STATEMENT
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT WAGNER, USA
DEPUTY COMMANDER
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING
TRANSFORMATION
26
FEBRUARY 2004
Mr.
Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee,
as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Joint Forces
Command, I am honored to testify on our role
in the ongoing process of transforming our
Armed Forces.
Joint
Forces Command is a dynamic command that learns
from and works with our Department of Defense
partners, the interagency, and coalition partners
to transform U.S. warfighting forces and capabilities
to ensure our Nation's continued ability to
rapidly and decisively conduct military operations.
U.S. Joint Forces Command maximizes the Nation's
future and present military capabilities by
advancing joint concept development and experimentation,
identifying joint requirements, ensuring interoperability,
conducting joint training, and providing ready
forces and capabilities in support of the Combatant
Commands.
This
last point is particularly important. We have
found that many do not understand the role
that Joint Forces Command plays in support
to our operational commanders. Our Armed Forces
fight as a joint force. Our command is responsible
for training and deploying fully functional
joint task forces with the enabling capabilities
to conduct Coherently Joint Operations. If
I can state it simply: we do what General Tommy
Franks and now General John Abizaid does but
on the supply side. In other words, we assemble
and deploy the joint forces for the operational
commander's use. We also focus on conceiving
and developing the future joint force through
our Joint Concept Development and Experimentation
campaign and do this in close partnership with
the joint community made up of Combatant Commanders,
Services, Interagencies and Multinational partners.
The
transformation we are conducting today is as
important as two other key instances of military
transformation in the last 30 years. The first
was the adoption of the All Volunteer Force
in the early 1970s. The second was the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986. Both were watershed events for the U.S.
Armed Forces. Both benefited from the wisdom
and support of Congress. Today's transformation
is driven by a dramatically changed environment
characterized by the emergence of global terrorism,
lack of a near term peer competitor, uncertainty,
new international partners, and the emergence
of opportunities, imperatives, and threats
of information age technologies in a globally
networked world. We do not know who we might
fight, where, when, with whom, or under what
geo-political conditions. Our force structure
and operating concepts must be responsive to
this condition of uncertainty. Our transformation
is both difficult and comprehensive, affecting
a wide variety of operational functions, processes
and organizations that impact not only how
the Services integrate with each other but
also how our forces interact with other governmental
agencies and multinational partners. Most importantly,
our transformation effort aims to change the
way we conduct operations at the joint operational
level of war.
The
important questions are not "why" and "whether" but "how" to
transform-and what direction and pace we should
take to create a force prepared to win the "next" war,
anticipate the next contingency, and conduct
broad campaigns such as the Global War on Terrorism.
Collectively and diligently, we worked on these
questions over the last two years and we have
benefited from your help.
Let
me first describe the continuing transformation
in how our Combatant Commanders conduct operations,
and in how we organize, train and equip our
Service forces. Traditionally, we divided the
battlefield into Service sectors. In those
sectors, we conducted Service centric operations
and we deconflicted their cross boundary operations
to ensure non-interference. Services
alone were responsible for organizing, training
and equipping their separate forces. This
template worked against traditional enemy forces
that operated in a similar manner. Increasingly,
speed, precision, technology and emerging doctrine,
allowed us to create cross Service capabilities
as we increasingly worked to integrate our
separately developed systems, capabilities
and training. Operation Desert Storm and operations
in the Balkans generated important insights
in each of these areas. However, the synergy
of joint training and operations in the 12-year
period between Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi
Freedom; advances in information age technology;
and the unprecedented energy, focus and commitment
of the Administration, Congress and the Defense
Department are producing unprecedented vision,
profound cultural change, and truly remarkable
networked capabilities.
