TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF
(RET)
PRESIDENT AND CEO
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
SENATOR ROBERTS, SENATOR ROCKEFELLER,
DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE, IT'S ALWAYS A SPECIAL
HONOR TO BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPORTANT WORK OF ANY
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. MY CONTRIBUTIONS, HOWEVER MODEST, ARE OFFERED
WITH THE HIGHEST SENSE OF PURPOSE.
I
HAVE BEEN ASKED, SPECIFICALLY, TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE HART-RUDMAN
COMMISSION-OF WHICH I WAS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR-IN THE CONTEXT OF INTELLIGENCE
REFORM. I WILL SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THAT EFFORT, AND THEN
LET YOUR QUESTIONS GUIDE THE DISSCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS. I WILL ALSO GIVE YOU A COUPLE OF PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES
DERIVED FROM DECADES SPENT AS A USER OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE HOPE
THEY WILL BE OF SOME USE. I
WILL LEAVE SPAGHETTI CHARTS AND WIRING DIAGRAMS TO OTHERS WITH
MORE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL FAMILIARITY.
BY
WAY OF REFRESHER, THE HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION WAS CHARTERED TO TRY
TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF WORLD WE ARE GOING TO LIVE IN OVER THE
NEXT QUARTER CENTURY, THEN DEVELOP A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
RELEVANT TO THAT WORLD, AND FINALLY TO EXAMINE THE STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES BY WHICH THE NATION FORMULATES AND EXECUTES ITS NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICIES, AND RECOMMEND ADJUSTMENTS OR RESTRUCTUING AS
APPROPRIATE. FOURTEEN PROMINENT
AMERICANS SERVED AS COMMISSIONERS, WITH ANALYTICAL, RESEARCH, AND
SUPPORT
STAFF, CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 50 PEOPLE. WE DEVOTED OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS TO WHAT
WAS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF OUR NATION'S SECURITY APPARATUS
TO BE CONDUCTED SINCE 1947.
THE
FIRST PHASE OF OUR WORK LED US TO A CONCLUSION NONE HELD AT THE
OUTSET: THAT THE SECURITY PHENOMENON OUR NATION WOULD
FACE IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY, AND THE ONE FOR WHICH
WE WERE LEAST PREPARED, WOULD BE TERRORISM-IN A VARIETY OF FORMS-RANGING
FROM SMALL SCALE DISRUPTION TO-QUITE POSSIBLY-MASS CASUALTY CATASTROPHE
OF A MAGNITUDE THAT COULD CHANGE THE VERY NATURE OF THE WAY OUR
SOCIETY WORKS AND INTERACTS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.
AFTER
THAT UNDERSTANDING HAD BEGUN TO SETTLE INTO OUR CONSCIOUSNESS,
IT AFFECTED, TO A PREVAILING DEGREE, HOW WE WOULD THINK ABOUT
SECURING THE BASE CAMP-OUR HOMELAND-AND THEN THE EFFECT THAT
WOULD HAVE ON ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, TO INCLUDE
OF COURSE, INTELLIGENCE.
HART
RUDMAN COMMISSION IS PRIMARILY IDENTIFIED NOW, IN THE AFTERMATH
OF 911, FOR ITS' SPECIFIC WORK ON HOMELAND SECURITY, AND IN
RETROSPECT IT IS THE PIECE OF WORK WITH WHICH I AM THE MOST
PLEASED. FOR OUR PURPOSES
TODAY, HOWEVER, I WILL IGNOR THAT, EXCEPT WHERE IT RELATES
TO INTELLIGENCE, AS WELL AS THE 40 OTHER MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS
THAT DEALT WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, AND STICK
WITH THE SECTION THAT PLEASES ME THE LEAST: THAT
HAVING TO DO WITH INTELLIGENCE.
WITH
OUR CONVICTION THAT TERRORISM WOULD BE THE METHOD OF CHOICE FOR
MOST OF OUR EARLY 21ST CENTURY ENEMIES, CAME THE DAWNING
NOTION THAT THE MILITARY COMPONENT WOULD DECLINE IN RELATIVE
IMPORTANCE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CALCULUS. THE ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC
AND COMMUNICATION COMPONENTS WOULD INCREASE IN RELATIVE VALUE,
AND SOME-NOT ALL-CONCLUDED THAT, ULTIMATELY, THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT
COULD NOT BE WON WITH THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE. ALTHOUGH THEIR ROLE WOULD BE IMPORTANT, SUCH
CONFLICT WOULD BE WON WITH THE OTHER COMPONENTS, WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT,
AND WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF ALL-INTELLIGENCE.
