

# Psychological Operations



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27 August 1999

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## **FOREWORD**


The history of armed conflict amply demonstrates the efficacy and value of psychological operations (PSYOP) across the range of military activity. Performing the critical tasks of preparing and influencing the battlespace psychologically, PSYOP are an integral part of today's aerospace strategy, especially in relation to broader information operations (IO).

Air Force PSYOP forces support US national and military objectives through planned operations to convey information to target audiences. PSYOP provide a low-cost, high-impact method to deter adversaries and obtain the support of friendly or neutral target audiences. The effective use of PSYOP can provide asymmetrical advantages by exposing and exploiting adversaries' resistance and psychological weaknesses to create uncertainty and ambiguity, thereby lowering their morale and will to fight and win. In combination with military operations, PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the adversary's leadership and degrade the enemy's ability to conduct military operations.

Psychological operations are an effective and integral component of information warfare and provide a vital contribution to the Air Force core competency of information superiority. When integrated with other activities, PSYOP maximize effects on the enemy and on their ability to make decisions.

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## INTRODUCTION

*A wise man learns from his experience; A wiser man learns from the experience of others.*

**Confucius**

### PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.3 provides Air Force doctrine for psychological operations (PSYOP). It supports basic aerospace doctrine and basic information operations (IO) doctrine contained in AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*. It replaces Air Force PSYOP doctrine outlined in AFDD 2-5.5, dated 22 February 1997. This AFDD implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-13, *Air and Space Doctrine*. This document is consistent with and complements Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, but its purpose is to promulgate the Air Force perspective on psychological operations. As such, it focuses on how Air Force assets can be organized, trained, equipped, and operated to conduct and support PSYOP.

### APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel (includes AFRC and ANG units and members). The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Therefore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

### SCOPE

This document discusses PSYOP organizations, command and control relationships, air campaign planning, and support considerations. It also covers how aerospace assets can support and conduct joint PSYOP across the range of military operations.



## CHAPTER ONE

### GENERAL

*PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders.*

**JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations***

#### BASIS

A 1983 National Security Decision Directive began the revitalization of a US military PSYOP capability, as well as directing the development of a PSYOP Master Plan. The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, in turn, required the Armed Forces to develop both joint and Service PSYOP doctrine. The updated 1990 PSYOP Master Plan directs each Service to evaluate and, if necessary, amend its PSYOP doctrine to ensure it supports and is compatible with joint PSYOP doctrine. In 1993 (updated in 1996), the Joint Staff published JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, which requires each Service to develop PSYOP doctrine for assigned primary functions. Since then, numerous documents including joint and Service doctrine manuals, Universal and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions and Department of Defense (DOD) Directives were released directing each Service to develop, train, equip and employ PSYOP as a mission essential task.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines psychological operations (PSYOP) as

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

**The Air Force may attain United States (US) national and military objectives through PSYOP designed to convey selected information to targeted audiences.** *PSYOP are systematically employed to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to US objectives.* While the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are assigned primary PSYOP responsibilities within the Air Force, almost all aerospace forces have the inherent capability to support PSYOP. Because PSYOP are an integral part of US military operations, US Air Force forces must be prepared to support PSYOP objectives in support of global engagement across the range of military operations.

## **PSYOP APPROVAL PROCESS**

**PSYOP campaigns are initiated and conducted under strict guidelines.** Policy approval authority for peacetime PSYOP rests with the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and is delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. *During war, this approval authority may be delegated to the warfighters;* e.g., theater commanders in chief (CINCs) or joint task force (JTF) commanders. *This authority may not be further delegated* and must be followed by all forces employing or conducting PSYOP.

## **FUNCTIONS OF PSYOP**

JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, indicates each Service has the following functions for PSYOP:

- ✦ Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning skills, as needed.
- ✦ Provide organic capabilities to execute PSYOP actions to include forces and equipment.
- ✦ Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to that Service.
- ✦ Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command [USCINCSOC]) to combatant commanders.
- ✦ Request additional PSYOP support from the CJCS PSYOP executive agent (USCINCSOC).

- ✦ Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets who are trained, equipped and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP.
- ✦ Train and educate departmental personnel to counter and neutralize the effects of hostile foreign PSYOP.

**Air Force PSYOP support national and military objectives by conveying specially tailored information to target audiences.** PSYOP provide aerospace forces a considerable advantage by exploiting the adversary's psychological weaknesses to create uncertainty, fear, and confusion, thereby lowering the opposition's morale and the will to fight.

**PSYOP provide a low-cost, high-impact tool to deter adversaries and obtain the support of friendly or neutral target audiences.** Air Force doctrine also recognizes that PSYOP are integral to information operations—and, indeed, can have a synergistic effect on the battlespace when used in combination with other information operations. PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the opposition's leadership and, by combining persuasion with a credible threat, degrade an adversary's abil-



**Aerospace assets are versatile. They can quickly spread information over large areas and through many channels.**


ity to conduct or sustain military operations. They can also disrupt, confuse, and protract the adversary's decision-making process, undermining command and control.

## **PSYOP RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

**Information plays a vital role in warfare, particularly in relation to command and control.** Successful commanders understand the critical need to maintain the flow of information up and down the chain of command while at the same time influencing the perceptions, attitudes, and reasoning of the adversary. IO strategy includes both lethal and non-lethal means of enabling friendly aerospace forces to operate more quickly and effectively than their adversary. *A basic objective of IO is to lessen the ability of the opposing force to assess and respond to a battlespace situation while preserving, and perhaps enhancing, the ability of friendly forces to do so.* The object, generally, is to interrupt or protract the adversary's decision cycle (defined by Colonel Boyd, Air Force officer and military theorist, as the observe, orient, decide, and act, or OODA, loop). *By using IO effectively, in a manner that influences or even controls the adversary's perceptions, commanders can shape the battlespace.* A strategy of fully integrating IO operationally can result not only in information dominance but can maximize combat power and deter hostilities as well.

