PLANNING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A PROPOSAL

A Research Paper

Presented To

The Research Department

Air Command and Staff College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC

by

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March 1997
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.
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Preface

The ancestor of every action is a thought.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Thoughts and ideas are the most powerful weapons on earth, for without them questions would be left unanswered and decisions not made. This project explores the tools that are available not only to the warfighter but all decision makers to influence others. The study was developed to: encourage discussion throughout the government and military, not just among those who are considered PSYOP specialists; and call for a reevaluation of how we, as a nation, influence others in pursuit of our objectives.

The impetus for this project was two-fold: professional and personal. First, the recognition that although the armed forces are undergoing their largest demobilization and infrastructure reduction since World War II, their ops tempo is at an all time high as they are increasingly called upon to participate in military operations other than war (MOOTW). In this environment of declining resources and increased taskings, it is imperative we leverage our capabilities to maximize their impact.

Second, I came to the realization that everything we do in the military is done to influence the actions of others. We may use our military instrument of power either as a stick to coerce and deter or as a carrot to entice. Regardless of how or why it is employed, its objective remains constant: to influence others to take actions favorable to American interests.
The following pages argue for the redefining of military PSYOP as it is traditionally understood and the establishment of an organization that guides and integrates its multidimensionality with the psychological impact of other instruments of power into a coordinated national PSYOP effort. The framework begins in chapter one with the development of terminology and systems to introduce the reader to key concepts. Chapter two provides an overview of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences, followed by the Soviet strategic missile gap deception case study in chapter three. The final two chapters integrate concepts and identify the need to redefine PSYOP and the potential role it has in grand strategy.

It would have been impossible to complete this project without the help and efforts of many people. I wish to thank Major Ralph Millsap of Air Command and Staff College for providing me with endless leads for information, loaning support material from his personal library and sponsoring this project as my faculty research advisor. My gratitude goes to President George Bush for responding to my written questions and for sending interview and speech transcripts. Colonel Frank Goldstein of Air War College also deserves my appreciation for our discussions and access to his collection of subject matter materials, as well as Dr. Richard Muller, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Weaver and Major George Weil for their interviews. Many thanks to Phillip Lacombe, with whom I have had numerous stimulating discussions dealing with image and perception projection over the years. My parents were also instrumental in instilling in me the understanding that actions do speak louder than words and what we do influences others. Finally, for my wife Michelle, many thanks for not only her understanding and support, but also her help as a research assistant.
This project explores issues that are not commonly accepted and proposes ideas that go beyond the traditional understanding of PSYOP. It is designed to challenge you to “think outside the box.” PSYOP offers you, the warfighter, another tool to leverage U.S. capabilities and exploit the cascading effects of influencing the decision making process. As we head into the 21st century, we need all the tools we can get!
Abstract

It is incumbent upon the state to gain support for national objectives. Employment of instruments of power is designed to influence other nations and organizations to respond favorably. Therefore, impacting the decision making process is the underlying principle for IOP power projection and highlights the psychological element. During a period of declining resources and increased world competition, the United States must find new ways to reach out and promote American interests. In order to maximize the impact and exploit the influence events create, joint planning and interagency coordination of psychological operations are critical.

The current ad hoc interagency coordination and joint planning process do not maximize the psychological factors’ impact and fully exploit its asymmetrical influence on a target audience’s decision making process. Traditional views towards concepts, particularly military PSYOP, do not lead to the innovative solutions demanded by an environment of declining funds and resources. This study recognizes the multidimensional aspect of military PSYOP and calls for redefining an area of operations that has changed little over the years. Additionally, the establishment of an organization responsible for the development of a national marketing strategy integrating all IOPs to achieve objectives beyond the tactical level is advocated.

Reviewing subject matter literature from the last forty years provided the project’s basis for concepts relating to PSYOP and the Soviet missile gap deception case study.
Internet searches, interviews, and recent literature brought current issues to light and developed a picture of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences.
Chapter 1

Introduction

*To fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.*

—Sun Tzu

*The Art of War*

Conflict is a part of life born from the desire for change. Inherent in change are two opposing forces, one empowered by the status quo and the other driven by the aspiration for a new order. As Sun Tzu recognized 2500 years ago, victory need not be gained on the battlefield. Rather, victory is determined by the side which exerts the greatest influence over the other’s decisions and actions, thereby inserting a psychological dimension into conflict. A state has at its disposal instruments of power (IOPs) that provide it with a broad range of options to influence events. When employed in concert, the synergistic effect of diplomatic, economic, military, and information initiatives enhances the state’s ability to impact a target audience’s decision making process. Since there is a psychological dimension to each IOP, their integration ensures a unity of effort among all participating organizations and maximizes their influence.

Recently, decision makers have placed an ever increasing demand for military IOP options short of the traditional mission of winning the nation’s wars. The current national military strategy directs numerous military operations other than war (MOOTW) to “help
shape the evolving world environment,” an objective that is not unique to the military. This emphasis places importance on exploiting the military’s psychological impact beyond the tactical battlefield level, a prime candidate for military PSYOP but an area of planning that has not received the emphasis warranted by its potential results. Traditional military PSYOP conducted by military personnel emphasizes tactical, battlefield operations. To maximize the military’s impact, people both inside and outside the defense establishment must go beyond this limited understanding and accept a new multidimensional military PSYOP incorporating both military and non-military efforts. A multidimensional PSYOP that embraces all activities conducted by the military to influence not only military events but also economic and political decisions and other IOP initiatives designed to influence decisions that impact the military. Only after recognizing the potential influencing power of the military and its synergistic psychological impact when coordinated with other IOPs, can a successful integrated national PSYOP strategy maximize its impact on a target audience’s decision making process.

The author proposes that the national strategy planning process lacks sufficient oversight and fails to effectively coordinate the psychological dimension of all the nation’s IOPs into an integrated PSYOP strategy. Furthermore, a new understanding of military PSYOP and its inherent multidimensionality is critical for the establishment of a national PSYOP strategy.

**Terminology**

A wide variety of concerns mold relationships and can be divided into two categories. Those one has control over and those one does not. The environment in which these
relationships exist drives the establishment of national objectives and interests. For instance, the American belief of Manifest Destiny resulted in the Louisiana and Oregon Territory purchases and a war with Mexico. While more recently, the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed to bolster America’s economy, an objective outlined in President Clinton’s National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement.

The key to influencing a state’s behavior and benefiting the sender’s objectives is shaping the state’s environment, such that decision makers perceive it is in their best interest to take actions favorable in relation to the sender. Therefore, the ability to influence another nation’s decisions is based on the perceptions of events as it relates to that states’ objectives. This does not imply that the one attempting to influence has complete control over events that shape the target state’s environment. However, the power to influence is grounded in manipulating perceptions (perception management) and therefore the psychological element. The accuracy of those perceptions is irrelevant. Their value is not what can or can not occur, but what others believe will occur. It can be said then that the ability to psychologically impact a target audience and favorably influence its decisions serves as the cornerstone of a state’s ability to project power.4

Today’s easy accessibility of information is driving an increasingly interdependent world. Methods of employing IOPs to influence target audiences and the size of those audiences are both growing. As William Bundy recognizes, “Real power—the ability to affect others—seems in fact more widely dispersed than at any other time in world history.”5 An increasing number of leaders and decision makers throughout the government now recognize the importance of coordinating efforts to influence both foreign and domestic audiences. As a result of this heightened interest in influencing
others, policy letters, directives, and other publications are calling for an increased emphasis on projecting the right image to the right audience at the right time to achieve greater success for U.S. initiatives. All of these developments point to the need to better understand the psychological factors that impact the decision making process.\(^6\)

**Elements of PSYOP Development**

The recognition of the need to coordinate efforts has led to a plethora of concepts and terms relating to PSYOP ranging from the benign sounding marketing and public diplomacy to what many view as anti-democratic tactics such as deception and black propaganda. Theorists, authors, and practitioners have redefined and modified PSYOP terminology to the point that definitions and concepts applicable to this paper must be reviewed prior to further discussion of the topic.

Psychological operations take place throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. The contributions of military PSYOP at the tactical level, supporting a commander during conflict by employing loudspeakers, radio and television transmissions, leaflets, and other locally focused activities, have proven to be effective in combat, most recently Desert Storm. Tactical activities have for the most part gained acceptance and become embedded in the planning process. This paper focuses its efforts on the less understood and accepted strategic and operational PSYOP.

Operational PSYOP is regionally focused. In terms of military efforts, operational military PSYOP involves regionally oriented efforts prior to, during, and after conflict in support of a commander’s plans. The final grand strategy level category is strategic, which involves all activities conducted by the government to “influence foreign attitudes,
perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives.”\textsuperscript{7} The Reagan Administration actively pursued strategic PSYOP. However, they also integrated domestic audiences, creating what this paper uses as public diplomacy efforts.\textsuperscript{8}

Once the level, strategic, operational, or tactical, of the PSYOP initiative is established, then its purpose, basis, and type must be determined. The PBT model in figure one integrates these three elements (purpose, basis, type) of PSYOP to create a representation of the wide range of activities available to the planner. The purpose for PSYOP activities can be either, coercive, deterrent, or incentive, and is directly related to the desired response.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{PSYOP Purpose-Basis-Type (PBT) Model\textsuperscript{9}}
\end{figure}

For instance, as the U.S. projects power, it can influence another government’s decision to reverse course, maintain the status quo, or choose a favorable option from several courses of action (COA). A review of the literature reveals a significant disagreement of the uniqueness of coercive and deterrent activities, and very little discussion on incentive PSYOP. For this paper, coercive activities include efforts to convince a government to \textit{reverse} previous decisions and positions. This may involve the threat of force, sanctions, or the removal of special benefits. Deterrence implies the \textit{prevention} of a given course of action, that may or may not have been the state’s most
beneficial option. Finally, incentive initiatives are designed to influence a state to choose a given option that furthers U.S. interests. Incentives may include security assurances, favored nation status, exchange programs, or nation assistance to name just a few.

A second element of PSYOP is the initiative’s factual basis and can be categorized as either white, gray, or black. White activities are based on fact. Black PSYOP ignores the facts and is made-up of lies and fabrications. Gray activities fall between the two extremes and are neither completely true nor false, but may be considered exaggerations and half-truths. Surprisingly, a large amount of the literature is dedicated to the discussion of propaganda in these terms, but none could be found deriving similar identifiers for PSYOP activities in general. However, discussions concerning propaganda assign a second attribute to the concepts, that of what organization is credited with the product, resulting in a restrictive two-dimensional model.10 The final element of PSYOP addresses this issue.

The third piece of the puzzle involves the type of activities, overt or covert. In the former, the sponsoring state is open and attaches its credibility to events, while the later is characterized by clandestine operations. Figure one serves as a model to illustrate the multidimensionality of PSYOP initiatives and the relationships between its three elements. For instance during the Cold War, U.S. efforts to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack were deterrent in nature. The deterrence was based on a real retaliatory capability (white) and communicated to the world through public statements and demonstrations (overt). Therefore, this can be identified as a deterrent-white-overt PSYOP effort.

