|
20 August 1999: Link to follow-up STOA reports on "Development
of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (an
appraisal of technologies of political control)," April and May, 1999
20 October 1998: Link to September
1998 update (101K)
4 February 1998
Source: Hardcopy from STOA, Luxembourg
Thanks to Axel Horns, Ulf Möller and STOA
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
_________________________________________
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT
STOA
AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES
OF POLITICAL CONTROL
|
Working document
(Consultation version)
Luxembourg, 6 January 1998
PE 166 499
Directorate General for Research
| Cataloguing data: |
|
| Title: |
An appraisal of technologies for political control |
| Publisher: |
European Parliament
Directorate General for Research
Directorate B
The STOA Programme |
| Author: |
Mr. Steve Wright - Omega Foundation - Manchester |
| Editor: |
Mr. Dick Holdsworth
Head of STOA Unit |
| Date: |
6 January 1998 |
| PE Number: |
PE 166 499 |
|
|
| This document is a working document. The current version
is being circulated for consultation. It is not an official publication
of STOA or of the European Parliament. |
| This document does not necessarily represent the views
of the European Parliament. |
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL
ABSTRACT
The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of
the European Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology
of political control; (ii) to identify, analyse and describe the current
state of the art of the most salient developments; (iii) to present members
with an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv)
to develop policy recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control.
The report contains seven substantive sections which cover respectively:
(i) The role and function of the technology of political control;
(ii) Recent trends and innovations (including the implications of globalisation,
militarisation of police equipment, convergence of control systems deployed
worldwide and the implications of increasing technology and decision drift);
(iii) Developments in surveillance technology (including the emergence
of new forms of local, national and international communications interceptions
networks and the creation of human recognition and tracking devices);
(iv) Innovations in crowd control weapons (including the evolution of
a 2nd. generation of so called 'less-lethal weapons' from nuclear labs
in the USA).
(v) The emergence of prisoner control as a privatised industry, whilst
state prisons face increasing pressure to substitute technology for staff
in cost cutting exercises and the social and political implications of
replacing policies of rehabilitation with strategies of human warehousing.
(v) The use of science and technology to devise new efficient mark-free
interrogation and torture technologies and their proliferation from the
US & Europe.
(vi) The implications of vertical and horizontal proliferation of this
technology and the need for an adequate political response by the EU,
to ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches
the hands of tyrants.
The report makes a series of policy recommendations including the need
for appropriate codes of practice. It ends by proposing specific areas
where further research is needed to make such regulatory controls effective.
The report includes a comprehensive bibliographical survey of some of
the most relevant literature.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objectives of this report are fourfold: (i) to provide Members of
the European Parliament with a guide to recent advances in the technology
of political control; (ii) to identify. analyze and describe the current
state of the art of the most salient developments; (iii) to present members
with an account of current trends, both in Europe and Worldwide; and (iv)
to develop policy recommendations covering regulatory strategies for their
management and future control. The report includes a large selection of
illustrations to provide Members of Parliament with a good idea of the
scope of current technology together with a representative flavour of
what lies on the horizon. The report contains seven substantive sections,
which can be summarised as follows:
THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
This section takes into account the multi-functionality of much of this
technology and its role in yielding an extension of the scope, efficiency
and growth of policing power. It identifies the continuum of control which
stretches from modem law enforcement to advanced state suppression, the
difference being the level of democratic accountability in the manner
in which such technologies are applied.
RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS
Taking into account the problems of regulation and control and the potential
possessed by some of these technologies to undermine international human
rights legislation, the section examines recent trends and innovations.
This section covers the trend towards militarisation of the police technologies
and the paramilitarisation of military technologies with an overall technological
and decision drift towards worldwide convergence of nearly all the technologies
of political control. Specific advances in area denial, identity recognition,
surveillance systems based on neural networks, discreet order vehicles,
new arrest and restraint methods and the emergence of so called 'less
lethal weapons' are presented. The section also looks at a darker side
of technological development including the rise of more powerful restraint,
torture, killing and execution technologies and the role of privatised
enterprises in promoting it.
The EU is recommended to: (i) develop appropriate structures of accountability
to prevent undesirable innovations emerging via processes of technological
creep or decision drift; (ii) ensure that the process of adopting new
systems for use in internal social and political control is transparent,
open to appropriate political scrutiny and subject to democratic change
should unwanted or unanticipated consequences emerge; (iii) prohibit,
or subject to stringent and democratic controls, any class of technology
which has been shown in the past to be excessively injurious, cruel, inhumane
or indiscriminate in its effects.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
This section addresses the rapid and virtually unchecked proliferation
of surveillance devices and capacity amongst both the private and public
sectors. It discusses recent innovations which allow bugging, telephone
monitoring, visual surveillance during night or day over large distances
and the emergence of new forms of local, national and international communications
interceptions networks and the creation of human recognition and tracking
devices.
The EU is recommended to subject all surveillance technologies, operations
and practices to: (i) procedures ensuring democratic accountability; (ii)
proper codes of practice consistent with Data protection legislation to
prevent malpractice or abuse; (iii) agreed criteria on what constitutes
legitimate surveillance targets, and what does not, and how such surveillance
data is stored, processed and shared. These controls should be more effectively
targeted at malpractice or illegal tapping by private companies and regulation
further tightened to include additional safeguards against abuse as well
as appropriate financial redress.
The report discusses a massive telecommunications interceptions network
operating within Europe and targeting the telephone, fax and email messages
of private citizens, politicians, trade unionists and companies alike.
This global surveillance machinery (which is partially controlled by foreign
intelligence agencies from outside of Europe) has never been subject to
proper parliamentary discussion on its role and function, or the need
for limits to be put on the scope and extent of its activities. This section
suggests that that time has now arrived and proposes a series of measures
to initiate this process of reclaiming democratic accountability over
such systems. It is suggested that all telephone interceptions by Member
States should be subject to consistent criteria and procedures of public
accountability and codes of practice. These should equally apply to devices
which automatically create profiles of telephone calls and pattern analysis
and require similar legal requirements to those applied for telephone
or fax interception.
It is suggested that the rapid proliferation of CCTV systems in many
Member States should be subject to a common and consistent set of codes
of practice to ensure that such systems are used for the purpose for which
they were authorised, that there is an effective assessment and audit
of their use annually and an adequate complaints system is in place to
deal with any grievances by ordinary people. The report recommends that
such codes of practice anticipate technical change including the digital
revolution which is currently in process, and ensure that each and every
such advance is subject to a formal assessment of both the expected as
well as the possible unforeseen implications.
INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS
This section addresses the evolution of new crowd control weapons, their
legitimation, biomedical and political effects. It examines the specific
introduction of new chemical, kinetic and electrical weapons, the level
of accountability in the decision making and the political use of such
technologies to disguise the level of violence being deployed by state
security forces. The research used to justify the introduction of such
technologies as safe is reanalysed and found to be wanting. Areas covered
in more depth include CS and OC gas sprays, rubber and plastic bullets,
multi-purpose riot tanks, and the facility of such technologies to exact
punishment, with the possibility that they may also bring about anti-state
retaliatory aggression which can further destabilise political conflict.
This section briefly analyses recent innovations in crowd control weapons
(including the evolution of a 2nd. generation of so called 'less-lethal
weapons' from nuclear labs in the USA) and concludes that they are dubious
weapons based on dubious and secret research. The Commission should be
requested to report to Parliament on the existence of formal liaison arrangements
between the EU and the USA to introduce such weapons for use in streets
and prisons here. The EU is also recommended to (i) establish objective
common criteria for assessing the biomedical effects of all so called
less lethal weapons and ensure any future authorization is based on independent
research; (ii) ensure that all research used to justify the deployment
of any new crowd control weapon in the EU is published in the open scientific
press and subject to independent scientific scrutiny, before any authorization
is given to deploy. In the meantime the Parliament is asked to reaffirm
its current ban on plastic bullets and that all deployment of devices
using peppergas (OC) be halted until such a time as independent European
research on its risks has been undertaken and published.
NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS
This section reports on the emergence of prisoner control as a privatised
industry, whilst state prisons face increasing pressure to substitute
technology for staff in cost cutting exercises. It expresses concern about
the social and political implications of replacing policies of rehabilitation
with strategies of human warehousing and recommends common criteria for
licensing all public and private prisons within the EU. At minimum this
should cover operators responsibilities and prisoners rights in regard
to rehabilitation requirements; UN Minimum Treatment of Prisoners rules
banning the use of leg irons; the regulation and use of psychotropic drugs
to control prisoners; the use of riot control, prisoner transport, restraint
and extraction technologies. The report recommends a ban on (i) all automatic,
mass. indiscriminate prisoner punishment technologies using less lethal
instruments such as chemical
irritant or baton rounds; (ii) kill fencing and lethal area denial systems;
and (iii) all use of electro-shock, stun and electric restraint technology
until and unless independent medical evidence can prove that it safe and
will not contribute to either deaths in custody or inhumane treatment,
torture or other cruel and unusual punishments.
INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES
This section discusses the use of science and technology to devise new
efficient mark-free interrogation and torture technologies and their proliferation
from the US & Europe. Of particular concern is the use and abuse of
electroshock devices and their proliferation. It is recommended that the
commercial sale of both training in counter terror operations and any
equipment which might be used in torture and execution, should be controlled
by the criteria and measures outlined in the next section.
REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION
The implications for civil liberties and human rights of both the vertical
and horizontal proliferation of this technology are literally awesome.
There is a pressing need for an adequate political response by the EU,
to ensure it neither threatens civil liberties in Europe, nor reaches
the hands of tyrants. The European Council agreed in Luxembourg in 1991
and in Lisbon in 1992 a set of eight Common Criteria for Arms Exports
which set out conditions which should govern all decisions relating to
the issue of licences for the export of arms and ammunition, one condition
of which was "the respect of human rights in the country of final destination."
Other conditions also relate to the overall protection of human rights.
However these eight criteria are not binding on member states and there
is no common interpretation on how they should be most effectively implemented.
However, a code of conduct to achieve such an agreement was drawn up and
endorsed by over 1000 Non-Governmental Organizations based in the European
Union.
Whilst it is recognised that it is not the role of existing EU institutions
to implement such measures as vetting and issuing of export licences,
which are undertaken by national agencies of the EU Member States, it
has been suggested by Amnesty International that the joint action procedure
which was used to establish EU regulations on Export of Dual use equipment
could be used to take such a code of practice further.
Amnesty suggest that the EU Member States should use the Joint Action
procedures to draw up common lists of (i) proscribed military, security
and police equipment and technology, the sole or primary use of which
is to contribute to human rights violations; (ii) sensitive types of military,
security or police equipment and technology which has been shown in practice
to be used for human rights violations; and (iii) military, security and
police units and forces which have been sufficiently responsible for human
rights violations and to whom sensitive goods and services should not
be provided. The report makes recommendations to help facilitate this
objective of denying repressive regimes access to advanced repression
technologies made or supplied from Europe.
FURTHER RESEARCH
The report concludes by proposing a series of areas where new research
is required including: (i) advanced area denial and less-lethal weapon
systems; (ii) human identity recognition and tracking technologies; (iii)
the deployment of 'dum-dum' ammunition within the EU; (iv) the constitutional
issues raised by the U.S. National Security Agency's access and facility
to intercept all European telecommunications; (v) the social and political
implications of further privatisation of the technologies of political
control and (vi) the extent to which European based companies have been
complicit in supplying equipment used for torture or other human rights
violations and what new independent measures might be instituted to track
such transfers.
CONTENTS
Whilst sole responsibility for the accuracy and contents of this study
rest with the authors, the Omega Foundation would like to thank the following
individuals and organisations for providing information and assistance
to compile this report:
Professor Jonathan Rosenhead of the London School of Economics, London,
U.K; Simon Davies and David Banisar of the London and Washington branches
of Privacy International; Tony Bunyan & Trevor Hemmings of Statewatch,
London; John Stevenson, House of Commons, London; Julian Perry Robinson
of Sussex University; Detlef Nogala of the University of Hamburg; Heiner
Busch Of CILIP, Berlin; Hilary Kitchin of the Local Government Information
Unit, London; The Committee For The Administration of Justice, Belfast;
David Eisenberg, Center For Defense Information, Washington; Terry Allen
of Covert Action Quarterly, Washington; Brian Wood of the International
Secretariat of Amnesty International, London; Kate O'Malley of Amnesty
International U.K. Section London; Human Rights Watch, Washington; Lora
Lumpe and Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, Washington;
Brian Martin of the University of Wollongong, Australia; Cathy Rodgers
of RDF Films, London; Martyn Gregory Films, London and Dr. Ray Downs,
Program Manager of Technology Development, U.S. National Institute for
Justice, Washington.
Thanks are due to the Press officers serving the Northern Ireland Office,
the British Army and RUC Information Offices between 1976 - 1982, who
provided the comprehensive statistical data required to perform the quantitative
analysis outlined in section 5.
We would also like to thank David Hoffman for permission to use many
of the black and white images used to illustrate the text.
| Chart |
Title |
Page
No. |
| 1 |
Declining Legitimacy and Repressive State Violence |
5 |
| 2 |
The Pattern of Revolution |
7 |
| 3 |
The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents |
12 |
| 4 |
Comparative Impact Effects of Various 'Less Lethal' Kinetic Impact
Weapons |
13 |
| 5 |
US Human Engineering Laboratory Technology Assessment of Various
'Less Lethal' Kinetic Weapons |
26 |
| 6 |
Trends in Riot Weapon Use in Northern Ireland from 1969-1986 |
27 |
| 7 |
Impact of Introduction of New Riot Weapons on the Level of Political
Killings in Northern Ireland |
28 |
| 8 |
Structure of Riot Weapon Use |
29 |
| 9 |
Multi Variant Time Series Analysis of Northern Irish Conflict 1976-1981 |
30 |
| 10 |
Biderman's Chart of Coercion |
48 |
| 11 |
Pre-Interrogation Treatment Used on Detainees |
49 |
| 12 |
Techniques used by the British Army in Northern Ireland to Mimic
Sensory Deprivation |
50 |
| 13 |
Police Torture Exports Licensed by the US Commerce Department 1991-1993 |
56 |
Table of Figures
[JYA Note: Figures were not provided with the report]
Section 3. Recent Trends and Innovations
1 Public Order - Tactical Options
2 Convergence of Police and Military Systems
3 Interception - Punishment
4 Cochrane Area Denial
5 Fingerprint Recognition Systems
6 Night Vision. From Vietnam to Belfast
7 Discreet Order Vehicles
8 New Arrest & Restraint Methods
9 Convergence and Riot Technology
10 Insect Like Images of Riot Police
11 US Peppergas Adverts
12 'Dum Dum' ammunition and effects
13 Wound effects of expanding ammunition
14 Frag 12. Pre-fragmented exploding ammunition
15 Typical forms of execution technology
16 Targetted Execution Technology
17 Special Force Killing
Section 4. Developments in Surveillance Technology
18 Parabolic Microphone
19 JAI Stroboscopic Cameras
20 Automated Vehicle Recognition Systems
21 US Made cameras in Tiananmen Square
22 CCTV in Tibet
23 Video Capture/Video Fit
24 Taps and Bugs
25 US/UK NSA European Communication Interception Network
Section 5. Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons
26 The Philosophy of Crowd Control Weapons
27 Israeli and Chinese Riot Weapons
28 Chemical Spray Backpack & Effects
|
Table of Figures (contd.)
Section 5. Contd.
29 Crowd Dispersion and Capture
30 French patients suffering severe burns from CS sprays
31 Capstun OC & Manufacture
32 British and German riot guns used in Northern Ireland
33 Injector Weapons
34 2nd Generation Less Lethal Weapons
35 Sticky Foam
36 Laser weapon systems
Section 6. New Prison Control Systems
37 Prison Control Technology
Section 7. Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technology
38 Redress Trust Map of Torture States
39 Restraining Technology. Hiatt Leg Irons. Chinese Thumb Cuffs
40 British and Chinese Thumb Cuffs & Leg Irons
41 House of Fun
42 Hand Held Electro-shock Weapon
43 Electronic Shield
44 Taser Gun and Dart H
45 Tibetan Monk Palden Gyatso
46 Torture Techniques use in Uruguay
47 Chilean Torture Technique 1
48 Chilean Torture Technique 2
49 US Counter Insurgency Training at the School of the Americas
50 Chinese Electro-shock manufacture and quality control
51 Electro-shock weapons on display at Chinese Security Fairs
|
Table of Figures (contd.)