We
envision the future from an information age
perspective where operations are conducted
in a battlespace, not a battlefield. We are
eliminating the artificial boundaries that
were established to deconflict Service areas
of responsibility and are transforming to a
seamless battlespace to allow a Coherently
Joint force to create effects throughout the
depth of the battlespace, massing of effects
when and where we choose versus the massing
of personnel and equipment as dictated by geography
and boundaries. We are now able to create decision
superiority that is enabled by networked systems,
new sensors and command and control capabilities
that are producing unprecedented near real
time situational awareness, increased information
availability; and an ability to deliver precision
munitions throughout the breadth and depth
of the battlespace. Additional capabilities
like reliable combat identification and blue
force tracking are advancing our ability to
instantly deliver precise orders to units of
action. Combined, these capabilities of the
future networked force will leverage information
dominance, speed and precision, and result
in decision superiority. My comments will address
transforming to achieve this capabilities based
joint force.
Our
transformation efforts follow directly from
the President's transformation agenda as outlined
in his Unified Command Plan 2002 that took
effect 1 October 2002, and directly support
three of the Department of Defense's top priorities:
1. Successfully pursue the Global
War on Terrorism
2.
Strengthen Joint Warfare Capabilities
3.
Transform the Joint Force
The
first two priorities address the on going fight
against global terror and the need to ensure
our joint forces receive the capabilities to
conduct those operations. The lessons learned
and operational insights gained from these
ongoing operations have contributed greatly
to our understanding of the future joint environment
that we must prepare for.
One
of the most instructive insights gained from
our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has
been on the characteristics of operational
attributes that an adaptive joint force must
possess in the modern Battlespace. To dominate
this battlespace, the joint force must be "knowledge
centric," "coherently joint," "fully networked
and collaborative" interdependent in organization
and employment and uniquely designed for "Effects-Based
Operations." Certainly any future joint force
must be capable of conducting rapid, decisive
combat operations. But we have found that a
future joint force must also apply these operational
attributes synergistically across the entire
range of military operations. We must be decisive
in every operation, not just the high-end portion
of war but across the full range of military
operations from peacekeeping to stability operations
right through to post hostility transition
operations. The advent of reliable and secure
digital communications, a new level of battlespace
awareness borne from joint and combined interoperability,
and precision weapons have created the potential
for a new type of force. This new coherently
joint, networked force must be skilled at finding
new ways to exploit and share knowledge, precision,
and mobility and to view these qualities as
weapon systems rather than relying on mass
to achieve both rapid and decisive operations.
These operational attributes of knowledge centric,
coherently joint, fully networked and Effects-based
now form the key elements of our Transformation
campaign.
Three
operational insights were particularly useful
in sharpening our Joint Transformation focus:
- The
U.S. no longer sends an individual Service
to conduct major operations but instead deploys
its military as a Joint and Coalition Force.
- The
power of a Coherently Joint Force is now
greater than the sum of our separate Service,
interagency and coalition capabilities.
-
"Speed
kills"-not just physical speed, but speed
of cognition and situational awareness.
It reduces decision and execution cycles,
creates opportunities, denies our adversaries
options and speeds his collapse.
Arriving
at these insights was not easy. They were proven
in actual combat and took a significant change
in Service culture to accept the message that
the power of a coherently Joint Force is far
greater than that of any individual Service.
When we use the term Joint Operations and Joint
Forces, we mean the seamless integration of
joint forces, interagencies and multinational
and coalition partners.
During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, for the first time,
we instituted a lessons learned process and
deployed a team for the express purpose of
gathering joint operational insights on a comprehensive
scale, in real time, with a mandate to assist
in operations and effect change. The significance
here was that our commanders realized that
the key to harnessing the full power of Jointness
begins at the operational level of command
and control which links strategic planning
to tactical execution. It is at that level-the
level of the Combatant Commander, the Joint
Task Force commander and the Joint Air, Land
and Sea Component Commanders-where the real
work of seamlessly integrating Service capabilities
into a Coherently Joint and Combined force
takes place.
We
examined how well Service and Special Operations
forces and methods actually worked together
as a joint and combined team, including operations
with other U.S. Federal agencies and with our
coalition partners.
Our
Joint Lesson Learned team was present in Iraq
before, during and after major combat operations.