THE
DEBATE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE, AT THIS MOMENT, IS ABOUT ORGANIZATION,
BUT THAT WAS NOT THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR WORK ON THE SUBJECT. IT
WAS ON PROCESS AND PRIORITES. WE
CONCLUDED THEN, AS HAD OTHERS, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
LOST IT'S FOCUS WHEN THE BERLIN WALL CAME DOWN, AND, TO THAT
POINT, SINCE THE NATION HAD NO EFFECTIVE, SYSTEMATIC PROCESS
FOR ESTABLISHING NEW NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES,
AND WAS FLOUNDERING IN ITS ATTEMPT AT REORIENTATION, IT FOLLOWED
THAT THE INTELLIGENGE COMMUNITY HAD NOTHING SOLID ON WHICH TO
REALIGN ITS OWN ORIENTATION AND PRIORITIES. THE
TWO HAD TO BE INSEPARABLE PROCESSES, SO, IN SOME OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT WORK WE DID, WE DEVELOPED MODELS FOR BOTH. I
COMMEND THEM TO YOUR ATTENTION.
THE
SECOND MAJOR AREA WE DEALT WITH HAD TO DO WITH HUMINT, SPECIFICALLY
THE PAUCITY OF IT. WE PUT VERY STRONG EMPHASIS ON THIS CAPABILITY,
WELL BEFORE THE BANDWAGON FOR IT BEGAN TO ROLL. I MIGHT ADD, MUCH OF THE REASON FOR THE DISSOLUTION
OF THAT CAPABILITY, AND RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE COULD
BE INVOLVED, CAME FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS. YOU'VE GOTTEN OVER
THAT NOW, I THINK, AND I FERVENTLY HOPE YOU STAY OVER IT.
FINALLY,
WE DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMENSUATE
WITH THE EMPHASIS WE HAD PLACED ON ECONOMICS AS A COMPONENT OF
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY ARSENAL, ALONG WITH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AS A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY FOCUS AREA.
THERE
WERE TWO DOGS THAT DIDN'T BARK: THE
POWERS OF THE DCI, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE BILLET.
TO
THE FIRST-IT'S NOT THAT WE DIDN'T ADDRESS IT, ONLY THAT IN THE
END WE COULD NOT FIND AGREEABLE, COMMON GROUND. SINCE
YOU INVITED ME HERE TODAY, AND NOT THE REST OF THE COMMISSIONERS,
I'LL TELL YOU WHAT MY POSITION WAS-AND IS: IF
THE DCI, OR NOW THE NID OR THE DNI IF THAT IS TO BE OUR FATE,
IS TRULY TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THIS NATION'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS,
THEN HE/SHE MUST BE ABLE TO DIRECT THOSE ELEMENTS ON WHICH THE
BROAD USER COMMUNITY IS DEPENDENT. BY DIRECTION, I MEAN: RESOURCE ALLOCATION-BUDGETS-MANPOWER-REQUIREMENTS.
AT
THE TIME WE STRUGGLED WITH THIS ISSUE, THE DCI OF COURSE ALREADY
CONTROLLED CIA, BUT OUR ANALYTICAL TEAM THOUGHT HE NEEDED MORE
CONTROL OVER THAT PORTION OF THE BUDGET THAT RESIDED IN DOD. THE
ARGUMENT THEN WAS BASED ON THE NOTION THAT THE NON-DOD USER COMMUNITY
WAS INCREASING FOR SOME DOD PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF NSA,
AND IN THE WORLD WE SAW COMING THAT FRACTION WOULD ONLY CONTINUE
TO INCREASE. THE ARGUMENT
IS EVEN MORE OBVIOUS TODAY, AND I WOULD PROBABLY TRANSFER CONTROL
OF NGA AND THE NRO, AS WELL AS NSA, TO THE NID. PURELY DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS DIA,
INR AT STATE, SERVICE INTELL ORGANIZATIONS, ETC SHOULD STAY RIGHT
WHERE THEY ARE. THESE
ARE THE ONLY ORGANIZATION FIXES WE CONTEMPLATED, AND INDEED REORGANIZATION
WILL NOT FIX WHAT'S WRONG TODAY. I
AGREE WITH A RECENT STATEMENT BY DR. FALKENRATH (Richard A.