Western societies are comfortable with this type of campaign and view activities in the non-white covert realm as inappropriate. On the other hand, maskirovka (deception
tactics) was embedded in the former Soviet Union’s power projection efforts. The missile gap deception, discussed in chapter three, serves as an outstanding example of their ability to incorporate multidimensional PSYOP in pursuit of strategic objectives. One of the deception’s objectives was to drive a wedge between the Western alliance (coercive). To accomplish this, their deception campaign involved a public campaign of threats (overt) based upon exaggerated capabilities claims (gray). Although their overall efforts may be categorized as coercive-gray-overt, they integrated efforts spanning the entire range of PSYOP from coercive to incentive, white to black, and overt to covert, in attempts to achieve strategic objectives.11

The previous discussions are not inclusive of all the issues relating to PSYOP. However, they serve as the background required for understanding the basis of this paper.

**Influencing the Target Audience**

To better understand how the U.S. influences certain actions or positions of other states, the process leading up to their decision for a given action must be examined. In *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, John Petersen identifies ideas and perceptions as the keys to influencing decision makers in a rapidly changing world environment.

We have new sets of global problems that discount traditional, narrowly focused national interests. We are finding that the notion of using brute force to coerce behavior change is crude and inefficient, and eventually adds to our problems. We are coming to understand that the nurturing of systems requires new mind-sets and new tools...we appear to be changing our forces from hardware to ideas and perceptions. The fact that there are few things more powerful than ideas for changing someone’s behavior only lends fuel to the trend.12

Petersen recognizes ideas must be communicated in such a way that the receiver perceives the desired message and then acts upon it favorably in relation to the sender’s
objectives. In order to influence decisions, it is critical that PSYOP practitioners understand how to link their objectives with a target audience’s actions. The Action-Influence Model (AIM) serves as a framework to do just that. What follows is an overview of key AIM concepts. An in-depth discussion of the model’s four phases and an example are located at appendix D, figures 10-15.

The basis for AIM is an understanding of how a sender creates observable phenomena that influence a target audience’s decision making process, resulting in actions favorable to the sender. The message flow process, pictured in appendix A, figure four, provides a general framework for the more detailed components of AIM. Forming desired phenomena to support a given interest is the task of the message sender. The sender must carefully select the medium(s) that will most likely result in the desired phenomena, thereby impacting the final decision. By no means is it inferred that the sender has control over all factors involved in both creating and the resultant perception of the phenomena. Although the message process requires a great deal of planning throughout, it is impossible to overcome all of the fog and friction existing within the environment and interactions between humans. However, selecting the proper target audience is a critical link in the process, for if the wrong people are influenced, then the targeted decision making process will not be impacted.

Clausewitz identifies a trinity of the government, people, and military; within each state that is fundamental for its continued existence. All three interact and influence each other in different ways depending on the situation. The understanding of their relationship is imperative, if one is to develop a plan to influence a given segment of society. For as Clausewitz suggests,
A theory that ignores any one of them and seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.\textsuperscript{15}

Figure five, appendix B, demonstrates the relationships between these groups and figure six recognizes the overlap of membership among groups. Within each of the groups, there are various levels incorporating people with greater stature or importance as displayed in appendix C, figure eight. Phenomena may be perceived at any level and then communicated throughout the group or across to one of the other segments (appendix C, figure nine). Regardless of the type of society—democratic, autocratic, monarchy—these relationships do exist to one extent or another. Their impact of cross-influencing other segments may rely on the type of society, but ultimately any one of the three can make decisions or serve as the primary advocate for change.\textsuperscript{16} The segment of society that is most influential and the most likely to be impacted in regard to a desired outcome becomes the target audience.

Once the target audience is selected, it becomes the task of the PSYOP specialist to determine the best methods to influence them, taking into consideration contextual and operational variables such as culture, attitudes, motives, social class, religion, organization, and mediums of message transmission.\textsuperscript{17} Integrating and expanding these concepts result in AIM.

During the analysis phase (appendix D, figure 11) the sender identifies an objective that is not being achieved and establishes a target audience that is in a position to beneficially influence decisions. As part of the projection phase, seen in figure 12, events are tailored to influence the target audience’s decision making process. The medium employed to create a phenomena that transmits the message may aim to coerce, deter, or
entice and can range from actual military force to the media. Col. John Boyd’s OODA (observation-orientation-decision-action) loop serves as the basis for the third phase. The internalization phase, in figure 13, begins with the observable phenomena, which may be altered by uncontrollable factors (fog and friction) before it is filtered by the target audience’s perceptions. Additional groups, including domestic and secondary audiences, also observe the event and impact either the target audience or message sender. Inputs to the target audience are evaluated and influence a decision to take an action that either moves towards or away from the desired outcome or has no change. As part of the feedback phase, figure 14, the sender evaluates the message’s success with the new outcome and inputs from other audiences, resulting in a new objective or further attempts to meet current interests.

Notes

1 National Military Strategy of the United States, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), i. Although this particular quote is from the executive summary, the overall strategy identifies peacetime engagement and deterrence and conflict prevention as primary tasks facilitated by overseas presence and power projection. All of these are MOOTW activities aimed at impacting the perceptions and therefore decision making process of other nations, peoples, or groups.


3 The Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College discusses the importance of considering a wide range of factors during the development of a military initiative in the campaign planning model (see below). Although the campaign planning model is primarily taught as a tool for the development of military action, its basic concepts can be applied to PSYOP initiatives. Beginning with the appropriate end state that will satisfy strategic objectives. Strategic objectives are translated into military objectives. In order to achieve the military objectives, enemy centers of gravity must be identified. These centers of gravity assist in the development of possible COAs, resulting in a final plan. Throughout the process, the campaign planning model identifies the concerns that help shape the environment as “operational art” and “contextual elements.” Operational art components are factors that the sender has some control over (more over their own then the target audience’s) and include: logistics, technology, information, deception, and targeting.
Notes

science to name a few. Contextual elements are factors that the sender has little control over other than to possibly exploit the relationships they develop. Several contextual elements are: political, cultural, economic, and leadership.

9 The author developed the PBT model as a representation of the primary elements of PSYOP encountered during the course of research for this project. Although others discussed these elements, few integrated them. None could be found addressing all three.
15 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. Some historians and theorists present the concept that if Clausewitz were alive today, he would incorporate the media into his theories, converting his trinity into a cube or some other application. For further discussion, see appendix B, Trinity Plus One discussion.
16 Many of these concepts evolved over a span of several years of conversations with Phillip Lacombe, Staff Director of the President’s Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Notes


18 Col John R. Boyd, A Discussion on Winning and Losing, (August 1987), a collection of unpublished presentations. Document No. M-U 43947, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Boyd’s work emphasized “shaping” the perceptions and impressions in the tactical environment. He advocated rapidly changing events that led to a paralysis of the adversary’s decision making process. AIM does not attempt to break down the target audience’s decision making process. Rather, it requires an intact decision making mechanism to provide influence for longer strategic objectives.

19 Twentieth Air Force Communication Strategy: Telling America’s ICBM Team Story and from discussions with Lacombe
Chapter 2

Current U.S. Policy

*The attainment of the carpenter is that his work is not warped, that the joints are not misaligned, and that the work is truly planed so that it meets well and is not merely finished in sections.*

—Miyamoto Musashi
*A Book of Five Rings*

The U.S. has a formidable array of organizations and methods at its disposal to increase the acceptance of American policies and objectives. Given the right circumstances, anyone involved with the government, from the President, congressmen, military leaders, to staffers, may play a role in transmitting messages to target audiences and impacting perceptions at the strategic and operational level.\(^1\) During remarks in Detroit, President Clinton identified the need to concentrate and coordinate efforts to “shape” the world.

We must set our sights on a more distant horizon. Through our size, our strength, our relative wealth, and also through the power of our example, America has a unique ability to shape a world of greater security and prosperity, peace and freedom. These are long-term efforts and often they take place behind the headlines. But only by pursuing them can we give our children the best possible opportunity to realize their own God-given potential.\(^2\)
Integrating Instruments of Power

Perhaps no one better understood the synergistic effect of those efforts than President Reagan, as evidenced throughout his National Security Decision Directives (NSDD). He recognized the interdependent relationship of the economic, military, and political/diplomatic IOPs and identified information as a fourth source of power projection.3 “U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.,” NSDD 75, exemplifies President Reagan’s IOP coordination efforts. (NSDD 75 can be found at appendix F.) This directive was designed to “focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship.”4 The strategy involved a multidimensional PSYOP approach targeting the Soviet leadership, military, and population by impacting their economy, allies, and relationship with third world and Western states. In order to implement his strategies, President Reagan established the Special Planning Group (SPG), which was inactivated after he left office, under the National Security Council.5

Recent events in Bosnia provide another example of the U.S. actively pursuing its interests. In this instance, regional stability can be identified as the primary objective. American diplomatic leadership played a major role in establishing U.N. resolutions calling for the end of hostilities and the acceptance of the General Framework Agreement (Dayton Peace Accords). In order to gain international and domestic U.S. support for military intervention, an intensive information campaign was executed. Finally, only those parties abiding by the accords are eligible for American economic assistance. Although diplomatic, economic, informational, and military initiatives had a synergistic effect on the warring factions, there was little effort to coordinate them, further leveraging their impact.
Since there is a psychological dimension to each IOP, failing to integrate them prevents a unity of effort among all participating organizations and suboptimizes their influence. Recognizing PSYOP’s inherent multidimensionality and the necessity to leverage declining resources, failure to collectively implement IOPs due to poor interagency coordination is not a luxury the U.S. can afford.

**Interagency Relations**

Implementing broad strategies to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) or specific programs and initiatives directed by the President or Congress requires cooperation among departments, agencies, and commissions. Unfortunately, the interagency process to integrate efforts maximizing PSYOP impact is ad hoc, leading Frank Barnett to characterize it as the most “neglected” component of the NSS. Although the Department of State is recognized as the “lead U.S. foreign affairs agency,” it is but one of the many organizations involved in projecting American interests. In order to understand the scope of U.S. efforts, following are several of the agencies and their missions. The Peace Corps utilizes volunteers working for world peace and mutual understanding, and helps to establish the U.S. as a good neighbor by supporting regional stability. The Environmental Protection Agency is dedicated to preserving the world’s ecosystems while supporting the educated use of renewable resources. Businesses look towards the Department of Commerce to promote international trade and the Federal Communications Commission to regulate international communications. Official information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s “special activities” is scarce but most likely falls into the covert, black, and gray arenas.
The Secretary of State has general foreign policy guidance over two extremely influential agencies: the U.S. Information Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development. One of the most powerful components of public diplomacy, USIA is chartered to influence foreign publics through numerous programs ranging from Voice of America to cultural exchanges. Its companion organization, USAID, promotes American interests via development and humanitarian assistance. Neither agency is regularly invited to participate in NSC foreign policy discussions.

The two primary players in the forefront of U.S. efforts to influence foreign activities are the Department of State and Department of Defense. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher described their complementing capabilities.

In today’s world, when American interests are more global than ever, our national security requires the wise use of force and diplomacy together. Diplomacy that is not backed by the credible threat of force can be hollow, ultimately dangerous. But if we do not use diplomacy to promote our vital interests, we will surely find ourselves defending them on the battlefield. Today, in more places and circumstances than ever before we must get the balance right.

More than one scholar has identified this relationship as political-military warfare or political war waged against other states. Recognizing that their methods are unique but their objectives shared and complementary, the interaction between both departments is worth exploring.