**The Air Force believes that dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as controlling air and space or occupying land was in the past** and is seen as an indispensable and synergistic component of aerospace power. Information superiority—the degree of dominance that allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition—is an Air Force core competency upon which all the other core competencies rely. In order to gain and maintain information superiority, the Air Force conducts robust IO and executes its two major aspects: information-in-warfare (IIW) and information warfare (IW). IO comprise those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information and information systems. IIW involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on its integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection and dissemination activities; and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. IW consists of the function of counterinformation (CI) and its two subsets, offen-

sive counterinformation (OCI) and defensive counterinformation (DCI). As figure 1.1 depicts, PSYOP issues fall within both OCI and DCI.



**Figure 1.1 PSYOP are part of Information Warfare**

**Although PSYOP is a component of offensive counterinformation, it is important to understand that its purpose may be offensive or defensive.** Choosing to strike targets that demoralize an opponent and shorten a conflict is an offensive use of PSYOP. Informing a foreign populace that US military forces are removing old land mines to build support for those forces and aid force protection is a defensive use.

**PSYOP are one type of military action that supports IO goals.** Employed independently, PSYOP can have a measurable effect on the adversary. If their military potential is to be maximized, however, *PSYOP cannot be conducted in a vacuum; rather, they must be woven into the strategies and operations of joint and multinational forces.*



## CHAPTER TWO

# AIR FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

*The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles. The supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies without even having to fight them.*

Sun Tzu

## GENERAL

PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. Psychological operations are guided by certain enduring principles and objectives. This chapter provides the framework which guides Air Force participation in PSYOP.

## CATEGORIES OF PSYOP

**As an integral part of US military response options, PSYOP are effective at all levels of warfare.** Air Force aerospace forces can support and conduct PSYOP activities across the range of military operations. *Just as it is important to understand the differences between the PSYOP categories (strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation), it is also important to understand that they may overlap.* There are no clear divisions between the start and end of a particular category of PSYOP. Actions in each category may start, stop, and restart during a campaign. These categories are intended to convey capabilities rather than outline employment guidelines. *Determination of the appropriate category, type, and method of PSYOP is the responsibility of the PSYOP planner.* With the narrowing of space and time due to technological advances, one cannot simply state that an action is strategic or tactical. For example, a target selected in part for its psychological impact on a tactical situation could have a more strategic effect on the adversary's will to fight; if a "tactical" leaflet is picked up and broadcast by an international news agency, the message may take on strategic significance.

### Strategic

**Strategic PSYOP are conducted on a global or regional basis in support of US goals and objectives.** PSYOP may take many forms, to

include diplomatic positions, announcements, or communiqués. An increase in US military presence provides a powerful psychological message. Accordingly, the US may send an aerospace expeditionary task force (ASETF) to convey a message of US resolve and act as a powerful deterrent to foreign aggression. Strategic PSYOP are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize DOD assets and be supported by military PSYOP and other air operations (e.g., bombers were deployed to Guam and Diego Garcia to influence Iraqi leadership to allow on-site inspections.)

## Operational

### Operational PSYOP in Operation DESERT STORM

During Operation DESERT STORM, Air Force C-130s dropped leaflets and broadcast radio messages warning Iraqi soldiers that they would be bombed by the world's largest conventional bomb. The next day, the joint force commander (JFC) employed a series of BLU-82 airdrops. Shortly thereafter, the C-130s dropped leaflets announcing additional BLU-82 airdrops. The combination of the leaflets, radio broadcasts, and bombs were subsequently credited with directly causing a significant number of Iraqi desertions

**Operational PSYOP are conducted in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of a theater commander's objectives as well as theater campaigns and strategies.** These operations

are designed to strengthen US, allied, or coalition capabilities to conduct military operations in the theater and accomplish particular missions during crises and open hostilities. *They are conducted prior to and during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities.* At the operational level, aerospace PSYOP can identify targets or centers of

gravity with the greatest potential for psychological impact. Additionally, aerospace efforts may include leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and airborne radio or television transmissions designed to encourage enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender, or undertake any other activity supportive of US objectives. *Additionally, if potential adversaries can be favorably influenced by PSYOP, confrontations may be avoided.* These efforts may also enhance force protection by influencing the local populace to report terrorist, sabotage, or other plans to attack US or friendly forces, thereby enabling the US to counter those plans. Persistent offensive attacks can have a synergistic effect with PSYOP accelerating the degradation of morale and encouraging desertion.

## Tactical

**Tactical PSYOP are normally conducted in conjunction with other tactical operations against opposing forces or audiences.** *At this level, PSYOP are normally targeted for individual engagements.* Planners tailor persuasive communications, in a variety of media formats, for the foreign target audience. During Operation JUST CAUSE, Air Force aircraft supported tactical ground forces by broadcasting radio and television messages urging the Panamanian populace to remain in their homes—and out of harm's way. In similar situations, Air Force assets can be employed to broadcast radio, TV, and loudspeaker messages which may influence a wider audience.

## Consolidation

**Consolidation PSYOP aim to strengthen, or consolidate, US efforts in a given region.** *Conducted in foreign areas where United States forces are operating and where an enemy or potentially hostile populace is also present,* consolidation PSYOP help influence the foreign populace to support US local objectives and allow the supported commanders operational freedom. Consolidation PSYOP may be particularly effective during foreign internal defense operations. For example, if US forces are helping a foreign government to remove land mines, PSYOP could publicize the effort to gain support from the local populace, hence



**Air Force assets conduct and support all four categories of PSYOP.**

creating a safer working environment for US personnel. Additionally, this would gain support for the foreign government as they are seen working to benefit their people.

