STATEMENT BY
DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES
U.S.
ARMY WAR
COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FIRST SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS
ON
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: OUTSIDE
PERSPECTIVES
21 OCTOBER 2003
The
views and opinions expressed are those of
the author and are not necessarily those of
the Department of the Army, the U.S.
Army War College, or any other
agency of the US
government.
Chairman
Hunter, Mr. Skelton, members of the
Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before
you to discuss Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
My remarks today are based on the
preliminary findings of a War College study of why the campaign to topple Saddam
came out the way it did, and what
implications should be drawn from this for
American defense policy.
This study is not yet complete; it is
undergoing peer review and is thus subject
to change. But on the basis of the work
completed to date, it is possible to sketch
the outlines of what I think the main
answers are likely to be, subject to the
proviso that the review process could still
alter the study's final conclusions if new
data or evidence so indicate.
The
key question for the study is why the war
came out to be a low cost victory. After
all, before the war, many feared that OIF
would see an urban street fight with heavy
Coalition casualties, a protracted siege of
Baghdad, a scorched earth campaign with extensive
Iraqi economic and environmental damage, or
Iraqi use of WMD (Weapons of Mass
Destruction). Of course, none of these
things actually occurred. Instead, Saddam
was overthrown in just 21 days of fighting,
without scorched earth or WMD use, and
without prolonged street fighting in Iraqi
cities. The Coalition loss rate of fewer
than one in 2300 troops killed in action was
among the lowest ever for major mechanized
campaigns, and resembles those of the other
recent American wars that have led many to
see an ongoing revolution in military
affairs.
How
did the Coalition avert the perils so many
had feared beforehand? Many now credit some
combination of speed, precision, and
situation awareness, which are held to have
destroyed much of Iraq's combat power before it could be brought
to bear, and prevented the rest from
responding meaningfully to Coalition
movements.
In this view, the speed of those movements
demoralized Iraq's forces, and preempted Saddam's
attempts to torch Iraqi oil fields, destroy
Iraqi ports, or employ chemical weapons.
Taken together, speed, precision, and
situation awareness can substitute for mass,
it is argued - in fact, many now see mass
as antithetical to the speed on which we
increasingly rely to keep losses down and
limit damage to the societies in which we
operate.
If
so, the implications for American defense
planning are potentially sweeping. If speed
and mass trade off, and if speed is
essential, then mass has become unnecessary
at best and counterproductive at worst. This
in turn suggests a declining role for
conventional ground forces optimized for
close combat in major warfare; an increasing
demand for information infrastructure and
standoff precision engagement capability;
and (in light of reconstruction demands in
Iraq and elsewhere) a reorientation of
whatever ground forces as may remain to make
them more suitable for peacekeeping and
stabilization duties rather than
conventional operations in major warfare.
Assessing
Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in
OIF
Is
this view of the war sound, and do these
implications thus follow? In fact, neither
speed, precision nor situation awareness per
se played as strong a causal role as is
often claimed.
In
spite of their limited situation awareness,
for example, the Iraqis nonetheless
interposed more than enough combatants in
our path to have caused much heavier losses
if those combatants had fought well once
there - speed and superior information did
not so outmaneuver the Iraqis as to leave
them incapable of hurting us. Elements of
four Iraqi divisions (the Hammurabi, Medina,
Adnan, and Nebuchadnezzar) redeployed
across the V Corps axis of advance after
D-day, and arrived in plenty of time to
prepare their positions for combat.
Some 10,000 paramilitary reinforcements were
moved south from Baghdad to stiffen Iraqi defenses at Nasiriyah and
Najaf once those cities became key
battlefields.
Perhaps most important, major concentrations
of paramilitaries and Special Republican
Guards were predeployed in Baghdad and other key cities long before they were
reached by Coalition forces, and remained
there until defeated by close combat in the
urban centers.
It took no special situation awareness to
recognize that Baghdad, for example, would
be a critical objective and that Iraqis
deployed there would get their chance to
kill Americans: no amount of speed or bold
maneuver could prevent Iraqi fighters who
had been predeployed there from blocking key
terrain and compelling close combat, as
indeed they did.
Nor
were the defenders of Baghdad, Basra, or Iraq's other major cities too demoralized by
our precision or speed to resist once we
arrived. When 3rd Infantry
Division's 2nd brigade made its
initial "Thunder Run" into Baghdad on April 5, for example, every vehicle in
the brigade column was hit by RPG and small
arms fire. When the unit made its second
foray into the city on April 7, it again
took heavy fire from all directions. Iraqis
reoccupied destroyed positions after
American units drove by, engaging follow on
elements in turn. An emergency resupply
convoy had to fight its way through to the
brigade's advance positions on the Tigris after nightfall; in a series of bitter
firefights it lost one ammunition and two
fuel trucks, suffering two soldiers killed
and 30 wounded en route.
This is not indicative of an enemy whose
will to fight had been crippled by standoff
precision or the speed with which we reached
Baghdad; nor had our maneuver left them too
maldeployed to have hurt us. Many Iraqis
were killed by air attack or made to flee
from fear of it, but many others were not.
Thousands of Iraqi combatants survived
standoff engagement, were deployed astride
key Coalition objectives (especially Baghdad
and other major cities) and tried to resist
- sometimes fanatically - when attacked
by Coalition ground forces. If these
surviving, actively resisting Iraqis had
inflicted the kind of per capita losses
typical of major warfare in earlier eras,
our casualties would have been radically
higher in spite of our speed and precision.
