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 26 FEBRUARY 2004

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, as the Deputy Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I am honored to testify on our role in the ongoing process of transforming our Armed Forces. 

Joint Forces Command is a dynamic command that learns from and works with our Department of Defense partners, the interagency, and coalition partners to transform U.S. warfighting forces and capabilities to ensure our Nation's continued ability to rapidly and decisively conduct military operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command maximizes the Nation's future and present military capabilities by advancing joint concept development and experimentation, identifying joint requirements, ensuring interoperability, conducting joint training, and providing ready forces and capabilities in support of the Combatant Commands. 

This last point is particularly important. We have found that many do not understand the role that Joint Forces Command plays in support to our operational commanders. Our Armed Forces fight as a joint force. Our command is responsible for training and deploying fully functional joint task forces with the enabling capabilities to conduct Coherently Joint Operations. If I can state it simply: we do what General Tommy Franks and now General John Abizaid does but on the supply side. In other words, we assemble and deploy the joint forces for the operational commander's use. We also focus on conceiving and developing the future joint force through our Joint Concept Development and Experimentation campaign and do this in close partnership with the joint community made up of Combatant Commanders, Services, Interagencies and Multinational partners.

The transformation we are conducting today is as important as two other key instances of military transformation in the last 30 years. The first was the adoption of the All Volunteer Force in the early 1970s. The second was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Both were watershed events for the U.S. Armed Forces. Both benefited from the wisdom and support of Congress. Today's transformation is driven by a dramatically changed environment characterized by the emergence of global terrorism, lack of a near term peer competitor, uncertainty, new international partners, and the emergence of opportunities, imperatives, and threats of information age technologies in a globally networked world. We do not know who we might fight, where, when, with whom, or under what geo-political conditions. Our force structure and operating concepts must be responsive to this condition of uncertainty. Our transformation is both difficult and comprehensive, affecting a wide variety of operational functions, processes and organizations that impact not only how the Services integrate with each other but also how our forces interact with other governmental agencies and multinational partners. Most importantly, our transformation effort aims to change the way we conduct operations at the joint operational level of war.

The important questions are not "why" and "whether" but "how" to transform-and what direction and pace we should take to create a force prepared to win the "next" war, anticipate the next contingency, and conduct broad campaigns such as the Global War on Terrorism. Collectively and diligently, we worked on these questions over the last two years and we have benefited from your help.

Let me first describe the continuing transformation in how our Combatant Commanders conduct operations, and in how we organize, train and equip our Service forces. Traditionally, we divided the battlefield into Service sectors. In those sectors, we conducted Service centric operations and we deconflicted their cross boundary operations to ensure non-interference.  Services alone were responsible for organizing, training and equipping their separate forces.  This template worked against traditional enemy forces that operated in a similar manner.  Increasingly, speed, precision, technology and emerging doctrine, allowed us to create cross Service capabilities as we increasingly worked to integrate our separately developed systems, capabilities and training. Operation Desert Storm and operations in the Balkans generated important insights in each of these areas. However, the synergy of joint training and operations in the 12-year period between Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom; advances in information age technology; and the unprecedented energy, focus and commitment of the Administration, Congress and the Defense Department are producing unprecedented vision, profound cultural change, and truly remarkable networked capabilities.

We envision the future from an information age perspective where operations are conducted in a battlespace, not a battlefield. We are eliminating the artificial boundaries that were established to deconflict Service areas of responsibility and are transforming to a seamless battlespace to allow a Coherently Joint force to create effects throughout the depth of the battlespace, massing of effects when and where we choose versus the massing of personnel and equipment as dictated by geography and boundaries. We are now able to create decision superiority that is enabled by networked systems, new sensors and command and control capabilities that are producing unprecedented near real time situational awareness, increased information availability; and an ability to deliver precision munitions throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace. Additional capabilities like reliable combat identification and blue force tracking are advancing our ability to instantly deliver precise orders to units of action. Combined, these capabilities of the future networked force will leverage information dominance, speed and precision, and result in decision superiority. My comments will address transforming to achieve this capabilities based joint force.

