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TESTIMONY
OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, JR.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BEFORE
THE
HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM AND FORCE PROTECTION INITIATIVES
APRIL 1,
2004
Introduction
Chairman Weldon, Congressman Abercrombie,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it
is my privilege to report to you on the state
of force protection initiatives and other major
ground component acquisition programs in review
of the fiscal year 2005 budget request process
and future years defense program. Let me
start by saying that the Marine Corps remains
firmly committed to warfighting excellence, and
the support of the Congress and the American
people has been indispensable to our success
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Your
sustained commitment to improving our Nation's
armed forces to meet the challenges of today,
as well as those of the future, is vital to the
security of our Nation. On behalf of all
Marines and their families, I thank the Subcommittee
for your continued support and commitment to
the readiness of your Marine Corps. Throughout
this statement, my reference to your Marine Corps
includes the outstanding service of our fine
Sailors who serve alongside Marines as corpsman,
surgeons, chaplains, and other specialists.
Provide a description of major current
operational force protection programs and
missions with particular emphasis to those
programs currently being implemented in Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
In terms of Force Protection programs
in support of our deployed Marines, let me start
by discussing some of the individual protective
measures provided. Essentially, when we
refer to force protection of individual Marines
in regard to the GWOT {Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)} we are
referring to the procurement and issue of Small
Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates and the
Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) in which the SAPI
plates are worn. At the outset of OIF,
the Marine Corps was already producing SAPI plates
and OTVs to equip our forces. However,
the surge demand for combat in OIF I required
us to not only adjust our fielding plan to deliver
all items coming off the production line to I
MEF's active duty and Reserve units but also
to direct some redistribution of SAPI plates
and OTVs from the other MEFs to support I MEF. To
date, the Marine Corps has completed the SAPI
plate fielding push required to meet OIF II requirements. All
active and Reserve Marines deployed in theater
now have 2 SAPI plates and one Outer Tactical
Vest. We are now returning to the established
fielding rate of 4800 plates per month over the
next year. In addition, we are preparing
to let a contract, in support of OIF II, for
14K additional plates, with delivery during summer
2004. In the interim, the Marine Corps
will redistribute plates as required to both
active duty and Reserve units in order to meet
any emergent contingencies requiring future combat
or peacekeeping deployments.
Finally, as a result of an urgent
request from I MEF on 12 March 2004, we are also
providing enhanced individual shoulder and side
protection that integrates with our SAPI/OTV
protection. Initial fielding will begin
in early April 2004, with complete fielding to
I MEF by mid May 2004. In short, we will ensure
our Marines have the best protection available,
to include emergent enhancements, whenever and
wherever they need it.
To ensure our deployed Marines
and Sailors have the equipment needed to support
OEF and OIF II, the Marine Corps has implemented
the Urgent Universal Need Statement (UNS) process
to assist I Marine Expeditionary Force with the
rapid fielding of equipment to fill priority
capability gaps and shortfalls. Through
close coordination between I MEF, the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Marine
Corps Systems Command (MCSC), the Marine Requirements
Oversight Council (MROC), HQMC (Programs and
Resources), and industry, we have been able to
rapidly address the highest priority capability
gaps of our deploying forces. Examples
of equipment fielded because of the Urgent UNS
process directly related to force protection
are:
- Armor
and Armor kits for over 3000 I MEF tactical
vehicles.
- Auxiliary
body armor: supplementary body armor
that when fit to the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV)
provides additional side and shoulder protection.
- Position
Location Information equipment (PLI).
- Counter
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection
equipment.
- Combat
Identification (CID) equipment: To prevent/mitigate
fratricide.
- Dust
Abatement equipment: Assists in allowing
aircraft (primarily rotary-wing) to safely
land in dusty environments and expeditionary
airfields.
- Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) center
seats: Newly designed seats that allow
Marines to face outboard vice inboard when
transported by truck.
- Vehicle
Barrier Nets: New piece of equipment
to assist Marine checkpoint facilities. Provides
a non-lethal capability to stop potential vehicle
threats.