## PSYOP PRINCIPLES

Certain principles should be adhered to for effective employment of Air Force forces in support of either long- or short-term PSYOP. While the methods may vary with the target audience, the basic considerations are the same.



Figure 2.1. PSYOP Principles

- ✦ **Define clear PSYOP objectives** corresponding to the supported commander's vision of how the campaign should proceed. The objectives should be consistent with concurrent diplomatic, economic, political, informational, or multinational efforts. *A key PSYOP objective is to decrease the enemy's will to resist.* The psychological dimension of warfare affects those fighting the battle, their political and military leaders and staffs, and the civilian population. During military operations, US personnel prefer facing enemies who are unsure and confused about their cause and capabilities and certain of an impending defeat. Even if the enemy is unwilling to surrender, they may be influenced not to engage in combat. This goal may be difficult but, if possible, pays high dividends for US forces.
- ✦ **Base PSYOP themes, activities, and symbols on a thorough analysis of targets**, including friendly and adversary PSYOP capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses.
- ✦ **Use transmission medium or media which are reliable and readily accessible by target audiences.** US forces must ensure message media are tailored for the local populace. Media can range from leaflets, to posters, to radio, television, and digital broadcasts. E-mail, mass e-mail, and web page postings take advantage of newer technologies and may also be used to influence an audience. *Planners should ensure transmission media can reach and be understood by the target audience.*

- ✧ **Evaluate results for their relevance to the overall campaign objectives.** The commander's decision to terminate or revise PSYOP programs should be linked to the analysis of all-source intelligence. All friendly actions should be thoroughly evaluated for psychological implications, and where necessary, should be supported by deliberate PSYOP actions to offset potentially negative effects or to reinforce positive effects. To the extent possible, PSYOP should be tested in advance of use to determine possible outcomes.

## PSYOP OBJECTIVES

**Effective PSYOP provide the NCA and joint force commander (JFC) unique leverage by influencing targeted foreign groups, key political and military leaders, and governments to act in a manner compatible with US goals and objectives.** *PSYOP are low-cost, high-impact tools which allow the JFC to directly communicate with and influence an adversary or selected foreign audience.* By implanting the correct message in an enemy's mind, PSYOP may preclude the need to employ additional combat forces. When combat is unavoidable, effective PSYOP can reduce the period of conflict. PSYOP, a nonkinetic weapon within the IO arsenal, can magnify the political, military, and economic instruments of national power. PSYOP objectives can be categorized into three main areas: general, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and war.

### General

- ✧ Reduce the efficiency of opposing forces.
- ✧ Advance US or multinational efforts by modifying or influencing attitudes and behaviors of selected audiences.
- ✧ Obtain the cooperation of multinational partners and neutrals.

### Military Operations Other Than War

- ✧ Support the elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy.
- ✧ Modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities.
- ✧ Support the theater CINC's regional security strategy objectives.
- ✧ Support the objectives of the country team.

- ✧ Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external threats.
- ✧ Gain and sustain foreign popular belief in, and support for, US and multinational goals and objectives.
- ✧ Deter adversary powers or groups from interfering with friendly operations or initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US or its multinational partners.
- ✧ Increase foreign popular support for US and multinational military operations.
- ✧ Support other IO elements.
- ✧ Diminish the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political system.
- ✧ Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to friendly powers.
- ✧ Diminish support and increase reporting of terrorist, sabotage, or other attack plans against US activities and resources outside the continental United States.
- ✧ Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary power.
- ✧ Support and enhance foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and foreign nation assistance military operations.
- ✧ Facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations.

## War

- ✧ Project the image of a strong, technologically superior, well-prepared US military force that will win on the battlefield and protect the US, its friends, and multinational partners whenever necessary.
- ✧ Foster an understanding of US political policies, aims, and objectives.
- ✧ Foster support for multinational operations.
- ✧ Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for (or against) a military operation.
- ✧ Undermine confidence in adversary leadership.

- ✧ Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary forces.
- ✧ Increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power.
- ✧ Support other elements of IO.
- ✧ Counter hostile foreign psychological operations and propaganda efforts.
- ✧ Influence the development of adversary strategy and tactics.

#### Powerful Effects of PSYOP

...incessant aerial pounding can break a unit without destroying all, or even a majority, of its parts. The real limit is the ability of the troops to absorb the pounding, since individual decisions to cease fire will eventually render the unit useless tactically. Soldiers may desert (leave their unit and go home), defect (present themselves as prisoners), or, if unable to leave the killing ground, desert in place, that is, consciously or unconsciously cease to be a functioning member of the unit. Backing up the aerial bombardment by specific suggestions through psychological operations radio, leaflets, and loudspeakers can speed up the process if the bombardment is perceived as personally threatening by the members of the unit. ...Iraqi prisoners were very specific about the effect the bombing of other units within earshot had on their combat capability and morale. ...They also confirmed the importance of random bombing in inducing helplessness and surrender among enemy troops before launching a ground assault.

*Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993*

- ✧ Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary.

## COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

**As an integral part of the joint team, air commanders should be aware of the unique contributions aerospace power makes to PSYOP.** *Commanders need to recognize that although they may not command dedicated PSYOP units, they possess aerospace, communications, and computer equipment that may prove extremely valuable in achieving PSYOP objectives.* Commanders need to evaluate the potential psychological effects and implications of all contemplated courses of action, addressing both intended and unintended consequences of military operations. Commanders should also ensure their staffs understand how PSYOP support can be

obtained from national and theater resources, and how they are applied to Air Force mission objectives. Finally, commanders should realize that PSYOP are most effective when planning is done early and in conjunction with broader information operations planning and the overall air campaign planning process. *Early planning and employment of PSYOP is essential.*

## CHAPTER THREE

# COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND ORGANIZATION

*The courage and morale of an army have always increased its physical strength, and always will.*

Carl von Clausewitz

### GENERAL

Air Force PSYOP command and control arrangements should be flexible to adapt to different requirements. Because of its strategic and operational importance, PSYOP planning is normally centralized at the combatant command level. Similarly, when the combatant commander activates a subordinate joint force (subordinate unified command or JTF), PSYOP planning is normally centralized within a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) at that level. Air Force PSYOP planners on the theater PSYOP staff should coordinate closely with the theater joint force air component commander (JFACC) staff to enhance effectiveness, ensure compliance with NCA direction, and to coordinate and deconflict PSYOP messages.