Our transformation efforts follow directly from the President's transformation agenda as outlined in his Unified Command Plan 2002 that took effect 1 October 2002, and directly support three of the Department of Defense's top priorities:

        1. Successfully pursue the Global War on Terrorism

        2. Strengthen Joint Warfare Capabilities

        3. Transform the Joint Force

The first two priorities address the on going fight against global terror and the need to ensure our joint forces receive the capabilities to conduct those operations. The lessons learned and operational insights gained from these ongoing operations have contributed greatly to our understanding of the future joint environment that we must prepare for.

One of the most instructive insights gained from our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has been on the characteristics of operational attributes that an adaptive joint force must possess in the modern Battlespace. To dominate this battlespace, the joint force must be "knowledge centric," "coherently joint," "fully networked and collaborative" interdependent in organization and employment and uniquely designed for "Effects-Based Operations." Certainly any future joint force must be capable of conducting rapid, decisive combat operations. But we have found that a future joint force must also apply these operational attributes synergistically across the entire range of military operations. We must be decisive in every operation, not just the high-end portion of war but across the full range of military operations from peacekeeping to stability operations right through to post hostility transition operations. The advent of reliable and secure digital communications, a new level of battlespace awareness borne from joint and combined interoperability, and precision weapons have created the potential for a new type of force. This new coherently joint, networked force must be skilled at finding new ways to exploit and share knowledge, precision, and mobility and to view these qualities as weapon systems rather than relying on mass to achieve both rapid and decisive operations. These operational attributes of knowledge centric, coherently joint, fully networked and Effects-based now form the key elements of our Transformation campaign.

Three operational insights were particularly useful in sharpening our Joint Transformation focus:

  1. The U.S. no longer sends an individual Service to conduct major operations but instead deploys its military as a Joint and Coalition Force.
  2. The power of a Coherently Joint Force is now greater than the sum of our separate Service, interagency and coalition capabilities.
  3. "Speed kills"-not just physical speed, but speed of cognition and situational awareness. It reduces decision and execution cycles, creates opportunities, denies our adversaries options and speeds his collapse.

Arriving at these insights was not easy. They were proven in actual combat and took a significant change in Service culture to accept the message that the power of a coherently Joint Force is far greater than that of any individual Service. When we use the term Joint Operations and Joint Forces, we mean the seamless integration of joint forces, interagencies and multinational and coalition partners.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for the first time, we instituted a lessons learned process and deployed a team for the express purpose of gathering joint operational insights on a comprehensive scale, in real time, with a mandate to assist in operations and effect change. The significance here was that our commanders realized that the key to harnessing the full power of Jointness begins at the operational level of command and control which links strategic planning to tactical execution. It is at that level-the level of the Combatant Commander, the Joint Task Force commander and the Joint Air, Land and Sea Component Commanders-where the real work of seamlessly integrating Service capabilities into a Coherently Joint and Combined force takes place.

We examined how well Service and Special Operations forces and methods actually worked together as a joint and combined team, including operations with other U.S. Federal agencies and with our coalition partners.

Our Joint Lesson Learned team was present in Iraq before, during and after major combat operations. They remain there still. Our team had complete access to every facet of General Tommy Frank's-and now General John Abizaid's-operations and, in turn, our lessons learned team provided real time insights and observations that were actually used to improve their adaptive planning. Because we had a dedicated Joint Lessons Learned team embedded at the operational level they were able to help the remarkable US Central Command team improve the effectiveness and precision of their actions. This ties directly back to the point I made earlier that "speed kills."  It's not just about weapon systems, but also about a persistent situational awareness.

This type of unfettered access and interplay is simply unprecedented and supports my earlier comment about how Service cultures have changed and are changing to accept a new way of conducting business. General Franks welcomed our Joint Lessons Learned team and General John Abizaid is continuing that close partnership.

Again, this was very different from how we traditionally captured lessons. In previous conflicts, gathering lessons and insights was generally done after-the-fact and the reports were more static, service-centric post mortems than a dynamic diagnosis of ongoing operations. A key aspect about such processes is that you must turn your "lessons learned" into lessons acted upon.

An important observation at the joint operational level we are exploiting in our Transformation efforts is the ability of our joint force to conduct adaptive planning. Joint Force Commanders like Generals Franks and Abizaid will tell you "it's not the plan, it's the planning." They understand that the ability to plan and adapt to changing circumstances and fleeting opportunities is the difference between success and failure on the modern battlespace. Many leaders of the past understood this-and it remains true today. GEN Tom Franks and his staff practiced this and became masters of adaptive planning. The same is true of GEN John Abizaid's staff.