Street fighting in Baghdad and elsewhere posed perhaps the single most
important threat of heavy casualties in OIF;
this possibility was not precluded by speed,
precision, or situation awareness in 2003.
What
about scorched earth or WMD use? Did our
speed prevent the Iraqis from destroying
their oil fields, blowing their bridges,
sabotaging the port at Um Qasr, flooding the
Karbala gap, or using chemical weapons? As for WMD,
none have yet been found anywhere in Iraq. They may yet be found. The difficulty of
locating them, however, suggests that it
would probably have taken considerable time
to make these weapons ready for use during
the campaign. At a minimum, no WMD have been
found in any reasonable proximity to an
intact delivery system, or near any form of
transportation that could move them to a
delivery system with any dispatch. If WMD
exist in Iraq, they exist in deep cover - and possibly
buried and/or disassembled. If so, then it
is hard to see how a slower Coalition
advance would have enabled these to have
been recovered, reconstituted, and employed
without being detected and either destroyed
from the air or overrun by even a much
slower ground force advance in the meantime.
Without direct evidence of their status it
is difficult to reach authoritative
conclusions, but at a minimum there is no
current evidence to suggest that the Iraqis
had WMD close enough to employment for the
speed of the Coalition advance to have made
any difference in their use. Conversely, it
is at least consistent with the available
evidence to hypothesize that the Iraqis
could not have used WMD soon enough to head
off overrun by even a much slower-moving
Coalition advance.
Nor
is there strong evidence to suggest that
speed was the central factor in preventing
scorched earth. The Iraqis had neither
prepared their infrastructure for
destruction on more than a token scale nor
were they in the process of doing so, either
before the war or during the fighting. They
may never have intended to carry out the
threat of scorched earth: the evidence is
consistent with a hypothesis that this was
merely a bluff for deterrent purposes. But
either way, their lack of preparations left
them unable to destroy infrastructure on any
wholesale basis, and their failure to
destroy even facilities left in their
possession for weeks after the fighting
began suggests that it was not our speed of
advance that caused this.
Consider,
for example, the issue of oil field
destruction. Of 250 wells in the key
sections of the Rumaila oil field, only 22
had actually been prepared for demolition
when the Marines secured the field on March
21. Of these 22, only 9 were actually
detonated, causing just 7 fires. No gas-oil
separation plants (GOSPs), pumping stations,
or pipelines were wired for destruction. Nor
was there any evidence of ongoing efforts at
preparing additional wells or other oil
field facilities for destruction in the days
before the invasion or the early stages of
the invasion itself. Even with a very
fast-moving offensive, there was still more
than 48 hours available to the Iraqis
between the beginning of hostilities and the
time the field was actually secured - if
Rumaila had been prepared for demolition the
Iraqis would have had more than ample time
to complete the job before we could have
stopped them, and they had considerable (but
unused) time for setting additional charges
or preparing additional facilities for
destruction even after the war began.
In
fact, the Kirkuk oil field in the north remained in Iraqi
hands for more than three weeks after the
invasion began. Yet at no point in that
interval were any oil wells destroyed, or
any facilities demolished, or any fires set.
No evidence of preparation for demolition
was discovered when American troops finally
took possession of the field after April 7;
in fact, dirt had been piled around a number
of wells to protect them from accidental
destruction in the fighting.
Even if one were to argue that the Iraqis
would have demolished Rumaila if we had only
given them more time, at Kirkuk they had the time - by any standard. Yet
they did less demolition at Kirkuk than at
Rumaila.
There
are many possible explanations for the
Iraqis' lack of preparation, ranging from
disobedience by oil field workers to
organizational incompetence in the Iraqi
military to a lack of intent at the highest
levels: perhaps the threat of scorched earth
was merely a bluff to deter us from
attacking. Either way, though, none of these
possibilities are consistent with a claim
that only a fast-moving advance prevented
mass destruction of the Iraqi oil industry.
None implies a process which would have
yielded significantly wider destruction if
the campaign had lasted weeks or even months
longer than it did. If time were all the
Iraqis needed, then at a minimum, Kirkuk should have been razed. Yet it was not.
Iraqi
bridges, port facilities, and inundation
follow a similar pattern. The Coalition
advance was obviously premised on its
ability to use a series of key bridges over
the Euphrates River. The towns at these crossings were in fact
major battlefields in the war, as the Iraqis
apparently understood their importance and
sought to contest the bridge sites. Yet few
of these bridges were wired for demolition,
and even fewer were actually destroyed. At
Nasiriyah, the Iraqis fought a week-long
battle for a city whose military importance
turned on its bridges - yet the Iraqis
made no systematic effort to destroy them.
Of the five bridges surrounding Basra, only one was wired, and none were actually
destroyed.
At Objective Peaches
south of Baghdad, the key bridge was found wired for
demolition, but undestroyed.
The key port of Um Qasr, critical to the
potential prosperity of postwar Iraq, was
undamaged in the war and captured intact by
Coalition forces, even though the Iraqis
held the port and its facilities for days
prior to its capture and could have done
extensive damage had they used this time to
do so.