### COMMAND

JFCs delegate the appropriate level of authority in accordance with guidelines in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. JP 0-2 details the assignment and purposes of the different types of command authority, including combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), support, and coordinating authority.

### OPERATIONAL CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

**Joint force commanders normally exercise OPCON of assigned and attached PSYOP forces through the subunified or component commander best suited for successful mission support and execution.** *US Air Force conventional air assets are normally under the OPCON of the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), who should normally be designated the JFACC. Special operations forces (SOF) aviation assets, including PSYOP-dedicated assets, normally remain under the OPCON of the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or the commander of the joint spe-*

cial operations task force (JSOTF). OPCON of SOF aviation is exercised through the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The commander of the JPOTF normally exercises TACON of US Air Force assets when performing the PSYOP mission.

## ORGANIZATION OF PSYOP FORCES

The organization of PSYOP forces is generally dictated by the nature and scale of the joint PSYOP mission. The organization may vary depending on the nature of the mission, the availability and qualification of assets and personnel, and the supported commander's assess-




Figure 3.1. Typical command relationship for a JPOTF

ment of the PSYOP requirement. To assess the situation, the supported commander may request a PSYOP assessment team. This team confers with the commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate component mix of personnel and equipment to accomplish the mission.

**If the team determines that additional PSYOP forces are required to accomplish the JFC objectives, a JPOTF may be required.** *The JPOTF normally remains under the control of the JFC to provide a centralized PSYOP focus* (see figure 3.1). If a JPOTF is established, Air Force planners should be prepared to advise JPOTF personnel on Air Force PSYOP capabilities to ensure smooth planning, coordination, and mission execution. Targeting and the application of aerospace forces to achieve PSYOP objectives are key aspects of Air Force PSYOP.

## **AIR RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES**

**The majority of US PSYOP capability is maintained in the reserve components.** *When mobilized (selective, partial or full mobilization), a significant portion of the Air Force's PSYOP capability becomes available for employment by the supported combatant commander.* Early identification and activation of Air Reserve Component (ARC) PSYOP forces is essential to ensure forces arrive on time, fully prepared to conduct required PSYOP. Both active and reserve forces which provide PSYOP capability should be identified in the theater time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure theater PSYOP objectives and operations are not delayed.

### **Air Intelligence Agency**

The Air Intelligence Agency is the “functional manager” for psychological operations in the Air Force. Headquarters (HQ), AIA has responsibility for PSYOP activities not already assigned to HQ USAF/Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (XOI) and HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). AIA will assign PSYOP-trained IO specialists to the information operations flights at selected numbered air forces (NAFs), theater air component commands, or standing AOC organizations. AIA will also make available a PSYOP reach-back capability.

### **USAF MAJCOMs/Theater Air Components/NAFs**

**Selected MAJCOMs with in-garrison or active AOC organizations, selected theater air components, and selected NAFs will have a**

**PSYOP-trained IO specialist, normally assigned to an information operations flight.** In times of conflict, the PSYOP-trained personnel should be assigned to the information warfare specialty team in the AOC. PSYOP officers ensure PSYOP targets supporting the CINC's theater PSYOP campaign and recommended by the JPOTF are integrated and sourced as part of the daily air tasking order.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# AIR FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

*PSYOP contributed significantly to the collapse and defeat of the Iraqi army.*

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War  
Final Report to Congress  
April 1992*

### GENERAL

**The Air Force has unique characteristics that allow application of aerospace power in a broad range of mission areas.** Although PSYOP messages have traditionally been associated with written and verbal communications, aerospace power can support theater PSYOP efforts in three primary ways. First, *psychosocial criteria can be part of the target development process*, ensuring that aerospace power achieves maximum psychological effect. Second, *specially equipped Air Force aircraft can transmit messages* over communications media such as radio and television or can airdrop leaflets. Third, *US aircraft, by their dynamic presence and actions, transmit an unmistakable psychological message* to most adversaries. The mere threat or presence of superior Air Force aircraft can ground an enemy's air force and demoralize their army and civilian population or promote stability. Air Force satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can also be used to support PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary claims or intentions. Finally, *aerospace power can be used to "bomb for effect."* Examples include: use of massive and persistent bombing of military targets; use of the BLU-82, precision-guided munitions to destroy specific targets; as well as use of unopposed high-speed, low-level ingress or egress flights for noise and shock value. Aerospace power is versatile—using it to further theater PSYOP objectives is one valuable application of that power.