- Explosive
Ordnance Detection Capabilities: Equipment
such as explosive protective suits for engineers,
mine detection equipment, x-ray machines and
robotic capabilities.
The Marine Corps fielded many new
items of equipment and weapon systems just prior
to or during the deployment of 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force for OIF I. Some were
in response to requests from the deploying forces,
and others were advance-fielded by Marine Corps
Systems Command (MCSC). Most new items
were positively received, although units did
not always have sufficient time to train with
these new systems. Thus, some new systems
were not used to full advantage. But, in
most cases, these new items functioned as intended
and were combat multipliers. Of particular
significance were: The Dragon Eye unmanned aerial
vehicle; the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) systems;
Combat Identification (CID) Panels/ Thermal Identification
Panels; and Personal Role Radios (PRR). All
of these initiatives provide enhanced unit situational
awareness, from squad through division. Commanders
noted many instances where SAPI Plates saved
Marine lives and reduced the severity of injuries. Night
vision devices such as the PAS-13 and PVS-17C/B
all enhanced lethality and situational awareness
in reduced visibility. The Secure Mobile
Anti-jamming Reliable Tactical-Terminal (SMART-T)
improved communications, and the Tank/Infantry
phone improved infantry/armor coordination in
the urban environment.
Another area where the Marine Corps
benefits from an improved capability is in tactical
ground mobility with the performance of both
our Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
fleet and the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) A2 fleet. The increased
payload over the predecessor vehicles (i.e.,
5 Ton payload replaced by MTVR's 7.5 ton off-road
and 15 ton on-road payloads; and HMMWV A1 payload
of 2500 lbs replaced by HMMWV A2 payload of 4450
lbs) paid real dividends in the critical lift
required to support the drive to Baghdad in OIF
I. Similarly, the improved maintenance
availability of these newer vehicles will continue
to be a key asset to our deployed forces. In
our quest for continuous improvement, we are
closely scrutinizing Marine Corps, US Army, and
coalition emergent lessons learned from OIF II
to apply, where applicable, to our continuing
series of vehicle upgrades.
Vehicle
Hardening
In December 2003, I MEF forwarded
an urgent request for vehicle hardening in advance
of their deployment to Iraq in support of OIF
II. The request was in the form of an Urgent
Universal Need Statement (UNS) and both I MEF
and Marine Forces Central Command ranked this
request #2 out of a total of 62 requests. The
Urgent UNS distinguished between heavy vehicle
hardening (provides National Institute of Justice
level III protection) and a lesser "baseline" level
of protection referred to as medium vehicle hardening. Additionally,
the Urgent UNS delineated the number and types
of vehicles for which I MEF requested protection. The
compressed timeframe and operational urgency
accelerated the more deliberate processes that
would normally be used to solve a problem of
this nature. After a timeline assessment,
it was decided that a gap in the coverage of
the MEF's vehicles (between force deployment
and delivery of protection) would be filled with
a temporary solution. Under the management
of Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM),
the Marine Corps invested $6M to rapidly provide
steel vehicle doors to allow forces to deploy
with a modicum of protection until the more permanent
solution is delivered. By 19 March 2004,
I MEF's stated requirement of hardening just
over 3,000 vehicles was met with a mix of permanent
and temporary hardening solutions. The
Marine Corps has committed approximately $9.6M
toward heavy hardening of vehicles. For
this investment, we will have 110 HMMWVs with
the O'Gara Hess Hard Kits and 37 Export Model
M1114 HMMWVs. Additionally, we have contract
options for an additional 190 of the O'Gara Hess
Hard Kits at a cost of $6.2M. Our investment
in medium vehicle hardening covers a broad range
of products including Simula Doors, Foster-Miller
Appliqué panels, ballistic blankets, and eventually
ballistic glass (approximately 25M).