American commanders had worried that the
Iraqis would flood the Karbala Gap, a key
choke point on the road to Baghdad and a potentially promising target for Iraqi
WMD use against stalled Coalition ground
forces. Yet nothing of the kind happened -
the closest the Iraqis came to deliberate
flooding was some small-scale tactical
inundation in the Subiyat Depression near
Nasiriyah.
In all, there is little evidence that speed
made the difference in the prevention of
scorched earth.
Skill-Technology
Synergy in OIF
But if
speed, precision, and situation awareness
were less important for low cost victory
than often assumed, then to what should this
outcome be attributed? Part of the answer
lies in idiosyncratic features of
Ba'athist Iraq: the Iraqis' failure to
destroy oilfields and other economic
infrastructure, for example, was ultimately
their choice. Either Saddam never meant to
carry out this threat, or his people refused
to follow his orders, or his organization
proved unable to implement his plan. But the
failure of scorched earth was less our doing
than theirs - even a different or less
capable Coalition military might still have
averted scorched earth given the Iraqis'
apparent unwillingness to carry out their
threat, and even a very capable Coalition
would have failed if the Iraqis had been
able and willing to follow through.
Much of the
answer, however, lies in the interaction
between our strengths and their particular
weaknesses. That is, we argue that skilled
use of modern Coalition technology
interacted synergistically with Iraqi errors
to produce unprecedented lethality and a
radically one-sided military confrontation.
In this, no one technology, or even family
of technologies (such as precision strike or
information processing) was necessary.
Practically any of the major advantages of
American forces, ranging from the
survivability of American armor to the
lethality of American firepower, would have
been sufficient given the skill differential
between ourselves and the Iraqis, and the
synergistic nature of the interaction
between skill and technology. With a diverse
panoply of sophisticated technology, there
were many possible ways in which a skilled
military could exploit hostile mistakes with
radical severity. And skill imbalance,
though necessary, was not by itself
sufficient: comparable imbalances in skill
or motivation prior to 1991 had never
produced outcomes as lopsided as either 2003
or 1991. Only together can a skill imbalance
and modern technology explain our ability to
topple Saddam without heavy cost in lives or
environmental damage.
Given
this synergy, our skill and technology would
probably produce similar results against
other enemies as unskilled as the Iraqis,
and with friendly forces no larger than
2003's. But because both technology and
a major skill imbalance are required, even
the same Coalition skills and equipment
would probably not produce comparable
results against a more skilled opponent. In
particular, the troop level required to
destroy a skilled force the size of
Saddam's military could well have exceeded
that available in 2003, and even so, the
losses required could well have been
significantly higher.
This is because skilled militaries can
survive standoff precision engagement and
compel close combat on terms unfavorable to
us, and because such close combat, even with
modern technology, is inherently dangerous
and labor intensive. To survive standoff
precision engagement and set the terms of
battle, however, requires high tactical
proficiency and an ability to exploit
complex terrain for cover and concealment.
The Iraqis in 2003 were anything but highly
proficient tactically. Their poor training
and leadership produced a combination of mistakes,
ill-prepared fighting positions, poor
marksmanship, and flawed dispositions that
left them fatally exposed to Coalition
technology. This in turn enabled a
relatively small Coalition force to prevail
in a short, relatively low-cost campaign -
but it would be a mistake to assume similar
outcomes against better prepared opponents.
Iraqi Ineptitude
To
see why, it is useful to review some of the
more serious of the Iraqis' many military
shortcomings, and how these interacted with
particular Coalition strengths in 2003. To
begin with, Iraqi training was radically
substandard in important respects, and
especially in weapon employment. Most Iraqi
fighters had fired little or no live
ammunition in the year prior to the war;
some had never fired their weapons at all.
The 2nd division of the Iraqi
Regular Army, for example, had no live fire
training in the twelve months prior to the
war.
The 3rd division held a single
live fire exercise in which each soldier
fired four rounds of ammunition.
None of the soldiers in the 11th
division's 3rd battalion had
fired their weapons in the past year.
Even the Baghdad Republican Guard division
held only a single live fire exercise with
just ten rounds for every soldier in the
year leading up to the war.
By contrast, a typical U.S. infantry unit might fire 2,500 rounds or
more of ammunition per soldier in an average
year; for units preparing to enter combat
that figure would be much higher.
The typical American infantryman thus had
over 250 times as much target practice as
even the best Iraqis.
Unsurprisingly,
Iraqi marksmanship was thus very poor.
Against the 3rd Infantry's 3rd
Brigade in Baghdad, Iraqi paramilitaries attained a hit rate
of under ten percent for rocket propelled
grenades (RPGs) fired at ranges of under 500
meters.
At Objective Montgomery
west of Baghdad, an elite Republican Guard
tank battalion fired at least 16 T-72 main
gun rounds at ranges of as little as
800-1000 meters at the fully exposed flanks
of the U.S. 3-7 Cavalry's tanks and
Bradley fighting vehicles - with zero
hits at what amounted to pointblank range
for weapons of this caliber. In fact, the
nearest miss fell fully 25 meters short of
the lead American troop commander's tank.
Similar results are reported from American
and British combatants throughout the
theater of war, and across all Iraqi weapon
types employed in OIF.