### CENTRALIZED PLANNING

PSYOP, like other information operations, rely on a synergistic application of all tools to gain the desired effect. **Planning joint air support for PSYOP should be conducted by the information warfare specialty team integrated into the joint air operations center (JAOC).**

*This is accomplished through extensive coordination by Air Force PSYOP planners working with the JPOTF, if established. PSYOP messages must be coordinated with other elements of IO (such as public affairs, counterintelligence, deception, and operations security [OPSEC]) and with information warfare planners to ensure consistency to achieve the desired effects. When developing strategies and long-range plans, air campaign planners should consider PSYOP when employing aerospace power to achieve theater objectives. Lethal use of airpower may have a resulting significant psychological impact, but this by-product of air operations should not automatically be considered PSYOP. PSYOP are approved operations with the express purpose to influence the attitudes, emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of a targeted audience. *Anything we do to an opponent, intended or unintended, may have a psychological effect, but—PSYOP are planned applications of action to achieve or exploit a desired effect.**

## **PSYOP AND THE AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS**

**The JFC should consider conducting PSYOP using aerospace power to achieve theater objectives.** Theater PSYOP will be planned by the JPOTF and integrated into the air campaign by air planners. PSYOP planners must be aware of deception operations, electronic warfare, and other information operations that could negatively affect PSYOP (or vice versa) on the same target, target area, or target population. *As with other Air Force capabilities, air campaign planners should consider and integrate PSYOP throughout planning and execution of the air campaign.*

Air campaign planners employ Air Force PSYOP capabilities to exploit culturally-based values, symbols, and behaviors; historical themes; past war experiences; military doctrines; and the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders to target an adversary's political, economic, and military systems. Ultimately, campaign planners employ PSYOP to defeat the enemy's strategy. Part of the air campaign planning process involves determining the centers of gravity (COG). *Enemy COGs can be attacked directly or indirectly.* Direct attacks physically attack a COG and engage it in decisive combat. Indirect attacks cause the downfall of the COG by attacking its supporting elements until the COG collapses of its own weight or is rendered ineffective. *Because PSYOP target adversary's attitudes, emotions, reasoning, and behavior, and are not necessarily intended to destroy the enemy, these operations are normally considered indirect operations.*



**COMMANDO SOLO is dedicated to PSYOP and civil affairs broadcasting.**

**The ultimate goal of the air campaign planning process is an effective air campaign which achieves theater objectives.** The air campaign plan harmonizes and integrates joint air operations in support of joint force objectives. The planners identify COG targets, prioritize them, indicate the level of effort, and phase required missions in relation to the JFC's plan (and in relation to each other). The plan typically contains traditional Air Force missions such as strategic attack, counterair operations, interdiction, close air support, and maritime support operations. However, *this is also an opportunity to integrate Air Force assets fully in support of other uses of airpower, such as PSYOP. Trained PSYOP planners ensure psychological factors and objectives are considered when developing the air campaign plan.*

## **INTEGRATING AIR FORCE PSYOP INTO THE JOINT PSYOP CAMPAIGN**

**Air Force PSYOP must be closely coordinated with the joint PSYOP planning staff.** The JPOTF, if activated, is responsible for managing and integrating theater PSYOP and for ensuring component operations are consistent with theater PSYOP objectives. If a JPOTF is not formed, a clearly identifiable and empowered PSYOP representative should be present and active in all planning activities. *Independent operations could*

*undermine theater PSYOP objectives, and degrade overall JFC objectives.* Once JFC objectives are known, Air Force PSYOP opportunities and options will be identified and recommended to the JPOTF or the joint PSYOP staff. *Air Force or air component planners may develop PSYOP products, but the JTF commander or the commander, joint psychological task force (COMJPOTF) must approve the products prior to use.*

Air Force PSYOP planning is conducted within the information warfare (IW) specialty team assigned to the JFACC staff. The team has expertise from all major IO disciplines and is responsible for integrating IW, including PSYOP, into an overall JFACC air campaign. The IW team is the JFACC's conduit to both the special operations liaison element (SOLE) for EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO expertise, and to the Air Force liaison officer to the JPOTF.

#### **The Psychological Impact of Airpower**

**Coalition strategy also benefited immensely from psychological operations, the success of which is evidenced primarily by the large number of Iraqi soldiers who deserted Iraqi ranks or surrendered without putting up any resistance during the ground offensive. Our efforts built on, among other factors, the disheartening effect on Iraqi troops of the unanswered and intensive Coalition aerial bombardment, the privations they suffered due to the degradation of the Iraqi logistic system, and the threat of the impending ground campaign. Radio transmissions and leaflets exploited this demoralization by explaining to the Iraqi troops how to surrender and assuring them of humane treatment if they did. More specific messages reduced Iraqi readiness by warning troops to stay away from their equipment (which was vulnerable to attack by precision munitions) and induced desertions by warning troops that their positions were about to be attacked by B-52s.**

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War  
Final Report to Congress  
April 1992*

## **PSYOP FORCES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

**Aircrew members and support personnel trained to conduct or support PSYOP for combat operations normally do not require additional training to conduct PSYOP for MOOTW.** *However, there may be requirements for unique support capabilities, such as intelligence personnel, political military affairs personnel, and other area specialists.* Through humanitarian operations, PSYOP can align foreign governments with the US, thus averting possible future confrontations.

**Employment of PSYOP is not only a wartime option.** Aircrew members and support personnel hone their wartime skills through training, exercises, and other “peacetime” activities. PSYOP may be employed, either overtly or covertly to gain support, prevent hostility or support long term national objectives. *To be most effective, PSYOP must be exercised and employed frequently in all environments.* It should become almost an unconscious act to employ PSYOP in all activities involving any sized military force.

**Specialized training allows PSYOP personnel to understand a potential adversary’s thought process and to predict possible enemy and friendly actions to manipulate favorable outcomes.** As during war, personnel participating in MOOTW must have a thorough understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE). Tightened ROE further challenge military support during peacetime engagement. Rules may be so constrained that use of conventional forces and means are not possible. Judge advocates advise personnel on legal issues, including rules of engagement—PSYOP participants should seek advice from assigned judge advocates regarding applicable ROE. AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, provides detailed guidance on employing aerospace assets during MOOTW.



