STATEMENT
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM S. WALLACE
COMMANDING GENERAL, COMBINED
ARMS
CENTER,
U.S.
ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
BEFORE
THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
On
C4I Interoperability: New Challenges in 21st
Century Warfare
OCTOBER
21, 2003
My
name is Lieutenant General William S.
Wallace, Commanding General for the Combined
Arms Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC),
Fort Leavenworth
,
Kansas
. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify on a
very broad area of military capability
labeled "Command and Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence"
or what we mercifully call C4I
interoperability in acronym.
As the commander of the
Combined
Arms
Center
, one of my focus areas is Battle Command
(BC). I
am the TRADOC's proponent for BC.
Also, it was my privilege to command
U.S. Soldiers in our nation's recent
invasion of
Iraq
and the removal of Saddam Hussein's
repressive regime.
Relying on that experience and my
current role with BC, I will focus my
testimony on "what worked" and "what
did not work" in regards to the C4I
interoperability in context of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
It's
important that you understand that my
perspective of OIF is quite different than
those heard earlier this month from Admiral
Giambastiani and Brigadier General Cone.
Their study focus was on the
joint/operational level of OIF.
As V Corps Commander, my view was
considerably more from the tactical level
- the pointy end of the spear.
Inherent
at this tactical level is the prosecution of
maneuver warfare; characterized by mobile,
widely dispersed, high operational tempo,
and simultaneous execution on a very fluid
and non-linear battlefield.
More so than at the operational level
of warfare, the tactical level requires C4I
technologies that are untethered from fixed
architectures.
The tactical level requires mobile
command posts and communication networks
that can support a corps in the attack.
Quite frankly, it is at the tactical
level that we face our greatest C4I
challenges to achieve the capabilities
envisioned for the future force.
It's
also important that you know the painstaking
efforts that V Corps and the Department of
the Army (DA) undertook in preparation for
OIF in regards to C4I.
In August 2002, the Army had a myriad
of different automation architectures
supporting command and control (C2).
They ran the gamut from digital
screens to plywood boards covered with maps
and acetate.
In
recent years Force XXI units, such as 4th
ID, received the lion's share of C4I
initiatives and were fully digitized.
Europe
and specifically V Corps, was in the midst
of our own C2 redesign to leverage
digitization to enhance C2 capabilities.
Likewise, the XVIII Airborne Corps
had employed its own unique automation
solutions to enhance C2.
The rest of the Army, especially the
Reserve, National Guard, and combat service
support (CSS) force structures, had little
or no digitized C2 capabilities.
The
force configuration necessary for decisive
operations in
Iraq
allocated underneath V Corps was comprised
of units representing diverse and sometimes
incompatible C4I architectures.
In order to fight within a cohesive
framework of C4I interoperability, the Army
quickly prioritized efforts to patch,
modify, and standardize the existing
architectures of the deploying units.
Led
by U.S. Army TRADOC, an army of smart guys
with resources descended upon us adapting
the V Corps framework for managing our C2
redesign and C4I integration.
We had to get the assembled force on
the same sheet of "C4I music" in terms
of hardware, software, and tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
We focused on developing solutions
for Battle Command on the Move (BCOTM),
Common Operational Picture (COP), Blue Force
Tracking (BFT), joint fires integration,
integrated air picture, combat service
support; clear voice command net, and
collaborative tools.
After
seven months of intense C4I integration
efforts of fielding, testing, training,
evaluating, and fixing, V Corps crossed the
line of departure on March 20th
commencing the ground war.
While not perfect, we had come a long
way in terms of C4I.
The effort I just described was
nothing short of Herculean, a tribute to
military men and women, and exceptional
support from our civilian and contractor
work force.
In
spite of its success, this experience was
very painful and we must prepare better
before crossing the next line of departure.
In fact, building upon the lessons
learned from OIF, the Army is committed to
leveling the C4I playing field across the
current force.
And because we are a nation at war,
the priority of effort is going to those
units preparing for the next rotations into
Afghanistan
and
Iraq
.
Now,
what worked?
OIF was characterized by rapid task
re-organization across all echelons to
enable exploitation of enemy
vulnerabilities, and execution of branch,
sequel, and follow-on operations.
We made aggressive road marches and
maneuvers at distances and tempos unheard of
in previous campaigns, separating lower
echelon combat units beyond Line of Sight
(LOS) connectivity to their higher HQs.
From my assault command post, we
accomplished joint, operational, and
tactical collaboration and coordination at
the battle's forward edge.
OIF
provided a substantial glimpse into the
advantage of waging network enhanced
warfare, even as it revealed the limitations
of our developing C4I capabilities.
The situational awareness of
commanders at every level during OIF
exceeded that of any modern war.
Satellite-based Blue and Log Force
Tracking with email exchange capabilities
enabled synchronization of command and staff
tasks at theater, operational, and tactical
levels.
Single
channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) at the
Corps and divisional levels enabled
broadcast C2 without regard to terrain or
distance.
Some would say the ground war was won
on TACSAT.
Using satellite-based Blue Force
Tracking, leaders on the ground were able to
successfully control the furious fight,
receive changes to missions, achieve
situational awareness, and navigate
unfamiliar terrain using digitized map
sheets that displayed Blue Force locations
in near-real time.
I
saw more of the fight than I expected to be
able to see from my Command and Control
Vehicle (C2V).
Enabled with satellite based
communications my assault command post was
mobile, responsive, connected, and allowed
me to be where I could best influence the
fight anywhere on the battlefield.
In the digital environment of my
headquarters, the Common Operational Picture
provided exceptional situational awareness
because of our joint interoperability with
higher headquarters.