They remain there still. Our team had complete
access to every facet of General Tommy Frank's-and
now General John Abizaid's-operations and,
in turn, our lessons learned team provided
real time insights and observations that were
actually used to improve their adaptive planning.
Because we had a dedicated Joint Lessons Learned
team embedded at the operational level they
were able to help the remarkable US Central
Command team improve the effectiveness and
precision of their actions. This ties directly
back to the point I made earlier that "speed
kills." It's not just about weapon systems,
but also about a persistent situational awareness.
This
type of unfettered access and interplay is
simply unprecedented and supports my earlier
comment about how Service cultures have changed
and are changing to accept a new way of conducting
business. General Franks welcomed our Joint
Lessons Learned team and General John Abizaid
is continuing that close partnership.
Again,
this was very different from how we traditionally
captured lessons. In previous conflicts, gathering
lessons and insights was generally done after-the-fact
and the reports were more static, service-centric
post mortems than a dynamic diagnosis of ongoing
operations. A key aspect about such processes
is that you must turn your "lessons learned" into
lessons acted upon.
An
important observation at the joint operational
level we are exploiting in our Transformation
efforts is the ability of our joint force to
conduct adaptive planning. Joint Force Commanders
like Generals Franks and Abizaid will tell
you "it's not the plan, it's the planning." They
understand that the ability to plan and adapt
to changing circumstances and fleeting opportunities
is the difference between success and failure
on the modern battlespace. Many leaders of
the past understood this-and it remains true
today. GEN Tom Franks and his staff practiced
this and became masters of adaptive planning.
The same is true of GEN John Abizaid's staff.
Essential
to the power of adaptive planning and execution
is an ability to conduct large scale, vertical
and horizontal collaboration. In today's collaborative
information environment, every level of command
throughout the entire force and including coalition
partners can be electronically linked to the
Combatant Commander's decision-making process
in the appropriate ways. Subordinate commanders
and staffs can thus understand the context
behind key changes across the battlespace and
are fully aware of the commander's intent to
guide their actions during specific missions.
This does not mean that everyone knows everything
that is happening in the battlespace all the
time but rather has a clear understanding of
the commander's intent and a persistent awareness
of the operational environment. In short, the
entire joint and combined force is acutely
sensitive to nuances in the battlespace and
is highly adaptive to change, seizing opportunities
as they arise or preventing mishaps before
they occur. We used to have this collaboration
on the hood of a jeep or tank. Now, with
information age technologies, we can collaborate
much more extensively all at the same time.
Another
key finding that drives our transformation
effort is the power achieved by closer integration
of our Special Operations and Conventional
forces. In Desert Storm, for example, we had
about 30 operational detachment teams of Special
Forces working separate missions from the conventional
force. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we deployed
over 100 operational detachment teams. They
were closely wedded to our conventional forces,
and in many cases merged the combined capabilities
of both ground and air forces. The net result
is that we not only had precision munitions
launched from air and ground but "precision
decision and execution" to guide the integrated
Special Forces and Conventional campaign.
In
total, what these lessons learned indicate
is that our traditional military planning paradigm
and perhaps our entire approach to warfare
have shifted. The main change, from our perspective,
is the shift from deconflicting Service-centric
forces designed to achieve victories of attrition
to integrating a joint and combined force that
can enter the battlespace quickly and conduct
decisive operations with both operational and
strategic effects.
One
general observation that seems to summarize
this shift, which has been going on since Desert
Storm, is based on what we have come to characterize
as the competing notions of Overwhelming Force
versus Overmatching Power.
As
an example, in Desert Storm, our military thinking
was to field Overwhelming Force to ensure victory.
Certainly, Overwhelming Force requires well-trained
and well-equipped forces, which are as important
today as they were back then, but at that time,
the emphasis was on numbers.
What
our observations in Operation Iraqi Freedom
tell us is that there is another approach to
modern warfare. We like to characterize this
approach as the employment of Overmatching
Power.
Under
this construct, the emphasis is no longer just
on numbers which remain important, but rather
on harnessing all the capabilities that our
Services bring to the battlespace in a coherently
joint way; the point now is on the effectiveness
of joint capabilities.