The Secretaries of State and Defense participate in the National Security Council and grand strategy development. Their relationship, however, does not involve close, coordinated global or regional program development unless directed by the President. Within the State Department, most issues are addressed as bilateral relationships between the U.S. and a second country by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Group.
Geographic bureaus, with dissimilar alignment from geographic combatant commanders, coordinate regional initiatives. It is the U.S. Ambassador and his country team that develop programs, in conjunction with the geographic CINC, targeting a country. This under secretariat is also responsible for managing U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping and developing support for U.S. policies in the United Nations.13

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, as part of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Group, is the remaining State Department organization with significant military related responsibilities. Arms control negotiations, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), foreign security assistance and arms sales are several of the bureau’s worldwide defense issues.14

A case can be made that DOD’s counterpart to the Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). The USD(P) is, among other matters, responsible for political-military policy issues, security assistance programs, WMD and arms control issues. The assistant secretary of defense, responsible for special operations and low-intensity conflict including civil affairs and PSYOP, falls under the USD(P).15 Due to the time-consuming bureaucracy and ad hoc relationships, the primary interaction between DOD and DoS is at the lower levels. Although both the CINC and Ambassador are official representatives for the U.S. government, there is no formal process to coordinate programs. The CINC’s staff and Ambassador’s country team are responsible for developing integrated plans in an ad hoc environment.16

To help guide the CINC, joint doctrine recognizes the vital role PSYOP plays across the range of military operations from MOOTW to war and identifies lofty objectives for its employment.17 Special operations forces (SOF) from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps provide DOD PSYOP capabilities. However, the vast majority of their resources are product-oriented and support the dissemination of information through the use of radio and TV broadcasts and printed material distribution. A review of the SOF 1996 posture statement reveals PSYOP is a special forces mission “involving planned operation to convey selected information” to influence foreign audiences. Although this mission, in conjunction with joint doctrine’s role of PSYOP, implies a large latitude of operations for PSYOP, an overview of actual uses by combatant CINCs reveals a narrow focus of information dissemination via media products in support of foreign international defense, humanitarian assistance, and commanders during actual conflict. In fact, according to the posture statement, the functional combatant commanders are not involved with SOF PSYOP programs. The lack of understanding and appreciation for the multidimensionality of military PSYOP has resulted in little doctrinal or methodology changes since World War II and a continued focus on the tactical level. With an inadequate understanding of PSYOP and poor interagency coordination, then it comes as no surprise that the U.S. lacks an integrated national PSYOP strategy.

Notes

Notes


10 U.S. Department of State, “Structure and Organization.”


14 U.S. Department of State, “Structure and Organization.”


Chapter 3

The Soviet Missile Gap Deception

*We always seek to direct the development of events, so as to ensure that while defending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not provide the imperialist provocateurs with a chance to unleash a new world war.*

—Nikita Khrushchev

*Sometimes drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministers; on other occasions separate his allies from him. Make them mutually suspicious so that they drift apart. Then you can plot against him.*

—Chang Yu

*The Art of War*

Public diplomacy initiatives require a great deal of coordination and the equivalent of interagency cooperation. The Soviet leadership was perhaps the most skilled in integrating all their efforts to influence decisions throughout the world and attain their objectives. This chapter summarizes the Soviet “missile gap” deception, successful for almost five years. Appendix E provides greater detail and analysis.

America awoke 27 August 1957 to the *Washington Post* headline “Red ‘World Missile’ Fired ‘Huge Distance,’ Russians Announce.”¹ It was the start of a well-conceived Soviet psychological campaign designed to subvert the Western alliance and promote global communism while deterring the use of strategic threats by the U.S.² To better understand the events that ensued, one must examine the foundation that set the stage.
Setting the Stage

The Soviets recognized their limited ability to directly impact U.S. policies and actions. They could, on the other hand, greatly influence world opinion, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, due to their proximity and ability to project military power. The Soviets quickly exploited potential pawns as states unknowingly became surrogates by pressing for changes in U.S. positions that benefited the communist bloc.

Premier Khrushchev’s confidence in his ability “to direct the development of world events” stemmed from his conviction that the U.S. would not initiate an unprovoked attack against the Soviet Union or interfere with activities inside the communist bloc. This belief was created by American responses to four events. First, the U.S. had possessed the capability to destroy the Soviet Union after World War II and failed to take aggressive actions. Next, the rapid acceptance of détente at the 1955 Geneva Summit demonstrated the West’s willingness to cooperate with only minor Soviet concessions. Third, the original success of the Soviet strategic bomber deception indicated the ease in which the U.S. willingly accepted exaggerations. Finally, America’s failure to provide military assistance to the Hungarian people during the recent revolt exposed a trepidation by the West to become involved in situations that were considered within the accepted Soviet sphere of influence. Khrushchev keenly understood that as long as U.S. interests were not directly threatened, he could take the lead and influence world events. Former CIA director Allen Dulles acknowledged after the missile gap drama played out, he believed the Soviets understood the magnified psychological impact of ICBM advances and space achievements before the West did.
The combination of these factors led the Soviets to develop a program designed to increase U.S. and Western uncertainty about the strategic balance. Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush identify the Soviet inducement of Clausewitz’s fog and friction into the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship as:

1. Soviet leaders assert they possess capabilities;
2. Soviet leaders make threats that presuppose such capability;
3. Soviet leaders demonstrate capabilities or similar capabilities to induce others to credit the USSR with capability;
4. Soviet leaders take actions that imply capabilities exist.\(^5\)

The following events during the missile gap deception follow this general pattern of interweaving military and space achievements, the creation of world crises, arms control, media campaigns, threats, and half-truths.

**The Deception Unfolds**

The seeds for the missile gap deception were sown during the 1956 Suez Crisis as the USSR maneuvered to take advantage of the situation. Statements released by the Soviets implied the use of rockets against Great Britain and France unless they agreed to an immediate cease-fire with Egypt. Both countries stopped hostilities the next day, not because of Soviet demands, rather due to continuing U.S. opposition. However, Soviet timing led to a public perception that France and Great Britain had backed down, boosting Soviet prestige, especially in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. For the next year, similar well-timed demands, threatening the use of rockets, targeted Western activities.\(^6\)

Then on 27 August 1957 *The Washington Post* reported that TASS had announced the successful test of a “super, long-distance intercontinental multistage ballistic rocket” that “flew at a very high, unprecedented altitude covering a huge distance.” Included in the
announcement was the re-release of a story discussing successful Soviet high altitude atomic tests. According to TASS, the Soviets were “impelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding” their security. Radio Moscow echoed the assertions, reporting advances only “offset the Western countries in the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons.” None of the announcements stated the missile’s accuracy or if the technology to put a nuclear warhead on board existed.

Western response echoed Senator Henry M. Jackson’s comments on the Senate floor.

It would be hazardous for the United States to dismiss the ICBM claim as propaganda…It would be a disastrous blow to our people and our allies should the Soviets win this race, because it would represent the first time the United States has failed to win a race involving an important weapon system.

Two days later, Valerian Zorin, the Soviet’s chief arms control negotiator terminated talks due to what was categorized as western intransigence. The Soviets had repeated their willingness to renounce all military uses of atomic weapons, but according to Zorin the U.S. refused to accept this offer, forcing the Soviets to develop their new missile. On Friday, 30 August 1957, TASS accused Western and in particular U.S. media for developing a “war hysteria” around the missile. Several days later, Newsweek accurately predicted this was the start of a campaign to “make a mockery of the U.S. (nuclear) shield.”

The announcement and withdrawal took place about one week before the U.N. General Assembly session on the Hungarian revolt. The Soviets were working to change their image from a ruthless occupying force to a “peace-loving (people) who have the ultimate terror weapon but offers to forfeit its advantage for the sake of peace.” For the
next few weeks, TASS reports discussed characteristics and capabilities of ICBMs, never claiming Russia had actually tested one with these traits.\textsuperscript{13}

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 2. Development of Soviet ICBM impacts arms control negotiations\textsuperscript{14}**

Less than two months after the ICBM announcement, Sputnik I was launched and the entire world heard a signal from outer space. The Soviets had proven their mastery of rocket technology. In an interview with *The New York Times*, Khrushchev said, “We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate range rockets, and short range rockets,” explicitly announcing they had all the types of missiles needed and implying they also possessed a sufficient quantity. Over the next few years Soviet statements and actions intensified, specifically targeting West Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Japan, and others, as Khrushchev worked to gain credibility for his ICBM force and its threat to Western Europe.\textsuperscript{15}

The Berlin Crisis in 1959 raised concerns that the Soviets truly had a formidable ICBM force. For nothing else had changed in east-west relations, except the possible Soviet missile capability, that would explain the new hard-line position.\textsuperscript{16} In a meeting with New York Governor Averell Harriman, Khrushchev said, “If you send in tanks (to
they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically.17 The cumulative effects of Berlin, Sputnik, missile rattling, and a growing uncertainty over U.S. nuclear security assurances began to impact global perceptions. By early 1960 USIA reported,

…current views of relative US-USSR power has shifted sharply since the advent of the first Sputnik and the development of intercontinental missile capabilities…In the critical areas of military strength and space achievements and a rate of economic growth capable of supporting them at a high level, popular opinion believes…the U.S. to be inferior to the USSR.18

Figure three illustrates the decline of U.S. military prestige and the Soviet Union’s corresponding ascension from November 1957 to February 1960. The Soviet’s enjoyed a nearly 3:1 public opinion margin in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Norway. A further analysis of the report identifies the sources of change in opinion were the synergistic result of successful multidimensional PSYOP efforts targeting Western perceptions.

![Western European Belief of Military Superiority](image)

Figure 3. Perceptions of Relative U.S./USSR Military Strength19

1. Soviet space achievements were equated with military capabilities.
2. Recently expanded international presence exerted influence and leverage in areas where little or no impact had been the status quo.
3. New “confident tone and aggressive posture” assumed a position of strength. Soviet achievements and Western reactions supported this assumption.
5. Small, focused Soviet foreign economic programs targeted high impact/visibility situations supported Soviet claims of growing economy and military power.
6. Doubts of Western alliance preparedness to meet Soviet challenges.

As Western European anxieties brought into question whether they could “unconditionally (depend) upon the protection of America’s atomic shield in the event of limited conflict,” U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities were rapidly changing. Secretary McNamara called these downward revisions “substantial.” Between January and February, estimates of Soviet ICBMs fell 66 percent. Within 18 months, their ICBM strength was less than four percent of original expectations. Finally, in 1964, DoD admitted the Soviets only had a handful of operational ICBMs.

For almost five years, the Soviets’ “double deception” of the size of their ICBM force and willingness to use it drove world relations. They recognized that if a nuclear war started it would be on their terms and they would have to instigate the first critical actions to threaten vital American interests. Therefore, while the U.S. moved forward spending enormous sums on rapid development of three different systems, the Soviets built a force just large enough for show but saved resources for future ICBM generations. In 1963, Allan Dulles, CIA director during the deception, wrote in his book *The Craft of Intelligence*: The question was,

... would they use their bulky and somewhat awkward ‘first generation’ ICBM, effective though it was, as the missile to deploy, or would they wait for a second or third generation? Were they in such a hurry to capitalize on a moment of possible missile superiority that they would sacrifice this to a more orderly program?