Essential to the power of adaptive planning and execution is an ability to conduct large scale, vertical and horizontal collaboration. In today's collaborative information environment, every level of command throughout the entire force and including coalition partners can be electronically linked to the Combatant Commander's decision-making process in the appropriate ways. Subordinate commanders and staffs can thus understand the context behind key changes across the battlespace and are fully aware of the commander's intent to guide their actions during specific missions. This does not mean that everyone knows everything that is happening in the battlespace all the time but rather has a clear understanding of the commander's intent and a persistent awareness of the operational environment. In short, the entire joint and combined force is acutely sensitive to nuances in the battlespace and is highly adaptive to change, seizing opportunities as they arise or preventing mishaps before they occur.  We used to have this collaboration on the hood of a jeep or tank.  Now, with information age technologies, we can collaborate much more extensively all at the same time.

Another key finding that drives our transformation effort is the power achieved by closer integration of our Special Operations and Conventional forces. In Desert Storm, for example, we had about 30 operational detachment teams of Special Forces working separate missions from the conventional force. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we deployed over 100 operational detachment teams. They were closely wedded to our conventional forces, and in many cases merged the combined capabilities of both ground and air forces. The net result is that we not only had precision munitions launched from air and ground but "precision decision and execution" to guide the integrated Special Forces and Conventional campaign.

In total, what these lessons learned indicate is that our traditional military planning paradigm and perhaps our entire approach to warfare have shifted. The main change, from our perspective, is the shift from deconflicting Service-centric forces designed to achieve victories of attrition to integrating a joint and combined force that can enter the battlespace quickly and conduct decisive operations with both operational and strategic effects.

One general observation that seems to summarize this shift, which has been going on since Desert Storm, is based on what we have come to characterize as the competing notions of Overwhelming Force versus Overmatching Power.

As an example, in Desert Storm, our military thinking was to field Overwhelming Force to ensure victory. Certainly, Overwhelming Force requires well-trained and well-equipped forces, which are as important today as they were back then, but at that time, the emphasis was on numbers.

What our observations in Operation Iraqi Freedom tell us is that there is another approach to modern warfare. We like to characterize this approach as the employment of Overmatching Power.

Under this construct, the emphasis is no longer just on numbers which remain important, but rather on harnessing all the capabilities that our Services bring to the battlespace in a coherently joint way; the point now is on the effectiveness of joint capabilities.

What we are suggesting is that advances in technologies, coupled with innovative operational warfighting concepts that are glued together by a new joint culture, are enabling a new level of coherent military operations that we have never seen or been able to achieve before.

The new approach is the application of Overmatching Power. It is based on the combined output of new ways of joint warfighting, greater integration of conventional and special operations forces, the use of old and emerging capabilities by new methods integrated through new schemes of joint training.

The Process and Product of Joint Transformation

Today we clearly recognize that we have a unique opportunity to develop powerful asymmetric capabilities that will enable our joint forces to conduct Effects-based Operations in a collaborative environment using Network-Centric capabilities. These are the attributes of a Coherently Joint Force and the aim of our transformation efforts.                                           

To achieve these attributes, Joint Forces Command has established close, collaborative partnerships with the Defense Department, Combatant Commanders, Services, Service Development and Training Centers, the Interagency community and with Multinational partners to develop an adaptive, dynamic change process that is comprehensive, that uses joint operational concepts to drive improvements in joint warfighting, that will inform the acquisition process and that integrates the lessons we have learned in near real time. Delivering innovative products and processes is based upon four closely wedded approaches to change:

1.       Joint Concept Development and Experimentation

2.       Joint Force Training and Education

3.       Joint Integration and Interoperability

4.       Joint Force Deployment, Employment and Sustainment

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation

Joint concept development and experimentation is an important catalyst for transforming military capabilities and delivering real innovation.

Our Joint concept development and experimentation process focuses on developing two distinct products as the result of a two-path strategy that delivers innovation. The first pathway consists of the prototypes that evolve from concept experimentation in concert with our partners in the joint community. These prototypes are designed to improve near-term joint warfighting capabilities. The second pathway consists of collaborative experimentation with new concepts and capabilities that focus on the future operational environment - trying to discover the "next generation" of capabilities.