Section 8. Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation
52 Arwen Riot Control Weapon on display at COPEX
53 Electro-shock weapons offered at European Security Fairs
54 Supplying the security needs of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America
55 Ispra Gas Riot Packs
56 SAE Alsetex Back Pack + on display at IDEF Military Exhibition
in Turkey, 1995
57 Foreign Internal Security Equipment on display at IDEF 1995
(Turkey)
|
AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL
PROJECT No I/STOA/RSCH/LP/POLITCON.1
The purpose of this report is to explore the most recent developments
in the technology of political control and the major consequences associated
with their integration into processes and strategies of policing and internal
control. A brief look at the historical development of this concept is
instructive.
Twenty five years ago, the British Society for Social Responsibility
in Science warned that a new technology of repression was being spawned
in an effort to contain the conflict in Northern Ireland. (B.S.S.R.S.,
1972). In 1977, members of BSSRS took this concept further in a seminal
work, the Technology of Political Control (Ackroyd et. al., 1977). BSSRS
analysed the role and function of this technology in terms of a new apparatus
largely created as a result of research and development undertaken as
part of Britain's colonial wars, (most recently in the ongoing Northern
Ireland conflict), and whose main purpose was quelling internal dissent.
According to critical U.S. NGO research organisations of that period such
as NARMIC & NACLA, work on this technology of political control was
further enhanced by technical developments achieved by the United States'
military industrial complex, largely as a result of the extended global
military interests of the U.S., and its deployment of highly technocratic
counter-insurgency doctrines, particularly during the.Vietnam War.1
Up until that period, shrewd commentators on technology and society
such as Haabermas Ellul (1964) recognised the potential risk of a specific
loss of traditional freedoms and civil liberties associated with broad
technological advances in the future, such as surveillance. However, BSSRS
was the first group of scientists and technologists to identify and characterise
a whole class of technology whose principal designated function was to
achieve social and political control.
In Ackroyd et. al (1977), BSSRS. defined the technology of political
control as "a new type of weaponry." "It is the product of the application
of science and technology to the problem of neutralising the state's internal
enemies. It is mainly directed at civilian populations, and is not intended
to kill (and only rarely does). It is aimed as much at hearts and minds
as at bodies." For BSSRS, "This new weaponry ranges from means of monitoring
internal dissent to devices for controlling demonstrations; from new techniques
of interrogation to methods of prisoner control. The intended and actual
effects of these new technological aids are both broader and more complex
than the more lethal weaponry they complement."
The concept of technology has many and varied interpretations. As emphasised
in the interim report (Omega 1996), the definition adopted for the purposes
of this work encompasses not just the 'hardware' - the tools, instruments,
machines, appliances, weapons and gadgets (i.e. the apparatus of technical
performance); but also the associated standard operating procedures, routines,
skills, techniques (the software); and the related forms of rationalised
human social organisations, arrangements, systems and networks (the liveware)
of any programme of political control.2 In
other words, it is insufficient to describe developments in a purely technical
sense, it is also necessary to consider these technologies as social and
political factors.3
1
When first published in 1977, 'The Technology of Political Control'
anticipated that the deployment of these technologies in Northern Ireland,
which acted as a laboratory for their future development, would spread
to mainland Britain. For BSSRS, governments would no longer reach for
the machine gun when threatened at home. It will have plastic bullets
which kill only occasionally, depth interrogation which tortures without
leaving physical scars. It uses electronics for telephone tapping and
night surveillance; computers to build files on actual or potential dissidents.
NARMIC also warned that this technology was not just reserved for low
intensity conflicts overseas but would return to be used to quell dissent
on the homefront.(NARMlC, 1971) Little by little this has happened.
There have been quite awesome changes in the technologies available
to states for internal control since the first BSSRS publication, a quarter
of a century ago. So many new technologies have been created that specialist
publications have emerged to service the burgeoning market.4
In the limited space available here, it is not possible to describe all
the many new technologies which have been developed. However, a broad
selection of illustrations have been incorporated (at the end of the report),
to give MEPs a good idea of the scope of the current technology and a
representative flavour of what lies on the horizon. An extensive bibliography
has been provided for those Members of the European Parliament wishing
to explore specific areas and implications in more depth.5
For the purposes of this report and its focus on appraising subsequent
developments in the technology of political control, it is worth focussing
on the same areas of Technology covered by BSSRS, which have not already
been the subject of recent STOA reports. Whilst the need to examine the
critical role of Northern Ireland in the evolution of some of these technologies
makes the overall assessment somewhat anglo-centric, every effort has
been made to show evidence of the proliferation and impact of this technology
in other European countries and worldwide by naming the actual companies
and corporations involved in both manufacture and supply.
Taking into account the multi-functionality of much of this technology,
Section 2. of this report explores its role and function and the continuum
of control which stretches from modern law enforcement to advanced state
suppression. With specific reference to problems of regulation and control
and the potential some of these technologies present for undermining international
human rights legislation, Section 3. provides a analysis of recent trends
and innovations. Section 4. explores current developments In surveillance
technology, from bugs and wiretapping to new global systems of mass supervision
and telecommunications surveillance already approved by the European Union.
Section 5. discusses the political and biomedical implications of innovations
in crowd control weapons including the prospect of a 2nd. generation of
paralysing and disabling technologies currently being developed by former
US nuclear weapons laboratories, together with the secret arrangements
to incorporate such technologies into EU policing practices and export
markets. Section 6. is devoted to the emergence of new prison control
systems and the prospects of privatised multinational prison corporations
transforming crime control into industry. Section 7. presents evidence
of Research & Development devoted to the creation of new interrogation,
torture techniques & technologies which leave few marks and the growing
role of EU member states and their allies in creating export markets for
supplying this equipment to tyrannical states.
The report ends with an examination of the whole question of future
regulation of the vertical & horizontal proliferation of this dual
use technology, in the face of relatively weak
2
democratic controls on its manufacture, deployment and export. Some
of these technologies are highly sensitive politically and without proper
regulation can threaten or undermine many of the human rights enshrined
in international law, such as the rights of assembly, privacy, due process,
freedom of political and cultural expression and protection from torture,
arbitrary arrest, cruel and inhumane punishments and extra-judicial execution.
Proper oversight of developments in political control technologies is
further complicated by the phenomena of 'bureaucratic capture' where senior
officials control their ministers rather than the other way round Politicians
both at European and sovereign state level, whom citizens of the community
have presumed will be monitoring any excesses or abuse of this technology
on their behalf, are sometimes systematically denied the information they
require to do that job. Therefore possible areas of policy change are
presented at the end of each section, which could bring much of this technology
back within the reach of democratic control and accountability, as well
as suggesting some further areas of future research.
Throughout the Nineties, many governments have spent huge sums on the
research, development, procurement and deployment of new technology for
their police, para-military and internal security forces.6
The objective of this development work has been to increase and enhance
each agency's policing capacities. A dominant assumption behind this technocratisation
of the policing process, is the belief that it has created both a faster
policing response time and a greater cost-effectiveness. The main aim
of all this effort has been to save policing resources by either automating
certain control, amplifying the rate of particular activities, or decreasing
the number of officers required to perform them.7
The resultant innovations in the technology of political control have
been functionally designed to yield an extension of the scope, efficiency
and growth of policing power. The extent to which this process can be
judged to be a legitimate one depends both on one's point of view and
the level of secrecy and accountability built into the overall procurement
and deployment procedures. There are essentially two opposing schools
of thought.
The first school of thought identifies developments in policing technology
with efficiency, cost-effectiveness and modernisation. This school believes
that the police and internal security agencies require the most up to
date forms of equipment to fight crime, mob-rule and terrorism. Sophisticated
law enforcement is viewed as value free and state security agencies are
considered to be in the best position to determine their operational requirements.
(See Applegate 1969), New technologies aid the police by ensuring that
messages are rapidly received and dealt with, personnel are freed for
other duties and overall efficiency is enhanced. Only those with something
to hide need fear the enlarged data gathering capacities of police computers.
Modern riot technology is presented as a much preferred non-lethal alternative
to the use of guns and the police should always be allowed to use 'minimum
force when dealing with actual or potential law breakers. Existing controls
and regulations governing the use of this technology are considered by
adherents of this school to have been adequately designed to ensure that
no misuse takes place. Advanced police technology is therefore understood
in this context as an invaluable aid to upholding the freedoms cherished
as inalienable rights by citizens living in Western Liberal democracies.
Its export to other countries sharing the same economic and ideological
views, is viewed as an opportunity to help modernise law enforcement and
buttress mutual stability, law and order.