He acknowledged Khrushchev led a remarkable psychological campaign of statements, indicators, and events that gave the impression the Soviets were rapidly
moving forward with early ICBM deployment. Although many of the Soviet gains during the missile gap deception were short lived, others had lasting impacts. Its effects demonstrated the leveraging of a multidimensional PSYOP campaign integrating IOPs to ensure a national unity of effort in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Notes

1 This rocket was later identified as the SS-6 Sapwood, primarily used as a space booster, very few became operational as strategic ICBMs. In order to overcome a lack of large rocket engine technology, the Sapwood utilized 32 smaller rocket engines. In essence, the Soviets used brute force to obtain an intercontinental range (6200 miles).

2 Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, U.S. Air Force Project Rand Report R-434-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, August 1965), x. To eliminate confusion between this report and the book *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, hereafter this will be referred to as Rand Reptr R-434-PR.


5 Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5.


12 “Dawn of the Super-Missile.”


15 Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 55.

16 Ibid., 119.


18 Ibid., 1.
Notes


20 Ibid., 2-3.

21 Ibid., 6.


24 Planned defense spending outlays increased $14 billion over the Eisenhower’s budget. $6 billion of the increase targeted strategic systems, most of which were dedicated to ICBM development. In 1997 dollars, the increases equal approximately $76 billion and $32.5 billion respectively. American ICBMs concurrently under development included two liquid fueled systems, Atlas and Titan, and one solid fueled, Minuteman, which later became the backbone of U.S. strategic missile capabilities.

Chapter 4

Reevaluating American PSYOP

The efforts of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole, which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical process . . . One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.

—Carl von Clausewitz

On War

The Soviet missile gap deception was a successful PSYOP program. Their efforts influenced U.S. and Western decisions as supported by Secretary McNamara’s comments after the ruse had been exposed.

This nation created a myth of its own weakness . . . the ending of the myth has made it possible to take a firm line with our adversaries and at the same time to reassure our friends that we are strong and determined to use our strength if we have to.¹

His comments imply U.S. positions on issues were softened, and allies’ confidence in American security assurances was somewhat shaken. Both outcomes were desired objectives of the Soviet web of deception that involved coordinating space program advances, arms control initiatives, military tests, diplomacy, the impression of a peaceloving nation, official statements, international threats, and media reports into a well-conceived strategic PSYOP program. Soviet efforts of integrating IOPs highlights the multidimensionality of PSYOP campaigns and points towards a reevaluation of how
America influences other states. If, as the Soviets demonstrated, military activities impact non-military decisions and other IOPs may be used to influence military decisions, then the question arises, what role does the military have in the process? In other words, what is military PSYOP?

Redefining Military PSYOP

Joint military doctrine acknowledges the psychological dimension of military actions but draws a line between the influence events may exert on decisions and actual PSYOP. "Actions such as shows of force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of the targeted audience."2 Yet the only reason for a show of force or any other military activity is to send a message that the U.S. supports a given position and that anyone who opposes it better think twice.

Several recent examples illustrate the psychological dimension of military activities.

1. Libya. The 1986 Libyan Raid objectives, though not planned as PSYOP, coincided with three NSDDs targeting Libya and were designed to demonstrate the high cost of sponsoring terrorism.3 Muammar Qadhafi received the message loud and clear and since then has considerably reduced his terrorist actions against the U.S.4
2. Russia, Zaire, Bangladesh. American armed forces providing disaster relief or humanitarian assistance send a message to the world that America believes in alleviating human suffering and maintaining regional stability with a collateral message that the U.S. can deploy forces anywhere, anytime on short notice.
3. Pasadena. When millions of people around the world saw the B-2 fly over the Rose Bowl parade, the Air Force was putting global reach and global power on display, not entering a high-tech float.
4. Arms Control. U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is designed to prevent other states from joining the nuclear weapons club.
5. Military arms sales. Providing modern military equipment to Pakistan establishes a regional counterbalance to India.
None of these activities were planned as or even considered PSYOP, but the U.S. initiated them as attempts to influence a target audience and further American interests.

Thirty years after the missile gap deception, President George Bush and Saddam Hussein fought a battle for world opinion before coalition forces expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. With the strong backing of Saudi Arabia and several Western states, President Bush worked to develop a coalition force and world support. He painted Iraq’s moves as a “ruthless assault” against all civilized nations and consolidated world opinion through U.N. resolutions, resulting in a formidable and overwhelming coalition force.\(^5\)

International response was much simpler to gauge than the possible impact efforts had on Iraq and her allies. Without dependable intermediaries, neither President Bush nor then National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft knew if their attempts to communicate with Hussein were reaching him.\(^6\) However, to insure the safety of coalition forces, President Bush felt it was critical to influence Hussein’s decisions on the use of weapons of mass destruction. He accomplished this by increasing Hussein’s uncertainty of America’s willingness to use nuclear weapons.

…it (a nuclear response) would be extraordinarily difficult. I suppose you could conjure up some horrible scenario that would call for the use…but it was not something that we really contemplated at all. What we did want to do, though, was leave doubt.\(^7\)

On the other side, Hussein was working to break up the coalition and render it an ineffective fighting force. He created an illusion of a much stronger Iraqi army that forced coalition partners to build a larger military force, requiring more time.\(^8\) The longer it took to prepare, the greater the likelihood Hussein could break the coalition. Two of his efforts aimed at influencing the coalition nearly succeeded. The first initiative designed to fan the
flames of anti-American sentiment and fracture the coalition involved a fabricated story reporting that Egyptian and Saudi forces were fighting American troops, who were desecrating Muslim holy sites. This resulted in Muslims rioting around the world against U.S. influences and the coalition. One series of riots threatened the Pakistani government. If the Pakistani government had fallen or given in to pressure and pulled out of the coalition, a domino effect among other Muslim nations might have occurred, jeopardizing the entire coalition.

A second coalition cracking effort targeted Israel. Through the use of Scuds aimed at cities, Hussein hoped to provoke a military response, drawing Israel into the conflict and tearing apart the coalition. Combine the fact that many of the rockets had dummy concrete warheads with their poor accuracy, it can be surmised he was targeting Jewish public opinion, not militarily significant facilities.9

The aforementioned events had one thing in common, the implicit or explicit attempt to influence a target audience’s behavior in favor of the sender’s objectives. In the latest Air Force Executive Guidance, “terrorism, sabotage, and unconventional warfare” are identified as tools available to future adversaries to influence U.S. national policy.10 These phenomena transcend traditional tactically oriented military PSYOP of radio, television and loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets. However, the recognition of PSYOP contributions beyond special operations is increasing, especially as Information Warfare moves to the forefront of future operations.11 The time is right to reevaluate what is considered PSYOP.

If one accepts the joint doctrine premise “the employment of any national power, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension,”12 then it is
not difficult to conclude that planners should take this dimension into consideration and plan to exploit its influence. For example, United States Strategic Command exists for the psychological dimension of influencing potential adversaries not to employ WMDs against the U.S. The first three words in its mission statement are to “deter military attack.”

The command takes great pride and has a large public affairs staff to disseminate their message of deterrence, yet it does not have a PSYOP specialist. George Copley repudiates the currently mild reception perception management receives in the military.

A target audience, whether an enemy or friend, domestic or foreign, will always perceive something from the way in which a government or armed force postures itself, and will act on that perception. So, given that a perception will be made whether this is wanted or not, it should be seen as important to project the image in the way you wish it to be perceived.

PSYOP has the potential to be the most powerful weapon in the military’s arsenal. It targets the mind, influencing decision makers to take steps supportive of U.S. interests in peacetime and war and possibly preventing conflict. The military establishment must come to the recognition that PSYOP does not support activities; rather military initiatives are developed and executed to influence others and therefore support PSYOP. Multidimensional military PSYOP provides increased options to not only the commander in the field, but also the NCA. It includes activities involving or impacting, but not necessarily undertaken by, the military. For instance, successful efforts to break the coalition by Hussein would have had similar results to victorious Iraqi forces. The coalition would have been weaker, possibly deprived of essential Arab support. A similar analysis recognizing the inherent multidimensionality for the other three IOPs can be employed with identical results.
Therefore the author proposes that military PSYOP must be redefined to accept its multidimensionality. Activities conducted by the military to influence a broad range of decisions (not just military) and efforts employing other IOPs to influence military related decisions must be integrated into a new military PSYOP.

National Marketing Strategy

The Soviets repeatedly demonstrated the value of coordinated public diplomacy. Using the inherent indirect approach of PSYOP, they melded:

…symphonic orchestras and sports teams with military threats, technological breakthroughs with the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist myth….So complete (was) the amalgam of military strategy, diplomacy, ideological agitation, and cultural and scientific activities that no one can say where communist propaganda begins and where it ends.¹⁶

Integrating resources and activities to influence an audience are not new ideas in the West. However, it is better known as marketing, a more palpable term than PSYOP, perception management, or influence peddling. It is virtually impossible to escape marketing efforts aimed at influencing one’s opinion. Advertisements on TV, radio, the Internet, billboards, and bumper stickers are designed to influence the consumer. Corporate healthcare, education, and incentive programs are instituted to influence employees to stay at their current jobs. Establishment of charitable organizations and recycling efforts promote the kinder, gentler side of a caring organization. These examples are not intended to be all inclusive or as absolutes but only scratch the surface of the programs developed to influence decisions and perceptions.

Business understands the need to incorporate objectives, vertically and horizontally throughout the organization, to maximize their impact on target audiences. Federal
organizations do take efforts to reach out to external audiences. The challenge strategists face is creating a coordinated program, similar to President Reagan’s NSDD 75, integrating their activities and maximizing the possible synergistic effect. The U.S. would benefit from such a national marketing strategy for objectives, not unlike the global campaigns General Motors and IBM use.17

Events surrounding the recent Gulf War demonstrated the possible outcome resulting from a lack of IOP unity of effort. For the establishment of a counterbalance to Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, Western nations, including the U.S., provided Iraq with economic and military support, bolstering Hussein’s regime and powerbase. Even as he turned the Iraqi military machine against Kuwait and amassed forces on their border, the U.S. diplomatic response to a possible invasion of Kuwait was ambivalent at best and tacit approval at worst. The lack of American military in the region exasperated the image of an uninterested U.S. These efforts influenced Hussein’s decision to invade since it appeared American interests were not at stake. This perception could not have been further from the truth. Maintaining regional stability and access to oil reserves were then and still are vital U.S. interests.

Arguably integrating a stronger diplomatic position supporting Kuwaiti sovereignty, a show of military force and economic assistance to aid Iraq’s recovery from its recent war with Iran may have deterred Hussein. Employing any one of these in isolation would most likely have had little or no effect. Strong diplomatic efforts denouncing a possible invasion without, as Warren Christopher said, a perceived willingness to support it with force could be dismissed. However, combined diplomatic and military efforts may only have served to illuminate shortcomings in Iraq’s ability to execute the invasion, thereby
temporarily deterring him, but not reducing his hostile will. Economic and humanitarian programs would have been needed to complete an integrated multidimensional PSYOP program. In comparison to the expense of: rebuilding Kuwait and Iraq, prosecuting the war, and the lives lost, the above integrated preventive efforts may have been much more cost effective.