What
we are suggesting is that advances in technologies,
coupled with innovative operational warfighting
concepts that are glued together by a new joint
culture, are enabling a new level of coherent
military operations that we have never seen
or been able to achieve before.
The
new approach is the application of Overmatching
Power. It is based on the combined output of
new ways of joint warfighting, greater integration
of conventional and special operations forces,
the use of old and emerging capabilities by
new methods integrated through new schemes
of joint training.
The
Process and Product of Joint Transformation
Today
we clearly recognize that we have a unique
opportunity to develop powerful asymmetric
capabilities that will enable our joint forces
to conduct Effects-based Operations in a collaborative
environment using Network-Centric capabilities.
These are the attributes of a Coherently Joint
Force and the aim of our transformation efforts.
To
achieve these attributes, Joint Forces Command
has established close, collaborative partnerships
with the Defense Department, Combatant Commanders,
Services, Service Development and Training
Centers, the Interagency community and with
Multinational partners to develop an adaptive,
dynamic change process that is comprehensive,
that uses joint operational concepts to drive
improvements in joint warfighting, that will
inform the acquisition process and that integrates
the lessons we have learned in near real time.
Delivering innovative products and processes
is based upon four closely wedded approaches
to change:
1. Joint
Concept Development and Experimentation
2. Joint
Force Training and Education
3. Joint
Integration and Interoperability
4. Joint
Force Deployment, Employment and Sustainment
Joint
Concept Development and Experimentation
Joint concept
development and experimentation is an important
catalyst for transforming military capabilities
and delivering real innovation.
Our
Joint concept development and experimentation
process focuses on developing two distinct
products as the result of a two-path strategy
that delivers innovation. The first pathway
consists of the prototypes that evolve from
concept experimentation in concert with our
partners in the joint community. These prototypes
are designed to improve near-term joint warfighting
capabilities. The second pathway consists of
collaborative experimentation with new concepts
and capabilities that focus on the future operational
environment - trying to discover the "next
generation" of capabilities.
Prototypes
on which later stages of development are based
or judged have inherent attributes that make
them valuable tools in promoting and sustaining
transformation. The process of prototyping,
including modeling and simulation, is crucial
to refining concepts and bringing transformational
ideas to physical form. It also provides a
means to rapidly deliver near-term warfighting
capabilities to the joint warfighter. Prototyping
experiments take place within combatant command
exercise programs, not
in the lab. That way we find out from operational
commanders what works and what does not, and
we find out fast. We get a secondary benefit
from prototyping within combatant command exercises: we
help promulgate a culture of innovation.
An
example of an organizational prototype is the
Standing Joint Force Headquarters, or SJFHQ.
The SJFHQ will allow for the rapid stand up
of a fully functional operational Joint Task
Force. The SJFHQ can bring to a Service Headquarters
a regionally focused joint team skilled in
Effects Based Operations, Systems of Systems
Analysis, Operational Net Assessment, Joint
Interagency Coordination, Joint Fires, and
Joint Logistics Common Relevant Operating Picture
all enabled with an established, Collaborative
Information Environment (CIE). The CIE is designed
to quickly provide situational awareness of
the adversary, the battlespace and the Joint
Force. The CIE allows for persistent, robust
situational awareness of the operational environment
and delivers top-down clarity of the commander's
intent. What results is a joint force that
is empowered to act and exploit opportunities
because it has unity of effort at the top and
trust and confidence throughout the force.
A
material prototype that has already enabled
our operational forces to establish a Collaborative
Information Environment is the Joint Enroute
Mission Planning and Rehearsal System-Near
Time (JEMPRS-NT) that enables the Commander
and staff to maintain continuous command, control,
and situational awareness enroute. Other prototypes
that we are delivering or plan to deliver in
the near future include: a Joint Fires capability;
improved Joint Battle Management Command and
Control capabilities; and a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group capability that will bring
the capabilities of the interagency community
to bear in joint operations.