3
The opposing school of thought on the other hand views police technology
and the associated 'policing revolution' quite differently (See Manwaring-White,
1983). They believe that innovations in political control technology has
put powerful new tools at the disposal of states in need of technical
fixes for their most pressing and intractable social and political problems.
It is at the point where authority fails that repression begins (Hoefnagels,
1977) and at that point an illegitimate government will use more force
just to keep the lid on.(See Chart.1a.) As the crisis deepens, further
force is required and the role of technology in such a situation is to
act as a force amplifier. Once the shaded area is reached (Chart.1b),
terror becomes the only government service.
New police technologies are perceived to be one of the most important
factors in attempting sub-state conflict control. Such 'control' is viewed
as more apparent than real, but serves the purpose of disguising the level
of coercive repression being applied. This school of thought argues that
once operationally deployed, these technologies exert a profound effect
on the character of policing. Whether these changes are symptom or cause
of the ensuing change in policing organisations, a major premise of this
school of thought is that a range of unforeseen impacts are associated
with the process of integrating these technologies into a society's social,
political and cultural control systems.
The full implications of such developments may take time to assess but
they are often more important and far reaching than the first order intended
effects. It is argued that one impact of this process is the militarisation
of the police and the para-militarisation of the army as their roles,
equipment and procedures begin to overlap. This phenomena is seen as having
far reaching consequences on the way that future episodes of sub-state
violence is handled, and influencing whether those involved are reconciled,
managed, repressed, 'lost' or efficiently destroyed. Police telematics
and their use of databanks (the subject of an earlier STOA report in this
area) for example, facilitate prophylactic or pre-emptive policing as
'data-veillance' is harnessed to target certain strata or classes of people
rather than resolve individual crimes. (E.g. the proposed introduction
of the Eurodac system which will utilise biometric information to control
and restrict the entry of all Asylum seekers into Europe, building in
the process a new technopolitics of exclusion).8
New surveillance technology can exert a powerful 'chill effect' on those
who might wish to take a dissenting view and few will risk exercising
their right to democratic protest if the cost is punitive riot policing
with equipment which may lead to permanent injury or loss of life. As
highlighted in the interim report, the human response to the deployment
of such technologies may be counter-intuitive and render progressive,
deployments of newer more powerful systems either obsolete or dysfunctional.
This possibility is discussed in greater detail below.
Any evaluation of these opposing schools of thought needs to identify
common ground since few would doubt that there are fundamental changes
taking place in the types of tactics techniques and technologies available
to internal security agencies for policing purposes. Yet many questions
remain unanswered, unconsidered or under-researched. Why for example did
such a transformation in the technology used for socio-political control
dramatically change over the last twenty five years? Is there any significance
in the fact that former communist regimes in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation
and continuing centralised economic systems such as China, are beginning
to adopt such technologies? What are the reasons behind a global convergence
of the technology of political control deployed in the North and South,
the East and West? What are the factors responsible for generating the
adoption of such new policing technology - was it technology push or demand
pull? What new tools for
4
Chart 1. Declining Legitimacy & Repressive State
Violence
5
policing lie on the horizon and what are the dynamics behind the process
of innovation and the need for a vast arsenal of different kinds of technology
rather than just a few? Are the many ways this technology affects the
policing process fully understood? Who controls the patterns of police
technology procurement and what are the corporate influences?
In deciding between these schools of thought, we need to determine the
extent to which future innovation is about the maintenance of existing
power relationships, rather than citizen protection In other words, the
extent to which their deployment ensures that only certain permitted ways
of behaving are allowed to continue without interference. Since this technology
provides a continuum of flexible responses or options, perhaps the overriding
factor is the extent to which its development and deployment is subject
to democratic control. Is the process of regulation democratically accountable
or are there more hidden processes at work? Do these technologies proliferate,
if so why and how and what are the most important mechanisms or processes
involved?
Since all this technology represents an unequal distribution of coercive
power, it is important for Members of the European Parliament to be satisfied
that sufficient democratic control is exercised to ensure that such powers
are not abused and that unwanted technological and decision drift is adequately
checked. Whilst the Interim Report (Omega, 1996) provided a brief analysis
of the role and function of specific classes of political control technology,
what follows is an analysis of the state of the art in certain key areas
of this technology which the authors believe warrant further scrutiny.
Since the 'Technology of Political Control' was first written (Ackroyd
et al.,1977) there has been a profusion of technological innovations for
police, paramilitary, intelligence and internal security forces. Many
of these are simple advances on the technologies available in the 1970's.
Others such as automatic telephone tapping, voice recognition and electronic
tagging were not envisaged by the original BSSRS authors since they did
not think that the computing power needed for a national monitoring system
was feasible. The overall drift of this technology is to increase the
power and reliability of the policing process, either enhancing the individual
power of police operatives, replacing personnel with less expensive machines
to monitor activity or to automate certain police monitoring, detection
and communication facilities completely. A massive Police Industrial Complex
has been spawned to service the needs of police, paramilitary and security
forces, evidenced by the number of companies now active in the market.9
An overall trend is towards globalisation of these technologies and a
drift to increasing proliferation, without much regard to local conditions.
One core trend has been towards a militarisation of the police and a
paramilitarisation of military forces in Europe. Often this begins via
special units involved in crisis policing, such as the Special Weapons
and Tactics Squads such as the Grenz Schutz Gruppe in Germany; the Gendarmeries
National in France; the Carabinieri in Italy; and the Special Patrol Group
in the UK or the federal police paramilitary teams in the United States
(FBI, DEA & BATF) that adopt the same weaponry as their military counterparts.
Then a growing percentage of ordinary police are trained in public order
duties and tactics which incorporate some element of firearms training.
The tactical training is often a mirror image of the low intensity counter-revolutionary
warfare tactics adopted by the military (See Chart 2). In Britain, where
10% of police on a revolving basis train according to a military style
manual,
6
|
Insurgent Phases
|
Sequence of Insurgent Action
|
Counter Action
|
Communist Concept
(Based on Sino-
Japanese War 1937) |
British
Interpretation |
With Aim of Achieving Revolution
|
By security force
|
'Passive'
[Organizational] |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Preparatory |
Activity by anti-government organisations, including political agitation
and manoevering propaganda activities. Formation of cells & cadres,
(political, intelligence and military), and civil and industrial unrest.
Infiltration into positions of authority. In general covert preparations
by those whose aim is to achieve a revolution. Any overt military
preparations take place in the remotest areas. |
1. |
Civil &
Law
Enforcement
Activity |
Active
Resistance
[Terrorism]
|
Civil disobedience, disturbances, riots, strikes, lawlessness. Sabotage,
particularly against communications. Assassinations, coercion and
terrorism on a limited scale. Use of propaganda & psychological
means to discredit the government.
Ambushes and minor insurgent activity on a limited scale. Increased
terrorism, a climate of dissidence, civil and industrial disobedience
is engendered.
|
2. |
Internal
Security
Operations |
'Active'
[Direct
Action] |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Insurgency
[Guerilla
Warfare]
|
Operations involving the use of guerrilla tactics by local formed
units have resulted in the guerillas gaining control over parts of
the country. Insurgent bases are established in relatively safe areas.
Increased activity in daylight. More ambitious operations by formed
units with some perhaps from a neighbouring country.
A whole series of operations ranging up to actions between formed
units with a simultaneous situation of widespread guerrilla activity.
Areas dominated by guerrillas may be enlarged and declared liberated.
|
3. |
Counter
Insurgency
Operations |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Open Offensive |
As above but having escalated to include regular land and perhaps
sea and air forces of the opposing sides. The revolutionary movement
now assumes the form of a peoples war against the government. Large
areas dominated by the guerrillas. |
4. |
Almost
using
the
techniques
of Limited
War |
Counter
Offensive |
Decision |
Negotiations leading to a cessation of hostilities with the revolutionaries
either in a position to achieve their aim without further fighting
or with the legal government back in control. |
|
|
Chart 2. The Pattern of Revolution
7
'Public Order - Tactical Options' using batons, shields and colonial
style military wedges (See Fig.1[No figures provided with report])
(Northam, 1988). In the US, one study uncovered a pattern of former and
reserve soldiers being intimately involved in police operations with almost
46% of trainees drawing expertise from "police officers with special operations
in the military." (Krasker & Kapella, 1997).