The author contends that the Soviets succeeded in developing a coordinated program because they had a strong centralized organization that focused efforts, a critical element the U.S. does not share. Although the President and NSC develop objectives and provide guidance to departments, agencies, and commissions, each organization determines what actions it believes are the most appropriate. Coordination is ad hoc at best, often omitting valuable players such as USIA. Decentralized planning and execution further exasperate the problem of developing common terminology and increases misunderstandings of intentions and capabilities. Therefore, the author proposes the establishment of an oversight organization, similar to President Reagan’s NSDD 77 mandated special planning group, would be the first step in exploiting the synergistic effect of a national marketing strategy.

Notes

1 Stewart Alsop, “McNamara Thinks about the Unthinkable,” Saturday Evening Post 236, no. 43 (1 December 1962): 19.
3 NSDD 205, Sanctions Against Libya and two unnumbered NSDDs, whose probable names are Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces and U.S. Naval Exercises off the Libyan Coast and Psychological Warfare Against Libya, targeted Libya’s state-sponsorship of terrorism and worked to incite internal dissent against Qadhafi with the objective of his removal from power.
4 For a more comprehensive discussion on the psychological impact of the raid on Libya and other countries see Alvin H. Bernstein, “Political Strategies in Coercive
Notes


7 Bush, interview by Frost.


9 Frank L. Goldstein, Col, USAF, interview by author.


12 Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-53, I-1.


14 George Weil, Maj, USAF, interviewed by author.


Chapter 5

Conclusions

Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That’s where the battles are won.

—Col. John Boyd

In today’s increasingly interdependent world, the ability of a state to exploit the psychological factor by creating phenomena that favorably influence the decision making process of target audiences continues to expand. Maximizing the impact of a state’s tools of influence, its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military IOPs, requires a unity of effort integrating a wide range of agencies and activities into a well orchestrated campaign to support national objectives and interests. Not unlike the other IOPs, the military option can be employed in a broad range of activities, from humanitarian assistance to war, aimed at influencing the decision making process of a target audience. To fully leverage the military’s resources and magnify its impact, people both inside and outside the defense establishment must go beyond the traditional acceptance of military PSYOP tactical tool and embrace its intrinsic multidimensionality. The author proposes that a new multidimensional military PSYOP must be accepted, one that expands the military’s role to influence a broader range of decisions and incorporate other IOPs in efforts to impact military decisions. Accepting such a redefined PSYOP concept will increase the
effectiveness of America’s armed forces, especially as MOOTW taskings increase. Through better understanding of military PSYOP and its inherent ability to influence political, military and economic events, planners can maximize the synergy of integrating it with other IOPs.

The foundation for better understanding PSYOP is embodied in the elements of its development and the four phases of AIM. The elements of PSYOP development involve three factors, purpose, basis, and type, interacting to produce a desired phenomena. The purpose of an activity may either be coercive, deterrent, or incentive, depending on if the desired outcome is a reversal of a target audience’s decision, a prevention of the selection of a COA, or enticing a COA selection. A second element involves the informational basis of the initiative and may range from white (factual) to black (lies and fabrications). The final element describes the type of PSYOP efforts as overt at one end of the scale and covert at the other end. The integration of these three elements can be illustrated using the PBT model in figure one.

Incorporating the four interrelated phases of AIM—analysis, projection, internalization and feedback—are critical for successful PSYOP development. The phases guide a PSYOP practitioner in the creation of phenomena that will influence the target audience’s decisions to a position favorable to the sender. Analysis serves as the foundation of any PSYOP campaign and includes the objective, desired outcome, target audience and message. Phase two involves projecting a desired message utilizing IOPs in the creation of an observable phenomena. Boyd’s OODA loop serves as the basis for phase three, helping to explain the internalization process of observable phenomena and its resultant action. Finally, feedback is critical for a reevaluation the entire process.
The Soviets were masters of this process and recognized the synergistic effect that results from the strategic coordination of PSYOP with the psychological dimension of each IOP. Their successful missile gap deception serves as a testament to their ability to incorporate scientific and military achievements, arms control, threats, the media, economic aid and crises development into a focused effort to drive a wedge into the Western alliance and prevent hard-line U.S. positions. After the deception was uncovered, McNamara and Dulles acknowledged its influence on U.S. positions and policies, the transatlantic alliance, and the cost of efforts to close the gap.

In comparison, American PSYOP today is fragmented by an ad hoc interagency coordination process. Few understand its far reaching effects. There are many advocates of tactical PSYOP in the military. However, advocates for the strategic integration of PSYOP are hard to find. Although Joint Doctrine recognizes the inherent psychological element of military activities, it fails to accept these same activities as PSYOP unless they were planned as such. The multidimensionality of PSYOP escapes those responsible for development of doctrine. Military action is taken to influence a target audience, the very basis of PSYOP, and yet it is not planned to maximize the impact. The author proposes a reevaluation of PSYOP, vastly expanding its uses. Redefining military PSYOP as: activities undertaken by the military to influence a target audience’s decision making process, including both military and non-military decisions; and initiatives involving other IOPs to impact a target audience’s military; is but the first step in improved exploitation of the psychological factor. A similar intuitive argument can be made for the expansion for PSYOP is it relates to the diplomatic, economic, and informational IOPs.
Acknowledging the multidimensionality of PSYOP and recognizing its synergistic effect are not adequate. The author contends the U.S. must strive for a unity of effort within the multitudes of federal agencies to maximize the synergistic effect of integrating IOPs. At the present, there is no mechanism similar to the Soviet’s centralized authority or President Reagan’s SPG to integrate and coordinate efforts. The establishment of an oversight organization, responsible for incorporating IOPs into a comprehensive national marketing strategy aimed towards influencing decisions beneficial to U.S. interest, would increase the effectiveness of American actions. Lacking such an organization, the status quo of ad hoc efforts will continue to inefficiently utilize dwindling resources. In such an environment, the criticality of espousing and offering multidimensional military PSYOP activities, as part of a unified campaign designed to influence, rests squarely on the military.
Appendix A

Message Flow

1. Sender develops a message that he believes will influence the receiver to take actions that support the sender’s objectives. The type of message may be coercive, deterrent, or incentive.

2. Sender transmits the message via one or a combination of IOPs to develop a desired phenomena. An IOP application may include a military raid, economic sanctions, media campaign, U.N. resolutions, etc. or any combination.

3. Receiver observes the phenomena and integrates his perceptions as the phenomena is internalized.

4. Once internalized, the message influences the receiver and impacts the decision making process so that the receiver takes an action that either supports or opposes the sender’s desired outcome or takes no action at all.

5. The action taken creates a phenomena that influences the sender’s decision as to the applicability of the objective and message. The current course of action may be continued, a new message may be developed, or a different medium may be employed. In the extreme case, the sender may recognize original objectives are not attainable and must be changed.

Figure 4. Basic Message Flow Model
In order to effectively influence a state to take actions and positions favorable to the U.S., one must first understand the importance of messages and their relationship to objectives of both the U.S. and target audience. Messages not only translate a sender’s objectives into observable phenomena but also serve as the foundation of support and the impetus for change and must therefore be carefully developed.

The sender is responsible for identifying an unfulfilled objective and developing a message designed to influence the target audience in taking favorable actions. The message’s basis (black, gray, white), its type (covert, overt), and purpose (coercive, deterrent, incentive), help identify the most appropriate medium(s) for the creation of an observable phenomena.

However, the control a sender has over the actual phenomena may be limited, since the planned activity may only be the first phase of an unfolding event that is impacted by numerous other factors. For instance, a military show of force may be met with international condemnation or broad domestic disapproval. This turn of events does not benefit the sender’s objectives and it may bolster the target audience’s objectives.

How the receiver perceives and internalizes the phenomena influences future decisions, resulting in behavior that either supports the sender’s objectives or does not. The message flow process is then reversed as the receiver takes an action that creates a phenomena that is evaluated by the sender. Depending on the sender’s interpretation of receiver’s response, the message may be modified.

Notes

1 The message flow process discussed originally appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Communications Strategy* and was developed by the author as a result of extensive discussions with Phillip Lacombe in 1993 and 1994. Lacombe was instrumental in the development of the Reagan Administration’s Drug Policy, served in numerous senior public affairs positions throughout DoD, and is currently the Staff Director for the President’s Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Over the last three years it has evolved to its present state along with the following discussions on target audience and the action-influence model. Since 1994, it has been used by U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and numerous subordinate units.
Appendix B

The Trinity Target Audience

Clausewitz identifies three pillars of a state, military, government, and population, that interact to establish objectives and interests. Although at different times, each may be the primary group molding events, none are capable of complete isolation from the influence of the others. Phenomena may be observed by members of any or all of the groups. Therefore, it is critical for the sender to identify the segment of society with the greatest impact as a target audience and develop a message designed to influence that particular group.

There is a great deal of communication both between and among the three groups. Military personnel advise government leaders, and may inform the general population of activities. The population may discuss issues with people in either of the two other
groups. This interaction is continuous even if official barriers inhibiting discussions are artificially instituted. Figure six highlights another basis for intergroup communications.

Not only is there interaction among the groups, but there are individuals who are members of more than one group. These people are direct links between and have inputs to different segments of society. This inherently increases the communications and information distribution among groups.

Figure 6. Target Audience Integration

Several military theorists and historians have begun to question the applicability of Clausewitz’s trinity. Today transnational organizations play an increasingly powerful role in shaping world events. International corporations, cartels, drug syndicates, religious groups and U.N. agencies impact decisions made by governments, the military, and a state’s populace. However, none appear to have changed the fabric of society and influenced the West Phalian state system more than the globalization of the media. Although some argue the media has transformed the trinity into a cube, others believes it is an element that permeates Clausewitz’s three pillars.

If one accepts the premise that the media reports the news and strives to be impartial, then it is not a decision maker and should not be put on an equal footing with the other elements of the trinity. However, by reporting and at times interpreting events, the media does influence decisions and future actions. Its influence depends on how the reporting is
perceived and internalized. The perception and internalization may be different for members of the government, military, and population, but the media presents it to all three at the same time in the same manner. Therefore, the media can be seen as a critical input to the decision making process, and at times as a conduit to spread information on observable phenomena. If one accepts this, then the Trinity Plus One model in figure seven can be used to illustrate these relationships.

![Figure 7. Trinity Plus One Model](image)

The three sides represent Clausewitz’s trinity of government, military, and population. Today, the media have become part of the fabric of society. Its permeation of all three segments is illustrated by partial inclusion in each. The purpose for the phenomena at the center, is that decisions are based on responses to the phenomena. Each segment may be influenced by the phenomena directly or via the media. Therefore, the arrows emanating out from the phenomena represent its direct influence, while the media intersection with each segment represents the phenomena’s influence via the media.²

Notes

¹ A variation of the Trinity Target Audience appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Strategic Communications Strategy* in 1994 as The Message Triad. The premise discussed the relationship of external and internal audiences relating the Air Force to the general public.