While
the joint prototype pathway focuses on improving current military
capability, the joint concept development pathway
helps us improve future warfighting
capabilities. It is in this pathway where the
close partnership between Joint Forces Command,
the Services, combatant commanders, as well
as interagency and multinational partners can
greatly affect the future force development
and acquisition process. Collaboration
in concept development also insures our future
concepts are "conceived joint," the first step
toward being "born joint."
A
key first step, and perhaps the most important
in our concept development approach was to
establish a Common Joint Context where we can
move our understanding of the future warfight
from a stovepipe Service view to a commonly
shared joint understanding of the future environment
where all the Services must operate as a Coherently
Joint team.
In establishing
this Common Joint Context, we have actively
partnered with each of the Services and created
co-sponsored wargames to assist them in embedding
a joint context in their concept development
and transformational Wargames. Furthermore,
we have used these co-sponsored games as venues
to advance co-evolution of service, joint,
multinational and interagency concepts. This
is truly a revolutionary change for each Service,
JFCOM as well as the interagency and multinational
partners are experimenting together just
as we fight. The Common Joint Context in our
co-sponsored games allows Services to examine
for themselves how well their projected capabilities
can operate in a Joint, and when appropriate
interagency and multinational, environment.
This process is a fundamental shift in our
existing force development paradigm. The Services
are now starting their force development programs
from a common joint perspective vice "tacking
jointness" on at the end of the process.
In May 2003,
for instance, then Army Chief of Staff General
Eric Shinseki and the Commander of Joint Forces
Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, co-hosted
the first ever Joint/Army wargame called Unified
Quest 03, with an embedded Common Joint Context.
Then the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Vern Clark, and Admiral Giambastiani co-hosted
the first-ever Joint/Navy Wargame called Unified
Course 04 in October 2003. This year General
John Jumper will co-host the first-ever Joint/Air
Force wargame called Unified Engagement
VII, and General Mike Hagee, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, will co-host Joint Urban
Warrior. After each of these watershed events,
senior leaders will gather to collectively
learn from the insights, observations and implications
produced by these intellectual exercises. In
the early fall, General Schoomaker will also
co-host the second Joint/Army Wargame called
Unified Quest 04.
In partnership
with the joint community, this month we are
expanding the experimentation arena to the
interagency communities by co-hosting with
the National Reconnaissance Office, Strategic
Command and Special Operations Command a path-breaking
Joint/Interagency event called Thor's Hammer.
This event, which is set in a global crisis
in the next decade, aims to investigate and
improve interagency processes in the areas
of space-based information management and integration.
There are over 70 organizations participating
including the Departments of Defense, State
and Homeland Security and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
In collaboration
with our NATO Allies, we also just concluded
our third major Multinational Experiment at
our Suffolk facility. In that event, we investigated
our ability to share information and conduct
Effects-Based Planning in a future coalition
environment. I should add that though this
particular event is the third in a series of
experiments with selected multinational partners,
this is the first time that NATO has participated
as an Alliance through Allied Command Transformation,
a powerful new partner for us and symbolic
of our Allies growing commitment to Defense
transformation.
This process
of experimenting in co-sponsored wargames,
and detailed coordination with the Services,
Joint Staff and Defense Department, has produced
a set of future warfighting concepts drafts
which are now before the Joint Chiefs. These
include 2015 concepts for major combat operations,
stability operations, joint forcible entry
operations, and joint urban operations. Drafts
of two other concepts, Strategic Deterrence
and Homeland Defense, written by United States
Strategic Command and Northern Command respectively
are also before the Joint Chiefs for their
consideration. This family of concepts, and
the Joint Operations Concept that provides
the foundation for them all, combined with
the Defense Department's roadmaps, will eventually
help change our investment strategies, force
development methodologies, and acquisition
systems from the previous threat-based approach
to a capabilities-based approach. This
change is yet another way we are advancing
the transformation of the joint force.
U.S. Joint
Forces Command is working in close partnership
with U.S. Transportation Command to develop
and conduct experiments on an operational concept
called the Joint Deployment, Employment and
Sustainment (JDES) concept. The central idea
of JDES is to align our deployment and sustainment
methodologies with our employment concepts.