## CHAPTER FIVE

# AIR FORCE PSYOP SUPPORT AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

*True economy of force is using the indirect approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat.*

Liddell Hart

## INTELLIGENCE

**Effective PSYOP actions depend upon timely and accurate intelligence information.** Although intelligence personnel may be assigned to and deploy with dedicated PSYOP units, they rely heavily on external intelligence sources and systems. Air Force units which may be tasked to support PSYOP objectives should be cognizant of the intelligence required and available to achieve those objectives. *Because the threat situation and PSYOP requirements are constantly changing, intelligence personnel need access to near-real-time, all-source intelligence* from Service (Air Intelligence Agency), theater (joint intelligence centers), and national (Defense Intelligence Agency and National Air Intelligence Center) intelligence components. Forward deployed expeditionary forces must have sufficient communications connectivity with these supporting agencies to ensure responsive reachback and timely information exchange. *More importantly, intelligence participation in PSYOP requires an extensive peacetime or precrisis/conflict commitment to intelligence preparation of the battlespace.*

Air Force human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel with target country language capability may be available to assist in the planning, deployment, and execution of a PSYOP mission. HUMINT personnel provide cultural understanding, foreign area expertise, and language skills which are necessary to work with coalition forces and foreign nation government and civilian entities.

**Simply put, PSYOP require a broad array of military, political, social, and economic intelligence on potential adversaries.** The rapid nature of warfare presents a significant challenge for collecting, analyzing, and displaying this intelligence during the crisis or conflict phase of an operation. In addition, “damage assessment” presents an equal or greater challenge to intelligence personnel in the PSYOP arena than to those en-

gaged in strategic attack, interdiction, or close air support operations. Intelligence personnel should identify in advance the sources of information they can call upon to help assess the effectiveness of PSYOP. Collection, analysis, and reporting procedures should be developed, coordinated, and practiced until they are institutionalized and personnel are proficient. For additional intelligence information, see AFDD 2-5.2, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*.

## **COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS**

**Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems facilitate the execution of command and control (C2) and its supporting functions. C4 systems are essential for planning, mounting, and sustaining successful joint PSYOP.** Rapid, reliable, redundant, and secure communications between staffs and components are required for planning and conducting successful joint PSYOP. PSYOP communications should be structured to support centralized control and decentralized execution. *Air Force PSYOP communications should be integrated with the joint PSYOP secure voice, data, and satellite networks.* Communica-



**Space-based capabilities make our PSYOP forces more effective. Voice communications and data transfer provided by this MILSTAR satellite are only one example.**

tions and computer resources (information technology including visual information technology) must be designed to support electronic generation, distribution, and dissemination of PSYOP information against selected targets as an extension of information warfare.

**By their nature, PSYOP demand high capacity, secure command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems** to gather, analyze, prepare, staff, and distribute PSYOP products. Although they possess sophisticated PSYOP support and communications systems, *PSYOP forces rely on other agencies and systems for essential information and intelligence.*

## LOGISTICS

**Air Force PSYOP planners should provide sustainment requirements to Air Force logisticians during both deliberate and crisis action planning.** Before any PSYOP plan is executed, planners need to coordinate all aspects of logistics supportability. *Logistics planners work closely with joint operations planners to bring operating supplies, repair parts, and major end-items for PSYOP-peculiar equipment into the theater.* This should ensure continuous sustainment and support of the PSYOP plan; it also will ensure requirements are included in the operation plan or operation order TPFDD.

Since most PSYOP involve operating from deployed locations, **dedicated Air Force PSYOP units develop mobility packages by establishing unit type codes (UTCs)** consisting of operations, intelligence, maintenance, and other support personnel required to manage deployed Air Force PSYOP. These UTCs should be built to respond to requirements across the range of military operations.

**To ensure timely notification of Air Force PSYOP units and assets, MAJCOMs with dedicated PSYOP assets should ensure resources are identified in the appropriate TPFDD.** While UTCs are normally placed in regional TPFDDs, forces should be ready to respond to all requirements. Air Force PSYOP forces should be able to execute time-sensitive deployments. Dedicated PSYOP units can deploy with minimal organic logistics support, contributing to their mobility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Additional maintenance and support personnel, as well as associated equipment, normally require airlift support or surface transportation for deployment. Air Force PSYOP assets should also be adequately supported by readiness spares packages for extended deployments.

## OPERATIONS SECURITY

**Air Force PSYOP forces should be prepared to respond to sensitive taskings and to maintain the strictest OPSEC requirements.**

*Security of information is vitally important to PSYOP forces from initial deployment through the recovery phase.* OPSEC denies the enemy valuable information about friendly capabilities and intentions, including advance notice of mission unique training, joint preparations, deployment, and employment. Air Force personnel do this by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators and actions associated with planning and conducting military operations and activities. *Failure to implement an effective OPSEC program could result in mission compromise and loss of personnel and resources.*

## MILITARY DECEPTION

*All warfare is based on deception.*

**Sun Tzu**

In a sophisticated battle environment, the JFC will use the necessary tools to accomplish the mission. One effective means of gaining an advantage over the enemy is to build military deception into battle plans and individual missions. **Air Force PSYOP forces must ensure military deception does not adversely affect the credibility of PSYOP.** PSYOP and deception both can create significant holes in the enemy's morale and fighting capability. PSYOP and military deception can be employed separately; however, military deception plans can take advantage of PSYOP themes to enhance planning opportunities. *Therefore, coordination is imperative between military deception and PSYOP planners.* Imaginative application of deception principles, coupled with aggressive training and execution, can result in improved combat effectiveness at all levels, particularly when employed synergistically with PSYOP.

## LEGAL

**PSYOP personnel will seek the advice of the assigned judge advocate in connection with the political and legal implications of their operations.** Commanders at all levels must consult their legal advisors on the legal aspects of specific operations. *Commanders must keep*

*their legal advisors informed* on all aspects of plans, policies, directives, and doctrine.