With the current status of vehicle
hardening as a basis, the Marine Requirements
Oversight Committee (MROC) can now make an informed
decision on a course of action for the mid-term
regarding additional vehicle hardening for the
operating forces. As with the original
assessment of the force's needs, the solution
has many variables and is complex. There
are several long-term issues that are under consideration. The
Marine Corps is developing a formal vehicle hardening
policy. It will address the proportion
of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that should
receive hardening, the optimal mix of medium
and heavy hardening, as well as the potential
of developing a new vehicle if the threat dictates
such an effort.
Fratricide
Prevention and Army - Marine Corps Blue Force
Tracker (BFT) Convergence
The reduction of friendly-fire
incidents continues to be a Marine Corps priority. The
Marine Corps, in partnership with the other services
and coalition allies, is exploring technologies
and procedures to minimize both "blue-on-blue" (friendly
fire) and "blue-on-white" (non-combatant) incidents. The
Army and Marine Corps employed seven different
types of Blue Force Trackers (BFT) during OIF
I, with varying degrees of success. While
the mix of systems was not ideal, such systems
are clearly an important capability and suggest
the need for compatible systems across all the
services. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROCM 161-03 of Aug 03) directed the
Army and Marine Corps to present an integrated
briefing to discuss a strategy to converge BFT
systems to achieve a single capability. Army
and Marine Corps leadership interpret this to
mean a single Blue Force Situational Awareness
(BFSA) capability (location, identification,
status, and intent) rather than just BFT (location
and identification). Interoperability and
capability gaps exist between the Army's Command
and Control (C2) application - the Maneuver Control
System (MCS) - and the Marine Corps' Command
and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) application. Additional
shortfalls exist between the Marine Corps BFT
program, Data Automated Communications Terminal
(DACT) utilizing C2PC, and the Army's BFT solution,
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
that includes messaging standards, classification
of data, and routing of information in a mobile
tactical environment.
A strategy to accomplish convergence
to a single capability consists of:
-
Army
migrating from their Maneuver Control System
(MCS) to the Joint Tactical Common Operating
Picture (COP) Workstation (JTCW), developed
on the C2PC baseline, at echelons Brigade
and above. Targeted fielding begins in FY06.
-
USMC
migrates to FBCB2-BFT application for echelons
Brigade and below, while maintaining unique
communications architecture when FBCB2 meets
Marine Corps required capabilities.
Although improved BFT may help
to reduce the likelihood of fratricide, BFT does
not address all of the complex combat identification
challenges posed by friendly fire on U.S. and
coalition forces and civilian populations, including
facilities and sensitive sites. The development
of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures,
along with integrated joint training, will be
a key element in reducing the toll of these tragedies
during future operations. The Marine Corps
will continue to work with the Army and the other
services to develop such joint solutions.
Improvised
Explosive Device Working Group (IED WG)
The Marine Corps has formed an
Improvised Explosive Device Working Group (IED
WG). This group is examining tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs), as well as technologies,
to defeat a serious threat to our forces. Our
working group is closely tied to the efforts
of a similar group formed by the Army to ensure
that effective solutions are shared and disseminated. Based
upon lessons learned from Marine and Army organizations
that participated in OIF I, both in major combat
and the ensuing security and stability operations
(SASO), the Marine Corps has devised a training
program for deploying units. This training,
conducted at March Reserve Air Base in Riverside,
California, is designed to simulate the complex
security environment that our Marines will find
themselves operating in and to provide them with
the tactics to accomplish the mission as well
as protect the force. The training is conducted
at multiple echelons from the battalion command
group, and their function in command and control
and intelligence, down to the most junior Marine,
and his vital role in security. Both regular
and reserve units have undergone this training. We
plan to continue training units as they prepare
to deploy, modifying the training as we continue
to collect lessons learned from deployed units.
The Marine Corps' IED WG is also
coordinating efforts with the Counter-Terrorism
Technology Support Office, Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG), an Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) sponsored interagency coordination
cell. TSWG is working to deliver capabilities
that counter the IED threat by attacking the
source. They emphasize tactics, techniques,
and procedures vs. technology reliance. TSWG
is providing training support at no cost to the
Marine Corps along with a number of other counter-IED
initiatives.