Iraqi
tactics could charitably be described as
self-defeating. Much of the close combat in
OIF took the form of Iraqi paramilitaries
charging Coalition armored vehicles on the
outskirts of Iraqi cities using civilian
sport utility vehicles, pickup trucks,
minivans, and even bicycles. These were
typically simple frontal assaults, fully
exposed, with no apparent attempt to
coordinate movement with suppressive fire,
use terrain for cover, or employ smoke or
other obscurants.
Moreover, they were usually directed at
Coalition heavy armored units; Iraqi
paramilitaries appear to have systematically
avoided softer-skinned command or logistical
elements in order to seek out Coalition
tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
Iraqi
position preparation was systematically
inadequate. After their losses to American
air power in 1991, the Iraqis understood
that survival against air attack would be
vital in 2003. They thus made an attempt to
protect their ground forces from Coalition
air power.
This attempt fell far short, however. They
were able to provide some concealment for
some units. But they were much less
successful in creating adequate cover. And
they were systematically unable to combine
cover, concealment, and an adequate field of
fire for their own weapons.
More-conventional
Special Republican Guard (SRG) units
deployed some heavy weapons, especially in Baghdad, but these were a tiny fraction of the
total available to the Iraqi military. And
even the SRG failed systematically to make
effective use of urban terrain for their
employment. The SRG's prepared positions
were almost entirely outdoors, typically in
shallow foxholes dug along the roadside or
in simple sandbag emplacements on building
roofs or at intersections (a typical example
from downtown Baghdad is illustrated in
Figure 4). SRG tanks were often simply
parked in the open at major intersections,
with no effort at cover or concealment (see,
for example, the T-72 in Figure 5).
Practically no buildings received the
interior preparations that would be normal
for urban warfare in Western practice, such
as interior barricades, wall reinforcement,
loophole construction, or wire
entanglements. Outdoor obstacles, barriers,
or minefields were almost completely absent.
As
with Iraqi marksmanship, their failings in
urban tactics have roots in poor training.
The Republican Guard and Iraqi Regular Army
received no training whatsoever in urban
warfare in the years leading up to the war.
In fact, Guard and Army commanders found the
entire concept of city fighting unthinkable.
As one Iraqi colonel put it: "Why would
anyone want to fight in a city?" His
troops "couldn't defend themselves in
cities."
Only the Special Republican Guard was given
any systematic training in conventional
urban warfare, and even this was poor
quality. The paramilitaries who shouldered
much of the burden of actual city fighting
in 2003 received no sustained conventional
military training of any kind.
Some
Iraqi difficulties stemmed from political,
rather than strictly military sources. The
unpopularity of the Ba'athist regime, for
example, made human intelligence (HUMINT)
available on the locations of nominally
concealed urban positions such as
paramilitary command centers or ammunition
caches in civilian buildings. Many Iraqi
civilians hated the Ba'athist regime, and
were at least initially sympathetic to
Coalition forces. Civilians with knowledge
of hidden assets' whereabouts were thus
potentially available to provide targeting
information. Of course, a major function of
the Ba'athist paramilitaries was to deter
such cooperation by the threat of violence
if collaboration was discovered; as a
result, HUMINT cooperation often developed
slowly. Once the Ba'athists'
vulnerability became apparent, however, and
as it became clearer that they would be
unable to hold their positions for long
given their staggering loss rates in
near-suicidal attacks on Coalition forces,
Iraqi civilians gradually came forward with
targeting information. This targeting
information proved instrumental in attacking
paramilitary command and communication nodes
within major cities. Without this HUMINT
from sympathetic civilians disaffected from
Saddam's regime, locating often-austere
urban command posts for standoff attack
would have been very difficult. The
illegitimacy of Ba'athist governance thus
made targeting intelligence available that
would be largely out of reach for urban
offensives against more popular regimes.
Interactions
Between Iraqi Ineptitude, Coalition
Technology,
and Coalition Skill
The
Iraqis' shortcomings left them extremely
vulnerable to the Coalition's
technological advantages. For example, the
Regular Army, Republican Guard, or Special
Republican Guard's inability to exploit
complex terrain for cover and concealment
left them exposed to the full weight of
Coalition standoff precision strike.
Coalition air forces were capable of
delivering thousands of precision guided
bombs and missiles a day, and could
concentrate hundreds against a single point.
Cruise and surface-to-surface missiles added
still more precision firepower. Against such
an armada, failure to secure cover and
concealment can be lethal to hundreds of
combatants in just minutes; the Iraqis'
exposure enabled the Coalition to slaughter
whole formations at safe distances, and
persuaded many Iraqis to abandon crew-served
weapons lest they suffer the same fate.
But
while precision weapons are tremendously
lethal against exposed targets, they are
much less so against opponents who exploit
complex terrain for cover and concealment.
As recently as 2001-2 in Afghanistan, for
example, al Qaeda defenders successfully
used the complex terrain of the Dar-ye Suf
and Shah-i-Kot valleys to reduce their
exposure to American surveillance and reduce
their vulnerability to standoff precision
engagement. At Bai Beche and Operation Anaconda,
al Qaeda fighters withstood long range
bombing in sufficient numbers to compel
sometimes bloody close quarters assaults by
American and allied ground forces. Fewer
than half the defenders of the Shah-I-Kot
valley were either found or killed by
standoff precision engagement prior to the
arrival of Western ground forces in close
combat in Operation Anaconda.