In some European countries, that trend is reversed, e.g. Last year,
the Swiss government (Federal Council and the Military Department) made
plans to re-equip the Swiss Army Ordungsdienst with 118 million Swiss
Francs of less-lethal weapons for action within the country in times of
crisis. (These include 12 tanks, armoured vehicles, tear gas, rubber shot
and handcuffs). The decision was made by decree preventing any discussion
or intervention. Their role will be to help police large scale demonstrations
or riots and to police frontiers to 'prevent streams of refugees coming
into Switzerland'.10 A disturbing case of
police deploying riot weapons against a peaceful festival occurred last
year in Zurich on 1 May, using water cannon laced with CN irritant and
rubber bullets below the advised 20 metres threshold, shows the process
of convergence well.11
Convergence is the process whereby the technology used by police and
the military for internal security operations converges towards being
more or less indistinguishable. The term also describes the trend towards
a universal adoption of similar types of technologies by most states for
internal security and policing. Security companies now produce weapons
and communications systems for both military and the police.(Fig.2). Such
systems increasingly represent the muscle and the nervous system of public
order squads. For example, according to BSSRS(1985), GCHQ's telephone
interception network was used to track UK miners during the 1984-5 strike,
so that when miner's cars were stopped, police knew who they were and
punishment or dissuasion could be targeted appropriately.(See Fig.3)
3.1 Area Denial replaces personnel guarding either areas or perimeters.
It has involved deploying technology which can either create punishment
when its limits are infringed or systems with built in intelligence which
can both locate the point of infringement and activate a corrective response.12
Sophisticated varieties incorporate punishment mechanisms which vary from
pain induced by electroshock to kill fences and fragmentation mines. Many
European companies make electrified razor coil stun fences e.g. Bollore,
Cogny & Santerne in France; Birmingham Barbed Tape, Gallagher and
Armbell, in UK; Reinaet Electronics in the Netherlands. Many South African
companies remain in the market from the 'snake of fire' days, e.g., Edair;
Grinaker; Microfence.13 Nowadays, the South
African Government has introduced new regulations on the maximum voltage
for stun fences and new criteria for not mixing barbed wire and stun capacities
- if snagged a victim can't be repelled and continues receiving current.
Europe needs to adopt best practice in this regard. It would also be useful
if existing research justifying company claims for sub-lethality of stun
fences should be made public. These systems are not cattle fences and
the same criteria cannot be used.
Neural networks with semi-intelligence are being introduced to protect
sensitive control zones. Systems produced by companies, such as Productivity
Systems in France and Cambridge Neurodynamics in the UK, can allow pattern
recognition and an ability to learn. Neural systems will play an increasing
role in sentinel duties as robot technology improves Already prototypes
known as insectoids are being evolved to cheaply replace personnel on
routine guard duties that require 24 hours cover and can be programmed
to track the fence and carry either lethal or sub-lethal weapons (Knoth,
1994).
8
The Non-lethal Warfare programmes discussed in 5.6 below are also exploring
area denial technology. For example, Defense Week reported (19/11/96)
that Alliant Tech Systems (USA) is working on alternatives to anti-personnel
land mines. One of these is a wire barrier system dispersed by the Volcano
Mine System. The company received a 10 month contract in early August
[1996] from the Army Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center
at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. The company is still to decide what
kind of wire to use for the canister-launched area-denial weapon system,
but the general idea is that the Volcano system will shoot out thin wire
with something like fish hooks along it in enough mass to cover a soccer-field
sized area. "It's intended to snag. It's not going to kill you" said marketing
manager Tom Bierman.
3.2 Surveillance Technologies are one of the fastest growing
areas of the technology of political control and a key problem is how
to deal with the torrent of information it yields The term covers a vast
range of products and devices but the overall trend is towards miniaturization,
more precise resolution through the adoption of digital technology and
increasing automation so that the technology can be more effectively targeted.
The technology also parallels political shifts in targeting so that instead
of investigating crime, a reactive activity, the fastest growing trend
is towards tracking certain strata, social classes and races of people
living in red-lined areas before any crime is committed. Such a form of
proactive policing is based on military models of gathering huge amounts
of low grade intelligence. With new systems such as Memex, it is possible
to quickly build up a comprehensive picture of virtually anyone by gaining
electronic access to all their records, cash transactions, cars held,
etc. Such pre-emptive policing means the majority are ignored and policing
resources are more tightly focused on certain groups. Such powerful forms
of artificial intelligence need continuous assessment. They have
an important role to play in tracking criminals. The danger is that their
infrastructure is essentially a massive machinery of supervision that
can be retargeted fairly quickly should the political context change.
Automatic fingerprint readers are now common place, and many
European companies make them14 (see Fig 5).
But any unique attribute of anatomy or personal style can be used to create
a human identity recognition system. For example Cellmark Diagnostics(UK)
can recognise genes; Mastiff Security Systems(UK) can recognise
odour, Hagen Cy-Com(UK) and Eyedentify Inc.(USA) can recognise the
pattern of capillaries at the back of the retina; whilst AEA Technology
(UK) are capable of signature verification. Over 109 companies
in Europe are known to be supplying such biometric systems. DNA
fingerprinting is now a reality and Britain has set up the first DNA
databank, and is already carrying out mass dawn raids of over 1000 people
at targeted suspects.15 Plans are being drawn
up by at least one political party to DNA profile the nation from birth.16
The leading edge companies are racing towards developing face recognition
systems which they see as being able to revolutionise crime customs
and intruder detection as well as service access control. Whilst fully
reliable systems are perhaps five years off, prototype systems have been
developed in France17, Germany18
the UK19 and the USA20.
Night vision technology developed as a result of the Vietnam
war has now been adapted for police usage (See Fig.6). Particularly successful
are heli-tele surveillance versions which allow cameras to track
human heat signatures in total darkness. The art of bugging has
been made significantly easier by a rapidly advancing technology and there
is a burgeoning European market.21 Many systems
described in Section 4 (below), do not even require physical entry into
the home or office. For those who can secure access to their target room,
9
there is a plethora of devices, many pre-packaged to fit into phones,
look like cigarette packets or light fittings and some, like the ever
popular PK 805 and PK 250, that can be tuned into from a suitable radio.
However, the next generation of covert audio bugs are remotely operated,
for example the multi-room monitoring system of Lorraine Electronics called
DIAL (Direct Intelligent Access Listening) allows an operator to monitor
several rooms from anywhere in the world without effecting an illegal
entry. Up to four concealed microphones are connected to the subscribers
line and these can be remotely activated by simply making a coded telephone
call to the target building. Neural network bugs go one step further.
Built like a small cockroach, as soon as the lights go out they can crawl
to the best location for surveillance.22
In fact Japanese researchers have taken this idea one step further, controlling
and manipulating real cockroaches by implanting microprocessors and electrodes
in their bodies. The insects can be fitted with micro cameras and sensors
to reach the places other bugs can't reach.23
Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging developed by the US Millitech corporation
can scan people from up to 12 feet away and see through clothing to detect
concealed items such as weapons, packages and other contraband. Variations
of this through-clothing human screening under development (by companies
such as the US Raytheon Co.), include systems which illuminate an individual
with a low-intensity electromagnetic pulse. A three side very-low X ray
system for human useage, in fixed sites such as prisons, is being developed
by Nicolet Imaging Systems of San Diego. Electronic monitoring
of offenders or 'tagging', where the subject wears an electronic
bracelet which can detect if they have relocated from their home after
certain hours etc, has entered into use in the 1990's after being developed
to regulate prison populations in the USA. (Schmidt, 1988). Satellite
tracking of VIPs, vehicles, etc., is now facilitated by the once military
Global-Positioning System(GPS) which is now available for commercial uses.
Vehicle recognition technologies are discussed in Section 4 below.
3.3 Data-veillance - The use of telematics by the police has
revolutionised policing in the last decade and created the shift towards
pre-emptive policing. It is properly the focus of an earlier STOA report
on the technology of political control. Some of the most recent trends
are discussed in Section 4 below. A comprehensive analysis of how such
equipment has led to widespread abuse of civil liberties and human rights
has been published by Privacy International (1995) and includes 100 pages
of all the companies involved in servicing the security requirements of
the regimes mapped in Fig.38.
Using data profilers, torturing states have used these systems to compile
death lists. For example, the Tadiran computer supplied to Guatemala and
installed in the control center of the national palace. According to a
senior Guatemalan military official, "the complex contains an archive
and a computer file on journalists, students, leaders, people on the left,
politicians and so on." Meetings were held in the annex to select assassination
victims. A US priest who fled the country after appearing on such a death
list said, "They had printout lists at the border crossings and at the
airport. Once you got on that - then its like bounty hunters."24
Within Europe, systems, such as that produced by Harlequin, allow the
automatic production of maps of who phoned whom to show friendship networks.