Prototypes on which later stages of development are based or judged have inherent attributes that make them valuable tools in promoting and sustaining transformation.  The process of prototyping, including modeling and simulation, is crucial to refining concepts and bringing transformational ideas to physical form. It also provides a means to rapidly deliver near-term warfighting capabilities to the joint warfighter. Prototyping experiments take place within combatant command exercise programs, not in the lab. That way we find out from operational commanders what works and what does not, and we find out fast. We get a secondary benefit from prototyping within combatant command exercises:  we help promulgate a culture of innovation.

An example of an organizational prototype is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, or SJFHQ. The SJFHQ will allow for the rapid stand up of a fully functional operational Joint Task Force. The SJFHQ can bring to a Service Headquarters a regionally focused joint team skilled in Effects Based Operations, Systems of Systems Analysis, Operational Net Assessment, Joint Interagency Coordination, Joint Fires, and Joint Logistics Common Relevant Operating Picture all enabled with an established, Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). The CIE is designed to quickly provide situational awareness of the adversary, the battlespace and the Joint Force. The CIE allows for persistent, robust situational awareness of the operational environment and delivers top-down clarity of the commander's intent. What results is a joint force that is empowered to act and exploit opportunities because it has unity of effort at the top and trust and confidence throughout the force.

A material prototype that has already enabled our operational forces to establish a Collaborative Information Environment is the Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System-Near Time (JEMPRS-NT) that enables the Commander and staff to maintain continuous command, control, and situational awareness enroute. Other prototypes that we are delivering or plan to deliver in the near future include: a Joint Fires capability; improved Joint Battle Management Command and Control capabilities; and a Joint Interagency Coordination Group capability that will bring the capabilities of the interagency community to bear in joint operations.

While the joint prototype pathway focuses on improving current military capability, the joint concept development pathway helps us improve future warfighting capabilities. It is in this pathway where the close partnership between Joint Forces Command, the Services, combatant commanders, as well as interagency and multinational partners can greatly affect the future force development and acquisition process.  Collaboration in concept development also insures our future concepts are "conceived joint," the first step toward being "born joint."

A key first step, and perhaps the most important in our concept development approach was to establish a Common Joint Context where we can move our understanding of the future warfight from a stovepipe Service view to a commonly shared joint understanding of the future environment where all the Services must operate as a Coherently Joint team.

In establishing this Common Joint Context, we have actively partnered with each of the Services and created co-sponsored wargames to assist them in embedding a joint context in their concept development and transformational Wargames. Furthermore, we have used these co-sponsored games as venues to advance co-evolution of service, joint, multinational and interagency concepts.  This is truly a revolutionary change for each Service, JFCOM as well as the interagency and multinational partners are experimenting together  just as we fight. The Common Joint Context in our co-sponsored games allows Services to examine for themselves how well their projected capabilities can operate in a Joint, and when appropriate interagency and multinational, environment. This process is a fundamental shift in our existing force development paradigm. The Services are now starting their force development programs from a common joint perspective vice "tacking jointness" on at the end of the process.

In May 2003, for instance, then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and the Commander of Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, co-hosted the first ever Joint/Army wargame called Unified Quest 03, with an embedded Common Joint Context. Then the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, and Admiral Giambastiani co-hosted the first-ever Joint/Navy Wargame called Unified Course 04 in October 2003. This year General John Jumper will co-host the first-ever Joint/Air Force wargame called Unified  Engagement VII, and General Mike Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, will co-host Joint Urban Warrior. After each of these watershed events, senior leaders will gather to collectively learn from the insights, observations and implications produced by these intellectual exercises. In the early fall, General Schoomaker will also co-host the second Joint/Army Wargame called Unified Quest 04.

In partnership with the joint community, this month we are expanding the experimentation arena to the interagency communities by co-hosting with the National Reconnaissance Office, Strategic Command and Special Operations Command a path-breaking Joint/Interagency event called Thor's Hammer. This event, which is set in a global crisis in the next decade, aims to investigate and improve interagency processes in the areas of space-based information management and integration. There are over 70 organizations participating including the Departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In collaboration with our NATO Allies, we also just concluded our third major Multinational Experiment at our Suffolk facility. In that event, we investigated our ability to share information and conduct Effects-Based Planning in a future coalition environment. I should add that though this particular event is the third in a series of experiments with selected multinational partners, this is the first time that NATO has participated as an Alliance through Allied Command Transformation, a powerful new partner for us and symbolic of our Allies growing commitment to Defense transformation.

