
110. (back) 50
U.S.C. 1544.
Consider also sec. 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (Public Law 98-164; 97 Stat. 1062; 50 U.S.C.
1546a) which provides:
"expedited procedures for certain joint resolution and bills
"Sec. 1013. Any joint resolution or bill introduced in either House which
requires the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories,
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization shall
be considered in accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
except that any such resolution or bill shall be amendable. If such a joint
resolution or bill should be vetoed by the President, the time for debate
in consideration of the veto message on such measure shall be limited to
twenty hours in the Senate and in the House shall be determined in accordance
with the Rules of the House.".
For text of sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, see Legislation on Foreign Relations Through
2002, vol. I-A.
111. (back)Sec.
1(a)(5) of Public Law 104-14 (109 Stat. 186) provided that references to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall
be treated as referring to the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives.
112. (back)50
U.S.C. 1545.
113. (back)50
U.S.C. 1546.
114. (back)50
U.S.C. 1547.
115. (back)50
U.S.C. 1548.
116. (back)50
U.S.C. 1541 note.
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