² Discussions with Dr. Richard Muller and Major Ralph Millsap brought to light recent developments in interpretations of Clausewitz’s work and the possible applicability the media has to his theories.
Appendix C

Target Audience Composition

Within the three segments of society are distinct groups that have varying levels of influence over state interests and objectives. Individuals with the greatest decision making input are on the top of each pyramid, while the broad population base of the group forms its foundation. Generally information flows up and down within a group to accomplish required tasks. Although, each segment of the target audience trinity can be broken down into many small subgroups. Figure eight identifies the three primary levels.
**POPULATION:** The general population includes every man, woman, and child in the state. Membership in the next level excludes local and community leaders who gain their authority due to their political position. It is comprised of those people who are seen as local and regional community leaders, such as ministers, activists, businessmen, professionals, and anyone else that can influence people. National non-political leaders may involve consumer advocates, religious and civil rights leaders, union presidents, and industry leaders.

**MILITARY:** The military segment is very similar to the chain of command with some minor inclusions at both the top and base. The general military population includes family members, contractors, and communities where military operations occur. The purpose for their inclusion is that in states with similar situations to the U.S., military issues impacting this broader population have a direct impact on military operations. Civilian control (President, Secretary of Defense, etc.), when it applies, is considered an integral element of national military command.

**GOVERNMENT:** All three levels, local, regional, and national, involve individuals who work for the government, not including the military, and can influence the decision making process.

Figure nine builds on the interaction and composition of the trinity target audience. One audience may influence another level within that segment or another group. Members may also belong to more than one audience, expanding their ability to impact decisions. Interaction and communication knows no boundaries or established chain of commands. For instance, the Belgium dairy farmer, whose cows are frequently scared by low flying U.S. aircraft or chased by military members during operations, may be good friends with powerful political leaders in the Belgium government. They may then push for greater exercise restrictions that will have a negative impact on training and therefore military capabilities. During the debate over introducing U.S. Pershing and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles to bases in Europe, the Soviet Union employed a wide range of activities in an attempt to influence European popular opinion and prevent their deployment. Ultimately, the missiles were installed at great political cost, but upgrades to their companion short range system’s Lance launchers were prevented in West Germany.²

Identifying the right target audience is critical for either directly or indirectly influencing decisions. The key is one must always remember the objective and desired outcome required to achieve it. In the above situation, if an adversary wanted to reduce military effectiveness, the farmer and others like him may be the easiest and most appropriate target audience to influence. In order to get a similar result in another situation the hiring of a lobbyist to approach U.S. congressmen may be more appropriate.
Figure 9. Audience Interaction

Notes

1 Similar to the Message Flow Process and Trinity Target Audience, a variation of the target audience composition and integration themes was developed by the author as a result of extensive discussions with Phillip Lacombe in 1993-1994 and first appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Strategic Communications Strategy*, 1994. Over the last three years it has evolved to its present state. Since 1994, it has been used by U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and numerous subordinate units.

Appendix D

Action-Influence Model

The Action-Influence Model (AIM) has four interlinking phases -- analysis, projection, internalization, and feedback -- that identify the process of influencing a target audience to take actions or modify behavior in favor of the sender’s objectives and interests.

Figure 10. Four Phases of the Action-Influence Model

During the initial analysis phase the sender determines an unfulfilled objective, the appropriate target audience that will have the greatest impact on achieving the objective, and the message that will most likely influence the target audience. The projection phase incorporates the activities required to transmit the desired message and ends with an
observable phenomena. Col John Boyd’s decision making “OODA Loop” model serves as
the basis for the internalization phase. Beginning with the observable phenomena, the
target audience internalizes the projected message, resulting in an action that may or may
not support the sender’s objective. During the final feedback phase, the sender re-
evaluates the objective and message in relation to the action taken by the target audience
and reactions by other audiences.

![Diagram of AIM Analysis Phase]

**Figure 11. AIM Analysis Phase**

**ANALYSIS PHASE:** The analysis phase begins with an evaluation of the state’s
objectives and the selection of a primary objective that serves to focus efforts. After the
objective is selected, a determination must be made as to what outcome is required for its
satisfaction. Once a desired outcome is identified, a target audience must be selected.
Discovering the target audience requires an analysis of the government, military, and
population audiences and a further refinement as to the group that has, either directly or
indirectly, the greatest influence over decisions relating to actions impacting primary
objective achievement.

After the target audience is selected, a message designed to influence decisions and actions
must be developed. Several decisions must be made regarding the message’s purpose
before a course of action is selected. If the desired outcome requires the reversal of
policy, the message will be coercive. If it involves the prevention of some future action,
then it is deterrent. Finally, if its aim is to influence decisions that have not been made, it
will be incentive. The sender must also determine the message’s factual basis, black, gray,
or white. Will the premise be based on lies and deception or verifiable facts? This
determination may play a role in deciding if the message should be overt or covert.
However, a message designed to deceive and based on half-truths may be projected via overt means as witnessed by the Soviet Union’s elaborate missile gap deception.

**PROJECTION PHASE:** Message development signals the completion of the analysis phase and the initiation of the projection phase. After the message is determined, the most appropriate IOP or combination of IOPs must be identified. Although all IOPs may not directly support the message, it is critical that they do not send mixed signals and counteract initiatives. Once the IOP(s) has been selected, options required to result in a phenomena that will project the desired message must be developed and implemented. It must be noted, the sender does not have complete control over phenomena creation. Fog and friction from other inputs will also influence events.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 12. AIM Projection Phase**

**INTERNALIZATION PHASE:** The resulting projection phase’s observable phenomena begins the internalization phase. Similar to Boyd’s OODA Loop, the phenomena must be observed before a decision resulting in an action can be made. The target audience’s observation is interpreted using both contextual and operational frameworks. In addition to the target audience’s interpretation, other audience interpretations influence the final decision. Implicit in the decision is its reaction to the message, either support, opposition or indifference to the primary objective. Unlike Boyd, however, AIM does not seek to break down a target audience’s OODA Loop by rapidly changing decision making inputs and parameters. Rather, it seeks to retain (to the maximum extent possible) the ability to predict and influence decisions and actions. It is critical to recognize that audiences influencing the sender may also observe and internalize the phenomena and communicate their decision making inputs.
FEEDBACK PHASE: The core of the feedback phase centers around the re-evaluation of the message, medium, and objective in relation to the target audience’s actions taken and inputs from domestic and other critical audiences (allies, world organizations, industry groups, etc.). If the target audience’s actions result in or move towards the original desired outcome, then the current message and mediums employed may be continued or intensified. If not, the message or mediums may need to be changed or modified. In extreme cases, objectives may also have to be changed.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER--AN AIM EXAMPLE

Figure 15 incorporates the four phases of AIM. The following hypothetical scenario involving the U.S. and Indonesia is presented to aid in better understanding of the model.

**Analysis phase:** According to the National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, the U.S. has three grand objectives: enhancing security; promoting domestic prosperity; and promoting democracy. For this exercise, promoting domestic prosperity is the primary objective. From that, ensuring adequate oil supplies to the U.S. and its allies can be one of the many supporting objectives established. Increasing oil imports from Indonesia is seen as the desired outcome.

Through analysis of Indonesia’s government, military, and population audiences, several key factors come to light. The government desires to increase oil exports. However, they lack the investment and physical capital needed. China accounts for nearly 75 percent of Indonesia’s total trade. They coerce fifty percent of Indonesia’s production at below market prices with the threat of trade sanctions and implied annexation of offshore oil reserves. Finally, the population is yearning for increased standards of living, but due to the lack of oil industry development and artificial prices, no significant economic relief is foreseen in the future. Since China is in the middle of rapid economic expansion, influencing the government to decrease pressure on Indonesia is unlikely. Therefore, the U.S. must develop a strategy to reduce China’s influence.
At first look, the Indonesian government appears to be the audience that should be directly targeted, since they control critical export decisions. However, further analysis reveals that the economic prosperity of the general population is the driving factor for oil export allocations. The Indonesian government cannot afford to lose its largest trading partner and must concede to China’s demands. Therefore, coercing Indonesia to sell the U.S. more oil would greatly damage the economy and result in even more problems as China began sanctions. Since Indonesia already sells oil to China, the U.S. could work to deter
an increase in sales to the mainland, but since Indonesia is already near oil production capacity, this would provide very little oil for U.S. purchases.

Given this situation, the U.S. should develop an incentive message. One possible message targeting the population may be: “China is experiencing rapid economic growth at the expense of holding back the Indonesian people’s prosperity. Establishing better relationships with the U.S. and its allies will improve the standard of living.” Note, this message does not mention oil. However, to increase oil exports to the U.S., economic improvement must be credited to America by the people and government of Indonesia, thereby reducing China’s ability to leverage their economic IOP. Otherwise, China may take credit and attempt to gain even greater influence. Therefore, this points to a message based on facts and overtly pursued. A PSYOP campaign that is incentive-white-overt.

**Projection phase:** The desired phenomena to project the above message would be signs of economic improvement not based on Chinese needs or demands. All four IOPs can be coordinated to pursue what at first appears to be an economic issue. The U.S. could lower tariffs and enter into special trade agreements on Indonesian products. Diplomatic efforts may be pursued to encourage other states to do the same. American industry may be provided incentives to do business and cooperative efforts with and upgrades to Indonesian companies. The U.S. Navy can schedule Indonesian locations for port calls, thereby showing the flag and implying American military support against Chinese military threats. Agreements for exploration and exploitation by American oil companies for oil exports to the U.S. and mutual security assurances to protect offshore oil deposits where U.S. companies are working may increase the available oil. Finally, an active public relations effort to ensure everyone is aware of the successful initiatives the U.S. has taken to improve the Indonesian economy would round out the package.

**Internalization phase:** If the phenomena created from the projection phase increases the Indonesian people’s standard of living, they will then in-turn work to influence the government to move towards better relations with the U.S. However, secondary audiences such as China may view the phenomena as a challenge to their ability to control Indonesian oil and react in a negative fashion, possibly threatening military intervention or trade restriction. In this case, American military assurances counter balance the threat of military intervention. Additionally, Indonesia’s economy has diversified and is no longer dependent on Chinese imports. Therefore, the action taken is to increase oil exports to the U.S. and its allies at the expense of China.

**Feedback phase:** Indonesia’s increase of oil exports to the U.S. was the original desired outcome. Therefore, it can be said that American efforts to influence events in Indonesia were successful and the outlook for domestic prosperity is improved. However, the selection of multiple IOPs and implementation options were critical for successfully influencing the Indonesian people. If only a military show of force or assurances for the Indonesian sovereignty of oil reserves was employed, China would have still had the leverage of reducing trade and damaging the economy. On the other hand, if only business incentives were used, China may have taken control of the oil fields.
Situations demand coordinated IOP efforts developed to create a desired phenomena that will influence the target audience to make decisions favorable to U.S. interests and objectives.

Notes

1 John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” (August 1987), a series of unpublished presentations. Air University Library Document No. M-U 43947. Boyd emphasized “shaping” the adversary’s impressions and perceptions of events. His objective was a rapidly changing environment such that the enemy’s OODA loop, (observation-orientation-decision- action) decision making process could not adequately react, thereby becoming disorganized. Major David S. Fadok provides an analysis of Boyd’s work in John Boyd and John Warden, Air Powers Quest for Strategic Paralysis.

2 Ibid.

Appendix E

Legitimizing the Soviet Missile Gap: A Chronology of Events

The following chronology of events prior to, during, and after the missile gap deception illustrate the broad range of IOPs and activities the Soviets employed from 1957 to 1962. A significant portion of this is based on the work of Horelick and Rush. Unless otherwise noted, English translations of comments attributed to Soviet publications and presentations came from their work. Text appearing in italics is an analysis of a particular entry or events leading up to it.