Other companies such as Memex described above, allow entire life profiles
of virtually anyone in a state having an official existence. Photographs
and video material can be included in the record and typically up to 700
other databases can be hoovered at any one time, to extend the data profile
in real time.25 Significant changes in the
capacity of new surveillance systems can be anticipated with the advent
of new materials such as Buckminster Fullerene, which will lead to minaturisation
of systems by several orders of magnitude.26
10
3.4-Discrete Order Vehicles - Hundreds of companies are now manufacturing
police and internal security vehicles in Europe.27
The newer companies entering the market for law enforcement vehicles tend
to manufacture for both military and police purposes (e.g., armoured personnel
carriers, patrol, riot control, mobile prison, perimeter patrol etc.)
and configured to have a 'non-aggressive design'. In real terms this means
that their external appearance rather than their operational characteristics
are modified to give a non-threatening appearance. Such 'discreet order
vehicles' look benign - like ambulances, whilst retaining a retaliatory
capacity, capable of dispersing, containing or capturing dissident groups
or individuals.(See Fig.7 Savage, 1985). Some models such as the Amac
vehicle and more recently the Talon incorporate repellant electrified
panels as well as a weapons capacity such as water cannon. Such vehicles
are frequently used to seal people into a dispersal zone where the riot
squads are at work, rather than chase them out.
3.5 Less-lethal Weapons - For reasons explained more fully in
Section 5 (below), the essential role of new crowd control weapons and
tactics is to amplify the level of aggression that can be unleashed by
an individual officer. Thus the same rationale lies behind the use of
the new US side handle batons, the use of horse, riot shield charges using
riot wedges and snatch squads and the new martial arts style arrest techniques
which entered European policing training in the mid 1980's.28
(see Fig 8). The biggest growth area however, has been in what used to
be called 'non-lethal weapons.' The fact that some of these weapons kill,
blind, scalp and permanently maim led the authorities and manufacturers
to act - they came up with a new name - "less-lethal weapons" - i.e. they
only sometimes kill. Again a PR objective is catered for in the names
which sound as if the security forces are using relative restraint. Whether
it be in Belfast or Beijing, these technologies are converging around
the same design types. (See Fig 8). One of the authors of the 'Technology
of Political Control' (Ackroyd, 1977) Professor Jonathan Rosenhead, believed
that the emergence of such technology in China vindicated their original
thesis. That is, after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese authorities
needed weapons options which would not excite international criticism,
particularly when some much lucrative foreign investment was entering
the Tiger economies of the Pacific Rim.29
As described in Section 5 below, this area has seen prodigious innovation
including a second generation of new weapon types being produced in the
former nuclear weapon laboratories of the US in conjunction with big business.30
The Council for Science & Society explained the phenomenon in terms
of technological and decision drift (CSS, 1978). BSSRS argued that such
processes were integral to any attempt to apply technical fixes - an alternative
explanation is that the riot control arsenal is never complete. Much of
a weapon's effect lies in creating a sense of uncertainty.31
Even the insectoid appearance of riot squad members is part of the threat
impact despite its ostensible purpose of personal protection.(See Fig
10).
Individually these weapons are becoming more powerful, for example each
new riot agent is more powerful than the one it replaces. Thus CS is nearly
20 times more powerful than the CN it replaced; CR is more than 30 times
more powerful than CN and the newest and most aggressively marketed agent
OC, (See Fig.11), the most powerful of them all (Chart 3). Little notice
has been taken of the professional hazard assessments of the most commonly
used kinetic impact weapons deployed in Europe and USA which have consequences
in the 'dangerous or severe damage region'. (See Chart 4).
11
|
Chemical Name and
Formula
|
Code
|
Form
|
Melting
Point C°
|
Effects
|
Relative
Power
|
ICt50 (mg min/m3) (1)
|
1-Chloroacetophenone
_
// \\_C_CH2CI
\ _ / |
_ |
O
|
CN |
White Solid |
59 |
Burning sensation in the eyes. Blisters at very heavy concentration.
Salivation, nausea and headaches. |
1 |
20 |
2-Chlorobenzylidene
malonitrile
_
// \\_CH=C(CN)2
\ _ /
_ \
CI
|
CS |
White Solid |
94 |
Strong lachrymation with involuntary closing of the eyes. Burning
sensation on moist skin, 2nd degree burns. Coughing and vomiting
at higher concentrations. |
5 |
3.6 |
Dibenz (b.f.)-1,4-oxazepine
_ o
/ \/ \/ \
| | | ||
\ /\ /\\/
N=CH
|
CR |
Pale Yellow
Solid |
72 |
Very intense skin pain particularly around moist areas. Involuntary
closing of eyes resulting in temporary blindness which may induce
panic or hysteria. |
30 |
0.7 |
| Oleoresin Capsicum |
OC |
Colourless |
65 |
Uncontrollable coughing and gasping for breath. Eyes close immediately.
Loss of body motor control. Intense burning sensation on skin. Leads
to immediate incapacitation. |
Most powerful
(exact figs
unavailable) |
N/A |
| (1) ICt50 The mean incapacitating dose.
The dose that will affect 50% of the test population. |
Chart 3. The Main Chemical Riot Control Agents
12
|
Weapons (2)
|
Manufacturer
|
Country
|
Weight of
Projectile
|
Range
|
Impact Energy /
Joules (1)
|
| L5A3 Plastic Bullet |
Royal Ordinance |
UK |
135g |
25-60m |
150-210 |
| 'Cross Cartridge' |
Heckler and Koch |
Germany |
179g |
up to 30m |
above 125 |
| Flash Ball |
Verney Carron |
France |
28g |
12m |
200 |
| Jelly Baton |
Crown
Aircartridge |
Netherlands |
N/A |
N/A |
265 |
| Bean Bag |
MK Ballistics |
USA |
40g |
10-30m |
120 |
| 'Cease and Desist' |
Milstor Corp |
USA |
N/A |
Less than 18m |
130 |
| Impact Energy |
Severity of Injury |
| Under 20 Joules |
Safe/low |
| Between 40-122 Joules |
Dangerous |
| Over 122 Joules |
Severe damage region |
| Notes: |
| (1) Testing of kinetic energy projectiles was carried out at the
Aberdeen Proving Grounds in the USA in 1975 to assess their safety
and the likelihood, and type, of injuries that might result from their
use (see Technical Report Number 24-75: Evaluation of the Physiological
Effects of a Rubber Bullet, a Baseball and a Flying Baton, Wargovich,
et al., US Army Land and Warfare Laboratory, September 1975.) The
results showed that for kinetic energy projectiles at different energies
the level of injury was as shown above. (J. Rosenhead, New Scientist,
16/12/76, pp. 672-74)
(2) Information taken from manufacturers product data, updated
to modern measurement units where required.
|
Chart 4. Comparative Impact Effects of Various Kinetic
'Less Lethal' Weapons
13
3.5 Lethal Weapons - Police Forces in Europe have acquired many
of the weapons normally associated with the military i.e. hand guns, rifles
and submachine guns, e.g., the Heckler & Koch MP5. Shotguns are increasingly
favoured by police forces because their wide spread of shot enables a
blast to hit more than one target and in the US, shotguns are standard
issue for a wide range of tasks including anti-terrorist and riot control.
Indeed many shotguns and holsters specially adapted for police use have
appeared on the market. E.g., those by Ithaca, Mossberg, Remington, Sage
International and Wilson Arms. Many of these are literally sawn off shotguns
and their wider spread increases the number of likely targets. For example,
the Witness shotgun has a barrel of only 12.5 inches. Specialist shotgun
ammunition enables some of these weapons to smash the cylinder block off
a car or literally cut a human in half. The shotgun 'bolo round' advert
e.g. claims "it slices - it dices". Shotgun ammunition leaves no evidence
of what weapon was used to fire it. Similarly caseless cartridges do not
leave "a spent cartridge signature" and this has significant implications
for associating a particular weapon with a specific crime.