This process of experimenting in co-sponsored wargames, and detailed coordination with the Services, Joint Staff and Defense Department, has produced a set of future warfighting concepts drafts which are now before the Joint Chiefs. These include 2015 concepts for major combat operations, stability operations, joint forcible entry operations, and joint urban operations.  Drafts of two other concepts, Strategic Deterrence and Homeland Defense, written by United States Strategic Command and Northern Command respectively are also before the Joint Chiefs for their consideration. This family of concepts, and the Joint Operations Concept that provides the foundation for them all, combined with the Defense Department's roadmaps, will eventually help change our investment strategies, force development methodologies, and acquisition systems from the previous threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach.  This change is yet another way we are advancing the transformation of the joint force.

U.S. Joint Forces Command is working in close partnership with U.S. Transportation Command to develop and conduct experiments on an operational concept called the Joint Deployment, Employment and Sustainment (JDES) concept. The central idea of JDES is to align our deployment and sustainment methodologies with our employment concepts. We envision employing our forces coherently, distributed widely within the battlespace, executing decentralized and non-linear operations simultaneously in multiple locations.  JDES will bring our deployment and sustainment in line with these employment concepts.

Our joint concept development and experimentation will continue to refine these and other concepts in the coming year. Just as importantly, we intend to leverage our close partnerships throughout the joint community and industry to speed the delivery of innovative capabilities to the Joint Warfighter.

Joint Force Training and Education

On the training front, we are delivering a Joint National Training Capability to improve the ability of U.S. forces to fight effectively as a joint and combined team.  It is important to note that the Services did a marvelous job in launching the first wave of Training Transformation when they established training capabilities like the Navy's Top Gun, the Air Force's Air Warrior and Red Flag and the Army's National Training Center.

What the joint community is striving to do with the JNTC is start the second wave of training transformation.  We will link the Service ranges with forces around the country and in time, around the world to a common joint environment at the operational level. In a sense, this new training transformation is producing "Born Joint Training" that seamlessly brings together a combination of live, virtual and constructive venues to create a common joint training environment that leverages rather than duplicates Service training. A key element is that we avoid any additive requirements to Service training while maximizing joint training within a common operational environment.

On Admiral Giambastiani's recent visit to the first JNTC event, an Army major participating in the exercise summed up for the Admiral the value of this new capability. He had fought with the 3rd Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom and had participated in many training rotations. When Admiral Giambastiani asked what he thought was different about the JNTC exercise, the Major replied: "Well sir, the only time we ever get to play with all the 'toys' is in war. Now we get to play with everything in training."  This is just one example of how the JNTC is delivering innovation to a transforming joint force. It is also worthwhile to return to an earlier point: No Service will go to war alone. We will fight as a Joint Force, so it is imperative that we train and educate our servicemen and women as a Joint Force.

On the education front, Joint Forces Command is partnering with the National Defense University to establish a Joint curriculum to inculcate the new methods of Coherently Joint Operations, building upon Service-level training and education. We have also expanded the Capstone course for our new general and flag officers and are drawing up plans for instituting a 3-Star course to "deepen our bench" of prospective JTF commanders. Training is important, but Joint Training and Education is more important.

Joint Integration and Interoperability

To accelerate the Joint Interoperability and Integration of Service-provided warfighting capabilities, our Joint Interoperability and Integration (JI&I) office continues to deliver materiel and non-materiel solutions to interoperability challenges by working closely with all Combatant Commanders, Services and Agencies to identify and resolve joint warfighting deficiencies. Our Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal-Near Time capability, described earlier, is just one example.