In Kandahar province, al Qaeda defenders
using local terrain for cover eluded
preliminary air strikes and thwarted
advances by friendly ground forces; al Qaeda
counterattackers found sufficient cover to
reach close quarters with American and
allied forces before being driven back in
hard fighting at point blank range.
In the 1999 Kosovo war, Serbian ground
forces used wooded terrain and urban
intermingling to thwart efforts by Western
aircraft to find and destroy them with
precision weapons.
Standoff
precision is valuable against any target,
and any defender can expect to suffer
against it. But it is far more lethal
against massed targets in the open than it
is against covered, concealed targets in
complex terrain. And whereas al Qaeda and
the Serbs largely denied us such easy
targets, the Iraqi Regular Army, Republican
Guard and Special Republican Guard did not.
The Iraqis' failures to reduce their
exposure thus played into the strengths of
the Coalition's technology, and enabled us
to destroy Iraqi combat power from safe
distances at a much higher rate than we
could have done had they been better
prepared.
Even
so, some Iraqis survived standoff precision.
Some hid in concealed but impractical
locations, as did the BMP depicted in Figure
1. A few others managed to mount limited
counterattacks, as did elements of the
Hammurabi division at Objective Peach.
And some survived long enough to defend
prepared positions against direct ground
attack, as did the 17th battalion
of the Hammurabi's 17th brigade
at Objective Montgomery.
Here,
too, however, the Iraqis' military
shortcomings interacted with Coalition
technological sophistication to produce
extremely one-sided outcomes. The M1
tank's ability to fire on the move, hit
targets on the first shot at ranges of
multiple kilometers, and penetrate both sand
berms and T72 frontal armor at the same
distances made deathtraps out of the simple
horseshoe revetments used the by Iraqis at
Objective Montgomery.
Together with highly skilled U.S. crews, this technology allowed a single
cavalry troop to devastate an entire
battalion of dug-in defenders in less than
10 minutes of firing.
Had
the Iraqis been better skilled, however, the
same technological match up could have
produced a much costlier outcome. The M1 is
an extremely survivable tank, but no tank
has equally resistant armor on all surfaces,
and like all tanks, the M1's flank armor
is much thinner than its frontal arc. In
Operation Desert
Storm, M1s were killed by T72 or BMP
fire that struck them from the flank or
rear; in OIF, even RPGs sometimes penetrated
M1s when hit from the proper direction.
And six of the 3-7 Cavalry Apache troop's
13 armored vehicles at Objective Montgomery
were Bradley Fighting Vehicles without even
the M1's level of flank armor protection.
At Montgomery,
the Iraqi position afforded flank shots by
most Iraqi combatants against all of Apache
troop's tanks and Bradleys - at ranges
of as little as 800-1000 meters.
A well-trained tank battalion would expect
to hit with nearly every shot at such
ranges; the 16 or more shots fired by the
Iraqis at Objective Montgomery
could thus easily have wiped out Apache
troop if fired by crews with skills anything
like their American attackers.
The
most important source of close combat in OIF,
however, was urban warfare. Paramilitaries
in civilian clothes and intermingled with
the population offered poor targets for air
attack; many thus survived to engage
Coalition ground forces at close quarters in
Iraqi cities. Even without standoff
precision engagement, however, other
Coalition technologies still interacted with
Iraqi ineptitude and Coalition skill to
yield slaughter. In particular, the modern
armor technology of the M1 and Challenger
tanks offer extraordinary protection, and
their fire suppression, blast localization,
and crew escape systems often make it
possible to survive even a large-caliber
penetration of the armor envelope. The
ability of Bradley Fighting Vehicles as well
as Abrams tanks to shoot on the move with
both accuracy and tremendous volumes of fire
makes them lethal even to hostile armored
vehicles, much less paramilitary foot
soldiers. For the latter to launch
themselves in frontal assaults at such
well-protected, highly lethal targets with
nothing more than civilian pickup trucks and
RPGs was clearly suicidal. Even where the
paramilitaries fought on the tactical
defense, as in their resistance to 2nd
Brigade's "thunder runs" in Baghdad,
the combination of the paramilitaries'
shortcomings and the Americans' lethality
meant that tremendous numbers of Iraqis
would be mowed down: without adequate cover
or concealment once firing had given them
away, Iraqi paramilitaries were dangerously
exposed. And whereas the Iraqis' fire
often missed, Coalition return fire was both
voluminous and deadly accurate - exposed
paramilitaries thus rarely survived to fire
again.
Yet
here, too, better trained Iraqis could have
produced a very different outcome even with
exactly the same equipment on both sides.
The light weapons wielded by Iraqi
irregulars can penetrate M1 tanks -
in fact, nine M1s were penetrated by RPG
fire in OIF.
If the hundreds of RPGs fired at 2 BCT in
the two thunder runs alone had been fired
accurately, the penetration rate could have
been dramatically higher. And if the
shooters had been firing from covered,
concealed positions, they could reasonably
have expected to survive their first shot at
a much higher rate, enabling them to shoot
again and thus increasing the hit rate even
further. Most important, though, a skilled
urban defender could not have been broken by
an all-mounted assault of the sort waged in
Baghdad and Basra. In 2003, the Iraqis were
exposed and could thus often be slaughtered
in the open even within the city center
without the attacker dismounting from its
armored vehicles. By contrast, a defender
who exploited the natural potential of urban
terrain by remaining in cover to fire from
within buildings; who prepared those
buildings for maximum cover and concealment;
who used barriers and obstacles to canalize
attacks into prepared ambushes; and who used
covered retreat routes to slip away for
subsequent engagements a couple of blocks
away would have been a much tougher target.