We envision employing our forces coherently,
distributed widely within the battlespace,
executing decentralized and non-linear operations
simultaneously in multiple locations. JDES
will bring our deployment and sustainment in
line with these employment concepts.
Our joint concept
development and experimentation will continue
to refine these and other concepts in the coming
year. Just as importantly, we intend to leverage
our close partnerships throughout the joint
community and industry to speed the delivery
of innovative capabilities to the Joint Warfighter.
Joint Force
Training and Education
On
the training front, we are delivering a Joint
National Training Capability to improve the
ability of U.S. forces to fight effectively
as a joint and combined team. It is important
to note that the Services did a marvelous job
in launching the first wave of Training Transformation
when they established training capabilities
like the Navy's Top Gun, the Air Force's Air
Warrior and Red Flag and the Army's National
Training Center.
What
the joint community is striving to do with
the JNTC is start the second wave of training
transformation. We will link the Service
ranges with forces around the country and in
time, around the world to a common joint environment
at the operational level. In a sense, this
new training transformation is producing "Born
Joint Training" that seamlessly brings together
a combination of live, virtual and constructive
venues to create a common joint training environment
that leverages rather than duplicates Service
training. A key element is that we avoid any
additive requirements to Service training while
maximizing joint training within a common operational
environment.
On
Admiral Giambastiani's recent visit to the
first JNTC event, an Army major participating
in the exercise summed up for the Admiral the
value of this new capability. He had fought
with the 3rd Infantry Division in Operation
Iraqi Freedom and had participated in many
training rotations. When Admiral Giambastiani
asked what he thought was different about the
JNTC exercise, the Major replied: "Well sir,
the only time we ever get to play with all
the 'toys' is in war. Now we get to play with
everything in training." This is just
one example of how the JNTC is delivering innovation
to a transforming joint force. It is also worthwhile
to return to an earlier point: No Service will
go to war alone. We will fight as a Joint Force,
so it is imperative that we train and educate
our servicemen and women as a Joint Force.
On
the education front, Joint Forces Command is
partnering with the National Defense University
to establish a Joint curriculum to inculcate
the new methods of Coherently Joint Operations,
building upon Service-level training and education.
We have also expanded the Capstone course for
our new general and flag officers and are drawing
up plans for instituting a 3-Star course to "deepen
our bench" of prospective JTF commanders. Training
is important, but Joint Training and Education
is more important.
Joint
Integration and Interoperability
To
accelerate the Joint Interoperability and
Integration of Service-provided warfighting
capabilities, our Joint Interoperability
and Integration (JI&I) office continues
to deliver materiel and non-materiel solutions
to interoperability challenges by working
closely with all Combatant Commanders, Services
and Agencies to identify and resolve joint
warfighting deficiencies. Our Joint Enroute
Mission Planning and Rehearsal-Near Time
capability, described earlier, is just one
example.
Joint
Forces Command, in partnership with the joint
community, is leading an important initiative
to develop a common command and control capability
for the joint warfighter called Joint Battle
Management Command and Control (JBMC2). The
JBMC2 capability will enable the future Joint
Force to plan, coordinate, execute and assess
effects-based operations in a coherently
joint and net-centric manner. Our leading
transformational efforts in JBMC2 include
the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, Collaborative
Information Environments, standard Deployable
Command and Control capabilities, netted
Joint Force initiatives, integrated Joint
Fires, and the Joint National Training Capability.
These efforts are fundamental to achieving
the capabilities promised in the Net-Centric
Warfare concept, and we are on our way to
providing them within the next five years. Each
Service is working closely with Joint Forces
Command through initiatives such as the Air
Force led Family of Interoperable Operational
Pictures (FIOP), the Army led Single Integrated
Air picture (SIAP), and the Navy led Deployable
Joint Command and Control System. Our efforts
will soon include the Single Integrated Ground
Picture (SIGP) and Single Integrated Maritime
Picture (SIMP) under the Navy's ForceNet
construct. These efforts amount to
a "systems-of-systems" approach
to command and control and integrates the
initiatives of the Services in a "born joint" way.