Having
the ability to track the theater air picture
and theater ballistic missile launches added
to our awareness and provided systems
redundancy.
Being able to track the adjacent 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) on the
same screen with the same "iconology"
and graphic control measures was essential.
What
worked?
Outstanding system products like the
Command and Control Personal Computer
(C2PC), Blue Force Tracking (BFT), Automated
Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCCS),
Air Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS),
and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (AFATDS) enabled us to achieve
an unprecedented level of combined and joint
arms synergy.
Time Sensitive Targets were
deconflicted in a matter of minutes using a
Theater-wide Joint Fires Coordination
Information System.
For
example, through the eyes of the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV), transmitted by Global
Broadcasting System, we could observe an
enemy artillery battery firing on our
troops, then coordinate over Tactical Voice
and single channel TACSAT for its subsequent
destruction by Air Force, Marine, or Naval
aircraft in close support of the ground
campaign.
What
didn't work?
As I marveled at how leveraging this
information technology gave me unparalleled
control of my battle formations, I also
observed subordinate leaders on the tactical
field struggling with the limitations of
their static, terrestrial based networks.
Despite the introduction of Battle
Command On the Move (BCOTM) capabilities
that I enjoyed in my assault command post
(CP), the vast majority of tactical leaders
and CPs enjoyed few on the move
capabilities.
Most were tethered to a CP and
largely dependant upon line of sight
communications.
Case
in point.
At the corps level the G2 could see
individual fighting positions defending a
critical bridge because we had a UAV leading
the lead formations.
But we could not get the data down to
the unit who was taking the objective
because all the CP's were moving.
It was a deliberate attack at the
corps level, but a movement to contact at
the battalion level.
Not
having satellite capability, most tactical
CPs received connectivity services from
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).
What capability MSE provides is done
so at the Warfighter's expense, as he must
trade considerable strategic lift, force
protection, key terrain, tactical
flexibility, time of installation, and C4I
capability in return for what is largely
intra-Corps voice and data service for
stationary command posts that take hours to
install.
The Army's MSE tactical network
does not effectively support high tempo, 21st
Century maneuver warfare.
It must be replaced as quickly as
possible.
The
Army must exploit the BCOTM principles
proven in OIF.
We must invest in the redesign of CP
structures to enable commander centric
operations on the move, while taking
advantage of the power of the network.
Mobile, satellite networked CPs would
have a smaller footprint.
Their satellite-enhanced connectivity
could feasibly allow for some traditional CP
functions to be performed from a distant
sanctuary or possibly from Home Station
Operation Centers.
The CP's smaller footprint could
improve its deployability while saving the
combatant commander significant amounts of
strategic lift.
Those enhanced CPs would have
improved survivability by offering a smaller
physical presence on the battlefield.
No
matter how perfect a future network and CP
we build, it won't do us much good until
we fix the overarching problem of bandwidth
management.
Limited bandwidth was a major issue
during OIF.
While fixed command and control
installations reliably use high-bandwidth
communications, the communications
architecture for mobile or semi-mobile CPs
at the tactical level is too fragile and not
robust enough to support our needs.
It effected collaboration,
information sharing and in some cases, the
Commander's ability to command.
In an environment where competition
for limited bandwidth is fierce, we must
seek efficiencies through a more
sophisticated management solution.
The time to fix bandwidth problems is
now, before we deploy to the next fight.
Once
the Army overcomes satellite bandwidth
constraints, we can aggressively address the
"Digital Divide" that exists between the
operational and the tactical levels of war.
We can extend the power of the
network down to the tactical level.
Despite our efforts to realize
network enhanced warfare since Desert Storm,
the trigger puller on the ground still
can't tap into the network and realize its
benefits.
In OIF, this was most pronounced in
dissemination of intelligence information.
Despite all the incredible products
at the disposal of my assault CP, we could
not get relevant photos, imagery, or joint
data down to the soldier level in near-real
time. The
opportunity to exploit intelligence to our
advantage, to the advantage of the fire team
in contact was lost.
Empowerment
of the Soldier on the ground is also crucial
to realizing Army concepts of future warfare
in complex terrain.
To fight in urban areas for example,
our junior leaders require a high degree of
specificity about the terrain and the enemy.
Today, we can't effectively push
information down to help the squad leader
fight. Terrestrial
based communications limit our warfighting
ability under conditions imposed by complex
terrain.
Yet full motion video (FMV) taken
from a UAV pushed down to the battalion or
company level would give the Soldier on the
ground the ability to see the enemy from
multiple viewpoints in relation to the
individual enemy fighting positions.
With near-real time, satellite
network connectivity, our junior leaders
fighting in complex terrain can leverage the
power of the network and enjoy increased
situational awareness.
In
summary, Operation Iraqi Freedom proved the
effectiveness and potential of networked
enhanced warfare.
We know it works.
Applying lessons learned, we can
rapidly improve our C4I capabilities by
discarding technology and concepts that did
not work and pursuing those that did.
The Battle Command on the Move
concept works, but we need to build the
Command Posts to support it.
Satellite based communication works;
but we need more bandwidth to push the
synergy of network enhanced operations down
to the tactical level.
Once we overcome the "Digital
Divide," when we can connect the synergy
of network enhanced operations to the
soldier in the dirt, we can be confident
that we have done our very best to ensure
his success on the modern battlefield.
But
please understand and always remember that
regardless of the improvements we gain and
the networks we build, warfare in the 21st
Century will remain lethal, up close, and
personal.
The American Soldier, supported by
family and nation, will be our most
treasured and lethal weapon.
His bravery, heroism, sacrifice and
compassion will continue to be our
inspiration.