Historically, it has been impossible to
destroy such urban defenders without
supporting armored advances with dismounted
infantry who can enter building interiors to
clear rooms, kill concealed defenders, and
hold the building interiors to prevent their
reoccupation by defenders. Mounted vehicle
crews simply cannot find properly-concealed
defenders in building interiors. And unless
such defenders are cleared before the
armored vehicles advance, the vehicles'
weaker roof, rear, and flank armor surfaces
risk easy penetration from bypassed but
unseen defenders. Working together, skilled
dismounted infantry and supporting armor can
clear urban terrain, but they cannot do so
cheaply if the defender makes the most of
that terrain: even with skilled attackers,
and even with armored support, dismounted
building clearance against skilled defenders
has typically been very costly. Recent
analyses by the U.S. Marine Corps have
concluded that against skilled urban
defenders, even the best-trained attackers
can expect no better than a 1:1 loss
exchange ratio (LER); a 1:1 LER against
multiple thousands of Iraqi urban defenders
would have produced thousands of friendly
casualties and a fundamentally different
outcome for OIF, even given the
technological advantages of the Abrams and
the Challenger.
Conclusions
and Implications
So
both advanced technology and a major skill
differential are necessary to explain
OIF's low casualties; to explain the
failure of scorched earth requires Iraqi
cooperation, whether deliberate (in the form
of disobedience or lack of intent) or
inadvertent (via organizational incapacity).
Given Iraqi idiosyncrasies, a major skill
differential, and modern technology, the OIF
outcome would probably have obtained even
without the speed of the Coalition advance
or our precision or situation awareness per
se; our technology was advanced enough and
diverse enough that any of a wide variety of
capabilities could have sufficed to punish
Iraqi error very harshly. Inter alia,
precision and situation awareness might have
been sufficient, but neither were necessary
as such; speed was probably neither
necessary nor sufficient. A major skill
differential, by contrast was necessary -
as was some source of the modern lethality
and protection needed to exploit Iraq's
mistakes. Given this, the causal importance
of speed, precision and situation awareness
has often been overestimated in the public
debate on the war; the causal role of the
skill differential between ourselves and our
enemies has probably been underestimated.
And the variety of ways in which technology
can exploit that differential has been
underestimated in the postwar focus on
precision and situation awareness per se.
This
is not to say that speed was a bad idea, or
that either precision or situation awareness
were unhelpful. Hindsight suggests that the
Iraqis would not have torched their oil
fields or used WMD with more time, but this
was less clear beforehand. A rapid advance
made sense given the credible possibility
that Saddam might carry out such threats.
And both precision and situation awareness
were important contributors to the aggregate
technological sophistication we needed to
exploit the Iraqis' mistakes.
But
to say that speed was a sensible choice, or
that precision and situation awareness were
valuable, is not to find that their role was
as important as often claimed. And the
difference matters. Views of past wars shape
future policies, and views on the relative
importance of contributing causes can have
serious postwar policy implications.
In
particular, underestimating the skill
differential's importance could have a
variety of dangerous consequences. First, it
could lead to an assumption that precision
and situation awareness can produce OIF-like
results against other opponents with better
skills than the Iraqis'. Even with skilled
forces of our own, this is a dangerous
assumption. In 2003, our technology could
operate at near-proving-ground effectiveness
against exposed, ill-prepared opponents.
Enemies who do a better job of exploiting
the natural complexity of the earth's
surface for cover and concealment could pose
much tougher targets - as we have already
seen in the performance of al Qaeda fighters
in Afghanistan. Our technology's
performance is strongly affected by the
nature of its targets, and our targets were
extremely permissive in OIF. If we overlook
this, we could thus exaggerate our
technology's potential against better
skilled enemies elsewhere.
Second,
an imprecise analysis of OIF could lead to
an assumption that modernization can be
accelerated at the expense of training. If
standoff precision and situation awareness
either destroyed or bypassed the Iraqi
military, then why spend the huge sums
needed to maintain perishable close combat
skills across a large American ground force?
Why not divert some of that into faster
improvement in the standoff capabilities
that render such close combat unnecessary?
The answer, of course, is that we did not
destroy or bypass enough of the Iraqi
military to preclude heavy casualties -
while many opponents were negated at
standoff, others could only be destroyed in
close combat. It was our superiority in
close combat capability that averted such
casualties - and this was a product of both
advanced technology and a major skill
differential. If technology and skill
interact synergistically, then perforce they
will be poor substitutes for one another.
Hence it will be difficult to buy enough
modernization acceleration to compensate for
the loss of skill that buys it.
Third,
misunderstanding causation in OIF could lead
to an assumption that speed can substitute
for mass, and that standoff precision can
substitute for close combat capability. If
speed were sufficient for the OIF outcome
(either alone or in conjunction with
precision), and if speed and mass are
antithetical, then reducing mass to enable
greater speed would make sense. But if speed
was not sufficient, and if a major
skill differential was necessary for speed
to succeed, then to trade speed for mass in
U.S. force structure would be a dangerous
bargain. Against enemies like Iraq, small,
fast-moving ground forces with massive
standoff firepower and excellent situation
awareness may well succeed again - in
fact, against such foes this could well be
the optimum solution. But if future warfare
pits us against better-skilled opponents,
and if a skill differential played the role
identified above in OIF, then a small but
agile U.S. ground force could find itself unable to
cope with concealed, covered enemies in
numbers too great to overcome without mass
of our own.