1. Mid-late 1950’s. Due to the actual limited number of operational first generation ICBMs deployed by the Soviets, Horelick believes the decision to proceed with a limited program was made sometime between 1955 and 1958.

   This is consistent with attempts by the Soviets to begin legitimizing the stature of their ICBMs even before they possessed an operational force. 


   Although the Soviet strategic bomber capabilities were very limited and far inferior to U.S. forces, their successful deception program identified a potential soft spot in western defense analysis, setting the stage for future deception plans.


   During discussion in Geneva, Soviet Premier Bulganin and senior leadership recognized the potential for an asymmetrical relationship with the West. In order to support détente, Western leaders were willing to make major concessions in comparison to the Soviets’ relatively minor gestures.

4. 5 Nov 55. Suez Crisis--Soviet Primer Bulganin sends messages to France and Great Britain calling for a cease-fire with Egypt. The day prior to its delivery in London and Paris, the Soviets released the message’s basic information through news services threatening the use of rockets if both countries did not terminate hostilities with Egypt. The next day, both France and Great Britain ordered a cease fire, primarily due to U.S. pressure. Many believe Soviet threat resulted in termination.
The message delivered to France and Great Britain was not as threatening as the Soviet news stories indicated. However, this procedure of issuing ultimatums to gain support in situations that had already been decided and alluding to nuclear missile attack became a mainstay of Soviet foreign policy for the next few years. This garnered strong support for the Soviets, especially in the communist and third world nations. In addition, due to their boasts and apparent reactions to the ultimatums, it established a de facto legitimate nuclear missile capability since they were never challenged.2

5. 26 Aug 57. Soviets announce successful test of a “super, long distance intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket . . . (that) landed in the target area” and reiterate information on recent high altitude nuclear detonation tests. They claim they were forced to develop this ultimate weapon in response to Western threats.

Although the launch was a surprise to most of the world, U.S. intelligence was aware of at least six successful ICBM tests prior to this. This brings up the Soviet’s keen sense of timing to maximize impact. Arms control negotiations had not been going well for them and U.N. hearings on their participation in putting down the recent Hungarian revolt were scheduled within the next few weeks. TASS statements alluded to either a current or soon to be operational nuclear capability of the rocket by re-reporting the nuclear atmospheric tests. Accuracy was implied by claiming it landed in the “target area.” The target area could have been all of Siberia. Finally, by claiming they were “forced” to develop such a terrible weapon, they began efforts to put the West and particularly the U.S. on the defensive in World opinion.3

6. 27 Aug 57. Soviets reject Western arms control initiatives and charge they are “actually sabotaging the reaching of an agreement” and call for the renouncing of “atomic and hydrogen weapons, including aerial bombs, rockets of any type with atomic or hydrogen warheads, atomic artillery, and so on.”

Soviets continue to work on their image as peaceloving people who were forced to develop the weapon that they would gladly give-up if the West agreed to their arms control proposals.4

7. 28 Aug 57. Soviets claim ICBMs can successfully strike strategic bomber facilities in U.S. and allied countries.5

8. 28 Aug 57. In an official White House statement, Pres. Eisenhower acknowledges as noteworthy “the boastful statement made by the Soviet Union that they have made advances in the development in means of bringing destruction to any part of the world.”

President Eisenhower’s statement lends credibility to Soviet claims and may be seen as acknowledging their ability to bring “mass destruction to any part of the world,” including the bomber bases Soviets allude to.6

Soviets begin to further legitimize their ICBM claims by re-printing stories from other papers. Many of these stories were found in Western papers and based on TASS reports, while others were Soviet stories planted in communist and front organization papers. In other words, they were writing news stories that were based on their original claims, beginning an endless cycle.

10. 29 Aug 57. Arms control negotiators return home. Soviets recommend moving talks to the U.N. and reiterate call “for elimination of military bases or withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.”

The abrupt change in Soviet negotiation tactics and new hard-line positions alluded to a change in the world power balance that did not exist. However, the image the Soviets portrayed was that they were in charge and could now push for the removal of U.S. forces from overseas facilities.

11. 29 Aug 57. Senator Henry Jackson calls for re-evaluation of U.S. ICBM program and charges administration with slowdown. “It would be very hazardous for the United States to dismiss the ICBM claim as propaganda. . . . It would be a very disastrous blow to our own people and our Allies should the Soviets win this race, because it would represent the first time the United States has failed to win a race involving an important weapon system.”

Powerful voices within the U.S. government begin to question the balance of world power. Sen. Jackson, along with others, successfully pushed for an increase in U.S. ICBM funding and accelerating development programs. However, public comments and debate led to a growing belief that the U.S. had fallen behind, legitimizing Soviet claims.


These headlines represent the rapid escalation of Western response. The Soviets continue to espouse that the West has nothing to fear from them. Hysteria is unwarranted since the Soviets are peaceloving and willing to give up these terror weapons.

13. Late Aug 57. Western European response similar to Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, “This country’s security has been based mainly in the impregnability of the United States. Will this protection now cease to exist?”
Allies begin to question the deterrent value of America’s strategic bombers. The protective nuclear umbrella they had come to depend on to prevent Soviet aggression was not as dependable. This was a key theme the Soviets continued to hammer home as they worked to create a rift in NATO.


*This level of accuracy implies the ICBM is a terror weapon, only applicable to very large soft targets similar to cities.*

15. 9 Sep 57. Zorin claims, “The statesmen of the U.S. and NATO openly proclaim that they are preparing for atomic war against the peace loving states.”

*Once again, the image of Soviets as peace loving people, who only want world harmony is brought to the forefront as the U.N. prepares to begin discussions.*

16. Mid-Sep 57. U.N. General Assembly sessions on Hungarian Revolt.

17. 4 Oct 57. USSR successfully launches Sputnik I.

*Soviets pursue efforts to link space achievements to military capabilities. USIA reports indicate they were successful.*

18. 3 Nov 57. Sputnik II successfully launched.

19. Mid-Nov 57. Khrushchev: “I think it is no secret that there now exists a range of missiles with the aid of which it is possible to fulfill any assignment of operational and strategic importance.”

*Building on recent Soviet space achievements, Khrushchev connects space capabilities with military weapon systems. Official statements can be seen as following a logical sequence continuing to remain ambiguous while creating the belief of a plausible ICBM capability in the West.*

20. 1958 (date unknown) Senator John F. Kennedy warns that Soviet missile superiority will threaten U.S. security within the next two to six years.

*The missile gap and Soviet superiority are accepted by the majority of Western leaders.*


*A new Soviet hard-line surprised the West. The only significant change in the world situation was the Soviet ICBM development. Therefore, they must have a strong ICBM force to risk war over Berlin.*

22. 19 Mar 59. Khrushchev: “If such a country as ours, which occupies one-sixth of the globe, can, as they assert, be destroyed in a brief period of time, how much time is
needed to destroy other smaller countries, the allies of the United States, by resorting to the same means with which we are threatened? If the American generals and admirals ignore their own allies and write them off, it is their own affair.”

*Note that the U.S. is not threatened here. ICBMs are being used as a wedge in possible Western Alliance cracks. ICBMs are not mentioned in this comment, however, since the Soviets did not have a capable bomber force, the implication is that rockets either land or submarine launched would be used against U.S. allies.*

23. 9 May 59. Khrushchev claims the Soviet Union has “enough rockets for America, too, should war be unleashed against us. . . . They allege that the Soviet Union has few intercontinental rockets. They would have you believe that the United States stands to lose least from a war. Even if this were true, does this make you Germans feel any better.”

*Further efforts to break-up NATO and sway public opinion directly targeted at West Germany.*

24. 29 May 59. Khrushchev states if attacked, they will destroy the rocket bases targeting them. “They are located not in bare rocky country, but where people live. But the governments of countries which provide territory for rocket bases of a transoceanic power for some reason do not take the vital interest of their peoples into account.”

*A direct attempt to influence Great Britain, threatening the general population and preventing deployment of U.S. Thor missiles to the British Isles. The transoceanic power can only be seen as the U.S. If Thors were deployed to Great Britain, then Europe had more than just a nuclear bomber umbrella to protect them.*

25. 1 Jun 59. Khrushchev declares, “The imperialists know our strength. To attack us is tantamount to suicide; one would have to be insane for this. I do not believe they are as stupid as all that; they understand the consequences which the unleashing of war against the socialist countries may have for them.”

*More threats implying non-existent Soviet ICBM capabilities.*

26. 30 July 59. Khrushchev to the Party Central Committee: “A situation has at present been created in which the imperialists will hardly dare to launch a war against our motherland or against the countries of socialism. Our forces and those of our socialist allies are colossal and in the West, apparently, this is now understood.”

27. 11 Oct 59. Khrushchev: “We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate-range rockets and short range rockets.”

*Although many may interpret this to imply the Soviets possessed the quantity of rockets required to threaten the U.S., in actuality Khrushchev was addressing the different types of rockets.*
28. Nov 1959. Khrushchev: “We now have stockpiled so many rockets, so many atomic and hydrogen warheads, that, if we were attacked, we could wipe from the face of the earth all our probable opponents.”

By not including bombers, Khrushchev infers the Soviets possess enough operational ICBMs to destroy the U.S. However, it has become generally accepted that Khrushchev did not view the U.S. as a serious threat to the survival of the Soviet Union as long as the Soviets did not threaten vital U.S. interest. It can be argued then that the U.S. was not viewed as a likely opponent that would attack.

29. 29 Nov 59. Khrushchev: “The Soviet Union has intercontinental ballistic rockets with hydrogen warheads.”

30. 1 Dec 1959. U.S. Secretary of Defense McElroy calls for 24-hour airborne strategic bomber alert to offset possible missile gap. Pres. Eisenhower rejected this concept but supported a standby alert capability.

The missile gap was accepted at all levels of government and the possible vulnerability of U.S. bombers to a surprise first strike became a growing concern for both the U.S. and its allies.

31. 15 Jan 60. Khrushchev to Supreme Soviet: “We already have enough nuclear weapons, atomic and hydrogen, and the corresponding rockets to deliver this weapon to the territory of a possible aggressor, that if some madman stirred up an attack on our state or on other socialist states we could literally wipe from the face of the earth the country or countries that attacked us.”

For the first time, Soviets connect sufficient nuclear weapons and the technology to place them on rockets. By including aggression against other socialist states, Khrushchev is implying the missiles are ICBMs.

32. Jan 60. Soviets claim successful test launch of space program rocket over 6,500 nautical miles.

Soviets continue to use scientific accomplishments as the basis for military claims. If a space rocket has a range of 6,500 nautical miles, then extending the range of other rockets is not difficult.

33. 15 Jan 60. Minister of Defense, Marshall Malinovsky: “The building of large, expensive airfields with complicated equipment is not required for launching rockets. It is far easier to camouflage and even completely conceal rocket-launch positions; this guarantees a higher degree of security and invulnerability for rocket weapons.”