In theory, police weapons should have a different level of lethality
and penetration compared with those used by the military. In urban settings
there is always the risk of hitting passers-by and if a round has high
velocity and penetration, it will easily pass through an intended target
and continue penetrating walls and go on perhaps to kill innocents beyond
the observed fire zone. To obviate this problem, manufacturers are increasingly
producing hollow point, expanding, or 'dum-dum' ammunition for police
and special forces use.(See Fig 12). Paradoxically, the Hague Declaration
(IV,3) of 1989, which prohibited the use of hollow point or dum dum ammunition,
does not apply to the policing of civil conflicts. Soft nosed ammunition
which mushroom in the body, cause far more serious damage than ordinary
ammunition. Dum-dums would take an arm or a leg off, whereas ordinary
ammunition would sail through leaving a relatively clean hole.(See Fig.13).
Some these weapons like Winchester's Black Talon or the high explosive
filled pre-fragmented Frag 12 (see Fig.14) cause horrific injuries and
raise serious questions about due process and the right to a fair trial
since without immediate medical attention, a target would be effectively
an extra-judicial execution. Many companies are now producing these bullets
in Europe.
3.6 Execution technologies - The equipment illustrated in (Fig.16)
are not just museum pieces. In the USA, companies such as Leutcher Associates
Inc of Massachussetts supplies and services American gas chambers, as
well as designing, supplying and installing electric chairs, auto-injection
systems and gallows. The Leutcher lethal injection system costs approx.
$30,000 and is the cheapest system the company sells. Their electrocution
systems cost £35,000 and a gallows would cost approximately $85,000.
More and more states are opting for Leutcher's $100,000 "execution trailer"
which comes complete with a lethal injection machine, a steel holding
cell for an inmate, and separate areas for witnesses, chaplain, prison
workers and medical personnel.34 Some companies
in Europe have in the past offered to supply such devices as gallows (Michael
Huffey Ltd, UK) or tender designs for the construction of 'Libyan Rehabilitation
centre" complete with stainless steel execution bays. (Observer,
5/84). A fuller picture is unavailable, but what is known is that European
designers are tendering for Middle Eastern prison building work with all
the attendant requirements to cater for Islamic shari'a laws and requisite
punishments and amputations. Modern target acquisition aids such as laser
sights, coupled with silenced weapons technology also make extra-judicial
execution much easier (see fig. 16) or if the deed must be achieved in
public, systems like 'syncrofire' (fig.16) take the guilt away from the
execution squad by allowing the firemaster to achieve it by pushbutton.
Special forces are of course taught how to achieve such executions (See
Fig.17 and this is one of the areas of expertise transfer that needs to
be brought back within democratic control. (see Section 8 below)
3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Given the civil liberties implications associated with
new technologies of political control, there is a pressing need to avoid
the risks of such technologies developing faster than any regulating legislation.
Therefore the EU should develop appropriate structures of accountability
to prevent undesirable innovations emerging via processes of technological
creep or decision drift.
(2) In principle, the process of innovation of new systems for use
in internal social and political control should be transparent, open
to appropriate public scrutiny and be subject to change should unwanted
and unanticipated consequences emerge.
(3) Any class of technology which has been shown in the past to be
excessively injurious, cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate in its effects,
should be subject to stringent and democratic controls. Therefore within
Europe:-
(a) No development or deployment of blinding laser weapons
and ancillary devices for police and internal security purposes should
be permitted;
(b) No deployment of 'sub-lethal' area denial mine systems such
as the Volcano (discussed above), should be allowed for law enforcement
or correctional purposes;
(c) Police personnel should not be routinely armed with 'dum-dum'
bullets, use of which is banned in international armed conflicts.
Further research should be commissioned by the European Parliament
to clarify the legal situation particularly in relation to the suggestion
that such ammunition can bypass the legal process and effect extra-judicial
execution.
(d) Further measures should be developed to regulate electrified
'stun' & 'kill' fences. Dual function fences with a kill function
should not be permissable as their use violates the right to life
and the right to a fair trial.
Surveillance technology can be defined as devices or systems which can
monitor, track and assess the movements of individuals, their property
and other assets. Much of this technology is used to track the activities
of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities,
trade union leaders and political opponents.
"Subtler and more far reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered
in the closet."
So said US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, way back in 1928. Subsequent
developments go far beyond anything which Brandeis could have dreamt of.
New technologies which were originally conceived for the Defence and Intelligence
sectors, have after the cold war, rapidly spread into the law enforcement
and private sectors. It is one of the areas of technological advance,
where outdated regulations have not kept pace with an accelerating pattern
of abuses. Up until the 1960's, most surveillance was low-tech and expensive
since it involved following suspects around from place to place and could
use up to 6 people in teams of two working 3 eight hour shifts. All of
the material and contacts gleaned had to be typed up and filed away with
little prospect of rapidly cross checking. Even electronic surveillance
was highly labour intensive. The East German police for example employed
500,000 secret informers, 10,000 of which were needed just to listen and
transcribe citizen's phone calls.
By the 1980's, new forms of electronic surveillance were emerging many
of these were directed towards automation of communications interception.
This trend was fuelled in the U. S. in the 1990's by accelerated government
funding at the end of the cold war, with defence and intelligence agencies
being refocussed with new missions to justify their budgets, transferring
their technologies to certain law enforcement applications such as anti-drug
and anti-terror operations. In 1993, the US department of defence and
the Justice department signed memoranda of understanding for "Operations
Other Than War and Law Enforcement" to facilitate joint development and
sharing of technology. According to David Banisar of Privacy International,
"To counteract reductions in military contracts which began in the 1980's,
computer and electronics companies are expanding into new markets - at
home and abroad - with equipment originally developed for the military.
Companies such as E Systems, Electronic Data Systems (founded by Ross
Perot ) and Texas Instruments are selling advanced computer systems and
surveillance equipment to state and local governments that use them for
law enforcement, border control and Welfare administration."36
According to Banisar, the simple need for increased bureaucratic efficiency
- necessitated by shrinking budgets has been a powerful imperative for
improved identification and monitoring of individuals. "Fingerprints,
ID cards, data matching and other privacy invasive schemes were originally
tried on populations with little political power, such as welfare recipients,
immigrants, criminals and members of the military, and then applied up
the socioeconomic ladder. One in place, the policies are difficult to
remove and inevitably expand into more general use."37
These technologies fit roughly into three broad categories. namely surveillance,
identification and networking, and are often used in conjunction as with
video cameras and face recognition or biometrics and ID cards. For Banisar,
"They facilitate mass and routine surveillance of large segments of the
population without the need for warrants and formal investigations. What
the East German secret police could only dream of is rapidly becoming
a reality in the free world."38
4.1 Vehicle Recognition Systems
A huge range of surveillance technologies has evolved, including the
night vision goggles discussed in 3 above; parabolic microphones to detect
conversations over a kilometre away(see Fig.18); laser versions marketed
by the German company PK Electronic, can pick up any conversation from
a closed window in line of sight; the Danish Jai stroboscopic camera (Fig.19)
which can take hundreds of pictures in a matter of seconds and individually
photograph all the participants in a demonstration or March; and the automatic
vehicle recognition systems which can identify a car number plate then
track the car around a city using a computerised geographic information
system.(Fig.20) Such systems are now
commercially available, for example, the Talon system introduced in
1994 by UK company Racal at a price of £2000 per unit. The system
is trained to recognise number plates based on neural network technology
developed by Cambridge Neurodynamics, and can see both night and day.
Initially it has been used for traffic monitoring but its function has
been adapted in recent years to cover security surveillance and has been
incorporated in the "ring of steel" around London. The system can then
record all the vehicles that entered or left the cordon on a particular
day.39
Such surveillance systems raise significant issues of accountability
particularly when transferred to authoritarian regimes. The cameras in
Fig 21 in Tiananmen Square were sold as advanced traffic control systems
by Siemens Plessey. Yet after the 1989 massacre of students, there followed
a witch hunt when the authorities tortured and interrogated thousands
in an effort to ferret out the subversives. The Scoot surveillance system
with USA made Pelco camera were used to faithfully record the protests.
the images were repeatedly broadcast over Chinese television offering
a reward for information, with the result that nearly all the transgressors
were identified. Again democratic accountability is only the criterion
which distinguishes a modern traffic control system from an advanced dissident
capture technology. Foreign companies are exporting traffic control systems
to Lhasa in Tibet, yet Lhasa does not as yet have any traffic control
problems. The problem here may be a culpable lack of imagination.(Fig.22)
Several European countries are manufacturing vehicle and people tracking
technologies, including France40, Germany41,
The Netherlands42 and the UK43.