Force Protection of units and
personnel deploying from the Continental United
States (CONUS)
Headquarters Marine Corps (Security
Division) is actively involved in multiple program
initiatives for the protection of our CONUS based
personnel. The programs listed below comprise
a holistic approach by focusing on Critical Infrastructure
Protection; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear protection for installations. These
programs will ensure that the Marine Corps can
effectively project the necessary force through
prudent force protection of our homeports within
CONUS.
These
programs include:
(1) The
Joint Service Installation Pilot Project (JSIPP). This
program entails installing Chemical and Biological
Sensors aboard one Marine Corps' base (Camp Lejeune)
(nine total DOD bases).
(2) Unconventional
Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) Program. This
is a pilot project to detect radiation at four
DoD installations. Marine Corps Base Camp
Lejeune was chosen as the host for JSIPP and
the UNWD program giving Camp Lejeune a chemical,
biological, and radiological detection capability. Funding
for these programs stops in FY05.
(3) The
Guardian Program. This program is destined
for 9 Marine Corps installations during FY05-FY09
to improve first response capability and assist
in CBRNE detection capability.
(4) Installation
First Responder Program. This is an on-going
Marine Corps response to Program Decision Memorandum
1-99 to improve the capability of all Marine
installations to respond to a Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) event. Funding for this
program was diverted to the Guardian Program.
(5) Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program. Designed
to support the combatant commander's (COCOM)
operations plans (OPLANS). The effort is
to ensure that critical infrastructure is identified
and protected against loss or degradation. The
Marine Corps shall identify, protect, and ensure
the availability of those assets and infrastructure
critical to the execution of its mission. We
must recognize that mission assurance is highly
dependent upon both Marine and non-Marine assets
and infrastructure. Overall, CIP is designed
to support the force projection platforms from
which the operational forces will deploy from
and/or protect those platforms from which they
will deploy.
The
CIP Program encompasses:
(a) Program
Management - individuals placed at each of the
Marine Force Headquarters to develop, execute,
and coordinate CIP policy and programs from HQMC
and the Joint Staff.
(b) CIP
database enterprise architecture - Designed to
provide a
comprehensive
tool which will enable those individuals responsible
for CIP and related activities to identify
critical assets, track current and future assessments,
readily identify funding shortfalls, and then
track funds from the source and date of issuance
to its eventual execution.
(c) Full
Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
- The FSIVA encompasses Antiterrorism/Force Protection
assessments, CIP related assessments, cyber assessments,
and commercial interdependencies related to critical
infrastructures which directly or indirectly
support DoD installations and forces. FSIVA
CONOPS and standards are currently in draft form.
(d) CIP
programs will have to be in future POM vice a
program of record. In order to execute
the requirements which will be leveraged on the
Services and COCOMS as a result of the FISVA
process and Assistant Secretary of Defense (HD)
and Joint Staff Policy.
Improved Individual First Aid
Kits (IIFAK)
The
Marine Corps began fielding an IIFAK prior to
OIF I. The current Individual First Aid
Kit has not been improved in over 30 years and
does not provide the life-saving medical technologies
available today. The IIFAK dramatically
enhances the life saving capability of the first
responder on the battlefield. Historically,
Marines wounded in action risked bleeding to
death or suffering with painful untreated burns
before reaching more capable treatment facilities. The
IIFAK, with advanced hemorrhage control and burn
treatment capabilities, will improve personnel
survival rates in combat. The Approved
Acquisition Objective (AAO) for the IIFAK is
213,000 units to support FMF requirements, with
153,000 remaining to be procured. $9M is
currently unfunded.
Provide
a description of the equipping initiatives
for Marine Expeditionary Forces resulting from
Army lessons learned in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Equipping initiatives are based
on lessons learned from both deployed Army forces
and the requirements articulated and prioritized
by the I MEF commander. Many of our equipment
initiatives are a direct result of close coordination
between Marine Corps Combat Development Command
and the Army Rapid Equipping Force. We
have procured and fielded significant enhancements
for force protection capabilities for our forces
deploying to OIF II.