Another
capability that we are working in partnership
with the Services to innovate is to shift
away from an exclusive reliance on Service
organic fires towards the concept of Joint
Fires. Under this concept and still developing
capability, warfighters will bring to bear
the right precision fires, at the right time
and in the right place from a range of joint
capabilities instead of just service organic
fires. Here again, an important operational
insight from OIF confirms the proper direction
of this effort: warfighters simply do not
care where capabilities come from, they just
care that it is timely, responsive, integrated
and effective.
Joint
Force Provider
A
primary Joint Forces Command responsibility
is to provide joint forces in response to
Combatant Commanders' requirements for operational
capabilities. In coordination with
our Service Components and the Combatant
Commanders, JFCOM identifies the right active
and reserve component forces in order to
tailor and deploy the right Joint Force Packages.
Additionally, in the last two years, Joint
Forces Command has stood up, trained and
deployed more Joint Task Forces (JTFs) than
it did over the previous ten years. This
is a critical transformational function in
that we are able to transition from a condition
where Services alone organize, train and
equip Service forces to where a Joint Command
performs some of those same functions to
produce a fully functional Joint Force. We
performed these functions in conjunction
with the Army trainers from Fort
Leavenworth for III Corps prior to their
recent deployment to Iraq through
Joint mission rehearsal exercises, staff
assistance visits, and leader development
training. The Joint National Training Capability
is another clear example of how the joint
community, with full Service partnership,
is advancing along the Joint training continuum.
We
are now in the initial process of developing
and preparing the replacement HQ for Combined
Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq and have assisted
Central Command with other JTFs including
JTF-180 (Afghanistan); JTF-IV (post hostilities-JTF
Iraq) and with a CENTCOM Forward HQ (with
functional components). In partnership with
European Command, we assisted with JTF Horn
of Africa and with SETAF (Southern European
Task Force) during Agile Response 03. In
support of Pacific Command's exercise/experiment
Terminal Fury 03, Joint Forces Command assisted
in the standup of JTF 519. Other JTFs that
we assisted in the standup and deployment
to Combatant Commands included JTF-Civil
Support to Northern Command; JTF-Guantanamo
to Southern Command; and a STRATCOM Global
Strike Division to Strategic Command.
Summary
In
closing, like the military as a whole, Joint
Forces Command has transformed itself to serve
as the nation's agent for transformation even
as we have been deeply involved in supporting
operations around the world. The divestiture
of our geographic area of responsibility has
enabled this Command to focus on our new area
of responsibility: the future. With your help,
we are receiving the resources and authority
to carry out our new mission and are now helping
to deliver:
· Trained
and ready joint forces to the Regional Combatant
Commanders
· Coherently-joint
capabilities and operational methods to the
joint warfighter of today
· A
common joint context to Service experimentation
programs that will lead to new "born joint" capabilities
of tomorrow
· The
first steps in alignment of Joint Battle Management
Command and Control programs across the Department
of Defense
· Integration
of Interagency and Multinational capabilities
into the change process
· And
the beginnings of a new culture of joint transformation
We are convinced
that improved interoperability is crucial,
to ensure near-term fusion of mission capabilities
across the joint services, allied, and interagency
partners. We have emphasized the need for operational
lessons learned and experimentation to drive
the development of new joint doctrine, new
concepts, and new integrated architectures
to properly defined and influence Service and
Agency capabilities of the future.
Transformation
is underway. Our efforts are accelerating
these trends. We look forward to working with
you to provide our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen
and Marines the joint capabilities they need
today and the transformational capabilities
our Joint Force will require in the future.
We are enthusiastic about our plan for the
future and extend to each of you an invitation
to visit Joint Forces Command and our Service
Components to see transformation in action.
Thank
you for your continued support of our Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen and Marines and of our Joint
Warfighters, our Combatant Commanders.