Joint Forces Command, in partnership with the joint community, is leading an important initiative to develop a common command and control capability for the joint warfighter called Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2). The JBMC2 capability will enable the future Joint Force to plan, coordinate, execute and assess effects-based operations in a coherently joint and net-centric manner. Our leading transformational efforts in JBMC2 include the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, Collaborative Information Environments, standard Deployable Command and Control capabilities, netted Joint Force initiatives, integrated Joint Fires, and the Joint National Training Capability. These efforts are fundamental to achieving the capabilities promised in the Net-Centric Warfare concept, and we are on our way to providing them within the next five years.  Each Service is working closely with Joint Forces Command through initiatives such as the Air Force led Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP), the Army led Single Integrated Air picture (SIAP), and the Navy led Deployable Joint Command and Control System. Our efforts will soon include the Single Integrated Ground Picture (SIGP) and Single Integrated Maritime Picture (SIMP) under the Navy's ForceNet construct.  These efforts amount to a "systems-of-systems" approach to command and control and integrates the initiatives of the Services in a "born joint" way.

Another capability that we are working in partnership with the Services to innovate is to shift away from an exclusive reliance on Service organic fires towards the concept of Joint Fires. Under this concept and still developing capability, warfighters will bring to bear the right precision fires, at the right time and in the right place from a range of joint capabilities instead of just service organic fires. Here again, an important operational insight from OIF confirms the proper direction of this effort: warfighters simply do not care where capabilities come from, they just care that it is timely, responsive, integrated and effective.

Joint Force Provider

A primary Joint Forces Command responsibility is to provide joint forces in response to Combatant Commanders' requirements for operational capabilities.  In coordination with our Service Components and the Combatant Commanders, JFCOM identifies the right active and reserve component forces in order to tailor and deploy the right Joint Force Packages. Additionally, in the last two years, Joint Forces Command has stood up, trained and deployed more Joint Task Forces (JTFs) than it did over the previous ten years. This is a critical transformational function in that we are able to transition from a condition where Services alone organize, train and equip Service forces to where a Joint Command performs some of those same functions to produce a fully functional Joint Force. We performed these functions in conjunction with the Army trainers from Fort Leavenworth for III Corps prior to their recent deployment to Iraq through Joint mission rehearsal exercises, staff assistance visits, and leader development training. The Joint National Training Capability is another clear example of how the joint community, with full Service partnership, is advancing along the Joint training continuum.

We are now in the initial process of developing and preparing the replacement HQ for Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq and have assisted Central Command with other JTFs including JTF-180 (Afghanistan); JTF-IV (post hostilities-JTF Iraq) and with a CENTCOM Forward HQ (with functional components). In partnership with European Command, we assisted with JTF Horn of Africa and with SETAF (Southern European Task Force) during Agile Response 03. In support of Pacific Command's exercise/experiment Terminal Fury 03, Joint Forces Command assisted in the standup of JTF 519. Other JTFs that we assisted in the standup and deployment to Combatant Commands included JTF-Civil Support to Northern Command; JTF-Guantanamo to Southern Command; and a STRATCOM Global Strike Division to Strategic Command.


In closing, like the military as a whole, Joint Forces Command has transformed itself to serve as the nation's agent for transformation even as we have been deeply involved in supporting operations around the world. The divestiture of our geographic area of responsibility has enabled this Command to focus on our new area of responsibility: the future. With your help, we are receiving the resources and authority to carry out our new mission and are now helping to deliver:

    Trained and ready joint forces to the Regional Combatant Commanders

    Coherently-joint capabilities and operational methods to the joint warfighter of today

    A common joint context to Service experimentation programs that will lead to new "born joint" capabilities of tomorrow

    The first steps in alignment of Joint Battle Management Command and Control programs across the Department of Defense

    Integration of Interagency and Multinational capabilities into the change process

    And the beginnings of a new culture of joint transformation

We are convinced that improved interoperability is crucial, to ensure near-term fusion of mission capabilities across the joint services, allied, and interagency partners. We have emphasized the need for operational lessons learned and experimentation to drive the development of new joint doctrine, new concepts, and new integrated architectures to properly defined and influence Service and Agency capabilities of the future.

Transformation is underway.  Our efforts are accelerating these trends. We look forward to working with you to provide our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines the joint capabilities they need today and the transformational capabilities our Joint Force will require in the future. We are enthusiastic about our plan for the future and extend to each of you an invitation to visit Joint Forces Command and our Service Components to see transformation in action.

Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and of our Joint Warfighters, our Combatant Commanders.

House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515