Falkenrath, formerly Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor,
Homeland Security Council) THAT OUR RECENT INTELLIGENCE
FAILURES WERE DUE TO PERFORMANCE, NOT ORGANIZATION.
MY
LAST ISSUE IS A TOUGH ONE, AND HAS NOT, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, APPEARED
IN THE CURRENT DEBATE. IN FACT, I MAY BE THE ONLY ONE WHO IS WORRYING
ABOUT IT, THOUGH I THINK OTHERS MAY IF THEY START THINKING ABOUT
IT, AND THAT IS THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR.
THE
PRESIDENT'S CHIEF MILITARY ADVISOR IS A MILITARY PROFESSIONAL,
STANDING AT THE VERY TOP OF THE ENTIRE PROFESSION OF ARMS. WE
PUT ONLY PROFESSIONALS INTO THAT POSITION, AND IN FACT OUR LAW
REQUIRES THAT ONLY ONE WHO HAS SERVED AS A SERVICE CHIEF, VICE
CHAIRMAN, OR COMMANDER OF A UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMAND CAN
HOLD THE POSITION. NOT
SO, FOR THE PERSON WHO STANDS AT THE TOP TO THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION, AND SERVES AS THE PRINCIPAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR INTELLIGENCE.
AFTER
1947, AS A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BEGAN TO BE DEVELOPED,
PROFESSIONALS WERE PLACED IN CHARGE. THE
FIRST FEW WERE MILITARY PROFESSIONALS SINCE THERE WERE NO INTELLIGENCE
PROFESSIONALS AT THE TIME. WHEN
EISENHOWER CAME TO OFFICE THE FIRST CIVILIAN WAS APPOINTED WHO,
THOUGH NOT A PROFESSIONAL, HAD SENIOR LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE IN
A WARTIME AD HOC INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.
IN THE YEARS SINCE, WITH OCCASIONAL EXCEPTION,
A TREND OF PLACING NON-PROFESSIONALS IN THE POSITION HAS EVOLVED: LAWYERS, BUSNINESSMEN, ACADEMICS, CONGRESSIONAL
STAFFERS, POLITICIANS, AND THE LIKE, AND INDEED THERE IS NOTHING
IN LAW THAT REQUIRES PROFESSIONALISM, OR EVEN NATIONAL SECURITY
EXPERIENCE. THE PRESIDENT
CAN CHOOSE WHOMEVER HE WANTS, AND THOUGH YOUR CONSENT IS REQUIRED,
I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY OCCASION WHEN THE SENATE OBJECTED TO A
NOMINEE ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS. SHOULD
YOU?
IT IS NOT JUST BECAUSE THE INTELLIGENCE
DISCIPLINE, THE SCIENCE, THE ART, INDEED THE CRAFT OF IT ARE
SO SPECIALIZED AND COMPLEX THAT, LIKE THE MILITARY, BEGS FOR
DEPTH OF PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE IN THE ONE WHO IS TO LEAD, BUT
IT IS ALSO THE SPECIAL ETHOS OF THE PROFESSIONAL THAT HELPS
THE PERSON STAND APART FROM THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT
INEVITABLY SURROUNDS EVERY PRESIDENTIAL POLICY CHOICE. THOSE WHO SERVE AT THE PLEASURE OF A PRESIDENT,
FOR AN EXPECTED TERM LIMITED TO HIS, WHO COME TO OFFICE PRECISELY
BECAUSE OF SHARED POLITICS AND POLITICAL RELIABILITY, COME-I
SHOULD THINK-UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE OR TEMPTATION TO GIVE
THE PRESIDENT WHAT HE WANTS RATHER THAN WHAT HE DOESN'T WANT
BUT NEEDS; AND WHEN THAT SERVANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SELECTING
THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO GIVE HIS PRESIDENT, I THINK I'D
PREFER A PROFESSIONAL TO A POLITICAL APPOINTEE-WITH AS MUCH
INDEPENDENCE AND JOB SECURITY AS POSSIBLE.
IT
IS WITHOUT IMPUGNING ANYONE WHO HAS EVER HELD THE DCI BILLET,
OR IS ABOUT TO, THAT I ADVANCE THIS IDEA. I
WILL DEVELOP IT FURTHER IN THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD IF
YOU WISH.
I'LL
BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.