As a direct result of our work
with various Army commands and working groups,
we are fielding armor and armor kits to harden
over 3000 vehicles. We have modified the seating
in our tactical trucks to allow Marines to face
outboard and more quickly respond to a threat.
Due of the efforts of our IED Working
Group, and the close coordination they have with
the Army effort, we have procured counter IED
equipment to aid in defeating what has become
the weapon of choice for our enemies. We
have concentrated our procurement elements first
on survivability, then on detection, and finally
on neutralization.
We are fielding auxiliary body
armor to provide enhanced ballistic protection
for our Marines.
Checkpoints can be vulnerable to
attack. To reduce this vulnerability and
to enhance our Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability
we have leveraged the Army's experience and we
are fielding Vehicle Barrier Nets as well as
new detection capabilities such as x-ray machines,
mine detection equipment, and robotics.
To improve the situational awareness
of our commanders and individual Marines, we
are fielding Position Location Information equipment
as well as Combat Identification equipment to
reduce the risk of fratricide. To assist
our Marines in communicating with the Iraqi people,
we have purchased and fielded hand held phrase
translators and provided additional cultural
awareness training.
The deployment of UAVs provided
by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab will significantly
enhance the intelligence collection effort at
the tactical level.
In addition, we are equipping our
Marines with the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight
(ACOG) to improve their ability to locate, identify,
and engage threats with greater precision and
discretion.
We are also fielding new communication
equipment such as the Multiband Inter/Intra Team
Radio or PRC-148, which supports small unit leaders
and convoy operations and the ability of our
Marines to rapidly respond to threats. To
enhance communications at the higher level, we
are deploying aerostat balloons that are capable
of acting as aerial relays in coordination with,
and in part as a result of, the Army's efforts
by the Rapid Equipping Force. In addition,
we are exploring using these same balloons as
surveillance platforms, mounting a variety of
sensor systems to include infrared cameras. Additionally,
there is a validated need for infantry Marines
to be equipped with the Personal Role Radio for
communication within the fire-team.
I have also directed the Marine
Corps' Marine Combat Assessment Team (MCAT) to
begin interviewing wounded Marines to consider,
from their unique perspective, how their wounds
may have been avoided or mitigated through fielding
of better equipment or changes in tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs).
Finally, to ensure that lessons
learned continue to be acted on rapidly and effectively,
at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy,
we have set up Operation Respond to provide a
venue for deployed Marines to identify emerging
OEF and OIF requirements and to provide a rapid
response.
The MCAT continues to coordinate
with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL),
and has actively pushed appropriate CALL products
to the training organizations preparing USMC
units for their return to Iraq, particularly
on such high level issues as TTPs for countering
ambushes, dealing with IEDs, and improvements
to body armor, crew-served weapons mounts, combat
optic weapons sights, and other equipment initiatives.
The Marine Corps also participated
in the Joint Survivability (JSURV)
effort and the Convoy Survivability
Conference hosted by the Army Transportation
School in late March 2004, and participates as
a member of the Army Improvised Explosive Device
Task Force. Members of our Forward Analysis
and Collection Team are deployed to theater and
will leverage the efforts of Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) and CALL teams. The Marine Corps
is applying its experiences as well as those
of the Army in OIF to guide its future efforts
to "fine tune" and transform its forces.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to
again thank the members of the Committee for
their continuing support of the Marine Corps,
and for the opportunity to discuss our readiness
issues. The young men and women of your
Marine Corps are doing an exceptional job in
OEF and OIF. Their accomplishments are
a direct reflection of your continued support
and commitment to maintaining our Nation's expeditionary
warfighting capability. We go forward with
confidence because our Marines and Sailors have
the best training and equipment in the world,
thanks to the support of this Committee, and
the Nation we proudly serve. |