Of
course, it is always possible that the
future could differ from the past, and there
is only so much one can learn from an
analysis of a concluded campaign. But it is
always a mistake to misunderstand the past,
and to draw lessons for the future from a
mistaken impression of the past is always
dangerous. The analysis above suggests that
OIF, at least, does not provide evidence
that it would be wise to trade speed for
mass, to shift too far away from close
combat capability toward greater emphasis on
standoff precision, or to accelerate
modernization at the cost of training for
close combat. Some important causes of the
OIF outcome lie beyond our control, in the
idiosyncrasies of Saddam's Iraq. But
others are products of our own choices. And
we must be careful to ensure that those
choices are informed by the fullest possible
appreciation of the war we just fought.
This study is based on evidence
collected in a series of 176 interviews
with American, British, and Iraqi
participants in the conflict, together
with primary source documentation on the
conduct of the war, and the results of
direct physical inspection of several of
the war's key battlefields. This
evidence was collected partly in theater
at Baghdad, Hillah, Basra, and Camp
Bucca, Iraq, and Camp Doha, Kuwait; and
partly with returnees at Ft. Carson,
Colorado, Fallon Naval Air Station,
Nevada, the Pentagon, and Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. The interviewees
ranged in rank from E-5 to O-8, and
include participants from the
conventional U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps; the British Army;
American Special Forces; and the Iraqi
Regular Army and Republican Guard.
Audiotapes of these interviews, together
with other primary source documentary
material collected for the study, have
been deposited at the U.S. Army's
Military History Institute archive in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and constitute
the MHI Strategic Studies Institute OIF
Research Collection, henceforth MHI.
See, e.g., Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense Hearing on
FY2004 Appropriations, FDCH Transcripts,
May 14, 2003, p. 3; Paul Wolfowitz,
Testimony on Iraq Reconstruction, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Thursday
May 22, 2003, pp. 2, 7; idem., Testimony
on U.S. Military Presence in Iraq:
Implications for Global Defense Posture,
House Armed Services Committee,
Wednesday June 18, 2003, pp. 4-6; Tom
Bowman, "Rumsfeld Taunting but
Naysayers Persist," Baltimore Sun,
May 18 2003; Sonni Efron, "Pentagon
Officials Defend Iraq Battle
Strategy," Los Angeles Times,
May 23, 2003; Esther Schrader,
"Official Ties Iraq's Troubles to
U.S. Success," Los Angeles Times,
July 9, 2003; Jim Mannion, "Rumsfeld
Rejects Case for Boosting Size of
Army," Washington Times, August
6, 2003; Rowan Scarborough, "Decisive
Force Now Measured by Speed," Washington
Times, May 7, 2003; Usha Lee
McFarling, "The Eyes and Ears of
War," Los Angeles Times, 24
April 2003; Terry McCarthy, "What ever
happended to the Republican Guard?" Time,
12 May 2003; Max Boot, "The New
American Way of War," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August
2003), pp. 41-58; Andrew Krepinevich, Operation
Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), pp.
13-24, 28, 30-31 (which also emphasizes
the importance of Iraqi shortcomings;
see analysis below for a more extended
discussion of this factor and its role
in OIF).
MHI: Tape 062503a1sb LTC B int;
050203p1sb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape
050403p1io LTC Sterling int.; Memorandum
for the record, LTC Rodgers, LTC Marcoz
int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha
Kuwait; Memorandum for the record, MG
Blount et al. int., 4 May 2003, 3rd
Infantry Division HQ, Baghdad
International Airport, Iraq.
MHI: Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape
042903p1sb COL Brown et al. int.; Tape
050303a1sb COL Allyn et al int.; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Walter int.; Tape
043003p2io COL Johnson int.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins et al.
int.; Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tapes
050203a1io and 050203a2sb, LTC Bayer et
al. int.; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ Robert
Walter int.; Tape 050203p1sb LTC
Schwartz et al. int.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins et al.
int.; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter
int.; Tapes 050203a1io and 050203a2sb,
LTC Bayer et al. int.
MHI: Memorandum for the record, CW4
Crowder int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ,
Camp Doha Kuwait.
MHI: Tape 062403p1sb LTC K int.; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.;
Memorandum for the record, CW4 Crowder
int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha
Kuwait.
For example by targeting them for
artillery or mortar fire after losing
them to American control, let alone by
effective pre-capture demolition. MHI:
Tape 042903p2sb LTC Kerl et al. int.;
Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int.
MHI: Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al.
int.
One span was dropped, but the bridge
remained trafficable. MHI: Tape
050203a1io LTC Bayer et al. int.; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int. On the
survival of most Iraqi bridges, see
Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Stephenson int., 30 April 2003, I MEF
HQ, Hillah, Iraq.
The authors inspected the port
facilities on April 25, 2003 and found
no evidence of damage. Captured Iraqi
officers maintain that orders to destroy
the port would not have been followed
- the commanders at the scene viewed
the facilities as the patrimony of the
Iraqi people and not as tools for
defending for Saddam: MHI: Tape
042403a1sb LTC Hamid int.