4.2 CCTV Surveillance Net Works
In fact the art of visual surveillance has dramatically changed over
recent years. of course police and intelligence officers still photograph
demonstrations and individuals of interest but increasingly such images
can be stored and searched. (Fig. 23) The revolution in urban surveillance
will reach the next generation of control once reliable face recognition
comes in. It will initially be introduced at stationary locations, like
turnstiles, customs points, security gateways, etc., to enable a standard
full face recognition to take place. However, in the early part of the
21st. century, facial recognition on CCTV will be a reality and those
countries with CCTV infrastructures will view such technology as a natural
add-on.
It is important to set clear guidelines and codes of practice for such
technological innovations, well in advance of the digital revolution making
new and unforeseen opportunities to collate, analyze, recognise and store
such visual images. Such regulation will need to be founded on sound data
protection principles and take cognizance of article 15 of the 1995 European
Directive on the protection of Individuals and Processing of Personal
Data.44 Essentially this says that:
"Member States shall grant the right of every person not to
be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or
significantly affects him and which is based solely on the automatic processing
of data."
The attitude to CCTV camera networks varies greatly in the European
Union, from the position in Denmark where such cameras are banned by law
to the position in the UK, where many hundreds of CCTV networks exist.
Nevertheless, a common position on the status of such systems where they
exist in relation to data protection principles should apply in general.
A specific consideration is the legal status of admissibility as evidence,
of digital material such
17
as those taken by the more advanced CCTV systems. Much of this will
fall within data protection legislation if the material gathered can be
searched, e.g., by car number plate or by time. Given that material from
such systems can be seamlessly edited, the European Data Protection Directive
legislation needs to be implemented through primary legislation which
clarifies the law as it applies to CCTV, to avoid confusion amongst both
CCTV data controllers as well as citizens as data subjects. Primary legislation
will make it possible to extend the impact of the Directive to areas of
activity that do not fall within community law. Articles 3 and 13 of the
Directive should not create a blanket covering the use of CCTV in every
circumstance in a domestic context.
A proper code of practice should cover the use of all CCTV surveillance
schemes operating in public spaces and especially in residential area.
The Code of Practice should encompass:- a) a purpose statement covering
the key objectives of the scheme; b) a consideration of the extent to
which the scheme falls within the scope of Data Protection legislation;
c) the responsibilities of the owner of the scheme and those of local
partners; d) the way the scheme is to be effectively managed and installed;
e) the principles of accountability; f) the availability of public information
on the scheme and the principles of its operation in residential areas;
g) the formal approaches to be used to assess, evaluate and audit the
performance of both the scheme and the accompanying Code of Practice;
h) mechanisms for dealing with complaints and any breaches of the Code
including those of security; i) detailing the extent of any police contacts
or use of the scheme; and j) the procedures for democratically dealing
with proposals of technological change.
Given that the United Kingdom has one of the most advanced CCTV network
coverage in Europe and that the issues of regulation and control have
been perhaps more developed that elsewhere, it is suggested that the Civil
Liberties Committee formally consider the model Code of Practice for CCTV
produced by the Local Government Information Unit (LGIU, 1996) in London
(A Watching Brief) at a future meeting of this committee, with a view
to recommending it for adoption throughout the EU.
4.3 Bugging & Tapping Devices
A wide range of bugging and tapping devices have been evolved to record
conversations and to intercept telecommunications traffic. (See Fig. 24)
In recent years the widespread practice of illegal and legal interception
of communications and the planting of 'bugs' has been an issue in many
European states. For example, Italy, France, Sweden,45
Belgium,46 Germany,47
Norway,48 the Netherlands49
and the U.K.50 The level and scale of some
of these illegal activities is astonishing. For example, a court meeting
on 30 September 1996 was told that the Presidential Palace's anti-terrorist
unit was tapping six former Mitterand administration officials, including
ex-cabinet chief Giles Manage.51 An official
panel, the independent Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions,
said that 100,000 telephone lines are illegally tapped each year in France
and that state agencies may be behind much of the eavesdropping. They
found that curbs imposed by official bodies may have tempted them to farm
out their illegal bugging to private firms.52
However, planting illegal bugs like the one shown in (Fig 24) is yesterday's
technology. Modern snoopers can by specially adapted lap top computers
like that shown in (Fig.24), and simply tune in to all the mobile phones
active in the area by cursoring down to their number. The machine will
even search for numbers 'of interest' to see if they are active. However,
18
these bugs and taps pale into insignificance next to the national and
international state run interceptions networks.
4.4 National & International Communications Interceptions Networks
Modern communications systems are virtually transparent to the advanced
interceptions equipment which can be used to listen in. Some systems even
lend themselves to a dual role as a national interceptions network. For
example the message switching system used on digital exchanges like System
X in the UK supports an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol.
This allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share the system with existing
lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as "Signalling CCITT1-series
interface for ISDN access. What is not widely known is that built in to
the international CCITT protocol is the ability to take phones 'off hook'
and listen into conversations occurring near the phone, without the user
being aware that it is happening. (SGR Newsletter, No.4, 1993)
This effectively means that a national dial up telephone tapping capacity
is built into these systems from the start. (System X has been exported
to Russia & China) Similarly, the digital technology required to pinpoint
mobile phone users for incoming calls, means that all mobile phone users
in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices, giving their owners
whereabouts at any time and stored in the company's computer for up to
two years. Coupled with System X technology, this is a custom built mobile
track, tail and tap system par excellence.(Sunday Telegraph, 2.2.97).
Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax communications are routinely
intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring
all target information from the European mainland via the strategic hub
of London then by Satellite to Fort Meade in Maryland via the crucial
hub at Menwith Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The system was
first uncovered in the 1970's by a group of researchers in the UK (Campbell,
1981). The researchers used open sources but were subsequently arrested
under Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The 'ABC' trial that followed
was a critical turning point in researcher's understanding both of the
technology of political control and how it might be challenged by research
on open sources.(See Aubrey,1981 & Hooper 1987) Other work on what
is now known as Signals intelligence was undertaken by researchers such
as James Bamford, which uncovered a billion dollar world wide interceptions
network, which he nicknamed 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by Nicky Hager,
Secret Power, (Hager,1996) provides the most comprehensive details
to date of a project known as ECHELON.
Hager interviewed more than 50 people concerned with intelligence to document
a global surveillance system that stretches around the world to form a
targeting system on all of the key Intelsat satellites used to convey
most of the world's satellite phone calls, internet, email, faxes and
telexes. These sites are based at Sugar Grove and Yakima, in the USA,
at Waihopai in New Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong Kong, and
Morwenstow in the UK.
The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlike many of
the electronic spy systems developed during the cold war, ECHELON is designed
for primarily non-military targets: governments, organisations and businesses
in virtually every country. The ECHELON system works by indiscriminately
intercepting very large quantities of communications and then siphoning
out what is valuable using artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to
find key words. Five nations share the results with the US as the senior
partner under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain, Canada, New Zealand
and Australia are very much acting as subordinate information servicers.
19
Each of the five centres supply "dictionaries" to the other four of
keywords, phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged intercept
is forwarded straight to the requesting country. Whilst there is much
information gathered about potential terrorists, there is a lot of economic
intelligence, notably intensive monitoring of all the countries participating
in the GATT negotiations. But Hager found that by far the main priorities
of this system continued to be military and political intelligence applicable
to their wider interests. Hager quotes from a"highly placed intelligence
operatives" who spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel we can
no longer remain silent regarding that which we regard to be gross malpractice
and negligence within the establishment in which we operate." They gave
as examples. GCHQ interception of three charities, including Amnesty International
and Christian Aid. "At any time GCHQ is able to home in on their communications
for a routine target request," the GCHQ source said. In the case of phone
taps the procedure is known as Mantis. With telexes its called Mayfly.
By keying in a code relating to third world aid, the source was able to
demonstrate telex "fixes" on the three organisations. With no system of
accountability, it is difficult to discover what criteria determine who
is not a target.
In February, The UK based research publication Statewatch reported that
the EU had secretly agreed to set up an international telephone tapping
network via a secret network of committees established under the "third
pillar" of the Mastricht Treaty covering co-operation on law and order.
Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding,
signed by EU states in 1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) which remains
classified. According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it reflects
concern among European Intelligence agencies that modern technology will
prevent them from tapping private communications. "EU countries it says,
should agree on "international interception standards set at a level that
would ensure encoding or scrambled words can be broken down by government
agencies." Official reports say that the EU governments agreed to co-operate
closely with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier minutes of these meetings
suggest that the original initiative came from Washington. According to
Statewatch, network and service providers in the EU will be obliged to
install "tappable" syst |