## **TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

As potential enemies become increasingly sophisticated, their levels of technology, communications, and mass media will mature. **The Air Force dedicated PSYOP capability needs to keep pace with future threat environments** by ensuring its forces are equipped with state-of-the-art acquisitions and upgrades. These new technologies should enhance the joint PSYOP capability, ultimately degrading the enemy's fighting capability. *Effective integration of new Air Force PSYOP technologies will reduce the number and severity of future lethal engagements.*

**PSYOP forces need to defend their critical information and support systems.** Alternate production and delivery methods must be identified. PSYOP personnel should be capable of switching quickly from sophisticated (high technology based) to unsophisticated (manually produced) products if required.

## **METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS**

**Timely and accurate meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information is important for success of PSYOP** missions and must be considered and implemented during all phases of planning and execution. *METOC conditions can degrade or enhance PSYOP* depending upon the extent of effects and how well they are considered in the planning process. Air Force units participating in PSYOP should have ready access to METOC information required to plan and conduct PSYOP and to achieve theater PSYOP objectives. PSYOP should be supported by a single coordinated mission forecast produced by a centralized METOC unit that is tailored to the specific mission needs by METOC personnel at the mission execution level. Timely and accurate launch, recovery, and target area forecasts will enhance the decision-making process by allowing PSYOP personnel to use the weather to minimize exposure to threats. *Key forecast elements include (but are not limited to) weather hazards to air operations, target wind profiles, atmospheric and space environment effects on electromagnetic propagation, atmospheric effects on acoustic propagation, and target area precipitation.* Rapid, reliable communications for conveying information between METOC units and PSYOP forces are essential.

## TARGETING

**PSYOP planners should understand how campaign plans are implemented through targeting and the daily ATO process.** Since Doolittle's raid on the Japanese homeland, it has been clear that the targets of aerospace power should be considered for psychological impact as well as destructive effect. Otherwise, attacks upon an adversary are not optimized. Access to the targeting planning process allows PSYOP planners to analyze all targets and determine possible PSYOP impacts and effects. PSYOP must be quick to respond to changes on targets and to develop tailored products to exploit opportunities. When possible, combining lethal and nonlethal targets will greatly improve effectiveness.

**To be effective, PSYOP must reach their intended audience.** Although some means involve indirect contact, many other PSYOP actions or products require direct contact. To this end, PSYOP planners must be familiar with the various means of tailoring and delivering the PSYOP message. Chief among these are standoff broadcasts and hardcopy products that have traditionally represented the art of persuasive communication in the battlespace. Air Force assets are essential to deliver these PSYOP products. With the explosion of electronic media, however, new and perhaps more efficient applications will emerge.

**Each Air Force PSYOP planner must understand the requirements for PSYOP targeting.** Knowledge of leaflets and leaflet delivery containers as well as the delivery characteristics of bombs is important; all are part of normal target planning. Weather planning is another important consideration. As new methods and systems are developed, PSYOP planners, along with other Air Force targeting personnel, must practice planning and procedures.

### Reaching an Audience

**Leaflets and other forms of printed PSYOP proved especially effective in terms of audience penetration. Of the targeted audience—300,000-plus Iraqi troops—calculations based on enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interviews suggest that approximately 98 percent read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in theater. Most EPWs were found clutching leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere in their uniforms.**

*Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993*

## **NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

PSYOP assets are not equipped to conduct sustained operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments. Planners must consider the effects of NBC environments and plan for limited operations, or select alternate locations for PSYOP product production and delivery.



## CHAPTER SIX

# PREPARATION FOR PSYOP

*If we should have to fight, we should be prepared to do so from the neck up instead of from the neck down.*

**Jimmy Doolittle**

### COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

**Commanders of units that routinely conduct or support PSYOP should ensure their personnel are familiar with the principles, objectives, and responsibilities outlined in this document.** Airmen and support personnel need to understand how their operations contribute to the JFC's overall PSYOP campaign. Additionally, commanders should continually evaluate their training programs to ensure realistic aircrew training meets known operational taskings and supports joint PSYOP interoperability concepts. AFDD 2-4.3, *Education and Training*, provides guidance on training and educating aerospace forces.

### TRAINING

**Air Force units should participate in joint training which emphasizes command and control arrangements and joint interoperability, as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures required to conduct the PSYOP mission.** As an example, Air Force units tasked to conduct leaflet operations should be familiar with joint coordination procedures, ballistic information (provided by requester), computer procedures, and dispersion characteristics for leaflets they may airdrop. In addition, these units should conduct training airdrops to evaluate their capability.

**It is important to point out that PSYOP training is not only for PSYOP units.** All mission planners should understand PSYOP objectives and consider how their missions can best support those objectives. This does not imply that PSYOP are all-important, but rather that all effects must be weighed when selecting courses of action.

## EXERCISES

**Air Force PSYOP personnel and assets should be scheduled to participate regularly in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other PSYOP-related exercises.** *The top priority should be to participate in exercises providing realistic training for aircrew, staff, and support personnel.* Participation in exercises with insufficient PSYOP participation or without realistic training wastes valuable time and resources and may unnecessarily limit the availability of scarce PSYOP resources for real-world requirements. Exercise planners need to consider participation in command post exercises to train PSYOP staff and liaison personnel. Liaison personnel should be employed not only for individual training but to advise other staffs of Air Force PSYOP capabilities and limitations.

## WARGAMING, MODELING, AND SIMULATION

Wargaming, modeling, and simulation can be used to examine and demonstrate the utility of dedicated PSYOP forces and conventional forces supporting PSYOP objectives to affect the outcome of joint operations. These useful tools save thousands of dollars in deployment costs and are also valuable for training staff and liaison personnel.



**As with other indirect effects, PSYOP are difficult to assess in wargames.**

**Accurately modeling the effects of PSYOP is difficult.** Cross-cultural, personalities, and other human factors must be considered. Continued development of these models is needed to predict effectiveness of specific PSYOP measures on differing individuals under varied conditions.