MHI: Tape 042803p1sb MG Marks, COL
Rotkoff int.
MHI: Col Mohammed Al Jboori int., 4/24
PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and
Filiberti.
MHI: Lt Col Ayad Hasam Aldemi int., 4/23
PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and
Filiberti
MHI: Tape 042403a2sb Staff Colonel
Alzadi int.
MHI: SSGT Ahmed Al Samarl, Baghdad
Division of Republican Guard int., 4/25
AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and
Filiberti. For similar examples from
other units, see MHI: Tape 042403a2sb
MAJ Al Tamimi int.; Tape 042303p2sb
Staff Brigadier Raid Sajid int.; Tape
042403a1sb LTC Hamid int.; Tape
042403p1sb Staff LTC Alaragi int.; Tape
042503a1sb COL Alzanabi int.; Major
Mohammed Abad int., 4/24 interviewed by
Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti; Captain
Amer Taleb Alseltane int., 4/23 AM,
interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and
Filiberti; Lt Col Kassim Alajeel int.,
4/25 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder,
and Filiberti.
DA PAM 350-38 1 (STRAC) Standards in
Weapons Training, October 2002, ch. 5.
MHI: Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.
MHI: Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Memorandum for the Record,
Objective Montgomery
Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003.
See, e.g., MHI: Tape 050203p1sb LTC
Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb,
LTC Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io MAJ
Walter et al. int.; Tape 043003a1io COL
Toolan et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io COL
Johnson int.; Tape 062503p1sb MAJ P.
int.; Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins et al.
int.; Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al.
int.; 042903p1sb COL Brown et al.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb LTC Schwartz et al.
int.; Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Tape 050303p1sb, LTC Pease int.;
Tape 050303p1io MAJ Walter et al. int.;
Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.; Tape
050203p1sb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape
050803a1sb MAJ Maciejewski int.; Tape
050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al. int.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins et al.
int.; Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape
050203a1io LTC Bayer et al. int.
See, e.g., MHI: Tape 042403a2sb MAJ Al
Tamimi int.; Tape 042403a2sb Staff
Colonel Alzadi int,; Tape 042403p1sb
Staff LTC Alaragi int.
See, e.g., Jesse Orlansky and Col. Jack
Thorpe, eds., 73 Easting: Lessons Learned from Desert Storm via Advanced Distributed
Simulation Technology (Alexandria,
Va: Institute for Defense Analyses,
1992), IDA D-1110, p. I-54; Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Hearings
Before the Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1991), S. Hrg. 102-326, p. 115.
MHI: Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier
Sajid int.; Tape 050403p1io LTC Sterling
int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb LTC Schwartz et al.
int.; Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Tape 050303p1sb, LTC Pease int.;
Tape 050303p1io MAJ Walter et al. int.;
Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Memorandum for the record, MAJ
Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003,
CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape
050103p2sb MAJ Robert Walter int.; Tape
050203p1sb COL Perkins et al. int.; Tape
050803a1sb MAJ Maciejewski int.; Tape
050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al. int.
MHI: Tape 050203p1sb LTC Schwartz et al.
int.; Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Tape 050303p1sb, LTC Pease int.;
Tape 050303p1io MAJ Walter et al. int.;
Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Tape 042903p2sb LTC Kerl et al.
int.; Tape 043003a1io COL Toolan et al.
int.; Tape 043003p2io COL Johnson int.;
Memorandum for the record, MAJ Colligan
et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ,
Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb MAJ
Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203a2sb LTC
Bayer int.; Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins
et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman
et al. int.
MHI: Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier
Sajid int.
MHI: Tape 042403a2sb St. COL al Saadi
int.
MHI: Tape 042403a1sb LTC Hamid int.;
Memorandum for the record, MAJ Colligan
et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ,
Camp Doha Kuwait.
MHI: Tape 050303a1sb COL Allyn et al.
int.; Tape 050203p1sb COL Perkins et al.
int.; Tape 050803a2sb MAJ Longman et al.
int.; Memorandum for the record, LTC C
int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha
Kuwait; MAJ Curtis int.
For detailed accounts, see Stephen
Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of
Warfare: Implications for Army and
Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: U.S.
Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute, 2002), pp. 15-16, 26-43. Note
that the indigenous Afghan Taliban (by
contrast with the better-trained al
Qaeda foreigners) were much less adept
at exploiting cover and concealment, and
suffered much more heavily under Western
air attack: ibid.
See, e.g., Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO's
Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 120-136; Stephen T. Hosmer,
Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When
He Did
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp. 77-90; Ivo H. Daalder and
Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly:
NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings, 2000), pp. 120-124,
153-155.
And where they were able to conceal
themselves from Coalition surveillance,
they were typically unable to provide
cover from fire or meaningful fields of
fire for their own weapons (see above)
- unlike al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
MHI: Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Memorandum for the Record,
Objective Montgomery
Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003, with
attached maps and photographs.
See, e.g., Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain
Victory:
The United States Army in the
Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, 1993), pp. 267-70; MAJ
Jeffrey R. Voigt et al., V Corps
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Out Brief,
U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, 28 April
2003.
MHI: Tape 050303p2sb, LTC Ferrell et al.
int.; Memorandum for the Record,
Objective Montgomery
Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003.
MAJ Jeffrey R. Voigt et al., V Corps
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Out Brief,
U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, 28 April
2003.
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