After U-2 flights, U.S. begins to question Soviet claims. Malinovsky uses Western doubt to his advantage and claims that ICBMs can not be discovered.
34. 31 Jan 60. U.S. statements point to much smaller Soviet operational ICBM capabilities than claimed. Soviets respond and say the “data” available to CIA Director, Allen Dulles is of little value. “To calculate in Washington the number of rockets and other types of Soviet arms is of as little use as counting crows on the fence . . . How many rockets do we have? Enough! Enough to wipe from the face of the earth any country that dares attack the Soviet Union.”

*Confident Soviet claims continue to fuel the Missile Gap deception.*

35. 11 Feb 60. Survey of Western European nations reveals Soviet Union is viewed as militarily superior to the U.S.

*Soviet deception efforts have succeeded in Western Europe. If the deception had not begun to unravel within the next few months, long term effects may have severely threatened the U.S. position and strained NATO.*


37. Mid 60. Berlin Crisis discussions


39. Jun 60. 45 percent to 15 percent of Norway opinion survey respondents believe the Soviet Union is militarily stronger.

*U.S. intelligence reports had not been made public at this time. Soviet deception efforts were still having a strong impact on Western states.*


41. Late 1960 to 1961. Defense spending increases gain momentum as Kennedy administration pushes for $14 billion more in outlays over Pres. Eisenhower’s plans. U.S. strategic systems receive $6 billion of the increase, primarily improving ICBM capabilities. In 1997 terms, these increases equal $76 billion and $32.5 billion.

*Missile deception results in enormous additional defense spending to overcome the gap.*

42. May 1961. Marshall Grechko, senior Warsaw Pact officer: “Soviet rocket troops (are) now able to destroy aggressors at any point on earth.”

*Operational Soviet ICBMs continue to be portrayed as a significant threat to the U.S.*
43. Mid-late 1961. Kennedy administration aggressively works to overcome inaccurate public opinion of Soviet superiority by supporting policies and actions that demonstrate American strategic capabilities.15

44. Sep 1961. U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBMs reduced to a level only 3.5 percent of Jan 1960 estimate, resulting in a total downward estimate of 96.5 percent in 19 months.

45. 21 Oct 61. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric: “The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part. ...we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first.”

*The Soviet ICBM bluff is called and the U.S. moves to correct the image of an inferior military capability.*16

46. 23 Oct 61. Malinovsky responds to Gilpatric comments. “Brandishing the might of the United States, he (Gilpatric) threatened us with force. What can one say to this one more threat, to this petty statement? . . . this threat does not frighten us.”

*Soviets challenge and attempt to discredit U.S. claims of superiority and Soviet inferiority.*

47. 19 Jan to 2 Feb 62. Secretary of Defense McNamara acknowledges overestimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities during congressional testimony.

48. 25 Jan 62. Malinovsky: “. . . we are capable of wiping from the face of the earth with one rocket-nuclear blow any targets, all the industrial and administrative-political centers of the U.S.A.”

49. 31 Jan 62. Radio Moscow implies security arrangements between the U.S. and Japan are based on false U.S. capability claims and “the Soviet Union with its nuclear rockets is capable of annihilating with one blow those countries which have permitted other countries to maintain military bases in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.”

*Soviets return to the strategy of threatening U.S. allies and de-emphasizing ICBM capabilities.*

50. 2 Feb 62. Soviet Admiral Gorshkov in comments targeting Turkey for its participation in NATO and CENTO said if war comes, “. . . a nuclear rocket blow will, of course, be inflicted on Turkey. After that, the assistance (the NATO Mediterranean Fleet) promises to Turkey will certainly not be asked for, because it will not be needed anymore.”
51. 29 June 62. Radio Moscow: “No appeals that blows should be directed only at military objectives could prevent the all-devastating counter-blow at the economic, transportation, military, and administrative centers of the United States and its allies.”

Pres. Kennedy’s announcement that the U.S. may consider limited nuclear responses alludes to a possible U.S. first strike. The U.S. may be starting to implement the nuclear blackmail the Soviets feared.

52. Sept-Oct 62. Cuban Missile Crisis

One final effort to hold significant numbers of U.S. targets at risk compensating for the inadequate Soviet ICBM program. Khrushchev’s willingness to back down highlights the Soviets inability to project intercontinental power. The Cuban Missile Crisis signaled the death knell for Soviet ICBM claims.

53. 1 Dec 62. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: “The ending of a myth has made it possible to take a firm line with our adversaries and at the same time reassure our friends that we are strong and determined to use our strength if we have to.”

Secretary McNamara further acknowledges the missile gap deception influenced U.S. policies and increased allies’ apprehension.

54. 1964. Soviets expand military and economic aid programs to countries such as Indonesia, United Arab Republic, and Algeria.

Threats aimed at the U.S. and its allies no longer impact world events. The Soviets turn to other methods of influence.

55. 14 Apr 64. DoD admits Soviets deployed only “a handful” of operational ICBMs.

56. Feb 65. U.S. begins bombing campaign against North Vietnam, without Soviet response as had been implied over the previous eight years.

57. Apr 65. Secretary McNamara discussing the current situation of U.S. Soviet strategic relationship: “(The Soviets) have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest . . . There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours.”

Notes

1 Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). Also applies to items 2-3, 21-26, 28, 30-34, 42, 46, 49-51, 54-57.

Notes

6 Washington Post, 29 August 1957. Also applies to item 9. Russian ICBM advances and arms control continue to be front page stories. Quotes taken from several articles appearing on this day. See: “Ike Voices His Concern At ‘Scornful Words’ In Soviet Arms Talk,” “Pentagon Embarrassed, Reds Say,” “Rocket ‘Guarantees’ Ruin, Red Says.”
8 “Dawn of the Super-Missile,” Newsweek 50, no. 11 (9 September 1957). Also applies to item 16.
9 “Foreign News,” Time 70, no. 11 (9 September 1957).
13 Stewart Alsop, “McNamara Thinks About the Unthinkable,” The Saturday Evening Post 236, no. 43 (1 December 1962). Also applies to items 41 and 53.
14 Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Programs and Authorization of Appropriations for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels by the Armed Forces: Hearings on S. 2734, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 January - 2 February 1962. Also applies to items 38, 40, 44, and 47.
U.S. relations with the USSR

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.

3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession.

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors.
Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (8)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military-related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (8)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flanks in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (8)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:
   - Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
   - To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource-rationing decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
   - To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
   - To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (8)

the U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced in November 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as high down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (5)

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. (5)

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy, as well as the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including:
   - The President's London initiative to support democratic forces.
   - U.S. efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations.
   - U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:
     - Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ('capitalist') world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).
     - Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the misappropriation of such terms as "peace." (5)

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership
and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act against vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

(a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region, while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully selecting and presenting the USSR in its foreign policy, and see a greater degree of internal liberalisation. If U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which oppose movements in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

(b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)

(c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilising activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defense against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. (S)

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. (S)

C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognises that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for the U.S. to maintain military balance, an important means for the U.S. to maintain economic and global stability. (S)

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to primarily on arms control, U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can
The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (5)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S. (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (6)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.

- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable arms. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 11, 1982.

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restrainting Leverage Over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (6)
Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.

Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.

Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.

Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.

Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection.

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow.
Appendix G

Correspondence with President Bush

GEORGE BUSH

January 16, 1997

Dear Major Cox,

Thank you for your letter of 10 January. I appreciated hearing from you.

Unfortunately, Major, I must respectfully decline your request for a personal interview. Since leaving office, I have received hundreds of like requests, and it simply is not possible for me to grant each one. Thus, in fairness, I decline them all. However, I hope the enclosed information is helpful to you in your research.

Regarding your third paragraph, I know very well that I would never send a message to Saddam Hussein "via a Japanese businessman." You state that copies of such a letter were "later found throughout Iraq." If you find a copy of this letter, I would very much like to see it. I am totally confident it is a fraud.

Regarding my pronunciation of Saddam Hussein's name, frankly, I don't really care how I pronounced it. I expect that my pronunciation did differ from time to time; however, I was not conveying some kind of message.

Thank you for writing, and good luck with your project.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Major Lee-Volker Cox
USAF
1815 Braddock Road
Montgomery, AL 36108

P.S. In the War College there in Montgomery is Colonel Kim Siniscalchi, USAF. She is a nurse and a leader in her field. I know you would enjoy meeting her, and if you do, please tell her that her former Commander in Chief and Mrs. Bush send a huge abrazo.
## Glossary

### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander-in-chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP</td>
<td>instrument of power</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directives</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>special planning group</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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Definitions

black propaganda. misinformation operations accredited to source other than the originating organization.
black PSYOP. PSYOP based on nonfactual information, lies and fabrications.
CINC. commander-in-chief. Although the U.S. President is considered the commander-in-chief of American forces, references to CINC in this paper imply the combatant commander.
coercive PSYOP. efforts undertaken to convince a target audience to reverse a previous position or decision.
covert. operations not conducted in the open, clandestine.
deception. activities undertaken to purposely mislead a target audience
deterrent PSYOP. activities undertaken to prevent a given course of action that may or may not have been the target audience’s most beneficial option.
gray propaganda. factual or misinformation operations from unidentified source.
gray PSYOP. PSYOP based on exaggerations or half-truths
incentive PSYOP. positive actions or inducements offered to a target audience to select a course of action that benefits the sender’s interests.
information warfare. action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information and its functions and protecting against similar activities.
intercontinental ballistic missile. Large surface-to-surface nuclear capable ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,000 miles.
interagency. Relationship between governmental organizations.
military operations other than war. Use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.
national military strategy. Strategy of how best to employ military capabilities to achieve national goals.
National Security Decision Directives. President Ronald Reagan’s authoritative orders on policies he felt were critical to U.S. security and interests.
National Security Strategy. The overarching presidential strategy of integrating IOPs for achieving U.S. objectives and supporting national interests.
operational military PSYOP. activities conducted in a geographic area prior to, during, and after conflict in support of a commander’s plans.
operational PSYOP. regionally focused activities undertaken to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender’s objectives.
overt. activities taken in the open
psychological operations. actions taken to create an observable phenomena that influences the target audience’s decision making process.
PSYOP. see psychological operations
public diplomacy. activities undertaken to influence foreign and domestic attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender’s objectives.
show of force. Military operation designed to demonstrate resolve, which involves increased visibility of deployed forces.
Scud. Short range mobile surface ballistic missile originally developed in the USSR but exported and modified by numerous other countries including Iraq.
**special operations forces.** Military units organized to perform unconventional missions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

**Special Planning Group.** established by NSDD 77 for the overall planning, direction, coordination, implementation and monitoring of public diplomacy activities. No longer in existence.

**strategic PSYOP.** activities undertaken to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender’s objectives.

**tactical military PSYOP.** activities conducted in support of a tactical commander during conflict. Radio, television, and loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets are the most common activities.

**tactical PSYOP.** locally focused activities undertaken to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender’s objectives.

**TASS.** Soviet news agency.

**United States Strategic Command.** Unified military command responsible for deterring a major military attack against the United States and its allies and if necessary employing forces. USSTRATCOM has at its disposal for planning purposes ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers and reconnaissance assets.

**weapons of mass destruction.** nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

**white propaganda.** factual information accredited to originating organization.

**white PSYOP.** PSYOP based on factual information.
Bibliography


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Millsap, Maj Ralph. Discussions with author.


Muller, Dr. Richard. Interview by author.