## **EDUCATION**

**Air Force personnel who plan, coordinate, or conduct PSYOP should attend specially developed PSYOP courses.** Responsibility for joint PSYOP training belongs to the Joint Staff and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the executive agent. Certain MAJCOMs conduct courses specifically aimed at meeting these training requirements. Personnel who may be involved in PSYOP support should receive a general orientation on PSYOP execution and capabilities.



## Suggested Readings

- AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*. 1997.
- AFDD 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*. 1998.
- AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*. 1998.
- Scott M Cutlip, *Effective Public Relations, 7th Edition*. (New York: Prentice-Hall).
- Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. (New York: Knopf). 1965
- Frank L. Goldstein, editor; Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., Co-editor. *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*. (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press). 1996.
- Robert Jackall, editor. *Propaganda*. (New York: New York University Press). 1995.
- John Anthony Maltese. *Spin Control: the White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). 1992.
- Ted J. Smith III, editor, *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective*. (New York: Praeger Publishers). 1989.
- Philip M Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*. (New York: Manchester University Press). 1995.
- Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company). 1993.
- Army Field Manual 33-1, *Psychological Operations*. 1993
- Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 1996

Check the Air Force Doctrine Center website at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil> for the most recent Air Force doctrine publications. Draft and final versions of Air Force doctrine publications are available for review, download, and on-line comment.



# Glossary

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AFDD</b>	Air Force doctrine document
<b>AFRC</b>	Air Force Reserve Command
<b>AFSOC</b>	Air Force Special Operations Command
<b>AIA</b>	Air Intelligence Agency
<b>AOC</b>	air operations center
<b>ARC</b>	Air Reserve Component
<b>ASETf</b>	aerospace expeditionary task force
<b>ATO</b>	air tasking order
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>C4</b>	command, control, communications, and computers
<b>C4I</b>	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
<b>CI</b>	counterinformation
<b>CINC</b>	commander in chief
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>COCOM</b>	combatant command (command authority)
<b>COG</b>	center of gravity
<b>COMAFFOR</b>	Commander, Air Force Forces
<b>COMJPOTF</b>	commander, joint psychological operations task force
<b>COMSOC</b>	Commander, Special Operations Component
<b>DCI</b>	defensive counterinformation
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>EPW</b>	enemy prisoner of war
<b>HQ</b>	headquarters
<b>HUMINT</b>	human intelligence
<b>IIW</b>	information-in-warfare
<b>IO</b>	information operations
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>IW</b>	information warfare
<b>JAOC</b>	joint air operations center
<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>JFACC</b>	joint force air component commander
<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JFLCC</b>	joint force land component commander

<b>JFMCC</b>	joint force maritime component commander
<b>JFSOCC</b>	joint force special operations component commander
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JPOTF</b>	joint psychological operations task force
<b>JSOACC</b>	joint special operations air component commander
<b>JSOTF</b>	joint special operations task force
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force
<b>MAJCOM</b>	major command
<b>METOC</b>	meteorological and oceanographic
<b>MOOTW</b>	military operations other than war
<b>NAF</b>	numbered air force
<b>NBC</b>	nuclear, biological, and chemical
<b>NCA</b>	National Command Authorities
<b>OCI</b>	offensive counterinformation
<b>OODA</b>	observe, orient, decide, and act
<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>PSYOP</b>	psychological operations
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SOLE</b>	special operations liaison element
<b>TACON</b>	tactical control
<b>TPFDD</b>	time-phased force and deployment data
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USAF</b>	United States Air Force
<b>USCINCSOC</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
<b>USSOCOM</b>	United States Special Operations Command
<b>UTC</b>	unit type code

## **Definitions**

**battlespace.** The commander's conceptual view of the area and factors that he must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the commander must consider in planning and executing military operations. The battlespace dimensions

can change over time as the mission expands or contracts according to operational objectives and force composition. Battlespace provides the commander a mental forum for analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and depth. (AFDD 1)

**centers of gravity.** Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02) [*They exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.*] {Italicized portion in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. See also operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

**consolidation psychological operations.** Psychological operations conducted in foreign areas inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by United States forces, or in which United States forces are based, designed to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support United States objectives in the area. (JP 1-02)

**doctrine.** Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

**EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO.** An airborne electronic broadcasting system utilizing the EC-130E aircraft. COMMANDO SOLO conducts PSYOP and civil affairs broadcasts in the standard AM, FM, HF, TV, and military communications bands. (Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**information-in-warfare.** Involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection/dissemination activities; and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. Also called **IIW.** (AFDD 2-5)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO.** (JP 1-02) The Air Force believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: *[Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and include both information-in-warfare and information warfare.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}. (AFDD 2-5)

**information superiority.** The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Also called **IS.** (JP 1-02) The Air Force prefers to cast 'superiority' as a state of relative advantage, not a capability, and views IS as: *[That degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 2-5)

**information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crises or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called **IW.** (JP 1-02). The Air Force believes that, because the defensive component of IW is always engaged, a better definition is: *[Information operations conducted to defend one's own information and information systems, or to attack and affect an adversary's information and information systems.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}. (AFDD 2-5)

**joint air operations center.** A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint

force commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called **JAOC**. (JP 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called **JFSOCC**. (JP 1-02)

**joint psychological operations task force.** A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. The joint psychological operation task force assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. The joint psychological operations task force may have conventional or special operations psychological units assigned or attached to support the joint task force commander. Also called **JPOTF**. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called **JSOTF**. (JP 1-02)

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: 1. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, poli-

cies, and operations. 2. Operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. 3. Tactical military deception— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. 4. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. 5. Military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. See also **combatant command (command authority)**; **tactical control**. (JP 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP.** (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA.** (JP 1-02)

**special operations forces.** Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called **SOF.** (JP 1-02)

**special operations liaison element.** A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air operations. Also called **SOLE.** (JP 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called **TACON.** See also **combatant command (command authority); operational control.** (JP 1-02)

